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Most political economists studying the global spread of neoliberalism have 
seen it as a form of policy diffusion. Recently constructivist political economists have 
pointed to the important role of the spread of neoliberal economic ideas in this 
process. However, they have not provided a theoretical framework for understanding 
the mechanisms through which neoliberal ideas travel across national policy spheres. 
To address this gap, this dissertation draws on the claim made by some sociologists 
that ideas do not stay the same as they travel from one social setting to another, but are 
―translated‖ by idea entrepreneurs called ―translators‖.  
More, specifically, this dissertation aims to specify what shapes the result of 
translation, the pace at which it occurs, and the means through which it can shape 
policy.  In doing this, it makes three contributions to the study of political economy. 
First, it argues that the content of adopted neoliberal ideas is shaped by the context-
  
specific choices made by translators who employ ―framing‖, ―grafting‖ and ―editing‖ 
as translation devices. Secondly, the pace of translation is shaped by the density of 
transnational ties between domestic policy stakeholders and external advocates of 
neoliberalism. Finally, translated neoliberal ideas are likely to serve as templates for 
economic policies when they are shared by an intellectually coherent policy team 
inside a cabinet that can effectively control economic policy decisions. To make these 
arguments the dissertation draws on a comparative historical analysis of the spread of 
neoliberalism two ―crucial cases‖: postauthoritarian Spain and Romania. 
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During the onset of the economic crisis that began in 2008 I was struck by a curious 
intellectual drama taking place in the pages of Financial Times. Martin Wolf, its chief 
editorialist, hosted a debate in which luminaries of the financial commentariat, world 
leaders, and even academic economists wrote texts that a few weeks before would 
have been deemed at best ‗anachronistic‘ even in the in this newspaper‘s famously 
pluralist ―letters to the editor‖ section. 
The generally dispassionate tone that the newspaper customarily demanded 
seemed lost, and a sense of doom and desperation permeated most interventions. Such 
ideas as the turning of investment banks into public utilities, the nationalization of 
large private firms, massive reflation, capital controls, the severe policing of hedge 
funds, and the treatment of off-shore jurisdictions as equivalents of international 
terrorist cells were no longer the talk of  radical political economists. Instead, these 
intellectual luminaries were hastily cobbling together such proposals out of the 
vestiges of neoclassical thinking to form confusing intellectual mosaics. Just as an 
eternally media-savvy French president was sighted reading Das Kapital and ―Anglo-
Saxon‖ capitalism went from celebrity to the butt-of-all-jokes, leading commentators 
resurrected ideas they had spent decades attacking. The era of small government 
seemed over and, in the window that the crisis opened, all that seemed solid melted 
into the air. 
Much has changed since the fall of 2008. While the debate did not shift back 




me the most in the fall of 2008 amongst the Financial Times commentators were the 
many economists and officials from the periphery of the global economy who felt just 
as invested in the very ideas that they had thought provided the path out of economic 
misery and that now lay bare upon the altar of experience. 
This dissertation is about how neoliberal ideas became the ―black box‖ of elite 
thinking about the economy in middle-income countries where economic liberalism 
had been relegated to the doghouse for much of their modern intellectual history. It 
concerns itself with how neoliberalism became dominant. Not only because it was 
advocated for by Western agents with superior material resources ‘handed down‘ to 
local agents via some intentional top-own diffusion process. But because of less 
vertical, less linear, and less obviously intentional processes such as the 
transnationalization of economics education and the integration of local economists in 
Western epistemic networks. 
The resulting translation was not a simple replication nut a second generation 
copy of the original. The translators transformed the ―original‖ neoliberal artifact, 
―black boxed‖ its problems and grafted it onto local ideas and institutions in order to 
make it seem simultaneously desirable, ―native,‖ unproblematic, and familiar. 
Sometimes the translators were local versions of the ―Chicago Boys‖ of legend, yet 
sometimes the job was done by those operating below the radar of existing scholarship 
on the spread of neoliberalism: amateur economists, transnational political party 
networks, political development NGOs, as well as think-tanks. The result of all this 




different versions out of the Western ―script‖ via local translations that this 




Chapter I- Neoliberalism in Translation: An Introduction 
 
―Ideas are for objects what 
constellations are for the stars.‖ 
                                                                                        (Walter Benjamin)  
Neoliberalism Is What States Make of It 
This is a study of how neoliberal ideas change as they travel across nations and take 
national characteristics. Its origins lie in a long fascination I have had with Karl 
Polanyi‘s metaphor of history as a pendulum that swings back and forth between 
strong social restrictions on the market and the market domination of society and 
nature, with each swing resulting from excesses of the other.  
Born and raised in Romania, I had the chance to see both excesses: the shock 
of national-Stalinism and the shock-therapy of neoliberalism. Those governments who 
did the former claimed to do it for the sake of society, whereas those who did the latter 
invoked the liberation of suppressed market forces. Although the former governed by 
illegitimate force and the latter governed by the democratic vote, they both ended up 
traumatizing large swathes of society.  
Then, travelling and living in the West, I was struck by how differently the 
pendulum swings within the core of liberal-democracy and capitalism. Both the 
unemployed in Copenhagen and the unemployed in Boston lived in the age of 




education, accommodation or income-replacement. ―Neoliberalism‖, ―globalization‖, 
―There Is No Alternative‖ were heard and seemed at work everywhere, but at the end 
of the day, their real effects on people changed across countries depending on what 
states made of them in local translations. This study provides political economy with 




When history changes in two years 
Every so often the world can change in the space of two years. Such swift and drastic 
turning points occurred twice in postwar history. The first happened between 1979 and 
1981 and marked the beginning of the end for the Western postwar embedded 
liberalism. It was neatly framed by the elections of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and of 
Ronald Reagan in 1981, which signaled the downfall of welfare Keynesianism and the 
rise of a new economic program based on less state and more market, less on 
redistribution and more on investment, less on manufacturing and more on services. 
Only later dubbed ―disembedded liberalism‖ or ―neoliberalism,‖ by 1982 this new 
economic program seemed to define the economic policy choices of Western 
conservative parties. The eruption of the debt crisis in the same year saw it imbricated 
in the agenda of the IMF and the World Bank.  
The second shift took place between 1989 and 1991 and was characterized by 




narrowed and left-of-center parties the world over shifted towards some form of 
neoliberalism. Events ranging from the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 
1989 to the simultaneous adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in such far flung 
places as Prague and New Delhi dashed hopes that democracy could coexist with a 
―third way‖ between liberalism and socialism. The ―end of history‖ meant that 
neoliberalism had defeated ―embedded liberalism‖ as well as socialism.  
These were world-historical shifts were powered by mighty economic and political 
transformations. Yet, some countries governments did not adapt to these shifts in the 
way, and with the speed, demanded by the economic and political contexts of the time. 
In Spain, after the fall of fascism, where one would have expected a contested shift to 
neoliberalism, the actual outcome was a swift adoption of this new economic program. 
After losing the Civil War, after decades of repression at the hands of Franco and after 
being reborn with the help of organized labor, Spanish Socialists embraced 
neoliberalism immediately after they took office for the first time.  
Conversely, where political and economic trends gave reason to expect a quick 
embrace of ―shock therapy‖ neoliberalism, for example in Romania after the fall of the 
Berlin wall, one found instead bitter contestation and a search for a non-neoliberal 
economic programs during the transition‘s first decade. , Radical neoliberal reforms 
followed only a decade later. After emerging from Eastern Europe‘s most Stalinist 
economic regime one would have expected the first democratically-elected  
governments to choose the neoliberal market reforms as had the Czech Republic and 




institutionalize heterodox economic reforms and it took them almost a ten years to ―go 
neoliberal It is to this puzzle that I now turn. 
 
Neoliberalism in Spain 
When the Spanish Socialists entered government in December 1982, they faced an 
economy affected by recession, inflation and high unemployment. To deal with these 
challenges they adopted the same policies embraced by conservative governments in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Fiscal austerity replaced efforts to reflate 
the economy, inflation priorities were no longer balanced with concerns with 
unemployment figures, loss-making state firms were privatized and a deregulatory 
drive was unleashed on both the labor market and financial services.  
In 1982 the Spanish Socialist government was the most likely case where one 
would expect resistance to the emerging neoliberal fashion. The measures described 
above ran counter to the Socialists‘ political program, to their historical status as a 
force of democratic socialism in Spain, and to the preferences of the main Socialist 
labor union on which the party had depended for grassroots mobilization. Most 
surprisingly, no other West European left-of-center party adopted such a 
comprehensive neoliberal reform package as early as 1982, with most European 
socialists and social-democrats opposing even modest deflationary programs until 





Over the next few years, however, the Socialists also showed that 
neoliberalism was not a universal script but a set of ideas and institutions that change 
as they become domestically embedded. Rather than eviscerate the state, they 
expanded its revenues. Rather than give tax cuts to corporations and the upper class, 
the government increased the tax burden on them just as it offered universal access to 
health care, pensions and university education. Instead of seeing all state ownership as 
problematic for a healthy economy, the Socialists kept the state involved with 
industrial champions. Spain had embraced neoliberalism but not its libertarian 
implications. It was an ―embedded neoliberalism‖ that balanced market capitalism 
with more egalitarian redistribution and state-enhanced growth strategies. In short, 
why did Spanish neoliberalism have such ‗embedded liberal‘ characteristics? 
  
 
Neoliberalism in Romania 
Neoliberalism in Romania occurred ten years later in another middle-income country, 
several thousand kilometers to the East. For six years after the bloody end of the 
Ceausescu regime in 1989, Romania was ruled by governments that were for the most 
part led by and based on an extensive network of mid-level politicians and bureaucrats 
of the defunct national-Stalinist regime.  
Much like the Socialists in Spain, these so called ―ex-communists‖ dominated 




Romania was perhaps the most likely case for embracing a deep and radical version of  
neoliberalism in 1990. The country had just emerged from Eastern Europe‘s most 
extreme form of economic interventionism. The government faced much greater 
economic disruptions than Spain insofar as the transition occurred in the context of a 
collapse of their East European markets with firms who never had to bother about 
what happened to their output. Moreover, by the time they took power the Zeitgeist 
had also changed dramatically: the neoliberal paradigm seemed the new lingua franca 
everywhere, especially in the former Eastern Bloc. While the Spanish government was 
not tied by conditionality agreements with international financial organizations and 
had proper access to international capital markets, the opposite was the case for the ex-
communist governments. Organized capital took years to emerge and organized labor 
was heavily fragmented. And while the Spanish Socialists had a close relationship 
with the country‘s biggest labor union, the ex-communists had a largely adversarial 
one with all of them. Finally, while Spanish Socialists had a clear ideology, the 
Romanian ex-communists spent years searching for one.  
Yet, from 1990 to 1992, the ex-communists administered a much more modest 
liberalization package than the Spanish Socialists.  What is more, the government of 
1990-1992 was replaced by one that lasted until 1996 and which embraced quite non-
neoliberal ‗heterodox‘ views. More specifically, the first postcommunist government 
limited its reformism to modest privatization initiatives and partial price liberalization. 
As these reforms triggered a massive fall in output and almost set off hyperinflation, 




rather than push on with more radical reforms.  Privatization was stalled, the socialist-
era provision of public services continued relatively untouched by ―marketization‖ and 
privatization, and, after a successful macrostabilization, fiscal policy became 
expansionary, while the reserves of the central bank were raided for the provision of 
industrial subsidies.  Only on the margins were some market reforms carried out, such 
as partial price liberalization, the withdrawal of subsidies for small state owned 
companies, the privatization of ―non-strategic‖ state-owned companies were adopted. 
The mixed market economy dominated by an activist state rather than the 
predominantly private market economy assisted by a minimal state seemed to 
dominate the ex-communists vision of the future. 
This Romanian economic heterodoxy did not last into the new millennium 
however. While the ―embedded neoliberalism‖ of Spanish Socialists withstood the test 
of time, the heterodoxy of the ex-communists withered away by the end of the 1990s. 
Back in office in 2000 as a programmatically rebranded local version of the Blairite 
―Third Way,‖ the ex-communists systematically adopted neoliberal institutions and 
policies. The macroeconomic orthodoxy, deregulation, privatization and liberalization 
that characterized the core of neoliberal development models became the policy of the 
day. The ex-communists even ―outbid‖ the right through decreasing progressivity of 
taxation, allowing welfare budgets to stagnate, and the complete replacement of 




Why then did Romanian Neoliberalism take this particular institutional and 
temporal form? Especially when it occurred a decade after the stars were best aligned, 
so to speak, for such a policy turn? 
These two cases take us further than the Spanish and Romanian transitions, 
however, and draw our attention to an interrelated set of questions of some importance 
in political economy. First, if the global spread of neoliberal policies and institutions 
could not have taken place without the spread of neoliberal ideas, how exactly do the 
latter travel and shape policy across nations? Second, if indeed neoliberal ideas are 
transformed as they travel, what factors explain the various results of these 
transformations? Finally, what actors and what kinds of resources are most likely to be 




The likelihood of adoption of neoliberal policies increased when they were shared by 
an intellectually-coherent policy team inside a cabinet that could effectively control 
economic policy decisions. 
In 1982 the Spanish Socialist cabinet had full control of the economic policy process. 
The cabinet itself was controlled by the premier and the economic ministries, with the 
ministry of Finance playing the leading role. All economic ministers came from the 
same professional network centered around the central bank, an institution that had 




Spain. In turn, the premier delegated policy initiative and execution to the economic 
ministries and defended them against challengers inside and outside the cabinet while 
insulating the cabinet against the political pressures of the party by building party 
institutions that severely limited the power of anti-neoliberal dissenters. This high 
degree of power centralization and buffering was facilitated by the fact that in Spain 
the head of state is constitutionally weak and the premier serves as leader of the party 
that forms the government.  
Until a similar process took place in Romania in the late 1990s, neoliberal 
ideas had very limited impact on policy. The first ex-communist cabinet inaugurated 
in 1990 had a coherent policy team committed to neoliberalism, but the cabinet did not 
control the policy process. Soon after its inauguration, the cabinet clashed with the 
powerful presidential institution and the branch of the ruling party that opposed 
neoliberal reforms. This led to a stop-and-go policy process culminating in the 
collapse of the cabinet. The next government (1992-1996) was strongly supported by 
the president and the ruling party and was dominated by a coherent policy team of 
heterodox economists who pushed through heterodox reforms even in the face of 
opposition from international financial organizations and a growing community of 
domestic economists based in Romanian academia and the central bank who 
advocated a local version of neoliberalism. When the latter had a chance to 
institutionalize their ideas with the support of the IMF, the central bank and a newly-
elected center-right political coalition (1997-2000), reforms did not materialize 




the policy process and was inconsistently supported by the ruling coalition and the 
president.  
Finally, all the posited variables were in place during the 2000-2004 spell in 
power of the returning ex-communists, whose cabinet was controlled by advocates of 
disembedded neoliberalism. The only time when a neoliberal idea (replacing 
progressive taxation with a flat tax) failed to materialize under this government‘s 
leadership was when Romania‘s powerful presidential institution used its veto power. 
This evidence would seem to buttress the argument for the simultaneous occurrence of 
all these variables for the observed outcome to occur. Yet, crucially, while important, 
these political and institutional dynamics do not tell us why the cabinet policy teams 
had some ideas and not others. 
 
Cross-national variation in the kind of neoliberal ideas shared by the cabinet policy 
team was the result of variations in domestic processes of translation 
 
As the Spanish Socialists were preparing to run in the 1982 election, Spanish 
developmentalism and its indicative planning outgrowth had largely run their course. 
As for Keynesianism, my analysis shows that this economic program had been diluted 
with German neoclassical ideas from its very inception and had only a handful of 
marginal proponents left in academia, never mind in politics. The evidence strongly 
suggests that as early as the late 1970s neoliberalism had become dominant in Spanish 




academics and as officials was internationally recognized. It was from this academic-
bureaucratic complex centered around the central bank that the Socialist neoliberal 
policy teams entered the party, just at the same time as the German social-democrats 
helped facilitate the Socialists‘ swing from neo-Marxism to the German mix of social-
democracy and orthodox macroeconomics. 
But these epistemic elites did not simply replicate the neoclassical, monetarist, 
rational expectations and supply-side innovations that constitute neoliberalism. 
Instead, they framed it in political narratives about ―Europeanization‖, grafted it on 
select domestic structuralist ideas and ―edited‖ it with pre-existing adaptations of 
German neoclassical (or ―ordoliberal‖) ideas such as the ―social market economy‖ or 
developmentalist ones like fostering external competitiveness through public 
investments in industrial champions. The framing, grafting and editing that made up 
the translation of neoliberalism in the Spanish context were not strictly endogenous. 
The academic-bureaucratic elites involved had received their postgraduate training in 
Western universities where they had studied with prominent neoclassical economists. 
Moreover, during the 1970s the ensemble of Spanish economics had become a 
professional field remarkable for the pace with which it built transnational networks 
with Western academia and policy institutions.  
In contrast to Spain, in Romania there was a robust non-neoliberal alternative: 
heterodox economics. An internally dynamic cocktail of selective neo-structuralist, 
neoclassical syndissertation and developmentalist ideas, heterodoxy was strongly 




communists. The epistemic authority of these ideas was contested by a growing 
network of economists who, like their Spanish peers, came from an academic-
bureaucratic complex centered around the central bank, an institution that resembled 
its Spanish counterpart from the standpoint of its epistemic authority. The translation 
activities carried out here resulted in the codification of a more orthodox variety of 
neoliberalism in which pre-existing but reconstructed intellectual traditions that 
survived the collapse of national-Stalinism were alloyed with neoliberalism not to 
dilute it, as it happened in Spain, but rather to radicalize its market-libertarian 
implications.   
 
The pace of translation increased with the degree of transnationalization of 
domestic policy actors  
 
In Spain the Western transition from Keynesianism to neoliberalism found the 
leading economists already with doctorates from prominent British and American 
universities, where most studied with luminaries of the neoclassical opposition to the 
more interventionist forms of Keynesianism during the postwar decades. This training 
made possible a swift embrace of neoliberalism, a process implemented in Spain even 
before neoliberalism‘s triumph became obvious in the West. Transnationalization 
affected the Socialists themselves. Well before they entered office, their economic 
policy program had been changed by the social-democrats from Germany, a country 




Transnationalization was equally important in Romania, albeit in different 
ways. Both the emergence of neoliberal networks as well as the gradual emasculation 
of heterodoxy could not have taken place without the transnationalization of the 
translation process. Like in Spain, international certification through Western training 
played a decisive role in strengthening the neoliberals, although this process took 
place less through postgraduate education and more through research stints in IFIs, 
visiting fellowships in Western academic departments, Western sponsorship of local 
research and the replication of a Western postgraduate program in Bucharest. As 
heterodox economists were enrolled in these forms of transnational socialization they 
gradually lost their epistemic solidarity and dropped their veto to the core of the 
neoliberal program, an outcome which had become obvious by the time the ex-
communists were returned to office after the 2000 elections and after having 
mainstreamed their economic program with the assistance of their new transnational 
ties with, once again, the German social-democrats. Consequently, by the early 2000s 
heterodoxy all but disappeared from economic debates that now were defined by 
neoliberalism‘s protean conceptual boundaries.  
 
Why This Matters and What It Tells Us More Broadly 
The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to bring to the study of 
political economy a school of sociological thought previously unexploited in the field. 
I argue that political science scholarship on the neoliberal turn can benefit from 




and should adopt instead the more dynamic and reflexive sociology of translation. 
Based on this approach I propose that the spread of neoliberalism across borders is a 
more dynamic process than previously held in the sense that domestic translators are 
not merely passive and unreflexive receivers of Western scripts. Rather, they can be 
expected to frame, graft and edit ideas.  This can result in ideational innovations 
influenced by domestic repertoires of ideas, making neoliberal ideas appear less 
incongruent to a domestic audience. 
I further suggest that translation is not carried out by isolated individual 
diffusers/brokers and domestic translators. Instead, I show that it takes place 
predominantly through transnational networks linking domestic translators with 
external ones. This claim holds the potential to simplify research design by focusing 
our attention on networks linking external and domestic translators rather than on the 
traditional troika of diffusers, brokers and translators. At the same time, by endowing 
them with superior epistemic, status and material resources, these transnational 
linkages enable translators to fight jurisdictional battles against the opponents of 
neoliberalism. In this way one can overcome a static understanding of diffusion as 
hamstrung by the domestic resonance of the ideas to be diffused; a lack of interest in 
the interpretive agency of domestic translators of new ideas; and the compression of 
the transnational spectrum of diffusers to epistemic communities of economists and 
international organizations.  
 As a French sociologist of science put it bluntly, ―[t]he social sciences have 




exception. The ideas with which policymakers deal with economic challenges seem to 
be creative interpretations developed in the encounter between core and peripheral 
epistemic elites. Without the ideas that constituted this ―economics,‖ the material 
structures in which those transitions took place could have led Spain and Romania in 
other directions. The transnational politics of translation thus emerges as a 
consequential locus for understanding how very different economies can be re-
engineered as the performative activity of ideational innovations.  
 
Outline by Chapters 
This study has eleven chapters: an introduction, a theory chapter, conclusions and four 
empirical chapters for each of the two countries. 
Chapter two unpacks the main concepts used in the dissertation (economic 
ideas and neoliberalism), introduces its main theoretical assumptions and reviews the 
claims of existing explanations of the diffusion of neoliberalism. Next, it introduces 
the theoretical base that informs the research hypotheses of the study and then 
continues with a detailed presentation of those hypotheses. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the data and methodology used in the empirical chapters. 
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter and is made up of two parts. The 
first part examines two alternative explanations of the Spanish turn to neoliberalism: 
one based on rational learning and one based on social emulation. Both are found 




Spanish economic history, with an emphasis on the postwar years and the economic 
policies of the first democratic governments (1977-1982). 
Chapter four takes a first stab at the translation of neoliberalism in Spain. In 
the first half I evaluate the main claims of the Western neoliberal revolution in 
economics by comparing them with the claims of the postwar neo-Keynesian 
consensus. The second half begins with an exploration of the conditions that facilitated 
the rise of neoliberalism in Spain by looking at the characteristics of the domestic 
institutional infrastructure. This part of the chapter walks the reader through the 
economic policy process in Spain and focuses on the central bank, the ministry of 
finance, the Socialist Party and the ties emerging between them and academic 
economists. 
Chapter five addresses translation per se. It opens with the examination of the 
degree of resonance between neoliberalism and existing economic theories. Then, I 
turn to a discussion of the actual translation processes that hybridized neoliberalism 
with select ordoliberal and developmentalist ideas, thus enabling the emergence of 
―embedded neoliberalism.‖ The chapter ends with a discussion of the ―paths not 
taken‖, or the sets of economic ideas that failed to make an impact in Spain during the 
critical junctures of its economic transition. 
Chapter six tackles the story of the translators of neoliberalism. Separate 
sections are devoted to Western-trained economists, international organizations, think-
tanks and transnational political parties. Each section examines specific aspects of 




through what mechanisms did IOs, internationalized think-tanks and transnational 
party networks intervene in domestic economic debate. 
Chapter seven begins by reviewing existing explanations of Romania‘s belated 
embrace of neoliberalism. To this end, the chapter begins with a review of accounts 
anchored in structuralism, interest groups and institutions. These explanations are 
rejected and the main argument made in the chapters on Romania is introduced. The 
second part of the chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand 
the historical narratives that mediated the translation of neoliberalism. 
Chapter eight introduces the intellectual uncertainty in which Western 
economics found itself with regard to the east European transition and reviews the 
main schools of thought that helped reduce it: shock therapy and gradualism. The 
second part of the chapter maps out the extent to which distinct elements of these 
approaches were adopted in policy practice. To this end, I analyze the partial and 
gradualist neoliberal reforms of the first two ex-communist governments (1990-1992), 
the heterodox backlash of the third (1992-1996), the shock therapy neoliberalism of 
the center-right government (1996-2000) and, finally, the ―Third Way‖ neoliberalism 
of the fourth ex-communist government (2000-2004). The last part of the chapter 
examines the institutional variables posited to shape the effect of neoliberal ideas on 
policy. 
Chapter nine looks at translation per se. It begins by examining the extent to 
which neoliberalism could have resonated with domestic economic theories and then 




the 1990s. Next, the chapter investigates the processes that led to the radicalization of 
Romanian neoliberalism and to the fading out of its heterodox foe. 
Chapter ten is the story of the Romanian translators of neoliberalism. As in the 
equivalent chapter for Spain, Western-trained economists, IOs, think-tanks and 
transnational political party networks are analyzed in turn in separate sections. 
Finally, the conclusions chapter takes each of the three hypotheses advanced 
by the dissertation and assesses the robustness of their causal power through a 
comparative analysis of the evidence presented in the empirical chapters. The chapter 
ends with suggestions for future empirical, theoretical and methodological pathways in 














Chapter 2 - Neoliberalism Across Nations: An Analytical Framework 
Overview   
This chapter aims to build a new analytical framework for studying the spread of 
neoliberal economic ideas across borders. The building of the analytical 
framework of this study departed from two observations. First, existing 
explanations of the diffusion of neoliberalism relegate neoliberal ideas to a 
secondary causal role at best. Second, while the constructivist tradition in IPE 
shows that economic ideas matter, a systematic discussion of how to study the 






Objectives, Organization, Disclaimers 
To build the analytical framework, I first unpacked the main concepts used in this 
framework: economic ideas and neoliberalism. Next, the theoretical claims of 
                                                 
1
 A series of constructivist comparative and international political economy studies on industrial 
democracies (McNamara, 1998; Marcussen, 2000; 2001, 2002; Seabrooke 2001; Schmidt 2002, 
2006a) and developing countries (Bockmann and Eyal 2002; Chwieroth 2007; 2008) argued that 
the shift from the policies and institutions of postwar ‗embedded liberalism‖ (Ruggie 1983) to 
macroeconomic regimes emphasizing supply-side policies was the result of the intellectual decline 
of Keyensianism and of the corresponding revamping of neoclassical orthodoxy with such 
innovations as monetarism, public choice or rational expectations. This argument was formulated 
mainly against approaches failed to determine their autonomous explanatory value relative to other 
variables (Hall 1986; Sikkink 1991; Keohane and Goldstein 1993).
1
 For extensive reviews of the 




existing explanations of the diffusion of neoliberalism were reviewed in detail. 
Then, I introduced the theoretical base on which I draw in order to build the 
following research propositions: The transnational spread of neoliberal ideas is 
shaped and made possible by domestic translation. In turn, the domestic 
translation of neoliberal ideas is shaped by temporal, institutional and cultural 
factors, while the supply of translators is shaped by the extent to which domestic 
economists, political party leaderships and think-tanks are embedded in 
transnational networks that advocate for or enable the adoption of neoliberal 
ideas. The chapter ends with a presentation of those mechanisms and with a 
discussion of the data and methodology used in the empirical chapters.  
It is very important to stress at this point that the ambit of this analytical 
framework is limited to the transnational spread of neoliberal economic ideas. 
Since the spread of neoliberal institutions is a more complex process of which the 
spread of neoliberal ideas is only a part, the analytical model proposed here 
should be construed as applicable specifically to the latter process. Therefore, the 
main added value of the present chapter is to contribute to already existing 
constructivist explanations of neoliberal transformations by explaining how the 
neoliberal ideas that made those transformations possible became dominant 
among domestic policy elites. In subsidiary, the framework covers the strong 
correlation between neoliberal ideas and neoliberal policies whenever neoliberal 
economists (professional or otherwise) controlled the most important public 







I define economic ideas to mean development programs plus historical narratives. 
To reach this conclusion I departed from the puzzling findings of a study on the 
uses of the term ―neoliberalism‖ in contemporary social science. The study found 
that those who employ this popular term as an independent variable often do not 
define it (65% of articles) or, when they do, they associate it with different 
conceptual categories: political ideology, economic paradigm, development 
template and a technocratic list of policies
2
 (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). While 
the definition of neoliberalism as a set of policies is the most popular (72% of all 
articles), its definition as a set of ideas (―ideology‖, ―development‖ model‖, 
―paradigm‖) is shared by the remainingscholarship. . Using all three terms 
confuses more than in clarifies, especially given the fact that it is hard to define 
the relationship between ideology, on the one hand, and development models and 
academic paradigms on the other hand. 
Scholars who equate ―neoliberalism‖ or ―developmentalism‖ with 
―ideology‖ refer to general and normative ideas about the proper role of 
individuals versus collectives or to the use of values such as freedom or solidarity, 
deployed to buttress the case for or against neoliberalism. This is too general a 
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 The study found three sets of policies that are considered as neoliberal: liberalization (of price 
controls, capital markets and trade barriers), withdrawal of the state from the economy 
(privatization of public firms) and macroeconomic austerity (tight control of the money supply, 




definition and leaves the researcher unable to distinguish between neoliberalism 
and related normative ideas with different prescriptive implications.
3
 
By contrast, defining economic ideas as development programs traceable 
to academic paradigms is more concrete. In the Boas and Gans-Morse study, the 
term ―development model‖ is defined as a prescriptive ―sets of economic theories 
linking disparate policies together into a coherent recipe for growth or 
modernization; prescriptions for the proper role of key actors […]; and an 
explicitly political project to carry out these prescriptions and ensure the actors 
play by the rules of the game.‖ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 144). Traceable in 
academic articles and books, policy memos, position statements, early warning 
reports etc., they are the kind of ideational material that is most causally 
proximate to policy as they chart clear and specific courses of action for 
policymakers. 
Constituting the epistemic core of development models, paradigms are 
underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how relations among 
markets, states and societies operate. For example, the combination between 
neoclassical economics, monetarism, public choice theory, rational expectations 
and New Public Management theory is seen as marking the neoliberal economics 
paradigm.
4
 Traceable in seminal theoretical texts and in other abstract academic 
                                                 
3
For example, David Caruthers‘ (2001: 345) definition of neoliberalism as an ―ideology that seeks 
to restrict the state to a minimum and to maximize the scope of individual freedom‖ can be applied 
to at least three more liberal economic traditions: classic liberalism, libertarianism, ordoliberalism.  
In a similar vein, Jacqueline Best argued that relative to Keynesianism, neoliberalism resembles 
Marxist economics in that it pushes for the idea of the universality of a technical model of the 
world economy in which the politics that makes national experiments possible is normatively 
rejected (Best, 2005:124–5, 127). 
4
 Unfortunately, in the practice of social science practice terminological confusions are rife and 




publications written by esteemed scholars‖ (Campbell 2001: 170), the diffusion of 
economic paradigms can be directly observed.
5
 Yet this perspective risks 
depoliticizing or sterilizing the concept, as it limits the debate to the discipline of 
economics and obscures the importance of the political contention that may 
accompany the adoption of ideational innovations.  
Given these limitations of existing definitions, what is to be done? First, it 
is important to begin by defining what does not constitute an economic idea from 
a constructivist perspective. This means the rejection of the rationalist reduction 
of ideas to a type of information about potential pay-off structures.
6
 Since 
intersubjectivity is at the heart of the constructivist program, it makes sense to 
define ideas as shared normative and causal statements 
7
 that describe what 
                                                                                                                                     
144), in social science the neoliberal paradigm is conflated with neoclassical economic theory. 
This is highly problematic. Such conflations make it difficult to distinguish between the 
neoclassical-Keynesian syndissertation that rested at the basis of postwar ―Keynesianism‖ and the 
syndissertation between the neoclassical tradition and such innovations as monetarism and rational 
expectations that undergird contemporary ―neoliberalism‖. It also does not reflect the reality that 
―neoliberalism‖ in 1991 meant something else than it means in 2010 and that in 1976 
―Keynesianism‖ meant one thing in Spain and something else in Britain.  
5
 Paradigms have the most profound effects on policy, as they define the very menu of policy and 
tend to be path dependent (Pierson 1981: 260; Blyth 2002: 37). Paradigms effect ―third level 
change‖ because what changes are not only the instrument of policy (first order change), or the 
instruments and the setting together (second order change) but the hierarchy of goals behind 
policy‖) (Hall 1993: 278).  
6
 In the rationalist framework, ideas are exogenous to material interests and their function of ideas 
could be that of ―hooks‖ upon which strategic politicians graft their objectives (Shepsele 1985) or 
as ―focal points‖ that makes it possible for actors to reach a common goal and coordinate their 
actions so as a more optimal equilibrium is reached (Garret and Weingast 1993; Keohane and 
Goldstein 1995). What makes ideas transfer in this conceptualization is therefore their distributive 
consequences: new ideas reveals possible favorable courses of action that actors with given 
material interests did not consider previously. In turn, new ideas are transformed (translated) in 
accordance to fit these given material interests. 
7
 According to Mark Blyth, the scientific and the normative aspects of economic ideas are 
intrinsically linked since ―all positive statements about the causal order of the economy 
necessarily imply value trade-offs and hence different patterns of distribution.‖ (Blyth 2002: 11). 




constitutes the economy, how its constitutive elements should work and what 
factors inhibit proper functioning of the economy.
8
  
I hereby suggest a solution that maintains the twin imperatives of clarity 
and resistance to terminological sterilization:our understanding of ―economic 
ideas‖ should be narrowed down to development programs and historical 
narratives. As suggested above, the most important payoff of the term 
―development models‖ is that it has a clear and inclusive relationship with the 
useful term of ―academic paradigms.‖  
In turn, historical narratives, understood as textual artifacts containing 
lessons about other policy contexts where the development model was tested can 
matter just as much. This is because historical narratives can be used to politically 
adjudicate between competing paradigms
9
 and structure perceptions of what is 
feasible, possible and desirable (Hay 2001: 199). Historical narratives also serve 
as experimental artifacts (―evidence‖) for certain economic arguments, as part of 
the performative nature of modern economics (McKenzie et al 2007; Muniesa and 
Callon 2009). In sum, development models are the ―theory‖ and historical 
narratives are part of the ―demonstration.‖ What is spread across national policy 
jurisdictions is not the practice of a new idea as such, but ―edited‖ accounts of this 
practice, informed by the historical narrative (Sahlin-Andersson 2007).  In a 
sense, then, the developmental model can be understood as the ideational 
                                                 
8
 To build this definition I drew inspiration from the work of Peter Hall (1993), Colin Hay (2001), 
Mark Blyth (2002) and Marion Fourcade (2009).  
9
 For example, in my research I found that the conservative narrative of the 1979 Winter of 
Discontent in Britain played a crucial role for advocating against the technical case for reflationary 




blueprint, and the historical narrative as local insights into how that blueprint 
must be adapted to suit the new environment. 
 
Neoliberalism 
As noted, recent popularity of the concept of neoliberalism on the agenda of 
social sciences has been characterized by a surprising lack of precision in the use 
of the term.
10
  The most notable definitional problem is that it is conflated either 
with selected schools of thought in economics (the spectrum varies from classical 
liberalism to the Austrian School), or with given policy templates (the 
Washington Consensus, Margaret Thatcher‘s economic program etc.). While 
these do indeed represent various faces of neoliberalism, the relationships among 
them are not spelled out clearly and parsimoniously, with ―ideas,‖ ―policies‖ and 
―institutions‖ mixed in an unsystematic and sometimeshaphazard fashion.
11
  
This dissertation embraces a definitional perspective that aims to balance 
elegance and complexity. First, I associate the neoliberal development program 
with the spectrum of ideas that grew out of neoclassical economics in the second 
half of the 20
th
 century to include such intellectual innovations as monetarist, 
                                                 
10
 The search term ―neoliberalism‖ rendered 65,800 hits on Google Scholar, relative to 32,300 for 
Keynesianism (Last search February 4, 2009).  
11
 Thus, according to Campbell and Pedersen (2001), neoliberalism is: ―[a] heterogenous set of 
institutions consisting of various ideas, social and economic policies, and ways of organizing 
political and economic activity[…]Ideally, it includes formal institutions, such as minimalist 
welfare state, taxation and business regulation programs; flexible labor markets and decentralized 
capital-labor relations unencumbered by strong unionsand collective bargaining; and the absence 
to international capital mobility. It includes institutionalized normative principles favoring free-
market solutions to economic problems, rather than bargaining or indicative planning, and a 
dedication to controlling inflation even at the expense of full employment. It includes 
institutionalized cognitive principles, notably a deep, taken for granted belief in neoclassical 




supply-side economics, public choice theory and New Public Management.
12
 
Accordingly, neoliberalism should be distinguished from other older off-shoots of 
neoclassicism, such as the Austrian School of economics or ordoliberalism. The 
concrete causal axioms and policy templates that constitute the neoliberal 
paradigm can be traced in policy memos, position statements, early warning 
reports, etc.  
Thus, neoliberals posit causal links between tax cuts and capital 
investment (rather than consumption) or between the rigidity of employment 
protection legislation and unemployment figures. Also, a litany of neoliberal 
policy templates (often identified with Williamson‘s original Washington 
Consensus) can be derived from the neoliberal policy paradigms: reducing 
inflation and budget deficits (even at the cost of employment), privatization, the 
scrapping of industrial policy, lower marginal tax rates and reduced corporate 
income tax rates, deregulation of financial instruments, decentralization and 
flexibilization of labor protection and the use of market principles in public 




                                                 
12
 Institutionalist economics typically represents the chief foil of neoclassical economics in 
modern capitalist history (Heilbronner and Milberg 1995). Yet the neoliberal paradigm cannot be 
boiled down to these ―technical schools.‖ 
13
 The adoption of selected neoliberal programs could occur separately from conversion to the 
economic paradigm itself. The mere adoption of a privatization program by a government does not 
warrant the conclusion that that government was compelled by the wider neoliberal paradigm. It 
merely signals a crack in the old interventionist consensus. Also, economic doctrines associated 
with neoliberalism can be downgraded to the status of programs. For example, scholarship on the 
spread of neoliberalism to the UK, (Hay 2001: 209-14; Epstein and Schor 1990; Panitch and leys 
1997; 121-22) showed that between 1974 and 1979 the Labor government used monetarism as an 
instrument of economic management, rather than as an economic doctrine, having not abandoned 
during this period its commitment to full employment, the mixed economy, the comprehensive 




The inclusion of historical narratives in the concept of neoliberalism may 
be controversial. Yet, it has been shown that the supporters of neoliberalism often 
give dramatized causal stories about the failure of developmentalism, such as the 
1979 ―winter of discontent‖ in Britain or about capital flight under globalization, 
as much weight as they give to, say, monetarism (Hay 1996; 1998; 1999). 
According to Colin Hay, this is because the ability of policy agents to assess the 
range of strategic options available is constrained by perceptions of what is 
feasible, possible and desirable and these perceptions are, in turn, likely to be 
shaped not only by policy paradigms and perceptions of institutional resources, 






The theoretical framework of this study is theoretically anchored in the 
constructivist tradition in international political economy. As such, it departs from 
the assumption that agents are not socialized into an a priori efficient outcome 
(e.g. neoliberal reforms). Rather, such outcomes are contingent on how the 
exogenous shocks and interests materialists talk about are interpreted, sustained 
                                                 
14
 As a recent review of constructivist political economy scholarship put it, ―[a] research focus on 
the construction of crises would allow analysis to better recognize the importance of expressive 
struggles over the ―lessons of history,‖ as intensified debate over the meaning of contemporary 
events often fosters reinterpretations of past wars and crises.‖ (Widmeier et al 2007: 755). The 
example given by Widmeier et al (2007: 755) are the causal stories about the Great Depression: 
[i]n the context of debates over the stagflation of the 1970s, the lessons of the Great Depression 
came under new discussion. Keynesian ―market failure‖ constructions, which had dominated 
discourses from the 1930s onward with their stress on the endogenous instability of market 
expectations, increasingly yielded to more classical ―state failure‖ constructions which cast 





and transformed  by agents‘ interesubjective understandings,
15
 (Blyth 2006; 
Widmeier et al 2007).
 16 
Even something frequently seen as glaringly ―obvious‖, 
such as capitalists‘ or labor‘s preferences cannot be simply abstracted from their 
positions, as these actors may quite often differ over what their interests are under 
certain conditions (Blyth 2002; Widmeier 2004; Woll 2008). 
17
 If this is so, then 
in situations as disruptive as those of Romanian and Spanish economic transitions, 
the analysis of the economic ideas of policy elites becomes crucial for 
understanding what policy options were imaginable in the first place.  
The constructivist postulate that the global economy is not solely a world 
of material power, but also a system of shared ideas inspired my focus on how the 
economic ideas that ―make the world hang together‖ acquire universal status.  But 
since sophisticated constructivist research has not focused on this aspect, I sought 
                                                 
15
 Intersubjective understandings differ from merely subjective understandings because they exist 
at the collective, rather than at the individual level, thus having a more robust likelihood of 
sustainability over time (Wendt 1999: 121-134).  
16
 Or, as a recent review of the constructivist literature put it, ―World War II did not cause the 
Bretton Woods Agreements. Rather, what agents thought caused World War II caused the Bretton 
Woods Agreements to take their particular form.‖ (Wiedemeier et al 2007: 749). 
17
 In a widely-cited article almost two decades ago, Peter A. Hall (1993) remarked that ―those who 
use the concept [of ideas n.a.] have yet to develop an overarching image of the way in which  
ideas  fit into the policy process or a clear conception  of how those ideas might change‖(Hall 
1993: 13, 276). Much has changed since then. A generation of constructivist IPE and CPE 
scholars began to give very specific accounts of how ideas affect economic policy as well as the 
workings of the economy itself (Helleiner 1994; Woods 1995; Hay 1997; McNamara 1997; 
Ziegler 1997; Marcussen 2000; Verdun 1999; Rosamond 1999; Parsons 2000; Legro 2000; 
Amoore et al 2000; Seabrooke 2001; Schmidt 2002, 2006a, 2006b; Blyth 2002; Culpepper 2003; 
Abdelal 2001, 2005; Best 2005; Sinclair 2005; Broome and Seabrooke 2006; Chwieroth 2007a, 
2007b, 2008; Epstein 2008).For an identity-oriented strand (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Abdelal 
2001; 2007; Abdelal et al 2006), the social purpose that agents ―inject‖ in the economy is shaped 
by identities constituted at different levels, whether they be entire nations (Abdelal 2001), or 
international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). While cognitivist constructivists 
emphasize the causal role of schemas, scripts, and analogies in a world permeated by calculable 
risk (Widmaier 2005; Denzau and Roy 2007), for many comparative political economists it is 
uncertainty (and not risk) that enjoys analytical primacy (Schmidt 2002; Blyth 2002, 2006; Hay 
2004; Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005). Finally, discourse paves the path into constructivism for 
scholarship of postmodern vintage (deGoede 2005; MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa and 




inspiration in the sociology of translation, in which I found the mechanisms used 
to ―edit‖ diffused ideas in the domestic context.  
This study also shares the ―transformationalist‖ assumption on the nature 
of authority in the international system according to which domestic processes are 
not isolated, but are shaped by external factors.
 
If this is assumption is sound, then 
the examination of the processes that constitute the diffusion of new economic 
ideas should take place across-rather than strictly within-the sub-disciplinary 
boundaries separating IPE and CPE. According to the ―transformationalist‖ 
school of thought in IR, state sovereignty is porous, ―unbundling‖ and contested, 
rather than discrete and taken for granted, with the state being only one type of 
actor among others (Zurn and Joerges 2005; Djelic and Sahlin Andersson 2006; 
Rosenau 1997; Ruggie 1992; Kobrin 2002).
18
 In addition to public actors situated 
at the systemic level (international organizations), state control is being 
transformed by various forms of private authority, ranging from business-self-
regulation networks (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Schmidt 2004) 
to transnational epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Djelic and Kleiner 2006). My 
analytical framework draws on this assumption to boldly expand the spectrum of 
potential advocates for neoliberal ideas. 
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 Indeed, the high degree of interdependence and the complicated entanglement of political 
agency in contemporary international relations rendered ―patchwork‖ political structures (Ruggie 
1983; Kobrin 2002; Keohane 2005) that are best studied as part of transnational governance rather 
than as inter-national relations or as national politics. In this world, multi-layered governance 
networks of actors challenge and redefine state control (Lynn et al 2001; Knill and Lemkuhl 2002; 





II. Literature Review 
Overview of the literature 
The need for an analytical framework for studying the spread of 
neoliberalism across nations has two main sources.  
First, economic ideas are not considered important in orthodox studies in 
which the dependent variable of interest is the diffusion of new policies, policy 
instruments (―blueprints‖), or policy institutions. However, this approach 
precludes the possibility that the diffusion of economic policies can actually be 
preceded and shaped by a diffusion of economic ideas to which those policies can 
be traced. The many substrands of this literature are plagued by numerous internal 
contradictions that my review presents in detail. Most importantly, I challenge the 
materialist political economy strands that see economic ideas as epiphenomenal to 
the formation of the interests of the key actors in the policy process: state 
managers, capitalists, and labor. In the first part of the literature review I show 
that the scope of this claim is not consistent with what materialists have claimed.   
Secondly, constructivists claim that policy change cannot be understood 
properly without demonstrating a change in the economic ideas with which policy 
makers make sense of the economy. Some constructivists have shown that in 
situations of uncertainty, the indeterminacy of interests is severe as economic 
structures do not determine the singular grounds on which to favor a certain 
choice set over another. Consequently, agents are unclear as to what their best 
strategy is. Such situations open the door to idea entrepreneurs who can 




interests and promote policies defined in the terms of the new ideas, the resulting 
policy regime is stabilized and develops performative effects.  
The main theoretical problem addressed by this dissertation is the 
following: while constructivists would be best equipped to address this gap since 
they are the only scholars of political economy to take the causal role of ideas 
seriously, to date they have not developed a systematic theory of the transnational 
spread of economic ideas. To fill in this gap, in the second part of the study I will 
integrate the theoretical innovations of political economy constructivists with the 
insights developed in two sociological traditions: the sociology of the economic 
profession and the sociology of translation. 
 
Diffusion studies in Political Economy 
Since Galton posited his puzzle on the shared source of marriage laws, social 
scientists have shown consistent interest in diffusion. A recent survey of the 
literature reveals that, over the past century, political science journals published 
800 articles on the spread of policies and political institutions from one 
government to another. Significantly, more than half of these articles have been 
published in the past decade (Graham et al 2008).
19
  
In this literature, transnational diffusion is defined as the process whereby 
a government‘s decision to adopt a policy innovation is influenced by the 
preexisting choices of other governments.  It has been at the core of political 
economy debates since Collier and Messick‘s (1975) ground-breaking but largely 
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 The gamut of topics is impressive, ranging from the diffusion of water boiling in a Peruvian 
village (Rogers 1963) and the diffusion of lotteries from one US state to another (Berry and Berry 




ignored study of the transnational diffusion of social security.
20
 Gourevitch‘s 
(1978) classic ―second image reversed‖ put transnational diffusion back on the 
map and during the 1990s the topic experienced a boom in the form of 
globalization studies (Garrett 1998; Milner and Keohane 1996). More recently, 
the ―second generation‖ literature on transnational diffusion in IPE kicked off by 
Simmons and Elkins (2004) mobilized complex quantitative models and large 
datasets to demonstrate that national economic policies are not simply 
endogenously-determined and path-dependent.  Rather, they tend to be more 
unstable and subject to exogenous change.
 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004; 2005; 
2006; Braun and Gilardi 2006; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2006; Swank 2006; Lee 
and Strang 2006; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons et al 2006; Weyland 2007; 2009; 
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2007; 2008; Mesenguer 2009; Gilardi, Fuglister 
and Luyet 2009; Messenguer and Gilardi 2009; Gilardi 2010).
 21
   
Throughout this literature, the dependent variable of interest is the 
diffusion of new policies, policy instruments (―blueprints‖), or policy 
institutions.
22
 Many of these studies test the causal effects of elite socialization as 
a mechanism of diffusion, thus acknowledging the impact of constructivism in 
IPE, if implicitly so. Nevertheless, they do not consider the possibility that the 
diffusion of economic policies can be preceded by a diffusion of economic ideas 
to which those policies can be traced.  
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 Americanists have been researching policy diffusion across US states since the 1940s (McVoy 
1940; Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Volden 2006). 
21
 For a review of the ―foil‖, the historical-institutionalist perspective on stability through path-
dependence in IPE, see Pierson and Skocpol 2002. 
22
 For example, Elkins and Simmons‘ (2004) high-impact study compared the explanatory 
potential of several successive mechanisms for the diffusing of economic liberalization. Fabrizio 
Gilardi‘s latest work provides a rich account of the adoption of conservative unemployment 




This position is built on three problematic assumptions: public authority is 
really (and uniformly) in charge of processes of diffusion; economic policies 
always diffuse as unprocessed ―scripts‖; and, at the end of the diffusion process 
one can only meet unreflexive domestic ―receivers‖ with pre-aligned conceptions 
of self-interest.. All of these assumptions are, however, problematic. 
Undermining this view, recent work in IR shows that state actors are often 
marginal in economic policy, with private forms of authority taking charge across 
policy areas (Stange 1996; Hall and Bierstecker, 2002; Cutler, Haufler, and 
Porter, 1999; Abdelal 2007; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009)Moreover,this 
contention is buttressed by a long research tradition of research in IR showing that 
state actors are often marginal in economic policy, with a lot of delegation to 
private forms of authority taking place across policy areas (Stange 1996; Hall and 
Bierstecker, 2002; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, 1999; Abdelal 2007; Seabrooke 
and Tsingou 2009). Similarly, other scholars have shown that the receivers of new 
policies are anything but passive and unreflective. Instead, they tend to actively 
shape the policies to be diffused after scrutinizing and filtering them through their 
ideational grounding (Bockman and Eyal 2002). As Kogut and MacPherson 
(2008: 206) recently put it,  
 
[I] nstitutions are not poured into nations like water into a vessel […] an 
adequate account of diffusion should address the microfoundations by 




within epistemic communities. Ideas are constructed within social 
networks and they diffuse within given social and national structures […].  
 
Another problem of this literature is that it assumes the legitimacy of the 
diffused policies to be based on ―elite proclamation‖ (Hobson and Seabrooke 
211). While coherent economic policy teams sequestered from broader socio-
political influence may make the rules undisturbed in most contexts (Chwieroth 
2007), in others legitimacy is much more problematic and callsnot for 
assumptions, but for the kind of empirical investigation that has recently been 
carried out by ―everyday‖ IPE scholarship (Hobson 2007; Hobson and Seabrooke 
2007). 
In sum, this recent wave of IPE literature on diffusion has advanced our 
understanding of how neoliberal policies spread yet this is a scholarship that it is 
still incomplete and rests on unvalidated assumptions. Its claims are nevertheless 
powerful, as they rest on older research agendas.It is to the examination of these 
historical  that I now turn. 
 
International economic crises and domestic politics 
An older materialist explanation of the global spread of neoliberalism emphasized 
the causal role of structural factors on economic policy (Scharpf 1991; Stallings 
1992; 1995; Drazen and Grilli 1993; Williamson 1994; Rodrik 1996; Haggard and 




argument of this school of thought is that the neoliberal turn was a rational 
response to structural changes in the world economy. 
For example, Barbara Stallings (1992) argued that an exogenous shock 
(i.e. the 1979 second oil shock and the attending monetary policy shift in the US) 
triggered a regional debt crisis throughout Latin America. This, in turn, led to 
deep domestic recessions, skyrocketing deficits, high inflation and dependence on 
IFI funding (with the attending conditionality). When combined with the 
liberalizing pressures of mobile domestic capitalists, these structural shifts left 
governments no choice but to embrace neoliberal reforms.
 23
  Writing on the same 
events, some scholars observed that the depth of the economic crises of the 1970s 
correlated with the swiftness and depth of the reforms of the 1980s, the reason 
being that intense crises incurred high economic costs for delays in adjustment 
and correlatively reduced the strength of domestic opposition to them (Drazen and 
Grili 1993; Williamson 1994).
24
 In the case of Spain, Boix (1994: 27-29), Roca 
(1991: 362-368) and Bilbao (1991: 251-270) further argued that technological 
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 Some structuralist accounts of reforms (Schleifer and Treisman 2000; Aslund 1999) rely on the 
assumption that neoliberal policies were the optimal response to the economic crisis of 
interventionist systems (state socialist or otherwise). This assumption is not only untested and 
often normatively biased, but is ill-placed to address the observed variation in post-interventionist 
responses to economic crises. As one reviewer put it, the authors   ―see neoliberal reform as the 
only legitimate political agenda for Russia. Politics that favor this agenda, no matter the process, 
are good; politics that thwart it are bad.  Those who accumulate sufficient money or power must 
be appeased; all others should be ignored, dispossessed, or marginalized. Russia's (admittedly 
flawed) democratic institutions are viewed mainly as inconvenient obstacles to the technocrats' 
plans. Existing organizations almost always represent retrograde stakeholders.  The rest of the 
population  appears  in  this account  only sporadically  as putative  beneficiaries  of anti-inflation 
policies and  as protesters  who must  be appeased  if they  threaten  disruption.  The reformers  
know  what  is best  for  Russia:  politics  is bargaining  among  the most  privileged elites; success 
involves finding  slightly  less destructive  ways for  them  to profit.  The authors are, to understate 
the case, uncritical about all of this‖. (Cook 2001: 177).  
24
 Similar arguments have been made by students of East European economic transitions, whose 
dominant working hypodissertation has been that the most radical reforms were adopted by 




innovation led to the growth of the non-unionized sectors just when unionized 
economic sectors were in structural decline. This situation gave labor unions no 
incentives to embrace the wage restraint that makes social democracy possible.  
As a result, PSOE governments had no choice but resort to orthodox 
macroeconomic policies.  
For still other structuralists (Alvarez et al 1991; Boix 1998; Kwon and 
Pontusson 2005; Huber and Stephens 2001; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Murillo 
2002; Murillo and Schrank 2005), partisan differences mediated some of the 
effects of changes in economic structures. Other like-minded scholars (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Packenham 1994) contended that 
structural pressures were mediated in the domestic arena by institutional variables 
such as regime type or the degree of centralization of the political party system.
25
  
Economic structuralism offers systematic and elegant accounts of how 
external and domestic structural incentives made some economic policies 
possible, while relegating other policies to the dustbin of the economic policy 
process. Yet, this literature leaves the story incomplete and causally 
overdetermined. Although international capital markets generated significant 
pressures on governments to drive down deficits and inflation, many transition 
governments could achieve these policy objectives not only through cuts in public 
expenditures and wages (as the Washington Consensus demands), but also by 
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 Thus, they argued that the more rooted in society are political parties, the more unlikely will be 
the popular mobilization against neoliberal policy change. These scholars also contend that the 
more non-polarized the party system, the more likely will be the neoliberal reforms, because a 
centralized party system is better prepared to moderate political conflict than a polarized one 
would. Finally, established democracies are seen as more likely than transition regimes to adopt 
drastic policy changes with high social costs, as transition regimes project weak political 
legitimacy, are more instability-prone, and, most importantly, are more pressured to provide 




taxing the rich or institutionalizing corporatist industrial relations (Royo 2000; 
Mosley 2003).  
Also, when faced with comparable domestic and external economic 
constraints, some transition governments pursued neoliberal models, others 
developed more statist models, and yet others reacted by crafting economic policy 
hybrids from the two, with no regional pattern being apparent.
26
 Case studies also 
suggest that many countries resisted neoliberal reforms, despite prolonged 
economic crises (Bolivia in 1982-1985, Peru in 1987-1989; Romania in 1990-
1993). And even during the paradigmatically neoliberal 1990s, most countries 
exposed to international policy conditionality successfully opposed IFI-suggested 
policies (Woods 2006), while others ceased to observe IFIs‘ advice after adopting 
the first round of reforms (Pop-Eleches 2009).
27
  
 Even when qualified by institutional or partisanship variables, many 
problems still remain. Kurt Weyland (2003: 24) showed that a fairly disciplined 
governing party in a centripetal system with two predominant parties was 
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 One could speculate based on the materialist logic that it was easier for the state elites of a 
capitalist country like Spain to shift gears from interventionism to neoliberalism than it was for the 
elites of a most rigid state socialist country, such as Romania in 1990. After all, in 1982 Spain, the 
state was a minority owner in the economy, basic market reforms had been institutionalized after 
1958 and a managerial and commercial middle class with capitalist skills was already available. 
By contrast, in 1990, Romania the state owned almost all the economy, Ceausescu‘s national 
Stalinism prohibited the initiation of any market reforms, while the available managerial and 
commercial class had been socialized in working with economic mechanisms tightly controlled by 
the state, with the black market being the only niche of market relations. This is another 
explanatory dead-end, however. In the early 1990s Poland was in the same league with Romania, 
economically speaking, yet its governments adopted neoliberal macroeconomic reforms that were 
faster and more radical than those of 1980s Spain were. When faced with the aftereffects of the 
1970s crises, other capitalist European countries tried to fight economic problems with 
interventionist approaches. Between 1981 and 1984, socialist governments in Greece, a capitalist 
country that was economically similar to Spain adopted bold redistributive Keynesian, not 
neoliberal economic reforms. 
27
 Pop-Eleches (2009: 24) noted that less than half of Latin American IMF programs in the 1980s 




associated with the enactment of neoliberal policies in some cases (Menem‘s 
Argentina), but not in ―most similar‖ others (Venezuela under President Perez). 
Formal institutions also seem to matter little due to the entrenched practices of 
rule-bending and instability that plague institutional life in many developing 
countries (Ferreira, Rubio, and Goretti 1998: 41-45; Weyland 2003: 24). As to 
informal institutions (democratic consolidation regime versus democratic 
transition regime), some cases fit the profile (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Portugal, 
Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia), while many others do not (Bolivia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Russia). This diversity of national responses suggests that the 
full range of policy options available to policymakers was broader and that the 
policy autonomy of state-level elites was greater than the supporters of this brand 
of economic structuralism envision.
28
   
With regard to the mediating role of partisanship, the relevant literature 
does not specify why Left party ideology blocked neoliberal policies in some 
cases, while it proved a surprisingly consistent and vocal advocate in others. 
When Charles Boix points out that PSOE‘s ―supply-side socialism‖ was a 
different variety of neoliberalism than that of various conservative political parties 
in Europe, he provides an accurate description of the events. Yet Boix fails to 
account for why PSOE economic policy elites operated with neoliberal categories 
about deficits, inflation and the role of unions in the first place. Neither does he 
explain why PSOE‘s supply-side socialism was a lot more orthodox than that of 
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 Writing on social spending in Latin America, Evelyn Huber (1996:164) showed that while many 
Latin American policymakers generally accepted that the policy status quo was in need of repair, 
the specific social welfare model to be chosen ―reflected the different governments‘ visions of an 




contemporary Portuguese conservative governments facing even tougher external 
and internal structural constraints.
29
   
 
International economic competition 
Rather than focus on economic crises as drivers of policy change, other 
structuralist accounts place greater emphasis on international economic 
competition (Krasner 1985; Stockman and Hernandez 1988; Goodman and Pauly 
1993). Its advocates contend that inter-state economic competition for capital is 
the basic feature of the world economic system. This feature creates incentives for 
state elites to strategically adopt economic policies that are at least as capital-
friendly as those of their foreign economic competitors, on the assumption that 
the aggregate economic growth generated by capital inflows will grant them 
political and economic rewards. This process of adjustment to the international 
economic structure does not take place in a void, though. Rather, it is mediated by 
the institutional capacity of the state vis-à-vis its own society: the stronger the 
state, the more likely will the state overcome the problems of coordination and 
distribution that accompany policy change.
30
  
  This is a robust literature, yet one wonders why some policymakers see 
the adoption of policies that meet the preferences of international capital as an 
elementary condition of aggregate economic growth (e.g. PSOE governments in 
the early 1980s), whereas others see it as a barrier to national economic 
development (e.g. Greek government in the early 1980s and Romanian 
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 For an edifying discussion of the Spanish-Portuguese contrast, see Fishman forthcoming. 
30
 In Krasner‘s foundational work, this capacity is defined along a continuum going from strong 




governments in the early 1990s).  One is also left wondering why economic 
competitors of comparable strength choose different policies: why Spain in the 
1980s went in a different direction than its Southern European competitors 
(Greece, Portugal) or why in the early 1990s Romania was experimenting with 
Gorbachevite economics while its East European competitors (Hungary, Poland) 
chose to embrace neoliberal economic reforms. 
 
International policy conditionality 
A rich structuralist tradition has developed around the concept of international 
policy conditionality exercised by international institutions (IOs). The core 
contention of this sophisticated substrand is that the likelihood of the adoption of 
neoliberal policies demanded by international organizations increases if the 
adoption is set as a condition for rewards, with the size and speed of these rewards 
and if threats and promises made by international organizations are credible 
(Stone 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Pop-Eleches 2009).
31
 At the 
domestic level, the IOs change the balance of power among organized interests 
and policy elites by empowering some and disempowering others, although this 
selective empowerment is limited by the number of veto points in the domestic 
institutional system. The most updated version of this argument (Pop-Eleches 
2009) enriches the original conditionality model by emphasizing the casual role of 
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 The credibility of threats unpacked as follows: the IO is able to withhold rewards at little cost, 
the IO has a consistent record in the allocation of rewards and punishments to its members and 
associates, the IO displays no internal conflicts on conditionality, monitoring by IO of the target 
state is effective and, finally, the target state has negligible influence inside the IO. Should 
conflicts arise between the policy objectives of the IOs deploying conditionality on a given 
country, it will be more cost-effective for that country to bow to the IO whose rewards that 




the ideational congruence between IO preferences and the ideational 
commitments of domestic elites and ordinary citizens.
32
  
It is important to acknowledge that its parsimonious and elegantly 
predictive hypotheses represent powerful mechanisms to probe the realities of 
economic policy change. This literature also generates well-specified and intuitive 
propositions about interaction effects between international and national-level 
material structures and societal group preferences. Yet, conditionality is not 
deployed by IOs with an ―either/or‖ kind of intentionality. Rather, it has been 
demonstrated that international organizations tend to set a spectrum of policy 
adjustment options between ―low precision‖ standards and the formulation of 
imperative demands for ‗faithful patches‖ of policy emulation (Jacoby 2004: 6-7).  
Such distinctions need to be seriously addressed in empirical studies on 
the role of IOs in domestic economic policy making. Also, some scholars have 
shown that governments often want IMF loans because they want external 
conditions imposed on them rather than viceversa (Vreeland 2003). These 
critiques about the incompleteness of the conditionality literature invite a number 
of questions: Why do comparable ―high precision‖ conditionality agreements in 
some cases (Romania‘s agreement with the IMF in the early 1990s and with the 
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This opening to ideas does not mean that Pop-Eleches advocates a constructivist second image 
reversed. The complex processes that enable the convergence between international and domestic 
interpretation of crises are not theorized about. Rather, in classic materialist fashion, he infers 
arguments from the material properties of the international system. ―[D]uring periods of 
worldwide economic crisis and international ideological contestation-such as the debt crisis of the 
1980s in the context of the final decade of the Cold War-IMF interventions are more likely to be 
regarded as thinly disguised impositions of Western economic interests by significant portions of 
the elite and the population. In such a political context, economic crises are more likely to trigger 
divergent partisan policy responses from governments of different orientations. […] During period 
of global economic expansion and international neoliberal ideological hegemony, the IMF is more 
likely to be viewed as a technocratic policy adviser. Under such circumstances-as was the case in 
the ex-communist countries in the 1990s-economic crises trigger non-ideological economic 




EU and the IMF in the early 2000s) extract extremely different levels of 
compliance? And why was there high compliance in Spain in the early 1990s, 
even though international policy conditionality was absent and the IMF merely 
used consultation procedures with Spanish governments?  
 
“Second image reversed” 
A final strand of materialist structuralist literature reviewed here is ―second image 
reversed‖ institutionalism in international and comparative political economy 
(Gourevitch 1986; Frieden 1991; Keohane and Milner 1996; Garrett 1998). In a 
self-conscious attempt to bridge the systemic and the domestic levels of analysis 
via institutions, its proponents argue that exogenous structures (international 
capital mobility, international economic crises, etc.) have distributional 
consequences that can be shown to alter the preferences of domestic interest 
groups and that the final policy outcomes reflect asymmetries in political leverage 
between these organized interests.
33
 This scholarship cautions that the interests of 
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 Political leverage is measured via preference intensity (actors‘ assets or the magnitude of the 
stakes involved) and organizational ability (costs and benefits of collective action, size of the 
constituency. While cautioning in the short run that ―the forms that these effects take vary cross-
nationally due to different institutional as well as political-economic conditions,‖ some scholars 
working in this tradition nevertheless maintain that in the long run ―institutions change under the 
pressure of constraints and the lure of opportunities.‖ (Keohane and Milner 1996: 256). Others, 
like Geoffrey Garrett (1998) dissent, and show that mediating effects of domestic institutions are 
bound to be resilient. For example, Garret‘s (1998) analysis of the political economy of 
globalization in contemporary Europe marshals much evidence to show that economic 
globalization (the systemic variable) rewards not only liberal capitalist economic regimes, but also 
social democratic corporatism (Garrett). Both regimes manage to institutionalize counter-
inflationary regimes (whether via encompassing labor market institutions or by centralizing 
economic policymaking in the executive), prevent social strife by appropriately compensating the 
losers and enhancing growth and returns on investment by increasing the skill level of the 
workforce. This argument resonates well with the arguments of new growth theorists on the 
complementarity between investment in human capital and returns to investments (Romer 1990; 
Ashton and Green 1996). In other words, interventionist economic policies are possible only 
where encompassing labor market institutions are strong, because these institutions are more likely 




interest groups do not automatically translate into policy, however. Rather, they 
are mediated by institutions acting as ―brokers‖ that aggregate conflicting 
interests into coalitions that then project their interests into policy outcomes.  
This literature offers a richly-specified perspective on how pressures 
originating at the systemic level are domestically mediated. The practice of 
deriving actors‘ interests from their structural position is highly problematic, 
however. As argued in greater detail bellow, this practice is of limited use in 
situations of uncertainty like economic crises, when actors simply don‘t know 
what their structural positions tell them and, consequently, what their interests are 
(Blyth 2002).
34
 Furthermore, a circular argument plagues this derivation: 
preferences are inferred from observed behavior and subsequent observed 
behavior is explained in terms of inferred preferences (Blyth 1997). Third, there is 
overwhelming evidence proving that societal interest groups are often uncertain as 
to what their interests are even when they are not faced with uncertainty caused 
by economic crises (Haggard and Webb 1993; Bates and Krueger 1993:456; Hall 
                                                                                                                                     
consistent with the older literature on democratic corporatism (Cameron 1984; Calmfors and 
Drifill 1988; Soskice 1990). 
34
 The assumption of structurally-derived preferences was shown to have a controversial record in 
crucial Latin American, South European and postcommunist transitions to neoliberalism. Thus, 
despite relatively strong ties to labor, Argentine Peronistas (Levitsky 2005), Spanish Socialists 
(Royo 2001) or the Polish Solidarnosc (Ost 2005) decided to implement neoliberal reforms that 






 As Cornelia Woll showed, this is also the case in highly 
institutionalized contexts like the ‗old‘ EU member states (EU-15) and the US.
36
  
 The examination of the main pillars of the materialist international and 
comparative political economy literature on transition to neoliberalism 
highlighted a number of inconsistencies, gaps, and logical problems.  To what 
extent are approaches incorporating the explanatory power of ideas better placed 
to address the problem of transition to neoliberalism? This possibility is examined 
in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Rationalist institutionalism 
Contra traditionalist rationalist approaches that relegated ideas to epiphenomenal 
status in political economy processes, the work of rationalist scholar Douglas 
North (1990) decisively established that without understanding the role of 
ideological pre-commitments in reducing transaction costs, rationalists are unable 
to provide adequate explanations of how collective action problems are overcome. 
Goldstein (1993), Keohane and Goldstein‘s (1993), North‘s recent work (2005) or 
Greif‘s bold interventions (2005) further softened the rationalist skepticism 
toward the role of ideas.  
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 The claims of the ―second image reversed‖ approach hold only as long as it proponents are able 
to empirically demonstrate that pressure groups actually matter in the policy process. The evidence 
here is equivocal, with many studies showing that societal actors often play a less central role in 
the policymaking process than the pluralists believe (Haggard and Kaufman 1989, 1992a; Nelson 
1988; Bates and Krueger 1993:455; Frieden 1991:157, 158), either because they have weak 
institutional power, or because they are simply uncertain about where their interests lie (Hall 
1997:197).   
36
 Cornelia Woll shows that within less than a decade, former telecom and air transport 
monopolies abandoned their protectionist preferences and joined competitive multinationals in the 





For example, Keohane and Goldstein volume showed how ideas foster 
cooperation among actors whose interests are not yet realized and help solve 
multiple equilibria problems by providing focal points. The volume usefully 
distinguished among ‗principled beliefs‘ (normative statements about particular 
decisions), ‗causal beliefs‘ (statements about means-ends relationships) and 
‗worldviews‘ as well as among the effects that each one of these three categories 
has on policy. For example, ‗causal ideas‘ guide behavior ‗by stipulating causal 
patterns‘ and ‗imply[ing] strategies for the attainment of goals‘, while ‗principled 
ideas‘ guide behavior ‗by providing compelling  ethical or moral motivations for 
action‘ (Keohane and Goldstein, 1993: 16, 10). 
37
 
 This rationalist scholarship simultaneously embraces the causal 
importance of ideas and consigns them to derivative functions. In other words, 
ideas act as mere explanatory ―fillers‖ for areas where rationalism fails, thus 
depriving them of autonomous explanatory value (Blyth 1997: 231).  Moreover, 
the ontological individualism of this brand of rationalism dramatically narrows 
down the definition of ideas to ―beliefs‖ held by individuals, thus dismissing the 
causal power of the formation and reproduction of systems of ideas that existed 
prior to individuals‘ perceptions. In some cases (Greif 2006), ideas are defined as 
interchangeably as beliefs and norms, a position that neglects the conceptual 
tensions between individual-level ideas (beliefs) and social-group level ideas 
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 Furthermore, in a significant concession to constructivists, Greif‘s recent book goes as far as 
suggesting that institutions have a significant ideational side that rational choice political 
economists need to come to terms with, as ―the motivation provided by beliefs and norms…is the 
linchpin of institutions‖ (Greif 2006: 28, 45) and institutions   ―provide individuals with the 
cognitive, coordinative, normative, and informational micro-foundations…[that]…motivate them‖ 




(norms).  Finally, as Yee (1997: 1024) pointed out, this approach is not equipped 
to account for the selection mechanisms that marginalize some ideas and give 
pride of place to others, while ignoring the social context from which economic 
ideas emerged in the first place. 
 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalists were quicker to take ideas seriously and overcome 
some of the limitations of the rationalist camp in political economy (Weir and 
Skocpol 1985; Weir 1989; Hall 1989, 1993; Skocpol 1992; Thelen and Steinmo 
1992; Weir 1992; Katzenstein 1993; Rueschmeyer and Skocpol 1996).
 38
 
Anchored in a comparative historical perspective, these scholars focused on the 
historical processes that led to the emergence, institutionalization and decay of 
what Peter A. Hall called ―policy paradigms,‖ i.e. theoretical and ontological 
assumptions that define the very menu of policy (Hall 19993). They were also 
more careful to specify the importance of cultural resonance as a filter of the 
causal effects of economic ideas.  
Thus, Weir and Skocpol (1985) insisted that the basic condition of the 
causal role for ideas is that they have a good ―degree of fit‖ with the ideas of key 
institutions and individual policymakers.  Peter A. Hall (1986) took this insight 
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At least since the mid 1980s, historical institutionalists began to take ideas seriously and to give 
them as much attention as they gave interest-based explanations. Early historical institutionalism 
in sociology and comparative political economy (Katzenstein 1978; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985; Hall 1986) assumed that the material interests of economic and political actors 
were mediated by institutions. For example, Weir and Skocpol (1985) showed that the adoption of 
the Keynesian paradigm by policymakers during the Great Depression led to a turnaround in the 
economic policy course. At the same time, they insisted that divergent institutional opportunities 
available to economists in Sweden, Britain and the US led to varying forms and speeds of 





further and argued that ideas matter if they resonate with the structure of political 
discourse at the national level. Hall (1993) also argued that that paradigm shifts 
are more likely to be result of political interventions than of the accumulation of 
scientific anomalies.  
 These are important scholarly innovations, yet they are not without their 
problems. By tying ideas so closely to institutions, historical institutionalists do 
not specify when ideas determine the policy outcome by themselves, 
independently of other plausible factors (Blyth 1997: 235-238; Blyth 2002: 22-
23). Or, the real challenge in making the case for the causal role of ideas is to 
demonstrate that ―[f]ar from being congruent with a nation‘s political discourse, 
ideas appear to be powerful only to the extent that they can challenge and subvert 
existing discourses and thus transform institutions‖ (Blyth 2002:22).  Historical 
institutionalists also neglected to examine how actors frame economic ideas to 
convince various policy publics of their appropriateness (Yee 1996; Campbell 
2001: 162). In other words, rather than assume the ―degree of fit‖ as a given, 
scholarship is called to theorize about how framing makes ideas fit. Finally, by 
emphasizing the structural characteristics of state power, historical 
institutionalists obscure the variation in the ability of state elites to mobilize or to 
be mobilized by outside technical elites endowed with superior epistemic 
authority (Ziegler 1997: 13). 
 This dissertation further submits that historical institutionalist accounts do 
not provide systematic accounts of how policy advocates came to have some ideas 




without theorizing the contentious politics of ideas fails to tell us very much about 
why alternative ideas did not take hold or at least why their advocates did not put 
up a stronger fight. If Peter Hall is right and the accumulation of anomalies is not 
wholly consequential, is this process of accumulation an objective fact, or a 
historical artifact involving the interpretive and performative agency of actors? 
And how does this agentic intervention affect the ―degree of fit‖ in the first place? 
Finally, what would change in these historical-institutionalist models if they were 
applied not to the shift from Keyensianism to neoliberalism in democratic 
systems, but to the embrace of neoliberal ideas, institutions and policies in 
countries departing from policy paradigms of different kinds (e.g. authoritarian 
corporatism in the case of Spain, national Stalinism in the case of Romania)?  
This literature review highlighted a considerable number of theoretical and 
empirical gaps in the existing structuralist-materialist and institutionalist literature 
on the shift to neoliberal policies. The next section turns to the review of the 
potential of constructivist IPE to address the diffusion of the neoliberal ideas to 
which neoliberal institutions can be traced. 
 
III. Analytical Framework 
The Promise of Constructivist Political Economy 
Why Neoliberalism Also Matters as a Set of Ideas  
Unlike historical and rationalist institutionalist accounts that view institutions as 
primary vehicles of uncertainty reduction in times of crisis, constructivists argue 




would be random or impossible. In Blyth‘s (2002) work on economic paradigm 
shifts in Sweden and the U.S., the policy actors‘ reliance on ideas is explained 
showing that ideas define what the appropriate‖ interrelations of the economy are, 
coordinate agents‘ expectations around ―both a scientific and a normative critique 
of the existing economy and polity, and provide blueprints that specify how these 
elements should be constructed‖ via specific courses of action (Blyth 2002: 37). 
But economic ideas define not only causal relationships in the economy 
and, consequently, agents‘ interests. They also ―serve to restructure those causal 
relationships by altering the agents‘ own beliefs about the interests of others, upon 
which the realization of agents‘ own ideationally derived interests depends‖ 
(Blyth 2002: 33).
39
 Ideas crucially contribute to the reduction of collective action 
problems under uncertainty ―by building bridges across class and consumption 
categories through the redefinition of agents‘ interests and by defining the 
common ends of action‖ (Blyth 2002: 38). When linking the ideas that underlie 
existing institutions and policies to an ongoing economic crisis (‗socialism‘, the 
‗welfare state‘), agents delegitimate existing policies and institutions by making 
them part of the problem.  
 By making crises interpretable and actionable in the process of wielding 
ideas as anti-institutional weapons, actors reconstitute their very interests. Also, 
by redefining interests and by specifying the ends of collective action, neoliberal 
ideas enable the formation of political coalitions around ―configurations of 
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 This argument is different from ―uncertainty as complexity‖ situations discussed in the 
―bounded rationality‖ literature (Simon et al 1992), when agents know their interests but are 
uncertain as to how they can achieve them, without reducing the set of possible strategies. In such 
situations, uncertainty can be reduced to risk, as agents use ideas as ―focal points‖ and ―road 




distributionary institutions‖ and provide blueprints for new institutions. Once 
established, these institutions path-dependently reproduce those ideas and 
coalitions. In this way, ideas are used to explain both the formation of new 
institutions and their reproduction over time.  
These are well-specified and useful propositions, yet they invite further 
complementary research. First, they do not theorize the the politics of the 
transmission of neoliberal ideas across borders from, say, the US to Sweden. 
Second, unlike in ―core‖ states, where state, labor and capital are well-constituted 
and therefore can be safely assumed to be the principal collective agents eligible 
for the formation of coalitions around new economic ideas, in the more thinly 
institutionalized post-authoritarian middle-income European countries they are 
not.
40
 Consequently, there is more space for transnatioal actors like IOs, think-
tanks or political party networks to affect the policy debate.
41
  
Other scholars working on economic ideas paid more attention to the 
transnational spread of ideas and to the multiplicity of actors involved but, as the 
next section shows, their work remains plagued by several weaknesses that this 
study subsequently addreses. 
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 In Spain, for example, domestic capital had formed a single organization by the early 1980s, yet 
was unable to advocate a cohesive ideational campaign on labor deregulation until the early 1990s. 
This allowed organized multinational capital and external consultants to play an important role in 
diagnosing the sources of Spain‘s very high unemployment. Capital was even more weakly-
constituted in early 1990s Romania, when employer organizations looked more like fragmented 
institutional Potemkin villages, with industrial interests being informally organized around 
scattered networks of managers of large state-owned companies. As a result, mixed chambers of 
commerce or organized multinational capital acted as policy entrepreneurs separately and 
deployed different economic ideas from those of organized domestic capital. 
41
 The research tradition inaugurated in economic sociology by Peter Evans (1979) shows that 
characteristic of the policy sphere in middle-income countries is its high penetration by forms of 





Constructivism and the Spread of Neoliberal Ideas  
By contrast with the ―policy transfer‖ literature reviewed above, in political 
science there was much less systematic interest in theorizing the transnational 
diffusion of economic ideas.
42
 Peter Hall‘s (1989) volume on the spread of 
Keynesian ideas across seven countries was a path-breaking contribution. Hall‘s 
argument was epistemiologically eclectic: economic ideas diffuse if they are good 
at solving local policy problems, if they are compatible with existing 
administrative arrangements and if they are useful for domestic politicians at 
winning support and building coalitions.
43
  
Beginning with the late 1990s, the constructivist ―wave‖ in IPE attempted 
to approach the issue of economic idea diffusion more systematically. For 
example, Kathleen McNamara‘s (1998) book on the politics of the European 
monetary system was the first to speak to this topic directly. Her excursus looks at 
the diffusion of German ―pragmatic‖ monetarism across the EEC and shows how 
German ideas about the virtues of low-inflation had been replicated throughout 
Europe before monetarist policies themselves were embraced by national policy 
elites. To explain why it was monetarist ideas and not others that diffused, 
McNamara argues that economic ideas that appear to have a superior diagnosis of 
the causes of a crisis (monetarism) and appear to work in a certain context (West 
Germany) can be expected to be embraced across different national policy spheres 
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 This topic had once been part of economic history (Coats 1981; 1986). 
43
 Ngaire Wood‘s (1995) early work on economic ideas in international relations proposed a new 
research agenda that included explanations of why some ideas make an international career 
whereas other don‘t but stopped short of theorizing on diffusion and focused instead on theorizing 




(emulation) given policy failure attributable to competing ideas (the failure of 
Keynesian reflationary policies).  
McNamara‘s argument is intuitive and is backed with much evidence, yet 
it is problematic in that it consistenly plays down the contentious nature of 
emulation. In other words why didn‘t French indicative planners put up a stronger 
fight? Why did Dutch Keynesians defect? Why was the German model the most 
compelling given that Austro-Keynesianism was arguably doing just as well? 
Economic history is rife with policymakers persisting in reproducing harmful 
paradigms (think Japan during the 1990s), so policy failure is a weak causal 
factor. Also missing from this book is a theory of agency: Who diffused 
monetarist ideas and how? And why were diffusers more successful than others? 
During the second half of the 2000s, constructivists began to learn from 
scholars in other social science fields (sociology, policy studies, legal studies, 
business studies) who have focused more systematically on the transnational 
diffusion of ideas through economics profession (Silva 1991; 2009; Valdes 1995; 
Montecinos 1997; Babb 2001; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Fourcade 2006; Kogut 
and MacPherson 2004; 2008). This literature showed that new economic ideas are 
not mimetically replicated, but spread through graduate education in Anglo-
American economics departments. Many of these scholars have shown how the 
investments made by US foundations in the training of Latin economists in US 
graduate programs was crucial for the ascendancy of neoliberal economic ideas in 
the region. In turn, those ideas form the interpretive grille through which these 




propose new policy solutions after they returned home and enjoyed the hybrid 
status as politicians and technocrats (―technopols‖).
 44
  
These insights were recently taken up by some IPE constructivists. 
Writing on capital account liberalization, Jeffrey Chwieroth (2007) put the 
epistemic community dissertation to a quantitative test across tens of emerging 
economies and found that graduate degrees in conservative American economic 
departments strongly correlated with neoliberal reforms at home provided the 
returning graduates controlled economic policy institutions.
45
 In a more recent 
contribution, the same author merged the epistemic communities literature with 
Barnett and Finnemore‘s (2004) arguments about IOs as norm advocates and gave 
constructivist IPE a theory of how the economic ideas of international 
organizations like the IMF are shaped by specific intraorganizational 
processesand by the prevailing ideas inside the profession from which the staff is 
recruited (Chwieroth 2009).
 46
  Chwieroth‘s most important theoretical 
contribution was to show that IMF ideas about how to proceed to a particular goal 
(sequenced change, ―shock therapy‖), are not static, but change in response to real 
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 It was argued that not only do US universities lend domestic economists prestigious credentials 
and access to expensive information. As studies of training in economics evidence (Colander and 
Klamer 1987; Colander 2005; 2009), they also restructure their professional identities through 
apprenticeship, a claim backed with extensive evidence drawn from social network sociology 
showing that one of the main effects of participation in such social networks is the increase in the 
likelihood of reproducing network ideas (White 1992: 67; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
Carley 1999; White 2002; Breiger 2000). In sum, new economic ideas travel through networks of 
economists tied together by shared graduate education experiences. 
45
 Chwieroth advanced the epistemic communities literature by specifying the conditions that 
facilitate the implementation of expert interpretations into policy: the formation of an intellectually 
homogenous policymaking team dominated by like-minded economists in key bureaucratic 
positions. Intellectual homogeneity (―coherence‖) is considered key because in the absence of 
competing ideas the chief of government and other politicians will receive consistent advice about 
what options are ―correct‖ and will be better positioned to resist various political constraints 
(coalition government, opposing societal groups). 
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 Chwieroth lists like professionalization, administrative recruitment, adaptation, learning and 




world events. By contrast, normative ideas about what the goals of policy (capital 
control, capital freedom) rarely change. 
Other constructivists incidentally interested in diffusion sought to 
emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the ―epistemic communities‖ 
framework. For example, the research of Diane Stone and colleagues on the 
formation of global knowledge networks among economists, IOs, think-tanks and 
research institutes complicated the problem of diffusion agency (Stone 1999; 
Stone and Denham 2004; Stone and Maxwell 2005). Also, Rawi Abdelal‘s (2005; 
2007) study of capital account liberalization showed that the formulation and 
diffusion of a global ideational consensus around this institution was not powered 
by the ―usual suspects‖: US financial firms, US Treasury, professional 
economists, policymakers trained in US-style economics. While it was neoliberal 
economists who crafted these ideas, advocacy was made possible and carried out 
by the intellectual creativity of a tight network of domestically-trained French 
Socialist civil servants who came to define capital controls as a ―prison‖ for the 
working class and then went on to occupy leading positions in the IMF, the EU 
and OECD. 
In sum, in less than a decade constructivists have come  along way in 
defining the conduits through which economic ideas flow across borders. At the 
same time, this scholarship remains plagued by three problems: an excessively 
narrow spectrum of diffusers, an overemphasis on the replication of the ideas to 
be diffused, and, relatedly, a problematic assumption that domestic ―receivers‖ 





The Problems of Constructivist Research on the Spread of Neoliberalism 
The first critique concerns the excessively narrow spectrum of agents who ―do 
diffusion:‖ the bulk of scholarship on the spread of neoliberalism looks at 
economists and international organizations as the main transnational carriers of 
neoliberal ideas. Anchored in Ernest Haas‘(1992) work on epistemic communities 
and in Philip Abbott‘s (1988) research on professions, the literature on the 
transnationalization of economics attempted to illuminate the processes through 
which quasi-closed groups, tools and worksites associated with the economics 
profession tried to establish exclusive jurisdiction over debates on what economic 
ideas are legitimate (Markoff and Montecions 1993; Valdes 1995; Babb 2001; 




Other scholars looked at international organizations not just as wielding 
the ―stick‖ of policy conditionality, but also as ―teachers‖ of the neoliberal 
development program (Broome and Seabrooke 2007; Epstein 2008; Orenstein 
2008).
48
  Thus, Rachel Epstein‘s (2008) work on central bank independence in 
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 Some argued that since modern economic policymaking is riddled with situations of uncertainty 
that require technical authority and/or skill, governments tend to rely on the advice of economists 
about what policies are possible and desirable (Hall et al 1989; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 
2007). Others, by contrast, have highlighted the path of calculus: policymakers appeal to 
economists because they calculate that, by delegating to economists, they will make their 
economic policy choices more credible to international official and private creditors whenever 
there is an international policy consensus on the matter of relevance (Markoff and Montecions 
1993; Babb 2001).This study takes an agnostic position on this debate
47
 and focuses on both types 
of situations: critical junctures when the intellectual, political and economic uncertainty was at its 
highest and situations when uncertainty was lower but the government badly needed the resources 
of some external actor. 
48
 The foundational work of Finnemore and Barnett (2004) alerted scholars to an overlooked 
function of IOs: the deployment of cultural and technical expertise with the intent of spreading 




Poland showed how the World Bank and the European Commission were decisive 
in using social learning to diffuse the norms and the discourses that underlie this 
institutional innovation as well as in defending them against domestic challengers. 
Mitchell Orenstein made similar arguments, albeit embedded in a more eclectic 
epistemiology, about the spread of pension privatization from Chile to former 
socialist countries (2008).   
Other constructivists (Seabrooke 2007; Broome and Seabrooke 2007; 
Chwieroth 2009) showed that the IMF does not ―broadcast‖ blunt and seamless 
interpretations of the Washington Consensus, as some had argued (Woods 2000; 
Feldstein 1999; Stieglitz 2002). Instead, this organization used context-specific 
interpretive templates for different types of economies and encouraged country 
missions to factor local circumstances into their analyses. Similarly, Catherine 
Weaver‘s (2008) study on the institutional hypocrisy of the World Bank usefully 
distinguished between the ―espoused theories‖ of IO and ―theories in use‖ that 
drive the actual work. In these studies, the IMF and the World Bank appear as 
more reflexive, internally contested and context-sensitive economic idea diffusers 
than is commonly understood. 
                                                                                                                                     
diagnoses and metrics for tackling existing problems in accordance with these new ideas, and 
assisting local agents with policy implementation.
48
 To perform these functions, IOs can target the 
state via the training of government technocracies or the establishment of relationships of 
knowledge dependence with state institutions via privileged access to datasets or analysis 
techniques. At the same time, Finnemore and Barnett show that IOs are equally likely to target 
societal groups (employer organizations, the media, the non-profit sector and even unions) in their 
advocacy activities, while Broome and Seabrooke (2007: 583-584) focus on the practice of policy 
feedback loops deployed by IOs like the IMF.  To sum up, both international economic 
organizations and transnational communities of economists shape the domestic infrastructure of 
ideas, but one can expect that only IOs are institutionally fit to carry out idea advocacy both inside 




Yet in addition to these ―technoscientific‖ prime movers of neoliberal 
ideas, the transnational channels for for the flow of economic ideas are often 
populated by amateurs or second hand dealers. Linkages formed between 
domestic think-tanks and external advocates as well as transnational party 
networks can play an important role as well.  
Thus, research shows that despite being often staffed by marginal and 
amateur economists, economic think-tanks have been extensively studied as 
domestic generators of new policy ideas (Cockett 1984; Weaver 1989; Desai 
1990; Abelson 2000; McGann and Weaver 2000; Ullrich 2002; Struyk 1999; 
Kimball 2000; Krastev 2000; McGann and Weaver 2000; Sandle 2002; Widmeier 
2007). Yet outside a few disparate contributions in policy studies (Struyk 2002; 
Kenis and Schneider 1991; Stone 2000), the role of think-tanks as bricoleurs of 
foreign economic ideas remains largely unexplored. 
49
  
Similarly, no research has been done on role of transnational political 
party networks as facilitators of the translation of neoliberal ideas. This is 
surprising given research showing that transnational party networks have been 
responsible for considerable agenda coordination at the EU level and elite-level 
interaction within European party networks is extremely high (Mair 2000; Goetz 
2000; Ladrech 2002; Raunio 2002; Ishiyama 2006). Unfortunately, this 
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 This gap is striking in the light of the fact that these private institutions grew in importance after 
the end of the Cold War, when NGO participation in domestic and international policy-making 
was seen as holding the promise of democratization of both domestic politics and of global 








The second critique of the existing constructivist approach to the spread of 
economic ideas concerns the relationship between ideas to be diffused and the 
domestic adopters themselves. This literature assumes that domestic adopters take 
for granted the ideas to be diffused, as if they were locked scripts. Working with 
this assumption, the traditional way of defining transnational idea diffusion has 
been the following: ideas spread as they are broadcasted from innovators to a 
broad spectrum of users in universally applicable formats through impersonal 
channels and purely relational patterns (Boli and Meyer 1987; Strang and Meyer 
1993: 137; Strang and Mayer 1993; Soule 1997; 2005; Strang and Soule 1998; 
Drori et al 2003). 
Constructivist IR scholarship on the diffusion of liberal norms (Risse-
Kappen 1994; Cortell and Davies 1996; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Checkel 
1998; Legro 1997; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004) 
and a few constructivist contributions in IPE (Epstein 2004; 2005; 2009) largely 
reproduced this ―thin‖ definition of diffusion from sociology, although some 
qualified it by emphasizing local mediation through attention paid to 
―congruence‖ or ―goodness of fit‖ between emerging global norms and domestic 
norms (Checkel 1998).
51
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 The case of the European socialist and social-democratic parties is particularly significant, 
because, in relation to other transnational party networks, the Party of European Socialists (the 
pan-European network of left of center parties) is notorious for having the most advanced level of 
interaction among its members (Mair 2000). 
51
 The central hypodissertation of this scholarship is that norm diffusion is ―more rapid when …a 




This position is problematic because it does not capture the realistic 
possibility that when ideas travel from one site to another, the receiving actors can 
hardly be assumed to passively ―sign for delivery‖ and then go on and use the 
ideas handed down to them without performing any alterations.
52
 Instead, as 
Gabriel Tarde said, in rather quaint language, more than a century ago: 
―imitations get transformed as they pass on from one race or nation to another‖ 
(Tarde 2001: 82).
53
 More specifically, when the ideas to be diffused do not 
resonate with domestic ideas, it does not matter that they will not diffuse, only 
that they can be made to resonate by ideational entrepreneurs or not.
54
 A study on 
the diffusion of human rights in Asia published in International Organization 
showed that domestic translators are not deterred by an inadequate ideational 
match between external ideational innovations and domestic ideas (Achary 2004). 
Instead, they may engage in localization, a process that ―may start with a 
reinterpretation and representation of the outside norm, including framing and 
grafting, but may extend into more complex processes of reconstitution to make 
an outside norm congruent [my emphasis] with a preexisting local normative 
order‖ (Acharya 2004: 244).  
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 See Fourcade 2006; Bockman and Eyal 2002; Czarniawska and Joerges 1996; Sevon 1996; 
Sahlin-Andersson 1996; Djelic 1998; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Campbell 2004, ch. 3, Sahlin-
Andersson and Engvall 2002; Czarniawska and Sevon 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; 
Pedersen and Campbell 2006; Campbell 2009. 
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 Curiously, Tarde‘s foundational insight of diffusion theory was forgotten in sociological studies 
on the transnational diffusion of ideas recently, when it was rediscovered first by Westney‘s 
(1987) classic study of the diffusion of Western practices during the Meiji era. 
54
 As John Campbell (2009) put it, such a narrow diffusionist approach does not tell us:―[…] what 
happens when an institutional principle or practice arrives at an organization‗s door step and is 
prepared by that organization for adoption.  Here the story often ends and it is assumed that the 
principle or practice is simply adopted uncritically.  We are left, then, with a black box in which 
the mechanisms whereby new principles and practices are actually put into use and 




Closer to home, Marion Fourcade (2006) showed that when they are 
diffused, economic ideas are disembedded from their original context, objectified 
or formalized in order to seem universal and thus made to travel more easily. 
However, Fourcade cautioned, the diffused ideas can also be expected to be 
tampered with by domestic ―bricoleurs‖ as they travel through various 
institutional contexts, with these phases often taking place simultaneously. . In 
this view, domestic actors do not simply cut-and-paste new economic ideas 
developed in foreign ―labs.‖ The work of bricoleurs has important practical 
consequences as it may result in considerable hybridization and even 
mistranslation.  
Finally, some critics of the neo-institutionalist literature on isomorphism 
point out to an internal contradiction: actors are assumed as reflexive but at the 
same time its empirical models work with an active ―Northern‖ core of authors 
and advocates and a passive ―Southern‖ periphery of recipients. Or, as Bockman 
and Eyal (2002) noted, one can‘t be simultaneously reflexive and passive. Their 
Latourian study of the spread of neoclassical economic in Eastern Europe during 




These criticisms serve as a basis for building an analytical framework that 
brings domestic actors back in the study of the transnational spread of neoliberal 
economic ideas.  
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 Moreover, it is submitted, in this co-production Western and Eastern scholars crafted, brokered, 
and reproduced the theoretical pillars of neoliberalism by forming transnational epistemic 
networks whose internal dynamics  mixed vertical (hegemonic) power relations and horizontal 





The Mechanisms of Translation 
Overview 
This study claims that neoliberal economic ideas do not remain unchanged 
through diffusion, but are actively translated in the context of other ideas, 
traditions and institutions. The result is not homogenization, but variation in the 
adoption of the economic program. To reach this conclusion I have built 
contextualized causal mechanisms that I believe best describe the processes by 
which neoliberal ideas travel across national contexts.  
Contextualized causal mechanisms are concepts or patterns of action that 
explain why and how a hypothesized cause contributes to a particular outcome 
and in a particular context (Tilly 2001: 26).
56
 These mechanisms do not lead to 
the outcome by themselves, but through interaction with each other and the 
temporal and non-temporal contexts within which they operate. However, the 
outcomes of processes cannot be determined a priori by knowing just the type of 
mechanism at work (Elster 1998; Faletti and Johnson 2009).
57
 Drawing on Faletti 
and Johnson‘s (2009)‘s work on causal mechanisms, my explanation of the 
transnational diffusion of ideas relies on two mechanisms that interact with each 
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 This perspective differs from the one employed by King, Keohane and verba (1994: 85-87) and 
Kitschelt (2003), for whom mechanisms are but a chain of intervening variables that connect the 
original posited variable with the effect. For a critique see Mahoney (2001) and Faletti and 
Johnson (2009). 
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 As Faletti and Johnson (2009: 1165) put it, ―[c]ausal mechanisms by themselves do not cause 
outcomes to occur; rather, the interaction between causal mechanisms and context does. We see 
causal mechanisms as being ontologically different from intervening variables. Whereas variables 
measure attributes of specific cases, causal mechanisms uncover the underlying social processes 
 that connect inputs and outcomes. As such, causal mechanisms are distinct from both inputs and 
outputs; they are portable and so may operate in different contexts. But depending on the nature 




other, are portable across contexts, and produce different results depending on the 
context in which they ―travel.‖ Both these mechanisms are the related to the 
institutional conditions in which ideas shape policy. 
The first mechanism is translation and refers to the content and form of 
neoliberal ideas as they are adopted domestically. I define translation as the 
process through which new economic ideas developed by epistemic communities 
and practitioners and advocated for by transnational carriers are transformed for 
domestic use by cultural entrepreneurs called translators. Since my approach 
presumes contextualized causal mechanisms, I embed the translation mechanism 
in several interacting layers of context.  
The second mechanism is called elite transnationalization and refers to the 
process through which the domestic supply of translators is shaped by the opening 
of professional markets for economists and by the reconstruction of domestic 
epistemic fields in economics by graduate training in Western academic 
departments and other such forms of transnational teaching of neoliberal ideas. I 
further submit that in addition to the ―usual suspects‖ (Anglo-American-trained 
economists and IOs), the range of translators should be expanded to think-tanks 
and transnational party networks. 
 
Hypotheses 
The main point made here is that what is being transferred across borders 
is not pure ideas, but accounts of certain ideational innovations that undergo 




on several contributions in the scholarship on transnational ideational processes in 
sociology
58
 and international relations,
59
 this study highlights the role of 
translation as a reflexive and critical act of cultural entrepreneurship whereby 
domestic translators perform ―cultural matchmaking‖ between foreign and 
domestic ideas. Unlike ―diffusion,‖ a term that suggests top-down transmission of 
ideas and passive local recipients, ―translation‖ has the advantage of suggesting 
both the movement and the transformation of ideas (Latour 1996). 
To unpack the first macro-mechanism, I propose that three devices or sub-
mechanisms of translation are at work in translation: framing, grafting, and 
editing. All of these sub-mechanisms are directly observable in objects (such as 
articles, books and models authored by translators) and generate distinct research 
propositions. After I extract the hypotheses of this mechanism I present the 
second one. 
 
H1: Neoliberal ideas change through their grafting on pre-existing economic 
ideas 
 
Grafting is defined as a translation device that associates new economic ideas 
with preexisting ideas that are relevant for the same issue area of economic policy 
and make similar prohibitions or injunctions, even as local ideas are reconstructed 
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 See Latour 1986; 1987; Westney 1987; 1992; Czarniawska and Joerges 1996; Czarniawska and 
Sevon 1996; Sevon 1996; Sahlin-Andersson 1996; Djelic 1998; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 
2002; Bockman and Eyal 2002; Campbell 2009. 
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  The importance of the transnational spread of ideas and norms reached the more resistant 
subfield of international relations, in a strand of literature that emphasizes the interaction between 
the systemic level and the domestic levels of analysis (Risse-Kappen 1994; Klotz 1995; Cortell 




in accordance with neoliberal ideas. This device enables translators to recycle pre-
existing economic ideas that are consistent with neoliberalism. The expected 
result is the presentation of neoliberal ideas as if they were part of the domestic 
ideational stock, thus making neoliberalism seem less problematic in the domestic 
context. But grafting can also change neoliberal ideas by giving birth to hybrids 
between the local ideational ―rootstock‖ and the neoliberal ―stem.‖  
 
H2: Neoliberal ideas change through editing  
 
Editing brings to the fore the ability of network participants to devise dynamic 
interpretations of neoliberal ideas that overcome the problems raised by 
neoliberalism‘s poor domestic resonance with pre-existing economic ideas. It is 
hypothesized that through editing neoliberal economic ideas are transformed by 
translators in accordance with what they perceive to be domestically dominant 
ideational conventions. As a translation device, editing is defined as the 
reformulations of the neoliberal text in terms of its focus, content and meaning. 
But editing can also entail that contested ideas from the outer boundaries of the 
neoliberal paradigm can be made to seem uncontested and central to 
neoliberalism. Editing may produce mistranslations, hybrids and affect pre-
existing economic ideas as well. The results of this veritable intellectual bricolage 





H3: Neoliberal ideas change through their framing within domestic historical 
narratives 
 
In the theory chapter framing was posited as one of the devices of translation and 
was defined as the process through which translators make ideational innovations 
like neoliberalism seem local by using language and presentation styles that 
―bridge‖ domestic historical narratives with neoliberal ones. This translation 
device allows for a variety of outcomes that can range from the radicalization of 
ideas to its very opposite.   
So far, the analytical framework proposed states that neoliberal ideas are 
translated as they travel and that time, institutions and culture may limit the 
creativity of translation. Yet none of these processes take place in an agent-free 
world and one cannot simply assume the availability of a critical network of 
domestic translators able match the transnational advocates of neoliberalism and 
the domestic opponents of neoliberalism. Nevertheless such networks provide the 
likely routes for the travel of ideas and if the ―transformationalist‖ position 
assumed by the dissertation is correct, then one can expect that the supply of 
legitimate and credible translators can itself be changed by transnational 
advocates of neoliberalism. It is to these aspects that I now turn. 
 
 
H4: A high degree of transnationalization of the domestic policy actors increases 





Transnationalization is defined as the device through which domestic actors who 
shape policy (economists, political party leaders) become part of international 
networks of advocates for neoliberal ideas, thus expanding such networks to new 
jurisdictions.  External advocates facilitate this device by endowing potential local 
translators with superior material and professional resources and by 
reconstructing the boundaries of domestic epistemic authority.  
This selective endowment of potential translators may increase the pace of 
translation by creating incentives for the emergence of a critical mass of 
advocates for neoliberalism and weakening the solidarity of neoliberalism‘s 
opponents. Particularly important in this regard is the international certification 
granted by Western training and the formation of transnational ties among 
political parties. Similarly, in cases where the economics profession is divided 
and has a small supply of neoliberal advocates, external actors may enable 
amateur economists to claim epistemic authority and fill this gap. In both cases 
the result is an acceleration of the pace of translation.  
Transnational carriers of ideas may reduce their activities to reporting new 
ideas, but they may also become transnational translators by teaching domestic 
actors framing, grafting and editing strategies. Most importantly, however, they 
can alter the supply of domestic translators by offering them status, professional 
and material incentives. Building off of Fourcade‘s (2005) theoretical work on the 
transnationalization of economics, I propose that the main mechanism neoliberal 






 , or a process of transnational network expansion whereby 
Western-trained domestic economists and/or Western economists attached to 
Western public and private investments enter local debates with superior material 
and epistemic resources and marshal them to reconstruct the local boundaries of 
epistemic authority by ―revolutionizing the structure from within.‖  
The returning graduates can get top positions in the state and hire like-
minded economists or they can establish think-tanks with neoliberal economic 
agendas. And the more fluid and contestable the boundaries of the economic 
profession, the more the same argument can be applied to amateur economists in 
think-tanks or political parties.  
But while this study embraces the claim that the Western graduate 
education of domestic economists does the explanatory heavy-lifting in the spread 
of neoliberal ideas, it modifies it in two ways. 
 First, I argue that doctoral education obtained in a neoliberal economics 
department should not necessarily serve as the sole marker of socialization in 
Anglo-American ―orthodox‖ neoliberalism via education. Shorter socialization 
experiences like repeated short-term fellowships at neoliberal economic 
departments provided they are followed by other study trips or inclusion in other 
forms of transnational epistemic dialogue (e.g. joint research projects) can 
perform the same functions.  
Second, I submit that one does not have to map the entire field of 
economics to show what ideas mattered and when, as some have done (Babb 
2001; Prasad 2006). Given the challenges of missing data, two ―next best‖ 
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strategies have been proposed. First, the study of the ideas of the intellectually 
most prominent academic economists can provide a sensible base for assessing 
what constituted ―mainstream economics‖ at a given point in time. Rough 
measures of prominence can be obtained via the review of available scholarship 
on domestic intellectual history, the archives of domestic economic associations 
and the editorial boards of leading economic reviews. Second, I suggest that 
proximity to the centers of the policy-making process could be safely assumed to 
be the most straightforward criterion for determining what academic economists 
actually mattered to those making policy decisions. Consequently, my analysis 
focuses on the published work of economists who used the revolving door 
between academia and the relevant public policy institutions (the advising team of 
the head of state/premier, economic ministries, central bank, political party 
executive bodies).  
My operationalization of this hypodissertation also modifies the way in 
which IOs contribute to the spread of economic ideas. The bulk of the literature 
reviewed above focuses on the direct advocacy of neoliberal ideas by IO staff 
based in central headquarters or in country teams. I suggest that this work is done 
in more subtle ways as well. One is the continuous funding of domestic actors 
who use a neoliberal discourse even in the absence of their proven expertise. The 
other avenue is the offering of attractive appointments in Washington/Brussels for 
domestic economists judged to have chances to play important roles in 
government. Organizational theorists have shown that isolated episodes of 




incorporation into an organizational culture through professional appointment 
(Schein 1992). If this is so, the socialization experience represented by a three 
year appointment in the World Bank or substantial experience as a domestic 
World Bank consultant should matter more than lecturing by a local mission of 
World Bank staff.  
The study further proposes that think-tanks and transnational party 
networks can play important roles alongside foreign-trained economists and IOs. 
The first reason for this is that these organizations often secure consulting 
contracts and/or research grants from international organizations with a neoliberal 
agenda. More indirectly, they can spread neoliberal ideas by becoming significant 
points of reference for mass media.  
Third, I add to the existing scholarship the argument that the term 
―economic think-tank‖ should be loosely defined to incorporate ―decoy‖ 
operations whereby advocacy for economic ideas takes place within a cocoon of 
advocacy for less contentious causes. This can be the case of pro-democracy 
and/or development NGOs empowered by the spike in Western democracy 
assistance during the past three decades. To the extent that this assistance was 
based on normative claims that conflated democratization and economic 
liberalization, one can expect domestic ―pro-democracy‖ NGOs to develop 
economic think-tank functions. 
In the table below I devised markers of transnationalization for each of the 











TABLE 1: Markers of transnationalization 






Training in economics in 
foreign economics departments. 
Access to Western economics 
journals and books. 
Use of foreign economics 
textbooks in universities. 
Organization of international 
conventions of economists 
 
National membership in 
economic IOs 
Jobs in the IOs for bureaucrats, 
experts, academics.  
Training activities (seminars, 
conferences, funded research 
programs) carried out by 
economic IOs for bureaucrats, 
experts, academics. 
Establishment of domestic 




Institutional ties between 
party executive bodies or 
economic expert 
committees. 
Direct ties between top 
party leaders and the 
leaders of peer parties in 
the ‗North‘  
Bilateral ―teaching‖ of  
economic policy templates 
for national party leaders.  
Think-tank networks 
Participation of domestic think-
tanks in transnational think-tank 
activities. 
Endowment of local think-tanks 
with ‗Northern‘ think-tank 
resources (expert assistance, 
training, public status 
recognition, mediation of 
organizational networking with 
donors, funding, free exchange 
of information or the 







H5: The likelihood that neoliberal ideas serve as templates for economic 
policies  increases when the former are shared by an intellectually-coherent 
policy team in a cabinet that can effectively control economic policy decisions 
 
Recent studies of translation of economic ideas have brought into relief 
the importance of the institutional fields in which translation takes place. First, the 
nature of the revolving door between academia and government has been 
identified by Weir and Skocpol (1995) as an important contextual variable for the 
translation of new economic ideas into public policy. The bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime of Franco fostered a higher degree of integration between 
academic and policy fields than Ceausescu‘s neo-patrimonial one. One would 
therefore expect that provided that those legacies had path-dependent effects, the 
translation of neoliberalism by prominent economists should also reach inside 
policy institutions faster in Romania than in Spain.  
Second, building on previous work in political economy and sociology 
(Skocpol 1985: 9-14; Hall 1993: 290-291; Haggard and Williamson 1994: 594; 
Chwieroth (2001; 2009; 2010) has argued that the formation of a ―coherent 
policymaking team‖ inside the cabinet also shapes the impact on translation of 
new ideas on policy. Coherence means that a group of like-minded actors control 
the economic policy decision-making in the cabinet and the cabinet itself is 
institutionally autonomous from the pressures of competing actors who may 




will be struggle and delayed translation of neoliberalism in the policy arena. I 
further add that it is reasonable to expect that coherence is unlikely to protect 
translation processes from challengers if the policy process is not centralized in 
the cabinet and if the head of the cabinet does have institutional tools to shield the 
policy team from the potential challenges made by ruling party/coalition. 
 
Alternative Explanations and Null Hypotheses 
To falsify the causal claims posited above, I resorted to two strategies. First, I 
examined plausible alternative explanations that have been offered by previous 
scholarship on the two cases. In the case of Spain I looked at a rationalist account 
based on learning or ―cognitive updating‖ and at a culturalist one based on status 
imitation. In the case of Romania I reviewed an argument based on interest group 
preferences and one based on claims about diffusion as an effect of external and 
internal structural constraints. Also, each of the two main mechanisms are 
confronted with null hypotheses. The null hypodissertation of translation is that 
neoliberal ideas are simply replicated domestically, while the null 







The falsifiability of the causal claims made in this chapter is further bolstered 
with by employing a ―crucial case‖ strategy.
61
 The Spanish Socialist cabinets in 
the early 1990s were a ―least likely‖ case of adoption of neoliberal ideas about the 
economy because on all potential explanatory factors except the mechanisms of 
interest (translation of neoliberalism and elite transnationalization) the case is 
expected not to achieve the predicted outcome and yet does so. The opposite 
holds true for Romania. 
 Thus, in late October 1982 when the Socialists came to power, economic 
policy reforms inspired by neoliberal economics were the exception rather than 
the norm in countries where the Left was in office. Given that Spain had a 
bureaucratic state that survived the political transition and even developed a track 
record of fostering neocorporatist institutions, the kind of demand-side policies 
that call for effective state institutions and state-capital-labor coordination were 
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 The crucial case methodology is superior to Mill‘s methods in terms of its causal strength as it 
provides ―perhaps the strongest sort of evidence possible in a non-experimenting, single-case 
setting.‖(Gerring 2004: 155). This approach does away with a host of ―apples and oranges‖ kin of 
reservations. Examples include: upper middle income (Spain early 80s) versus lower middle 
income (postcommunist Romania), corporatist developmentalist legacy (Spain) versus neo-
Stalinist developmentalist legacy (Romania), ―pacted‖ and relatively fast democratic 
transition(Spain) versus violent and relatively slow democratic transition (Romania), anti-
authoritarian regime party (PSOE) versus authoritarian regime successor party (FSN), labor-
socialist party alliance (Spain) versus no such alliance (Romania), highly organized and 
economically dominant private capital (Spain) versus weakly organized and economically 
unimportant private capital (Romania).  Furthermore, Spain in the early 1980s and early 1990s 
Romania shared a number of characteristics: semi-peripheral economic position in the European 
economy, a politically dominant and internally centralized left party, very weak political 
opposition, weak Parliaments, proportional electoral system. The choice for Spain and Romania 
also has the advantage of holding constant a structural factor identified by some historical 
institutionalists (Weir 1989) as a good predictor of which idea will win in the domestic arena: 
career promotion versus political appointment in the higher echelons of the public bodies in 
charge with economic policy.  In both countries the high positions in the policy-making scene 
(secretaries of state and undersecretaries of state) were political appointees rather than civil 
servants. This means that the opportunities for dramatic policy shifts following a change in the 




feasible. PSOE had made its ideological transition from programmatic Marxism 
to social democracy barely three years erlier (Gillespie 1990; Linz and Stepan 
1996; Boix 1998; Marvall 1993) and, in 1982, it was far from obvious that 
European social-democracy had opened up to neoliberalism.
62
 In fact, other ―in-
group‖ governments (Mediterranean socialist governments in the early 1980s) 
adopted Keynesian policies upon entering office.
63
  
Furthermore, the party had close institutional relations to the Socialist 
labor union UGT. Or, unlike in other middle income states, union demands for a 
more expansionist economic policy could not have been vetoed by international 
financial institutions as Spain had no conditionality agreements with the IMF and 
the World Bank. On the same note, while EC membership was on the agenda, 
PSOE embraced supply-side socialism before the generalization of supply-side 
preferences at the EC level (a process that unfurled after 1986). Finally, the 1979 
oil crisis provided a relatively mild exogenous shock to the Spanish economy and 
while the macroeconomic fundamentals looked worse than before the crisis, they 
were nevertheless comparable with those of East European economies that had 
tried heterodox reforms in the early 1990s. 
By contrast, Romania under the ex-communists seems like a ―most likely‖ 
case of adoption of neoliberal reforms. The ex-communists came to office when 
neoliberalism was at its historical apex. Heterodox reforms had been tried in Latin 
America but they were short-lived, while most postcommunist states, including 
Russia, embarked on radical market reforms. In Europe, it was only in Slovenia, 
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 See annex for a more detailed discussion. 
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Bulgaria and Romania, all of them ruled by ex-communists, that heterodox 
reforms were given a second chance. Finally, while the oil crises of the 1970s 
certainly weakened the Spanish economy, the collapse of Romania‘s Eastern 
European markets and the embargo on Yugoslavia had a much more devastating 
impact on the Romanian economy. 
Also, by contrast with PSOE, the Romanian ex-communists did not have a 
clear ideology, had no institutionalized links with labor and their governments 
faced both IFI conditionality and a boycott of international capital markets. 
Private capital had a very small slice of the economy and its organizations were 
weak. By contrast with the relatively strong Spanish bureaucratic state, the 
Romanian state, with its Sultanist legacy of neopatrimonialism and weak 
administrative capacity
64
 appeared to many as clearly in need of a neoliberal 
shock treatment.  
   
Methodology 
There is currently a gap between quantitative and qualitative methods in IPE. 
While other studies of macro-political processes in political science oscillate 
between quantitative and qualitative methods,
65
 most studies on diffusion in 
political economy are quantitative. 
66
 But as a recent review of quantitative 
scholarship on diffusion shows, the problem is that quantitative ―methodological 
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 See Linz and Stepan 1996; Tismaneanu 1990; 2004; Davies 2005. 
65
 Examples include such as processes as war (Starr and Most 1976; Siverson and King 1980), 
human rights norms (Price 1998; Acharya 2004), environmental standards (Prakash and Potoski 
2006), democratization (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006) 
66
 Few political economists have ventured to probe diffusion via case studies. Examples include 
Weyland (2005; 2007; 2009) and Orenstein‘s (2008) examinations of the cross national diffusion 




sophistication has probably plateaued given the available data‖ and ―the nature of 
diffusion processes cannot be elucidated satisfactorily unless broad patterns can 
be supported by detailed information on the underlying dynamics‖ (Gilardi 2010).  
How can this ―detailed information on the underlying dynamics‖ be 
obtained vis-à-vis the diffusion of economic ideas?  A rather obvious point is that 
case studies lend themselves to identifying how diffusing ideas are domestically 
translated into local practice much better than quantitative approaches. Also, as 
Meyer and colleagues admitted (Meyer et al 1997: 645), quantitative studies may 
determine the degree to which diffusion occurs among states but not of the causal 
sequences through which diffusion occurs.   
 
Comparative historical analysis  
Within each case, I analyze sequences of events and the intervening mechanisms 
that link the Western roots of neoliberal economics in Western epistemic centers 
and their translation in specific domestic policy settings. This analysis involves 
three steps. First, I describe the association between external advocacy for 
neoliberal ideas and the swift and broad embrace of those ideas by the domestic 
policy elites. But only by doing this one cannot know for certain whether the 




Therefore, in step two I next set out to define the specific mechanisms 
through which these economic ideas thus ―broadcasted‖ alter the domestic 
ideational landscape to the point of causing a shift with path-dependent effects. At 
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this point I will map out the form in which the new ideas are ―indigenized‖ and 
examine translation as the main mechanism through which transnaltion changed 
the parameters of domestic debate on what economic ideas best diagnose the 
causes of the perceived economic crisis and provide policy templates for an 
―exit.‖  
While I do not purport to provide a systematic framework for the 
institutionalization of ideas across all relevant categories of interests, in the third 
step I nevertheless show that the main stakeholders in the economic policy 
process embraced neoliberal ideas and reproduced them even as evidence was 
mounting against them. 
 
Levels of analysis  
The empirical base of this study is relatively narrow and focused: the individual 
and the institutional channels through which the ideas put forward by the largely 
Anglo-American neoliberal economics gathered recognition among domestic 
policy actors. Following Lawrence Stone‘s (1971), Bruno Latour‘s (1988) and 
Dezelay and Garth‘s (2005) methodological justification of ―revealing social 
biographies‖, my excursus focuses on the social trajectories of economists who 
shaped economic policy debates from such vantage points as government, 
academia or the third sector. Then, I ―plug‖ these individual social biographies 
into networks spun by domestic organizations (central banks, government 




neoliberal economic flows (international organizations, foreign state agencies, 
Western academic communities and think-tanks, foreign political parties).  
Working with four types of actors across three cases may raise questions 
about the elegance of the dissertation. This is an important point, yet one that 
should not be dramatized. For if one takes seriously the proposition that economic 
policy decisions implicate both domestic and transnational actors and if empirical 
investigation reveals several layers of agency involved in decision-making, then 
there are good reasons to accept that accurate research and fear of too many 
moving parts should not live side by side.
68
 At the same time, while I am in 
agreement with those constructivists who take seriously the interaction effects 
between policy elites and mass publics (Seabrooke 2006; 2007; Widemeier 2007: 
749; Blyth forthcoming), I nevertheless refrained from engaging with the role of 
mass publics due to lack of systematic and reliable data.  
 
Data  
The evidence collected for this dissertation comes from secondary literature, 
archival research and interviews. The data was obtained during successive waves 
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 I reached this conclusion by satisfying the orthodox methodological call for moving between 
theory and data in building hypotheses. First, when I researched the story of Romanian tax and 
labor reforms in the early 2000s I found that a classic political economy position on why matters 
the most (state, labor, capital) led me nowhere. By contrast, when IOs, transnational business 
networks, transnational epistemic communities and think tanks were brought into the equation I 
could see better who made the rules, how and at what critical juncture. Second, the existence of 
exemplary scholarship that navigated several levels of analysis and types of agency on tightly-
defined policy areas (Dezelay and Garth 2005; Orenstein 2008; Woods 2009) helped me overcome 
the fear that the dissertation would implode under its own weight. Therefore, I integrated a high 
number of types of potential agents while tightly limiting the number of policy issue areas to three 




of fieldwork between 2008 and 2009.
69
 For data on economics scholarship in the 
two countries I relied on leading professional journals.
70
 In addition to traditional 
archival research, I carried out in-depth research on the web archives of the 
central banks of the two countries, of PSOE and PSD, as well as of the non-state 
actors and international organizations analyzed in the dissertation.  
 To determine the impact of ideas, I used secondary literature from the 
field of international economic history to establish the crucial junctures marking 
the intellectual marginalization in Western economics of economic paradigms 
mandating state intervention (Keynesianism, structuralism) and the dominance of 
schools of thought associated with neoliberalism (the new neoclassical 
syndissertation, monetarism, public choice).
71
  
At the same time, this data did not lend itself to the accurate 
documentation of whether paradigmatic shifts in Western economics were 
actually translated into the Spanish economics profession and its Romanian 
counterpart a decade later. To fill in this gap, I used a three-pronged strategy. 
First, I made a list of the economic policymakers in the state institutions of 
interest: (1) ministries of finance, economic reform and labor, (2) advising boards 
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 In July and August 2009 I conducted archival research on partially declassified documents at the 
Fundaccion Pablo Iglesias in Madrid (Alcala de Henares), where the archives of PSOE are stored. 
The archives of the PSD remain classified, and consequently I relied on the party‘s public records, 
which are available at Institutul de Studii Social-Democrate in Bucharest. Both these institutions 
have been very helpful in providing me with interview contacts.  
70
 My historical analysis would not have been possible without access to the print and electronic 
archives of two popular dailies for each country (Adevarul and Romania libera in Romania, El 
Pais and ABC in Spain). 
71
 This entailed using secondary literature on what constituted the dominant school of economic 
thought in prestigious American and West European economics professional associations as well 
as in the most prestigious economic departments of North America and Western Europe. To the 
extent that domestic Spanish and Romanian academic economists and economic policymakers 
were members of or were educated in these venues, this descriptive exercise was able to document 




for the prime-minister‘s and president‘s office, (3) central bank governors and 
chief economists during the historical periods of interest for this dissertation. 
Then, using biographical data (CVs, published (auto)biographies, interview data), 
I determined which of these policymakers had educational or professional 
experience with international teachers of economic ideas. 
72
 
 Key informant interviewing (Whittier 1995; Johnston and Klandermans 
1995) emerged as the natural variety of semi-structured interview.
73
 Given the 
relatively high number of relevant informants, I self-consciously selected the ones 
who, in the view of local experts, were reputed to have rich knowledge 
(institutional memory, access to wider social network etc) of the processes under 
analysis.
74
 In my semi-structured interviews I also strove to follow the principle 
of similarity and dissimilarity (Rubin and Rubin 1995) in that I chose key 
informants that were similarly situated vis-à-vis the process under analysis so that 
I could have access to potentially alternative explanatory pathways. Perhaps the 
most important benefit of this approach was that it allowed me to take seriously 
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 More specifically, I looked into whether these actors had (1) undergraduate, graduate or 
postgraduate education in economics in Western European or US universities and/or (2) had 
worked for an IFI or international think tanks and/or (3) was an active member in transnational 
professional networks of economists. This result was the building of a small self-generated 
longitudinal dataset linking these actors‘ international ideational experiences and their policy 
positions in their home countries.  
73
 This is because the topic required that the main criterion used in selecting the population of 
interviewees should be the importance of their role in processes of idea diffusion, translation, 
policy adoption etc. 
74
 While some interviewees were recruited by phone or email, most ended up on my interview list 
via my snowball and stratification strategies. Before each interview, I emailed each interviewee a 
message on what the research project was about, why the interview was important, what kind of 
questions I would ask and what were the ground rules of the interview. Upon receiving consent, I 
sent out a second letter/email to thank for the opportunity and to establish a date for the interview. 
At the end of each interview I asked the informants about whether there were any further relevant 
areas to be touched and which I had not yet mentioned. Each interview was prepared in advance 
with a list of questions as well as question-specific objectives edited in small print on the actual 
interview guide to be used during the interview. The questions and the objectives were continually 




Michael Burawoy‘s (1991) call to see the informants‘ answers not merely as 
―data‖, but as opportunities to revise and extend the proposed approach. My 
interviews used a narrative mode based on mutual trust and mutuality. In two 
cases, I chose the conflict methodology used by critical studies because the lack 
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 I recorded in digital form 19 of the 28 interviews (see annex for a complete list of used 
interviews. The reasons why I preferred notes to recording included noise (the interviews were 
taken in cafes or noisy offices), explicit rejection of the recording procedure by the interviewee, or 
apparent reserve towards the interviewer. I also took notes of ―off the record‖ comments. In 
processing the interview answers I devised the following methodological algorithm: (1). Listing of 
the sources of contamination (e.g. motives, incentives for censored responses, interviewer effects) 
for each interviewee. (2) Triangulation of interview information with external sources (e.g. press 







This dissertation departed from my dissatisfaction with existing scholarship on 
economic policy shifts in middle-income states. The study found that rationalist 
and materialist approaches in political economy are good at explaining how 
exogenous shocks and their domestic institutional mediation destabilize the 
existing institutional status quo, Yet I embraced the constructivist critique that the 
settlement of a crisis of the institutional status quo is not a mere function of 
structural conditions and that the terms of the settlement cannot be understood 
without looking at how non-material factors (economic ideas) are deployed to 
make sense of the crisis in the first place.  
To understand how economic ideas shape the ensuing institutional 
outcomes, I built a new analytical framework for studying the transnational 
diffusion, domestic translation and subsequent institutionalization of economic 
ideas in the policy sphere of middle-income European countries. This objective 
was reached by formulating six research propositions and their attached 
observable implications for the context of Spanish and Romanian economic 
transitions. These hypotheses refine the constructivist state-of-the art by 
theorizing the mechanisms through which transnational governance networks 
remake domestic ideational orders, so that ideational congruence emerges 












Chapter III - The Puzzle and the Background of Spanish Neoliberalism 
I. Spanish Neoliberalism and Its Causes  
Overview 
The success of liberalizing economic reforms in Spain is one of the most 
important transformations of European political economy given this country‘s 
somewhat extreme history of interventionism throughout the 20
th
 century. Both 
authoritarian and democratic regimes made the liberalizing reforms possible, yet 
it is now clear that it was the Socialist governments that definitively 
institutionalized a liberal economic project that turned Spain into the ninth largest 
economy in the world on the cusp of the 20
th
 century.  
This was a project that corresponded neither to the then emerging 
Washington Consensus, nor to the party‘s initial dirijiste and democratic socialist 
agenda. By intervening both on the supply-side and the demand side of the 
economy, while adhering to neoliberalism‘s strictest macroeconomic theses, the 
Socialists showed that the global economic orthodoxy of the last three decades is 
not inconsistent with forms of state intervention that are reminiscent of pre-
neoliberal days.  
This is more than an Iberian story. The strategy to embed neoliberal 
reform in state interventions, to keep inflation, deficit and tariffs down, while 
promoting production growth through active supply-side interventions, to give up 




expanding the welfare state and increasing public sector employment characterize 
the more recent developments in the global South (Snyder 1999; Macario et al 
2000; Rodrik 2004; Schrank and Kurtz 1995; Katz and Brooks 2008). Similarly, 
privatization had a distinct statist flavor, with the state maintaining its role in 
firms it considered as having the potential to be globally competitive 
(Etchemendy 2005).The march of neoliberalism, it seems, has not been uniform 
across policy sectors. 
Yet the building of Spain‘s ―embedded neoliberalism‖ in Spain was 
unique in two ways. First, Spanish governments created a welfare state that is 
much closer to Northern European standards than the welfare states of emergent 
economies. Second, in Spain the embedding of neoliberalism began not after the 
trial of ―disembedded‖ Washington Consensus policies, as it happened throughout 
Latin America and Asia, but after ―embedded liberalism‖ began to take root on a 
wave of popular mobilization.  To shift away from an economic paradigm that 
promised employment and onerous social compensations towards one that made 
no such promises required an institutional matrix that centralized economic policy 
in the hands of a cohesive policy team and effectively suppressed the opposition 
of labor unions and of PSOE‘s own leftist voices.  
 
The Orthodox Explanation 
This study challenges the popular argument that PSOE‘s route to embedded 
neoliberalism was inevitable in the structural and ideological context of the early 




orthodox macroeconomic policy had been the result of the pragmatic conversion 
of PSOE‘s top leadership in 1982 from Keynesianism to qualified neoliberalism 
via a process of rational learning from the experience of others. This entails a 
purposive search for a solution to economic problems, the choice of a solution 
based on observed experience and a better understanding of which policies may 
lead to particular outcomes (Mesenguer 2005: 73).
76
 In the Spanish case one can 
expect to see Spanish policy elites as changing their beliefs as to what was 
economically desireable after factoring in three new information items: the French 
experience, the swing to neoliberalism of European social-democrats and 
deteriorating structural problems of the Spanish economy in the second half of 
1982.  
 
Learning from Mitterand‟s Debacle? 
The argument about the ―crucial case study‖ represented by the French 
reflationary ―experiment‖ was succinctly formulated by Miguel Boyer, PSOE‘s 
finance minister between 1982 and 1985 in two much quoted interventions in two 
Spanish economic reviews (1983; 1984).
77
 Boyer argued that the attack on the 
peseta in the fall of 1982 and the faltering French Keynesian reforms made the 
expansionary measures promised in the 1982 election manifesto eminently self-
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 Such processes have recently been regarded as key mechanisms of transnational diffusion of 
neoliberalism (Levi-Faur 2005; Messenguer 2005; 2008). 
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defeating. The same view was shared by industry minister Carlos Solchaga (1997) 
and by labor minister Joaquin Almunia (2001).
78
  
Jose Maria Maravall, a political scientist and minister of education in the 
González government, used his insider perspective to endorse the conversion 
dissertation in his scholarship when he claimed that: 
 
 "[i]n spite of the economic crisis, in the summer of 1982 and before the 
general elections in October González still believed that the future government 
would have a considerable margin of maneuver for expansion, for increases in 
public expenditure, and for substantial job creation" but "by September the future 
minister of the economy, Miguel Boyer, gradually came to know the real depth of 
the crisis" (Maravall, 1993: 95). 
 
Charles Boix‘ classic study of PSOE‘s economic policies reinforced the 
conversion/‖cognitive updating‖ dissertation: 
 
 [t]he fiasco of the French reflationary attempt just a year before 
convinced the government that expansionary policies could be attempted 
by one country alone only at the risk of incurring a high economic and 
electoral cost (Boix 1998: 108).  
 
Similarly, Sophia Perez argued that 
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 In his memoirs, Joaquin Almunia unequivocally acknowledges that as a minister of labor he 





The back-stepping of the French Socialist policy in late 1982 
seemed to illustrate the impossibility of national Keynesianism 
in a context in which governments in the other major world 
economies were imposing monetary and fiscal austerity; a 
perception that was bolstered by an increase in speculative 
pressure against the peseta and a fall in foreign reserves in the 
weeks after the PSOE electoral victory.(Perez 1998: 139).  
 
The ―cognitive updating‖ dissertation tells an incomplete story and is 
marked by several internal tensions. Miguel Boyer recently admitted that the 
decision to enact an orthodox program had been taken before the French 
Socialists launched their expansionist economic package in earnest. In recent 
confessions, the leading economic policy leaders in the PSOE (finance minister 
Miguel Boyer and Economy minister Carlos Solchaga) admitted that they did not 
have any intention to allow for repeat of the French experiment even before the 
experiment was even tried. Writing on the events of 1981 in France, Boyer made 
it clear that the people who really mattered in making economic policy decisions 
in the PSOE government had not even been involved in writing the expansionary 
1982 economic program and did not need the failure of Mitterand‘s expansionary 






I myself warned Felipe Gonzales in 1981 that he should moderate all 
enthusiasm with regard to French Socialists […] and to distance himself 
from their recipes […] Therefore, at least a group of those of us who 
would later hold economic policy responsibilities knew what orientations 
to avoid. Nevertheless, the French experiment-useless as it was for 
opening some people‘s eyes, as I said-ended up being very useful as a 
dialectical effect and as an argument for convincing [party] militants 
without economic training as well as some economists with a vulgar 
Keynesian orientation what was the road to be taken after 1983. (Boyer 
2005: 87). 
 
The same point was unequivocally made by Boyer‘s successor and MEH 
―superminister‖ Carlos Solchaga, who had been an advocate of ending subsidies 
for industry since 1977 (Alcaide 1997: 195) and who in 1982 thought that: 
 
The problem of macroeconomic policy, and particularly of monetary 
policy, was not unemployment, since this did not depend on the direction 
and content of economic policy, but inflation. Once this had been 
corrected, all the advantages which come from economic stability, 
including perhaps an increase in employment and reduction in 





Indeed, as early as 1981, Carlos Solchaga had a detailed orthodox policy 
template carefully laid out. The young MP from Navarra reacted to the drafting of 
an expansionary economic program by a PSOE team coordinated by Javier Solana 
by writing a 90 page ―parallel report‖ in which one can find the basic elements of 
the austerity package adopted in 1982 by the Gonzales government. The report 
received the endorsement of Andalucian and Basque party chapters and was 
skillfully and aggressively sold to the media by Solchaga, then a relatively 
unknown PSOE MP, who also used this opportunity to raise his national profile.  
At PSOE‘s 29
th
 Congress, Solana and his team tried to persuade Solchaga to 
integrate his parallel report within the boundaries set by their own draft, but the 
dramatically threw the official program way with the words ―Esto es rubbish.‖ 
When Luis Carlos Croissier, one of the drafters of the Solana program equated the 
Solana report with a Bank of Spain policy paper, Solchaga left the convention The 
PSOE convention adopted the Solana program for the 1982 but, as chapter two 
showed, the program that won after PSOE assumed power was Solchaga‘s 
(Tomas and Alonso 1993: 62-64). 
As for the much debated French case, it is evident that Mitterand‘s 
economic policy could not be construed as evidence of a turn to the right in 
Europe until well after the Socialists decided to embrace embedded neoliberalism. 
In 1981, as Spanish Socialists were debating the party program,  the new French 
Socialists government reversed the deflationary policies of the ―proto-neoliberal‖ 
D‘Estaig governments adopted beginning with 1976 and launched a bold 




welfare expansion and employment-generating policies (Prasad 2005; McNamara 
1998). As the American reflation faultily predicted by OECD did not materialize 
and as the West was not pulling out of recession, the external environment 
severely constrained this policy experiment, leading to its reversal. Yet it was not 
until March 1983, well after PSOE decided on its neoliberal path, that the internal 
debate inside party elite ended and the politique the rigueur invoked by PSOE 
elites and scholarship was actually adopted (Schmidt 1997: 110-113; see also 
Prasad 2006; Hall 1989; Cole 1999; Loriaux).  
The cognitive updating dissertation has important analytical problems in 
the form it is used by PSOE scholarship as well. Charles Boix argued that ―the 
calamitous Labor administration in Britain in the late 1970s also served as a 
strong warning against expansionary strategies‖ (Boix 1998: 109). But if PSOE 
knew about British Labor‘s woes in the late 1970s, then its leadership did not 
need for the French experiment to end in failure in order to turn rightward. 
Second, as argued at length in the last section of this chapter, the French 
government‘s ―Great U-turn‖ to the politique de rigueur did not happen until 
March 1983 (Schmidt 1996; Hall 1989), that is months after PSOE implemented 
its neoliberal macroeconomic package. Finally, it is not entirely clear why PSOE 
reformers read in the problems of British Labor a warning against expansionary 
policies. While popular, this eminently ―Thatcherite‖ reading is controversial. As 
Colin Hay has recently shown, a Keynesian solution to the 1973 crisis was never 
really attempted in Britain and, after 1976, the IMF-imposed economic policy 




administration‖ and the Winter of Discontent on which it ended was a crisis of 




But why did this British Tory story resonate with the PSOE economic 
team in the first place? Citing central bank reports, Luis Angel Rojo (1981) and 
Fuentes Quintana (1979) as evidence,  Boix suggests that such readings of the 
British and French experiences ―[w]ere reinforced by an emerging consensus 
among Spanish economists that the country‘s persistently poor economic 
performance derived from structural factors that could not be solved by merely 
propelling up internal demand‖(Boix 1998: 109).  
Yet this crucial point is nowhere systematically explored in Boix‘s work 
or, for that matter, anywhere else in the rich literature on the Spanish economic 
transition. It is to the puzzling interplay between ideational and structural changes 
in Spain‘s external environment between the crisis of embedded liberalism and 
the advent of neoliberalism that the next chapters turn. 
 
Social Emulation: European Social-Democracy in the Early 1980s 
Some scholars of diffusion think that governments simply emulate the policies of 
some peer group of governments (Braun and Gilardi 2006; Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garrett 2006). This literature would intimate that by adopting neoliberal policies 
PSOE did what peer European social-democrats were doing at the time.  
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 Hay concludes that ―the Winter of Discontent did mark the passing of Keynesianism, 
corporatism and the post-war consensus. But it did so not because the events of the winter of 
1978–1979 were precipitated by union power nor by the inherent contradictions of the 
Keynesianism economic paradigm, but because the crisis that it was seen to symbolise was 




This section confirms that during the 1980s neoliberal ideas began to enter 
the economic policy conventions of social-democratic parties. But the review of 
secondary literature done in this section also evidences that with the exception of 
German, Italian and Swedish social-democrats they turned to neoliberalism much 
later in the decade than PSOE did.  
The case of the ―pragmatic‖ neoliberalism pursued by German social-
democrats is well-known
80
 and the same rightward turn was observed in Swedish 
social-democracy, albeit much later than in Germany.
81
 And in Italy, the 
Socialists coming to power in 1983 via a complex coalition advocated a policy 
package that outdid that of their conservative government partners in terms of 
macroeconomic austerity, privatization and financial deregulation, while 
relegating welfare and redistribution to residual importance (Discala 1988; 1996; 
Abse 1994; Anderson and Camiller 1994). However, social-democrats waited 
until the late 1980s to acquiesce to supply-side ideas about the desirability of cuts 
of corporate tax rates and top personal tax rates.  
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 As suggested earlier in the chapter, after 1974, German social-democrats pioneered inflation 
targeting and convinced other European governments to do the same. But by 1980, the second oil 
shock and strict monetary policy contributed to a rise in unemployment. To ameliorate worsening 
job market figures, the SPD pushed for increased government supply-side spending on 
infrastructure projects. To finance them, the SPD proposed a ―third way‖ policy mix: tax increases 
and cuts in welfare benefits. This policy position that led to the collapse of SPD‘s alliance with the 
liberals and the conservative victory of 1982 (Scharpf 1987, 192; Borchert 1995). After the party 
entered opposition, its programmatic renewal efforts took it into an increasingly market-
conforming direction, with anti-inflationary policies, skepticism towards reflation and welfare 
state cuts to boot (Padgett 1987). 
81
 Here, the party‘s right wing made the rest of the party accept the argument that cutting inflation 
was a primary policy objective. SAP‘s ―third way‖ entailed increasing profit levels to increase 
investment at the cost of wage stagnation. As a result, budget cuts, deficit cuts, investment 
incentives and a weakening of social democratic-union ties became mainstream SAP policies. 
Erstwhile advocates of ―overcoming‖ capitalism began to reproduce classical liberal theses such as 
the ―crowding out‖ effect of public investment or the reduction of demand side policies to cost 
competition measures that would increase the consumption of Swedish goods. By the mid 1980s, 
SAP went as far as carrying out financial deregulation and advocated tax cuts on top marginal 
rates (Blyth 2002: 223-228; Steinmo 1993; Fraser 1987; Englund 1990; Englund and Vihriala 




In other parts of Western Europe center-left parties defied ―third way‖ 
trends and kept pushing Keynesian counter-cyclical programs even after the 
Mitterand fiasco. Until they lost office in 1982, Danish and Dutch social-
democrats overcame their doubts about the primacy of full employment and 
refrained from embracing a Third Way course in real politics until the 1990s 
(Esping-Andersen 1985; Wolinetz, 1993; Dalgaard 1995; Green-Pedersen 2000; 
Petersen 2001; Lindvall 2009). British Labor had pioneered orthodox monetary 
policies in the late 1970s, the move was contested as imposed by duress from the 
outside and, once in opposition, the party‘s programs (1979; 1983; 1987) swung 
back to a radical left agenda: state-sponsored expansion of nationalised firms, 
indicative planning, industrial protectionism. Until they left office in 1982, 
Danish social-democrats maintained wage and social security indexation despite 
inflation levels rising above 10 percent (Green-Pedersen 2003).
82
  
Resistance to neoliberalism was also evident in Belgium and Austria. In 
Belgium, two Socialist-Christian Democratic coalitions fell apart between 1980 
and 1981 because the Socialists, unwavering in their commitment to full 
employment, wanted a Keynesian reflation and the conservatives wanted a 
Thatcerite turn. And while in opposition, Belgian Socialists bitterly opposed the 
macroeconomic austerity and supply-side policies of the center-right coalition that 
ruled between 1981 and 1985 (Pijnenburg 1989; Hemerijk and Visser 2000).
83
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 Moreover, the data shows that such tax cuts were made on the OECD average only after 1985 
(Sorensen 1998). Even so, tax systems remained steeply progressive and in Scandinavia the top 
personal tax rates hovered over 50 percent (Ganghof 2007). Similarly, when some Scandinavian 
social-democrats adopted ―sound finance‖ objectives, they continued to emphasize fiscal, as 
opposed to monetary policy as an instrument of macroeconomic management (Lindvall 2009). 
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 The liberal-conservative Belgian coalition ruled for five years (1981-1985) and by decree and 




The fact that Belgian Socialists did not fret over 12 percent budget deficit, while 
their Spanish counterparts saw 5 percent as catastrophic is particularly suggestive 
in this regard.  
The same situation could be observed on the Austrian left. Here, until 
1986 the social-democrats
84
 stuck firmly to ―Austro-Keynesian‖ policies that 
combined a hard currency policy vis-à-vis the DM with counter-cyclical deficit 
spending, employment in nationalized industries to hoard labor during 
employment crisis to achieve their commitment to full employment. Austrian 
social-democrats also resisted financial deregulation, tax cuts, labor market 
deregulation and maintained OECD‘s highest nationalized industrial sector until 
the late 1980s (Talos 1987; Muller 1988; Bischof and Pelinka 1994; Guger 2001; 
Luther 1999; Unger 2001; Unger and Heitzmann 2003). At a time when Spanish 
Socialists saw in 5 percent budget deficit a sign of impending doom, their 
Austrian counterparts kept pushing policies based in the Keynesian  idea that the 
state should accept a higher deficit for the sake of lower unemployment (Feigl-
Heihs 2001). When one considers the fact that social-democrats maintained these 
policies while running a government coalition with the liberals, the contrast with 
Spain becomes even bolder. As former federal leader of the party‘s wing Alfred 
Gusenbauer remembers: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
froze wage indexation, thus transferring productivity gains to firms, cut taxes, instituted job 
sharing agreements to cut unemployment, consolidated the country‘s fiscal position and lowered 
select categories of unemployment benefits   (Hemerijk and Visser 2000). 
84
 Since the Second World War SPO SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs had been one 
the strongest left-wing parties in Europe, rivaled in strength only by the social-democratic parties 




During the early 1980s, monetarism, supply-side economics and 
neoliberal economic ideas in general was considered to be too 
conservative for our party. That is, we thought they were 
inappropriate in Austria under a social-democratic government. It 
was not until the late 1980s that we started to take more seriously 
economic options that you would today associate with the ―Third 




The cases of Greek center-left parties were also far from pointing towards 
neoliberalism in 1982. Greek Socialists (PASOK) taking office in 1981 launched 
a Keynesian demand stimulus program doubled by planning arrangements for the 
private sector, welfare state, generous wage policy for low income earners and 
employment protection schemes. Evan as the plan sputtered in the face of a global 
recession and governmental inability to improve tax collection, PASOK did not 




The diversity of the ways in which the European center-left was adjusting 
to the new order during the early 1980s was more likely to increase the 
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 Interview with former Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gussenbauer (November 3, 2009). 
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 Even so, the much vaunted ―austerity‖ of the PASOK government meant cutting inflation from 
18.5 to 16.5 percent in three years, the first serious attempt at macroeconomic stabilization 
involving devaluation, systemic wage control and attempts to control the budget deficit were not 
advocated until after 1985, with little success, (Tsakatos 1998; 185) , government gross 
investment increased dramatically until 1986 (Kouras 2001: 175) and general government deficit 
nearly doubled between 1982 and 1985 (from 6.5 to 11.5 percent)(Kouras 2001: 175). Practically, 
a coherent and comprehensive turn to orthodox economic policies under PASOK rule could not be 
noticed until after 1993 (Psalidopoulos 1996; Brissimis and Gibson 1997; Diamandouros et al 




uncertainty faced by a Spanish Socialist government that entered office at a time 
of considerable social and economic turmoil.  
To conclude, the cognitive updating dissertation can‘t explain why 
Germany served as a model and France as a foil, when updating occurs or exactly 
what the lessoj of updating is. Given the externalmosaic of models about how 
social-democrats should deal with a crisis, in the winter of 1982 the PSOE 
government could have just as well carried out its expansionary program and then 
back off, as did their French peers, embrace austerity yet without labor market 
deregulation, as their German and Swedish peers, or continue to govern with an 
―updated‖ Keynesian program, as the Austrians did. But, as the next chapters 
show, by 1982 the Spanish bureaucratic-academic complex that came to control 
economic policy under the Socialists had already embraced the kind of embedded 
neoliberalism described earlier in this study.  
The second half of this chapter provides the background to Spanish 
economic history, with an emphasis on the postwar years and the emergent 
embedded liberalism of the UCD years (1977-1982). Then, in chapter three I 
show how by 1982 neoliberal ideas had already become dominant in the nervous 
centers of Spanish economic policy institutions. Finally, chapter four investigates 
the process through which these ideas raised to prominence and morphed into the 
―embedded neoliberalism‖ that characterizes contemporary Spain. 
 





State and Capitalist Development in Early Modern Spain (1833-1939) 
Economic modernization in a neo-mercantilst fold 
Spain‘s economic decline began in the early 19
th
 century and coincided with the 
destruction of Spain‘s budding industries by invading French armies (1808-1814). 
The decline was compounded by the cutting of cheap gold inflows from Latin 
America as a result of successful independence movements there (1810-1826). In 
addition to these geopolitical shocks, Spain‘s economy continued to be weighed 
down by an ineffective banking sector and an administration unable to push the 
tax reforms that had enabled many European states to launch industrial 
development in the second half of the 19
th
 century. Large expanses of land were 
inefficiently exploited in the mortmain regime, and the guild system paralyzed 
industrial initiatives. The negative role of these structural economic factors was 
further magnified by the endurance of an ossified semi-feudal social structure 
well into the late 19
th
 century. As a result of these factors, Spain went from being 
a middle economic power to an underdeveloped state in less than a century.  
The death of the conservative king Ferdinand VII in 1833 ushered in 
liberal socio-economic reforms. Powered by the ideas of French, British and 
German liberalism, the state elites of mid-19
th
 century Spain abolished the guilds, 
liberalized the legal regime of agricultural land, and introduced civil and 
commercial legislation. These measures laid the foundations for Spain‘s gradual 
transformation from a semi-feudal agricultural economy with weakly integrated 
local markets, into a capitalist one with a national market. Yet this budding 




weak internal demand. To address these constraints, Spanish policy elites turned 
to foreign capital to finance capitalist development (Vives et al 1969; Harrison 
1978; Nadal 1975).  
The sluggish growth of local industries opened up fierce debates about the 
role of the state in the economy. As a result, Spanish economic policy oscillated 
between mercantilist (1833-1849) and laissez-faire (1841-1869) periods. During 
the 1870s, the mercantilists began to definitively unseat classic liberals by 
institutionalizing their ideas in a broad protectionist coalition that encompassed 
conservative capital and socialist industrial labor.
87
  
By the late 1880s, the ideas of mercantilism definitively triumphed and 
shaped Spain‘s road to capitalist development (Galvez Munoz 2001; Fuentes 
Quintana 2001; Jarregui and Ruiz-Jimenez 2005). Consequently, Spain went off 
the gold standard and, during the first quarter of the 20
th
 century, it became the 
most closed and interventionist economy of the capitalist world (Fuentes Quintana 
1986). ―Infant‖ industries were protected via import quotas and high tariff walls 
(the stiff Tariff Act of 1906 was in force until 1960!). Spain‘s industrial distressed 
goods were guaranteed to be purchased by government agencies. After 1917, the 
state set up special banks to provide industrial expansion with generous loans. 
This neo-mercantilist paradigm survived several political regime types: 
constitutional monarchy (1874-1923), dictatorship (1923-1930) and liberal 
republic (1930-1939) (Harrison 1978; Nadal 1975; Balaguer and Cantavella-Jorda 
2004; de la Escosura 2005; Junquito 2006). Yet neo-mercantilism did not breed 
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 The protectionist capital included the mill-owners of Barcelona, steel-owners in Bilbao and 




autarchy, because Spanish governments‘ economic modernization plans depended 
heavily on foreign industrial investment (Tortilla 2000).
88
   
Unfortunately for the government, neo-mercantile development failed in 
Spain. Modest growth and deep recessions in 1908 and 1911 increased the gap 
between Spain and Northern Europe. Rather than grow under Spain‘s expensive 
protectionist walls, industrialization slowed down there, just as it was booming in 
other parts of Europe. Foreign investors responded to Spain‘s low levels of 
private internal demand by concentrating their capital in export mining and 
subsidized public services (railways, utilities), often by importing equipment and 
manpower from abroad.  
To a considerable extent, the failure of industrialization in Spain was due 
to the fact that industrialists faced difficult structural constraints: a neo-mercantile 
state unable to expand the fiscal base to provide cheap credit for industrial 
development, and a deflationary monetary policy that kept interest rates above 
international levels to attract scarce foreign capital.
 89
 Moreover, the government 
targeted its scarce resources away from industrial credit and towards land 
disentailment programs (Tortella 1969; 2000). 
 
From military developmentalism to Franco 
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 For overviews of the modern economic history of Spain see Harrison (1978: 54-58), Nadal 
(1975), Sánchez-Albornoz (1987) and Carr (1982). 
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 Spain proved that monetary stability could be maintained without the gold standard. During the 
heyday of the Gold Standard, Spain preserved the stability of its finances with inconvertible paper 
money by running low budget deficits, keeping interest rates above international levels and 
managing high trade surpluses. The only exception was the Spanish-American War of 1989 




Instead of recognizing the failure of interventionism in this situation, Spanish 
state elites chose an even more interventionist approach once Spain‘s wobbly 
parliamentary regime was terminated by a coup d‟etat in 1923. Until the Second 
Republic was proclaimed in 1930, Spain experienced its first attempt at import 
substitution industrialization under the dictatorship of general Miguel Primo de 
Rivera. Inspired by fascist Italy‘s ―production-oriented corporatism‖, this weak 
military regime (dictablanda) adopted an expansionary monetary policy, launched 
a debt-financed unprecedented expansion of public works, and generously funded 
―industrial champions.‖ The results were spectacular. Industrial growth averaged 
5.5 percent a year, industrial production boomed and Spain developed modern 
highway, irrigations and electric grid systems. Industry become more diversified 
during this period as well, with automobiles and aircraft construction cutting new 
economic niches for Spanish industry (Velarde 1973; Carreras 1984; Maluquer 
1987; Harrison 1985).  
By staying off the gold standard, Spain avoided the worst excesses of the 
Great Depression. After 1932, its exports did face collapsing external demand, but 
Spain had been less export-dependent than other semi-peripheral European states 
so it suffered less. Owing to an increase in public expenditure, consumption was 
stabilized after 1933. What is more, very few Spanish banks failed, and the run on 
the peseta that took place in the middle of the Credit Anstalt crisis was weak and 
short-lived (Bernake 1995; Martin-Acena 1992; Temin 1993; Tortella and Palafox 
1984). Spain‘s avoided financial crisis, because the military regime did deficit 








However, Spain‘s political crisis was greater than its economic challenges. 
By adopting an ambitious political, social and cultural agenda, the left-leaning 
governments of the Second Republic (1931-1935), and particularly the reforms 
that targeted the church and the military, ended up stoking systemic conflict. The 
Spanish civil war broke out in 1936
91
  throwing into the violence a mosaic of 
social forces
92
 and and wreaking havoc with the Spanish economy at a time when 
other capitalist states were experiencing economic recovery from the Great 
Depression.
93
 The Nationalists won the conflict in 1939 and instituted an 
authoritarian political regime headed by the military leader of the military putch 
of 1936, General Franciso Franco Bahamonde. The new regime put an end to 
Spain‘s experience with competitive democratic institutions, multiple parties and 
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 Essentially, like in Denmark and Sweden, the central bank in Spain expanded discounts in order 
to increase liquidity and ease the pressure on the money market (Tortella and Palafox 1984). 
91
 The conflict began in July 1936, following the attack on the mainland by the joint forces of the 
Navarre army corps and of the colonial army of Spanish Morocco. 
92
 The conflict dramatically reconfigured the politics and the economy of Spain, pitting the ―two 
Spains‖ – created by more than a century of liberal reforms, labor conflicts and neo-feudal 
reaction – against each other. On the Republican side was a motley assortment of proletarians 
(industrial and agricultural workers), secular bourgeoisie (entrepreneurs, professionals, 
intelligentsia), and regionalists (natives of the Basque country and Catalonia of all socio-economic 
stripes). Against this coalition fought a variegated assortment of actors (‗the nationalists‘) who 
mobilized against the Republic along such fault lines as class (large bank, manufacturing and 
agricultural interests, high-ranking civil servants, rentiers), ideology (the social-revolutionary 
fascists of the Falange, conservative intellectuals, monarchists) and religion (the Church, 
practicing Catholics of all classes) (Beevor 1982; 2006; Graham 2002; Preston 1978; 1996; 
Gunther 1980; Payne 1970; 2004). 
93
 During the war, the economy dropped by 6 percent a year on average (Carreras 1984). By its 
end in 1939 Spain‘s GDP was at half its 1929 level. Entire industries had been reduced to rubble, 
the Spanish gold reserves ended up in the Soviet Union, and the country‘s infrastructure of 
communications and transport was severely disrupted (Beevor 2005). Agricultural production 
reached its 1929 levels only in 1950 (Carreras 1984). Since most of the tens of thousands of 
Spain‘s Republican emigrés were young, active and skilled, the country saw a dramatic shortage in 
talent. To make matters worse, the outbreak of World War II disrupted Spain‘s traditional trade 
relations, while Nazi Germany showed little interest in propping up the economy of its ideological 





interest groups for the next four decades. At the same time, as the regime 
launched ambitious state-led industrialization plans, its openness to the liberal 
economic ideas espoused by some of its most conservative Catholic supporters 
(the Opus Dei lay organization) cemented the way for the neoliberal revolution 
that swept Spanish economic policy after the mid 1970s. 
 
The Franquist political system 
This institutional matrix was as much a legacy of Franquism as it was a reaction 
to it. The extreme level of power concentration at the cabinet level in the ministry 
of finance and the flows of academic economists in economic policy 
bureaucracies were both features of the Franco years that survived transition to 
democracy. To a considerable extent this was due to Spain‘s murky break with the 
Franquist past and to PSOE‘s shortage of prominent economists with professional 
dossiers untainted by the institutions of Franquism. By contrast, centralism and 
intramural authoritarianism were powered as much by electoral strategy as by the 
perception of factionalism as a cause of the Republican quagmire and of the 
subsequent fascist victory in the civil war. By 1982, these institutional factors 
converged to weaken the case for a non-neoliberal alternative after 1982. 
Until the German military disaster became apparent in 1944, the political 
order instituted by the nationalist victory in the civil war was a single-party state 
with powerful totalitarian tendencies of fascist inspiration (Ramírez 1978:23–5; 






 But after this date, Franquism was an authoritarian state 
95
 with a 
nominal legislative power
96
 and a powerful and centralized executive,
97 
yet one 
marked by ―limited pluralism,‖ the absence of ideocratic tendencies,
98
 a general 
disinclination to public political mobilization, and a leadership marked by 
predictable limitations (Linz 1964; 1978; 2001). Other scholars also remarked on 
its classism and the fact that its political representation outside the Franquist 
coalition was mostly pro-forma (Gunther 1980).  
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 The single-party in question was Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva 
Nacional-Sindicalista (FET-JONS).  
2. At the top of the system was Franco himself (Chief of State or Caudillo) and his close circle of 
trusted friends and relatives. The rest of the system was highly centralized and completely 
dominated by the executive power. The Caudillo and his inner circle held the right to appoint the 
members of the Council of Ministers, the Spanish executive branch. The custom was to appoint 
ministers known for their moderate views inside each faction of the governing social coalition, 
with no single faction being allowed to amass a disproportionate amount of power. The Chief of 
State also appointed the head of the Parliament (Cortes), whose legislative powers were strictly 
symbolic. Franco‘s closest advisors were Nicolas Franco, his brother, and Ramon Serrano Suner, 
his brother-in-law.  
96
 The Cortes was not a real legislature. Its members were not elected directly by the citizens. 
Instead, its membership was constituted by appointees of the corporatist ―syndicates,‖ local 
government bodies, universities, the Supreme Court and various cultural institutions. After 1967, 
in a minor concession, the law allowed for the direct election of a number of ―Family‖ 
representatives by the vote of 16 million Spaniards who were either ―heads of households‖ or 
married women. Even so, the Council of Ministers answered only to the Chief of State, and not to 
the Cortes. The Cortes had no decision-making authority of its own, and its approval of laws could 
only be exercised ―without prejudicing the powers of the Chief of State‖. The evisceration of the 
legislative capability of the Cortes was ensured by two constitutional norms:  the prohibition of 
factions inside the Cortes (which eliminated the possibility of coalitional politics neccessary for a 
minimal debate) and the right of the Chief of State and the Council of Ministers to control the 
daily agenda of the Cortes (Gunther 1980).  
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 In practice, as long as it had Franco‘s backing, the Council of Ministers would adopt decisions 
without consulting the Cortes, which was expected to rubber-stamp the results.  
98
 Although the new regime did not have a homogenous ideology, Franco and his clique had a set 
of strong beliefs. They all rejected class conflict and income redistribution, and emphasized 
national unity guaranteed by an authoritarian state. This led them to reject competitive politics 
embodied in political parties and independent interest groups as a form of undermining national 
unity.
 
 (Anderson 1970). Since universal suffrage was regarded as threatening to national unity and 
to conservative Catholic doctrine, the legitimacy of this system rested on its claims to be a 
guarantor of Spain‘s Catholic civilization, on the historical position of Franco as savior of Spain‘s 
unity (―original acquisition‖ of authority) and the citizens‘ representation in a system of ―organic 




Unlike in the case of Eastern European authoritarianism, Franquism had a 
weak single party (the Falange),
 99
 yet the ideas of this organization shaped some 
of the institutional matrix of Franquism and especially the exclusion of labor from 
political and economic decisions.
100
  
In theory, the system denied class conflict, organizing labor and capital 
interests in vertical rather than horizontal ―syndicates‖ that were grouped by 
sector (rather than by class interests). 
101
It was only through these vertical forms 
of organizations that private claims could be legally expressed. After 1958, labor 
and capital won greater autonomy within the syndicates and were able to do 
collective bargaining between ―social sections‖ (labor) and ―economic sections‖ 
(capital), thus ending a period when the Ministry of Labor would set the wages 
for the whole economy (Anderson 1970: 68).
 102
 However, the sections remained 
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 Franquism had a small fascist party, the Falange Espanola (or Movimiento), a political actor 
that was responsible for some of the mobilization on the right, making the regime look less 
personalistic. Throughout much of its existence, the Falange remained consistent in its 
endorsement of a social-fascist ideology that combined totalitarianism and authoritarian 
corporatism with calls for the nationalization of banking and rail, redistributive land reform, and 
socio-economic rights. Yet the revolutionary and totalitarian aspirations of the Falange and its 
supporters in the Franco inner circle (his brother in law Serrano Suner) never managed to 
transform Spain into a single-party state (Payne 1961; Linz 1970; 1976; 2008).The influence of 
the Falange peaked between 1939 and 1945, and during the 50s and 60s it had very limited 
influence on government policy. Basically by 1958, outside the management of the corporatist 
―syndicates,‖ the Falange party was a shade of its former self.  (Payne 1961; Linz 1970).Franco 
expediently got rid of the radicals of the Falange by encouraging them to volunteer in the Blue 
Division, the Spanish contingent on Nazi Germany‘s Eastern front.  
100
 This happened because authoritarian corporatism addressed the sources of social conflict 
abhorred by Franco and his supporters (especially the Church), traumatized as they had been by 
the class conflict that ripped through society during the years of Republican government. 
101
 All laborers, management and capital owners in a specific sector or profession were 
compulsorily grouped in a single ―syndicate‖ supervised by the state as the guarantor of national 
interests (Gunther 1980). The result was the formation of 26 vertical syndicates for separate 
economic branches (Anderson 1970: 67). Beginning with 1951, shop stewards were elected 
directly by workers and were protected by threats of arrest with workers‘ strikes.  This allowed the 
election of myriad leftists in this position during beginning with the late 1960s as well as the 
establishment of informal (and illegal) communist and socialist horizontal labor organizations. 
102
 The Falange held a great deal of influence in the syndicates, and between 1940 and 1958, it 
controlled the Ministry of Labor, the institution that dictated the wages and working conditions for 




controlled by central syndical headquarters (whose members were appointed by 
Franco himself), while the lower levels were controlled by Falange militants.  
In this institutional environment, there were no autonomous labor and 
business organizations,
 
strikes were illegal, and independent unions were banned.
 
103
  In compensation, workers received job security, unemployment compensation, 
pensions, sickness benefits, paid vacations and training. By contrast, business got 
a much better deal in exchange for losing the right to independent organization.  
Large corporations, especially banks, could access the higher echelons of 
decision-making directly, via appointments to economic policy positions, and 
indirectly, though audiences to the Council of Ministers and Franco‘s inner circle 
itself (Payne 1987; Gunther 1980; Holman 1993). 
 
From Autarky to Constrained Liberalization: Capitalist Development in 
Franco’s Spain 
Import Substitution Industrialization (1939-1959) 
During early Franquism (1939-1959) Spain pursued an import substitution 
industrialization strategy led by the state, reliant on the forced suppression of 
labor cost increases and self-limited by a weak fiscal base (Anderson 1970; 
Donges 1971; de Escosura 1994; Fuentes-Quintana 2001).
104
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 As late as 1974, the attempt to set up independent labor unions was punishable by prison terms 
of up to 20 year (Perez Diaz 1979). 
104
 As Charles Anderson (1970) showed, import substitution industrialization was hardly a 
completely new policy paradigm in Spain. Some policies had precedents in the previous 
dictatorship (1923-1930), when Primo de Rivera‘s military regime sought to achieve economic 
self-sufficiency in a more forceful state-led industrialization (e.g. the establishment of ―strategic 
industries‖) and corporatization of the business sector. The dirigiste bent of these measures had 
deeper roots than the military tradition, however. During the 19
th




 Unlike the relatively modest government interventions of the neo-
mercatile era, this time the Spanish government committed much greater 
resources to direct public investment. Generous fiscal incentives, low interest 
rates, protection against foreign competition, and expropriations required for plant 
expansion ensured a business climate favorable to domestic firms. Inward-
looking, the new paradigm demanded that the exchange rate regime foster 
domestic production, rather than exports. As a result, the Spanish government set 
seven groups of exchange rates for imports and five rates for exports until 1957. 
To the same end, the regime kept marginal income taxes low, and as a result of 
state-controlled corporatism and labor repression,  industrialists were constantly 
reassured that wages would remain low
105
 (Toretella 1994: 363; Poveda 1975). 
The central tool of the new industrialization policy was the establishment 
of a public holding company in 1941 (the Institute of National Industry/Instituto 
Nacional de Industria or INI). The basic function of INI was to launch new 
industrial branches where private firms were loath to act, and to challenge private 
monopolies with the establishment of new firms.
106
 Until 1957, the INI was 
                                                                                                                                     
French administrative and bureaucratic system while developing a higher education for state 
managers molded on the French grandes ecoles that produced an interventionist bureaucratic ethos 
with regard to economic policy (Anderson 1970: 56). 
105
 In effect, strikes were illegal and, until 1958, wages were set by government decree, although 
fringe benefits were extensive. This was not a Spanish idiosyncrasy either.
 
The Dutch used this 
policy until the 1960s and the same mechanism was in place in France until the 1950s. Yet while 
in the Netherlands and France wage controls were regarded as temporary measures to ensure full 
economic recovery from wartime devastation, in Spain they were regarded as permanent. 
Moreover, like in the case of East Asian authoritarian developmentalism, Spanish labor repression 
and the syndical industrial organization guaranteed low labor costs (Anderson 1970). 
106
 The importance of INI in the economy or direct price supports for agriculture should not be 
overstated as a sign of ―autarchy‖, however. Outside of Germany, Belgium and Scandinavia state-
led industrialization was common in the postwar years. Moreover, in relative terms, at the height 
of the industrialization drive in 1960, public industrial investment in Spain, a country with a 




financed directly with grants from the national government
107
 and targeted its 
industrialization efforts at a long list of industrial branches deemed strategic by 
the state.
108
 While managed industrial credit kept the costs of capital low for 
targeted industries, the state boosted domestic demand through massive railway 
infrastructure and the irrigation systems (Anderson 1970). 
Monetary policy during this period was expansive. The government 
increased the budget deficit to pay for its industrialization, money supply was 
steadily increased, and the inflation rate averaged 13.7 percent between 1939 and 
1959 (Lakauskas 1978). Yet expansionary monetary policy was not carried out, as 
in Western Europe, through the corresponding increase of state revenue. While 
Italy‘s state budget was 21 percent of GDP and Britain‘s was 33 percent, the 
figure in Spain was frozen at 14 percent as a result of a self-imposed cap on the 
expansion of state budgets relative to GDP (Comin 1996). This created major 
problems, as the costs of the expected expansion were concentrated in high 
budget deficits and foreign currency loans, transforming this developmental 
model into a ticking time bomb. Most importantly, since industrialization 
depended on expensive technology imports, any major drop in Spain‘s 
agricultural exports raised the specter of bankruptcy against the background of a 
generally underperforming economy.
109
 This happened in 1956, when Spain‘s 
                                                                                                                                     
development, much smaller than in countries with a liberal model like Austria (47%), the UK 
(32%) or France (31%) (Anderson 1970: 40).  
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 Between 1941 and 1954, INI owned 12 firms, held a dominant share in 27 and a minority share 
in 12 (Anderson 1970: 39). 
108
 The list included steel, aluminum, hydropower, shipbuilding, fertilizers, air transport, telephone 
communications and autos. 
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 Basically, the industrial expansion expected by the regime did not happen. Between 1946 and 
1950, industrial production grew by 10 percent, relative to increases of 70 to 100 percent in other 




citrus crop of 1956 dropped to half of its 1955 level, leading to a catastrophic 
balance of payment problem. With a total of 40 million dollars left in the state‘s 
foreign currency accounts, this underfunded ISI model came to the brink of 
bankruptcy (Lieberman 1995: 47). The situation was complicated further by 
student riots, miners‘ strikes, and an emerging clerical opposition. This led to a 
cabinet reshuffle in 1957 that put an end to ISI and inaugurated a period of 
economic liberalization 
 
Limited Liberalization (1959-1964) 
In 1957 the Spanish cabinet saw a shift in the center of power from ISI towards 
economic liberalism. The key new figures were conservative Opus Dei 
technocratsknown for professionalism and commitment to the regime. The new 
holder of the Commerce portofolio was Alberto Ullastres, a young economist 
known for his joint research projects with German liberal economist Friedrich von 
Stackelberg. The head of the influential Office for Economic Coordination and 
Programming was Laurenao Lopez Rodo, a conservative Catholic administrative 
law professor, who adapted some of Keynes‘ ideas to the Spanish context, and 
who was the protégé of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco‘s right hand man.  
The new government devalued the peseta and began to run the printing 
press to pay for ongoing expenses. A dramatic decrease in purchase power led to 
                                                                                                                                     
grew after 1950, productivity figures remained very low, and Spanish exports began to decrease 
just as the economy began to grow after 1950 (Gonzales 1979: 47-48; Velarde Fuertes 1973: 484). 
As a result of weak industrial competitiveness, Spain‘s exports remained dominated by citrus, 
wine and olive oil, which brought only modest export revenues. The small domestic market and 
the limited access to foreign markets meant that the industry had narrow limits of expansion and 
was starved of new technological innovations. Chronic shortages in fuel, energy and raw materials 




more social unrest in Asturian mines and Basque foundries, ―forcing‖ the regime 
to kidnap and court-martial the strike organizers. In 1958, minister Rodo used 
growing social unrest to convince the Caudillo that more economic liberalization 
would stabilize public finances and reduce the incidence of social unrest, by both 
making the average Spanish wealthier and avoiding the tax hikes that Franco‘s 
backers disliked  (Fuentes Quintana 1991; Gutierrez 1992). The drafting of the 
reform policy package known as the Stabilization Plan involved Spain‘s young 
generation of neo-Keynesian and ordoliberal academic economists and 
technocrats, as well as the direct advice of an IMF delegation stationed in Madrid 
for a few months. 
After seven months of preparation and drafting, Spain unveiled its 
Stabilization Plan on June 30, 1959. The plan's objectives were threefold: to take 
the necessary fiscal and monetary measures required to restrict demand, and to 
contain inflation. The deflationary measures quickly arrested the growth in 
inflation and balancing the budget deficit. The plan enabled Spain to avert a 
possible suspension of payments to foreign creditors holding Spanish currency. 
Gold and foreign exchange reserves went from almost zero to over 1 billion. In a 
year, Spain‘s balance payments ran a surplus of half a million dollars. The 
devaluation of the peseta led to a significant increase in Spanish exports and 
quadrupled tourism receipts, with the number of tourists nearly doubling from 3 
million in 1958, to almost 6 million in 1961.
110
 Other aspects of the reform were 
more interventionist. The ―mixed banking‖ of the ISI era was terminated, 
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 Spanish exports grew from 498 million in 1958 to 759 million in 1961. For more detailed data 
see Report on Spain of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve, November 29, 1962 




commercial and investment banking were separated, and the central bank was 
nationalized. 
Another pillar of reform concerned trade and foreign capital flows. For the 
first time since 1920, Spain allowed for some liberalization of trade. The entry 
costs of foreign investment were reduced, as the licensing of foreign capital 
participation in the capitalization of Spanish firms was lifted, on the condition that 
such participation did not exceed half of the total capital. The government lifted 
restrictions on the repatriation of earnings from foreign investment and the 
principal involved. The elimination of many restrictions on exports led to 
imbalances in Spain‘s external position, and by 1961 Spain had the same current 
account deficit as in 1957. Yet with the receipts from tourism added to exports, 
Spain ran a surplus in 1961. 
Although it was dramatic by Spanish standards, trade liberalization 
remained modest. A 1962 federal US Federal Reserve reports maintained that 
Spain still had the most protectionist trade regime in OECD in 1961.
111
 Thus, the 
government maintained barriers to entry on ―strategic‖ industrial sectors and 
limited trade liberalization with those countries that allowed the convertibility of 
Spain‘s net earnings, which had originated in commercial exchange with them 
(Lieberman : 52). Also, imports were liberalized only for goods judged not to 
harm domestic development.
112
 To shield Spain‘s banks from international 
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 Report on Spain of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve, November 29, 1962. 
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 The decree-law no. 10 of 1959 maintained the requirement of individual import licenses on 




competition, foreign banks were not allowed to enter the country. This ban 
remained in force until 1978.
113
  
In late 1959 and throughout the 1960s, domestic demand and output fell in 
tandem. The resultant economic slump and reduced wages led approximately 
500,000 Spanish workers to emigrate in search of better job opportunities in other 
West European countries. As the export sector failed to act as an engine of 
growth, the government loosened credit conditions and allowed for salary 
increases to restart aggregate internal demand. Fortunately for the government, 
the ensuing contraction of internal demand was compensated by a doubling of 
migrant remittances (over 100 million in 1961), U.S. economic aid (100 million 
annually between 1959 and 1961),
114
 and the growth of U.S. expenditures on 
military installations in Spain.   
After a year-long stagnation in 1960, the economy began to expand. The 
liberalization of imports and FDI facilitated the modernization of Spain‘s outdated 
industrial base by increasing imports of capital goods and technology transfers. 
The effects of the liberalization measures were compounded by more effective 
protocol for the creation of new industries. During the 1960s, these developments 
enabled Spain‘s transformation into an industrial country and led to its first boom 
in industrial exports.  
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 The Spanish financial system was essentially non-competitive internationally and poorly 
diversified. Spanish banks were small, highly regulated and had extremely weak deposit bases, 
loan portofolios and economies of scope (Acena 2009: 43-46). 
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 Foreign aid took the form of US$75 million in drawing rights from the IMF, US$100 million in 
OEEC credits, US$70 million in commercial credits from the Chase Manhattan Bank and the First 
National City Bank, US$30 million from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and funds 
from United States aid programs. Total foreign backing amounted to US$420 million (Gonzales 




Luckily for the government, the external environment was favorable. The 
European Community absorbed Spain‘s exports and excess labor. Spanish net 
migration to Europe and the total dollar value of remittances quadrupled between 
1960 and 1961. The state‘s involvement in tourism promotion and a booming and 
more socially egalitarian Europe combined to nearly quadruple earnings from 
tourism between 1961 and 1964 (Gonzales 1979: 286). Boosting domestic 
demand, the money spent in Spain by the average tourist more than doubled 
between 1958 and 1964, and the total number of foreign visitors grew from 3.2 
million in 1957 to 14 million in 1964 (Gonzales 1979: 286).The boom in migrant 
remittances and earnings from compensated for expanding commodity trade 
deficits. 
 
Indicative planning (1964-1975) 
Triggered by a 1962 IBRD report revised by Opus Dei minister Lopez Rodo and 
inspired by French indicative planning (Schwartz and Gonzales 1978: 73), Spain 
adopted several development plans between 1963 and 1973. Although the 1962 
IBRD report urged the government to make the Spanish economy more market 
friendly by deregulating the economy, it nevertheless did not suggest a 
―neoliberal‖ course. Rather, IBRD asked the government to increase the size of 
the public budget relative to GDP and to ―make markets‖ by taking a more 
coordinated approach to industrial development (IBRD 1963). This did not mean 
a return to ISI industrial policy either. While basically all industrial firms had 




subsectors judged by technocrats to have a pull effect on the rest of the economy 
were to receive government support (Lieberman 1995). 
The plans were managed by a new ―superministry‖ called the Planning 
Commission (Comisaria del Plan), and their main objective was to ―raise rapidly 
the productivity of Spanish firms in order to obtain an outward displacement of 
the economy‘s production possibility frontier‖ (Lieberman 1995:73). To achieve 
this, the plans established partnerships (accion concertada) between government 
planners and the CEOs of selected industrial sectors. Like French ―quasi 
contracts‖, accion concertada tended to replace free-market economic 
competition with a combination of discretion and political competition (Gonzales 
1979: 321). Essentially, the CEOs pledged to attain certain production and 
productivity levels within periods that ranged from 4 to 8 years, in exchange for 
direct monetary subsidies, low-interest government credits, import duty 
exemptions, and tax cuts. Industrial coordination was accompanied by state 
guarantees for the stabilization of the domestic financial sector that financed this 
development. When in trouble, the Bank of Spain orchestrated discreet bailouts, 
takeovers and mergers (Pons 2002). Market-making interventionism consolidated 
Spanish banks; their deposits, loans and profit, measured by the coefficient of 
variation, were higher in 1962-74 than in 1940-62 (Acena et al 2009: 45).  
During the indicative planning years, Spain had the highest economic 
growth in OECD.  Industrial output grew in double digits per annum, and 




industrial country. By 1973, Spain was Europe‘s fifth industrial economy.
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Most Spaniards saw significant increases in purchase power and standards of 
living. Yet the political and economic costs of the three Spanish development 
plans were high. Economically, it drained the budgets of a country whose 
leadership vetoed tax increases. During the first year of the first indicative plan 
alone, budget expenditures increased by 20 percent (Lieberman 1995: 81). 
Macroeconomic imbalances posed another challenge. Industrial modernization 
was powered by a growth in technology imports, which was greater than the 
country‘s capacity to export.  Thus, after 1965, Spain began to run external 
deficits on current account and inflation levels rose by almost 2 percentage points 
above the OECD average.
 116
 Even before the oil shock hit in the fall of 1973, 
Spain was already running double digit inflation (14%).  
Unfortunately for the government, the external environment deteriorated 
as well. Falling demand in E.C. after the 1973 oil shock led to falling exports, tax 
receipts from tourism and migrant remittances, a shift from surplus to deficit in 
the current account, worsening inflation, and balance of payment problems. A 
weak reflationary effort (0.3% of GDP) was followed by a worsening fall in 
domestic demand and output. Puzzlingly, during the next year, the government 
shifted to a more explicit deflationary policy, with a balanced budget and interest 
rate increases topping the list. By the end of the year, inflation was cut from 21% 
in 1974 to 12%, just two points above the OECD average. But the stabilization of 
prices further depressed production levels, which led to deteriorating public 
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 See Harrison (1993) and Wringt (1993). 
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 OECD calculated that to cover its 1966 current account deficit, Spain needed to increase 




finances, and especially to serious balance of payment problems. Most 
importantly, however, it took an authoritarian system to keep labor down. The 
combination between the economic effects of the 1973 oil shock, the death of 
Franco in 1975, and the ensuing collapse of authoritarianism made this 
development model entirely unsustainable.  
Also, the death of Franco in 1975 unleashed both political liberalization 
and mass political mobilization at a time when the Spanish government was one 
of the few European governments that reacted to the October 1973 oil shock by 
refraining from adopting expansionary policies. This happened despite the fact 
that Spain had the highest savings and credit ratings in the Mediterranean (Tovias 
1984: 162-154). Yet the costs of the attempts made by the central bank and by the 
ministry of finance to pass the costs of adjustment to the population could not 
survive the meltdown of authoritarianism that took place two years after the 





The End of Franquist Developmentalism 
The terminal crisis of the Bretton Woods order had immediate repercussions in 
Spain. As markets bet aggressively against an overvalued dollar in 1969, they saw 
incentives in investing in the undervalued currencies of countries with strong 
growth and low debt like Spain. As a result, Spain saw a boost in credit, 
inflationary pressures and a deteriorating balance-of-payments sheet. Between 
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1971 and 1973, Spain‘s hard currency reserves grew by 500 percent, encouraging 
more speculation on the peseta (Andreu et al 2006: 282). Declaring that the 
economy was ―overheated,‖ the ministry of finance intervened to ―cool‖ the 
upward cycle by increasing the discount rate to the high levels used by France 
during the late 60s and early 70s.  
But while Spain‘s balance of payment markers (with the exception of the 
current account) saw important surpluses, the high interest rates attracted foreign 
portofolio investments, which facilitated a spectacular inflation growth from 1.6 
in 1970 to 8.3 in 1971. Before the first oil shock hit, Spain‘s inflation was at 14 
percent, almost double the average of the previous fifteen years (7.8 percent).
118
 
But, like in postwar France, Spain‘s high inflation was accompanied by high 
growth rates (almost 8 percent in 1973), full employment and high savings 
simultaneously.
119
   
Adding fuel to the fire, the oil shock of October 1973 cost Spain 3 percent 
of GDP,
120
 put its external deficit in the red for the years to come and increased 
inflationary pressures even further.  But while other countries tried to cope with 
the resulting fall in demand by using countercyclical policies at the cost of a 
further deterioration in inflation and deficit figures, the Spanish government 
allowed the central bank to resort to inflation targeting in late 1973, more than a 
year before this policy was tried by West Germany and Switzerland. In effect, the 
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 In 1973 Spain had a real growth rate of 8 percent, unemployment at 2 percent and a record 6 
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central bank adopted official targets for growth in the principal money stock 
aggregate (M3) by targeting the evolution of bank reserves through its low 
interest loans to the banking sector, but unlike in Germany inflation targets were 
set much higher. Additionally, the finance ministry adopted a budget that, on a 
first reading, reflected the neo-Keynesian trade-off between monetary inflation 
and demand stimulation through increases in countercyclical public investments 
and social transfers.  
Yet the actual operationalization of this ―Keynesian‖ response to the crisis 
remained highly suggestive of how faint the response was. While the US counter-
cyclical package in 1975 mobilized 11% of budget expenditures in 1975, in Spain 
this figure for 1974 was 0.2 %. Even more suggestively, in 1975, a particularly 
tough year for levels of demand, the public budget was executed with a surplus of 
3.4 percent (Gunther 1980). Also, as demand in Western Europe decreased and 
given the lack of a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy in Madrid, Spanish 
industry saw a spectacular collapse in orders. In turn, this caused a further 
slowdown of growth, from 6 percent in the early 1970s to 1.1 percent in 1975 in 
an external environment marked by a collapse of Spain‘s external economic 
emergency engines: immigrant remittances and tourism (Martinez Mendez 1982).  
The death of Franco in 1975 and the surge in Spain‘s economic difficulties 
put his political and economic order under the hammer. His successors embraced 
democracy, dismantled developmentalist institutions and during the 1980s let 
their Socialist adversaries rule over one of Europe‘s first neoliberal experiments. 




completely. The high degree of centralization of economic policy institutions was 
reproduced by the Socialist government and contributed to the smooth diffusion 
of the ideas of the central bank throughout the government. The developmetalist 
idea that the government was responsible for increasing the country‘s external 
competitive-ness by investing in industrial champions lived on as well. Rather 
than represent a complete break with the past, the Spanish transition looked more 
and more like a historical palimpsest. 
 
Transition Begins 
The Political Transition as a Domestic Generator of Uncertainty 
Political liberalization and mass mobilization processes intersected to generate a 
―renovating legitimation scenario.‖ Pivotal elites associated with the old regime 
(King Juan Carlos and post-Franquist premier Adolfo Suarez) acted out of ―fear 
of a vacuum of authority, of a sudden transfer to the then quite radical opposition 
forces.‖ (Linz and Stepan1996: 92). These elites assumed that democratization 
would not lead to the political victory of radical forces (Bermeo 1997:317-318),
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and that centrist parties would control the Spanish political system.
122
 Based on 
these perceptions, they undertook radical alterations of the political system. In the 
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 These expectations were based at first on polls showing that the Spanish population was 
ideologically moderate and committed to democratization, and that Spanish Eurocommunism was 
electorally unattractive (Share 1986; Maravall 1981). Then, the 1977 elections convinced these 
pivotal elites that radical parties could not muster much support and that democracy was popular. 
In 1978, polls showed that 77 percent of the population deemed democracy to be the best political 
system for Spain. For an extensive account, see Linz and Stepan 1996: 108. 
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 Even so, before the moderate Suarez came to power in 1976, the communists, the socialists and 
their affiliated trade unions decided to abstain from their initial strategy to overthrow the 
government and adopted a strategy of ―negotiated rupture‖ (ruptura pactada), whereby a 




autumn of 1976, the Franquist Cortes voted out to phase itself by passing a 
package of political reforms that legalized political parties and trade unions and 
scheduled the country‘s first democratic elections for the following year. As 
predicted, the Center-Right party (UCD) won and began liquidating the 
institutions of authoritarianism. After the elections, in what became a foundational 
moment for the consolidation of Spanish democracy, an intra-party agreement 
called Moncloa Pacts was brokered by Suárez, committing all parties to the 
creation of a new political regime (Linz and Stepan 1995). 
But Spain‘s political transition did not occur as a ―velvet revolution‖ in 
which the outcomes of political liberalization were shaped by elites alone. 
Granted, Spain did not see the radical socialist mobilization of Portuguese 
industrial workers and peasants, whose intensity had not been matched in Europe 
since Russia‘s October Revolution.
123
 However, between 1976 and 1977, Spanish 
political life was anything but peaceful or elite-dominated. As a matter of fact, 
Spain‘s elite-engineered reforma pactada took place against the background of 
nationalist and worker mobilization. The widespread violence triggered by the 
armed wing of the Basque separatist movement ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) 
and by government reprisals that led to a state of emergency in the Basque 
country in 1976. Wave after wave of assassinations, kidnappings and police 
shootings ripped through the fabric of Spanish political life between the adoption 
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 In 1975 in less than a year, Portuguese workers seized more than 23 percent of Portugal‘s 
farmland, 940 industrial enterprises, and ten thousand houses. The new regime purged the state of 
both hardliners and centrists, and the constitution of Portugal promised a ―classless society‖ and 
the ―transformation of capitalist relations.‖ The Communists had a strong presence in 
governments, and Portugal came close to pulling out of NATO.  Faced with this situation, the US 




of political reform laws that gave Spain a multi-party system, and the organization 
of the first free and fair elections in 1977, with political killings rising steadily 
until 1980. 
The dismantlement of planning institutions as a result of the assassination 
of Carrero Blanco, the planners‘ patron, the approaching death of Franco, growing 
social unrest and the subsequent political instability increased economic 
uncertainty for investors used to a stable authoritarian regime in Spain. With 
prime ministers and finance ministers changing every year between 1973 and 
1977, nobody knew what kind of political regime would emerge, leading 
policymakers to postpone any potentially disruptive economic reforms, especially 
with regard to measures that risked increases in unemployment or wage cuts. In 
this way economic uncertainty was compounded by political uncertainty.  
Unlike in 1959, when labor repression and a buoyant West European labor 
market forced excess labor to leave the country, neither of these two conditions 
applied by 1976. Jobs were being destroyed throughout Europe at a record pace, 
forcing governments to restrict migration flows. And, back in Spain, a labor union 
movement liberated by the worst excesses of the Franquist regime and supported 
by an emerging political opposition, mobilized and demanded state protection 
against the vagaries of the market.  
After almost half a century, Polanyi‘s pendulum seemed to swing back to 
(re)embedding the market through more redistribution and ―voice‖. For a while, it 
seemed that labor would be able to force open the historical window to 




through strikes grew four times between 1975 and 1976 and as the number o 
strikers grew from 1 million to 3.6 million (Ludevid 1982) in a year when 
Portugal saw mass expropriations and a collapse of the ancien regime, the post-
Franquist ruling elites had every reason to be cautious. 
The death of Franco also unleashed a wave of strikes throughout Spain. 
Labor unions had a strong dossier in this regard. During the 1960s, Spanish 
workers, and especially the communist-controlled Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), 
defied repression and organized strikes at a rate that fell within the Western 
European spectrum of the time (Fishman 1981: 283). Jose Maria Maravall‘s 
classic study of the Spanish transition found that, by the early 1970s, this pressure 
developed in a crucial direction by weakening the authoritarian regime‘s 
desperate move to open the door to limited liberalization and evolve into a 
dictablanda: 
 
[popular pressure from below; […] especially that coming from the 
workers‘ movement […] was causal factor in the Francoist crisis, in the 
non-viability of any mere ―liberalization‖ policy, in the willingness on the 
part of the ―democratic right‖ to negotiate the transition and carry through 
reform up to the point of breaking with Francoism, and in the initiative 
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 While the high costs of labor mobilization under Franquism had 
prevented coordinated actions, coordinated industrial conflict could occur 
virtually unimpeded after 1975. Although the Spanish workers‘ protest repertoire 
did not include Portuguese-style occupations of agricultural and industrial 
property, they outdid their Portuguese counterparts in terms of strike mobilization. 
Studies of labor activism recorded an ―explosion‖ in industrial conflict between 
1976 and 1979 (Perez-Diaz 1993: 238-239; see also Collier and Mahoney 1997), 
with over 3.6 million strikers registered in 1976 alone (Bermeo 1997: 309-310). 
But the rise in striking activity did not mean that moderation was off the menu of 
union choices. On the contrary, Robert Fishman‘s classic study of plant-level 
Spanish labor suggests that workers were not ready to go beyond strikes and 
generally supported elite pacts as the main avenue of democratization. Both 
CCOO and UGT had good reasons not to fear that their interests would be left 
unrepresented in the party elite negotiations of the late 1970s, as the links between 
these unions and ―their‖ parties (PCE and PSOE) were especially strong during 
that period.  
The result of the fear of social unrest that could derail the transition was 
the adoption of expansionary policies in 1976, largely in the form of credit issued 
by public banks and targeted to high-employment housing and capital goods 
sectors. This new policy posture earned elites enough social peace to weather the 
challenges of the political transition, led to an extra percentage of growth in GDP, 
yet played havoc with the inflation targeting ambitions of the central bank. In July 




year‘s end. To compound the difficulties experienced by the government, between 
1974 and 1977 Spain‘s ―baby boomers‖ entered the labor marked in record 
numbers, just as 700,000 farm laborers moved from the countryside to urban labor 
markets and 230,000 Spanish migrants returned home, fleeing West European 
markets ravaged by the crisis. As a result, by 1977, the Spanish unemployment 
rate began to grow far above the OECD average. 
 
The short life of Spanish embedded liberalism  
Once it became clear that democratization was ―the only game in town‖ and the 
post-Franquists won the founding elections of 1977, the liberal reforms launched 
in the early 1970s were resumed, this time by a government staffed by the most 
liberal elements of the Franco regime. The new ―superminister‖ of the economy, 
Enrique Fuentes Quintana, understood that since the government could no longer 
resort to violence to quell demands for wage indexation, the only available 
solution was a negotiated stabilization package (Fuentes Quintana 1982). The 
resulting policy package contained in the Moncloa Pacts  mixed liberal measures, 
such as trade liberalization, financial liberalization, an orthodox stabilization plan 
(currency devaluation, tight monetary policy, wage increases well below inflation 
rates), with more redistributionist measures, such as tax increases and increased 
welfare expenditures. This mix was less orthodox than the liberal post-Franquists 





[I]n other times the economic measures agreed upon by the cabinet would 
have been enough to drastically change the course of the economy. But 
now they have not been as efficient as one might have expected and this 
owes to the impact of politics on our economy. So long as a country is 
haunted by unknown quantities of politics, the economy cannot be 




Labor pressures also led to a dramatic modernization of the Spanish 
welfare state. Social spending as percentage of GDP grew by 50 percent between 
1975 and 1982 (Guillen 1982; Guillen and Matsaganis 2000:128). While spending 
on public goods and economic services in Spain remained stable or even fell as a 
proportion of GDP after the mid 1970s, both expenditure groups showed a 
marked increase between 1975 and 1982, with spending on general public 
services growing the fastest. Within this category, welfare spending and subsidies 
to high-employment private and public companies grew the most. Real 
compensation for unemployment benefits grew (Fina 1986). To pay for some of 
the growth of these expenses, the government ―Europeanized‖ the tax system by 
making it more progressive. They also increased the tax burden by 1 percentage 
point of GDP per annum between 1977 and 1982, with most of the growth being 
concentrated on high income earners. The new tax legislation imposed 
extraordinary surcharges on company profits, luxury goods and very high 
personal incomes, introduced an ―extraordinary net wealth tax,‖ abolished 
confidentiality in bank operations, and criminalized tax evasion. As a result of 
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these measures, the GDP share on taxes and income rose by 7.6 percent in 1978, 
almost double the1975 figure (Gonzales-Paramo and Herandez de Cos 2007).  
 Finally, if collective bargaining took place de facto at the factory level 
only during the Franco years, national level bargains became the rule during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s  (the 1979 Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal). UCD 
governments also constrained the hire-and-fire freedom of employers by passing a 
new labor code (Estatuto del Trabajador). For the first time since the Civil War, it 
seemed that a Spanish government reacted to social unrest by incorporating labor 
into economic decision-making. Yet unlike the Republican governments of the 
thirties, this time labor entered the policy process not strictly through 
confrontation, but through a combination of contentious registers (strikes, direct 
action) and an emerging democratic corporatist institutional infrastructure. 
 
Business divided 
Beginning with 1978, the stabilization package from the 1977 Moncloa Pacts 
brought inflation down considerably,
126
 the money growth targets were met and 
wage growth was kept bellow inflation through a series of social pacts in which 
the labor unions played a constructive role. Unfortunately for the government, the 
stabilization package backfired on several fronts. First, although it made taxation 
more progressive and raised state revenues by six percentage points, the ambitious 
fiscal reform demanded by the increasing social bill of ―concerted‖ 
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democratization lost much of its edge due to the opposition of business and 
increased uncertainty for investment.  
Like in the US, where the Nixon administration adopted a string of anti-
business decisions that prolonged the slump in private investment, Spanish 
industrial business felt at a loss as to who represented its interests in the political 
system as long as the post-Franquist UCD, a right-wing party, concentrated the 
costs of economic adjustment on I through tax hikes, expensive credit, a crunch 
on central bank lending to commercial banks.  
At the same time, the conflict between the squeezed industrial capital and 
the privileged the large banks became more dramatic after the Moncloa Pacts. In 
the middle of a tough downturn, big banks were making higher net profits and 
wider profit margins as a result of the removal of deposit rate ceilings. This policy 
triggered a race for deposits that bid up the costs of bank liabilities, leading to 
higher loan rates (Tafunell 1998).
127
 As small and medium banks were almost 
completely eliminated by the banking crisis that broke out in 1977, the degree of 
oligopolization and oligopolistic coordinarion in the banking sector grew, 
concentrating activity in a handful of large banks (Fanjul and Maravall 1985; 
Cuervo 1988).  
The oil shocks increased the costs of Spain‘s maintenance of an industrial 
finance model that blended German characteristics (universal banks and large 
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industrial firms had interlocking directorates)
128
 with local traits (a historical 
preference for short term and discriminatory loans) (Munoz 1968; Pons 2001; 
Pueyo Sanchez 2006). Moreover, throughout the 1960s, the inter-bank 
competition manifested itself more in terms of opening new offices than in 
investment per se (Fanjul and Maravall 1985; Cuervo 1988). As government 
policies signaled withdrawal of support for developmentalist finance but not of 
state guarantees for large banks, once industrial firms started to bleed after 1973, 
universal banks shed their participation in industry, passing the adjustment costs 
on the government budget and on labor (Pons 2001).  
 By contrast, industrial and service firms fares less well. They faced not 
only a fall in aggregate demand and the highest interest rates in OECD, but also 
the highest levels of industrial action and unemployment since the civil war. 
Unlike banking, industry did not have the luxury of ignoring the social costs of 
transition and could not push as hard for cuts in the public budget for fear that this 
would cut the welfare spending that prevented Spain from going the more anti-
capitalist way of Portugal. The consequences for growth of uncertainty in the 
ranks of industrial capital were dramatic: capital investment and industrial 
production fell precipitously and, as a result, the annual real GDP growth went 
down from 3 percent in 1977 to 1 and respectively near-zero rates throughout the 
1978-1982 period. Although labor extracted more wage concessions as well as a 
more favorable legislation, the government‘s anti-inflationary policies tripled the 
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 In 1967, Spain‘s top six banks (Espanol de Credito, Hispano Americano, Cantral, Bilbao, 
Vizcaya, Urquijo) had representatives on the company boards of 955 firms representing 70 percent 




rate of unemployment, from 4.9 in early 1977 to 16.5 at the end of 1982, the 
highest increase in OECD.  
The weakness of business was compounded by its paradoxical political 
isolation by UCD. Organized capital was not even invited to join the negotiations 
for the 1977 Moncloa Pacts. With an eye to the situation in Portugal, prime-
minister Suarez knew that labor could ruin the chances of a comprehensive 
political pact, so he cultivated labor assiduously, while shunning capital. His 
memoirs show that organized business found out about the results of the Moncloa 
negotiations only hours before they were released to the Parliament. 
Consequently, business declared Moncloa Pacts as ―unreal and unjust,‖ as 
―evidence that the government was executing a socialist program,‖ and 
consequently pulled their political support from UCD. 
 
The second oil shock and the crisis of the Moncloa Pacts 
The second OPEC oil shock and the restrictive shift in US monetary policy, both 
taking place between 1979 and 1980, further magnified the economic difficulties 
of the Spanish economy. Because the oil shock further reduced global aggregate 
demand, and since Spain had to pay its higher oil bill in appreciated US dollars, 
industry saw falling orders and tighter credit. Between 1979 and 1982, this led to 
a spike in bankruptcies, falling profits and the sharpest rise in unemployment 
since the civil war at a time when 300,000 youth entered the labor market every 
year.
129
 To increase uncertainty even further, a failed military coup in 1981 sent 
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 Between 1979 and 1982, the number of unemployed doubled, reaching 2 million. During this 




shockwaves through the political system, just as the UCD government was being 
experiencing suicidal internal strife (Gunther and Hopkin 2002). 
The second oil shock of 1979 dealt a heavy blow to the policies of the 
Moncloa Pacts. The oil-guzzling Spanish industry registered heavy losses, leading 
to the first near-zero growth of Spain‘s non-agricultural sector between the 1979 
and 1981 (Tovias 1984: 164). Since the UCD government refused to make labor 
pay for the adjustment, the public deficit exploded. Rather than choose the 
austerity of Spain‘s neighbors after the second oil shock, the Spanish government 
transferred the costs of increased social spending  into the budget deficit, which 
consequently grew from 1.7 percent in 1979 to 5.5 percent in 1982 (Segura 1989). 
Given the interest rate hikes on international capital markets during this period, 
two thirds of the deficit was financed by the central bank and domestic financial 
institutions, on which the government slammed compulsory ratios and other non-
market instruments (Lakauskas 1995; Gonzales-Paramo and Hernandez de Cos 
2007: 100). 
Instead of revising the financial and monetary policies that were blamed 
for worsening the situation in a real economy made fragile by two exogenous 
price shocks, the government stuck to its orthodox monetary policy line. At the 
same time, the UCD policy team did not withdraw into a radical non-
interventionist posture and decided to compensate the losers by blanket 
nationalizations of thirty troubled industrial firms sectors hit hardest by higher oil 
prices (steel and shipbuilding), by expanding welfare through higher taxes and 




strengthened unions and the bargaining position of workers on the shop floor. 
Three years after the second oil shock, Spanish political elites presided over an 
economy with low growth and high unemployment but in which the 
macroeconomic fundamentals were far from disastrous for the standards of the 
time (14 percent inflation, 5 percent budget deficit, 2 percent current account 
deficit).  
PSOE‘s economic program saw high unemployment rather than high 
inflation as the main problem of the Spanish economy and endorsed an 
expansionary macroeconomic package as the way out. The main promise of the 
program was the creation of 800,000 jobs during PSOE‘s first term. But, as 
suggested above, the economic policy team that came to shape the actual 
economic agenda of the Gonzales government after the October 1982 elections 
took some of its core ideas from an insurgent policy paradigm that was in the 
process of turning Keynesianism and embedded liberal institutions in historical 
artifacts. It is to the rising influence of this new ideational order and to its effects 
on Spanish economists that I turn in the following chapters.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter started by challenging the popular argument that PSOE‘s route to 
embedded neoliberalism was inevitable in the structural and ideological context of 
the early 1980s. Using primary sources, I show that PSOE‘s story is not one of 
―pragmatic‖ conversion of its top leadership in 1982 from Keynesianism to 




Mitterand‘s reforms.  Instead, I submitted, the Socialist‘s decision to enact an 
orthodox program had been taken by the party‘s leading players in the economic 
area before the French Socialists launched their expansionist economic package in 
earnest. Indeed, as early as 1981, they had a detailed orthodox policy template 
carefully laid out. 
The rest of the chapter provided the historical background to these 
developments. I show how after the partial liberalizations of the Franco era, the 
transition to democracy created the prerequisites for a Spanish ―embedded liberal‖ 
model, in which the post-Franquist state took advantage of capital‘s weakness to 
forge a class compromise able to guarantee basic economic rights irrespective of 
variations in the macroeconomic sphere. Ironically, it took 14 years of rule by a 
socialist party to destroy this project and adopt an alternative, less labor-friendly 
one.  
This chapter tells us a lot but not why Spain chose embedded 
neoliberalism. By themselves, the crises of the 1970s and the political turmoil that 
followed the death of Franco did not contain a solution to Spain‘s economic woes. 
Given the systemic uncertainty they generated, policymakers had no recourse to 
calculable risk technologies. Instead, it was only through a coherent set of ideas 
that could provide a certain diagnosis of the economy and not others that a 
specific course of action could be elaborated. In the case of Spain under Socialist 
rule these ideas drew heavily on the innovations of the neoliberal insurgency in 
economics. These ideas were constructed within transnational social networks and 








Chapter IV - Policies and Institutions in the Neoliberal Moment 
Overview 
This study advanced the hypodissertation that new economic ideas do not travel 
across borders as ―scripts,‖ but as contestable ideas likely to suffer ―editing‖ at the 
hands of domestic translators. It was also advanced that this transnational voyage 
of ideas would be mediated by three variables: the autonomy of the executive 
from political pressure, the stability of the governing coalition and the extent to 
which neoliberal economists control the economic policy process via 
appointments in key positions. 
This chapter explores the empirical evidence for these claims in the case 
of Spain. First, I evaluate the main claims of the Western neoliberal revolution in 
economics by comparing them with the claims of the postwar neo-Keynesian 
consensus. This descriptive exercise is important in order to estimate the extent to 
which the policies of PSOE governments institutionalized the ―original‖ in their 
economic policies, an aspect discussed in the second part of the chapter. The last 
part of begins the exploration of the conditions that facilitated the rise of 
neoliberalism in Spain by looking at the characteristics of the domestic 
institutional infrastructure that facilitated the rise of neoliberal ideas in the policy 
sphere. 
 





Keynesianism and Its Crisis 
The Keynesian policy paradigm adopted by postwar governments departed from 
the assumption that the private sector was fundamentally unstable to emphasize 
the role of the government in influencing growth rates, employment and 
production through a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. This policy 
paradigm was based in an intellectual consensus shared by mainstream 
economists throughout Western Europe and North America, with the notable 
exception of Germany, where ordoliberal views constrained the effects of the 
brief 1966-1973 Keynesian interlude (Hall 1989; Backhaus 1985).
130
  
The angular stone of the paradigm was Keynes‘ General Theory (1936), 
an initially obscure book proposing a theory where involuntary unemployment
131
 
was attributed to a deficiency in aggregate demand.
132
 After the Second World 
War, what was understood as ―Keynesianism‖ was in fact a syndissertation 
between neoclassical economics and the ―orthodox‖ Keynes of the General 
Theory (Hall 1989; Backhouse 1998).  
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 Juergen Backhaus‘ survey of the adoption of Keynesian ideas in Germany concluded that in 
this country Keynesians ―emphasized productivity, capital formation, fiscal conservatism and an 
entrepreneurial approach to the attainment of public purposes. It was not designed for intervention, 
but participation in the market.‖ (Beckhaus 1985: 243). On the 1966-1972 ―Keynesian‖ interlude, 
one observer noted that ―[t]he entry of the SPD into the government finally allowed Keynesians 
some access to the policy arena, and, as Economics Minister, Schiller was finally able to secure 
passage of a Stability and Growth Law in l967, which officially recognized the government‘s 
responsibility for employment and mandated macroeconomic measures to secure the goals of the 
―magic polygon‖, consisting of price stability, economic growth, full employment, and balanced 
trade. However, the first and fourth goals outlined in this polygon received much more stress than 
did the second and third.‖ (Allen 1989: 16-19). During this time, the central bank placed strict 
monetary limits on deficit spending and continued its epistemic hegemony by employing over 
1,000 economists, in sharp contrast with the 200 economists on the payroll of the German finance 
ministry.  
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  Keynes defined involuntary unemployment as a situation when some people are willing to 
participate in the labor market at the given wage or even at a lower wage yet are unable to act on 
this choice. For a discussion of the Keynesian definition see Hahn (1986).  
132
 Keynes‘ qualitative insights were formalized a year later by three economists (Meade 1937; 
Harrod 1937; Hicks 1937) who saw in the General Theory the opportunity to reconcile 




By contrast with ―fundamentalist Keynesianism‖ (Coddington 1978: 
1259), in the neo-Keynesian model the neoclassical model of Smith and Marshall 
was assumed to hold in the long-run while the Keynesian one was applicable in 
the short run and for situations when the economic situation was marked by sticky 
wages, liquidity traps and interest-insensitive investment.
133
 Neoclassical 
synthesizers like Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, James Tobin, James Meade, J.R. 
Hicks and Franco Modigliani strived to fit Keynes‘ insights into the neoclassical 
fold as well as to formalize them through econometrics.
134
  
Far from being a homogenous paradigm, neo-Keynesianism was a 
spectrum of ideas. The ―right‖ of the spectrum stretched as far as the neo-
Keynesians who embraced the so-called ―Pigou effect‖, which stated that Keynes' 
General Theory failed to specify a link from "real balances" to current 
consumption, and that the inclusion of such a "wealth effect" would make the 
economy more ―self-correcting‖ to the drops in aggregate demand (and therefore 
in employment) than Keynes predicted.
135
 This entailed a decreased emphasis on 
using demand-side policies to achieve the Keynesian objective of full 
employment.  
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 The basic infrastructure of ideas used by Spanish neoclassical synthesizers was the Samuelson-
Kaldor-Hicks formalization of Keynes‘ thought. The intellectual manifesto of Keynesians as a 
group took place in a 1953 special issue of the economics review De Economica on 
Keynesianism‘s applicability to the Spanish context. 
134
The basic formalization of the General Theory was achieved by John Hicks and Franco 
Modigliani in the infamous IS-LM model, a system of simultaneous equations meant to address 
short-run imperfections to achieve the long-run equilibria in all the markets of the economy 
expected by neoclassicals.
 
 IS/LM stands for Investment Saving / Liquidity preference Money 
supply. The IS-LM model allowed for the syndissertation of the classical regime, where wages 
were assumed to be flexible and the Keynesian regime, where nominal wages were assumed to be 
relatively rigid (―sticky‖). 
135
 For a classical Keynesian critique of the Pigou effect see Kalecki (1944)..Kalecki argued that 
the adjustment required by the Pigou effect would increase catastrophically the real value of debts 




On the ―left‖ of the Keynesian spectrum were those who concluded that 
the ―Pigou effect‖ had to work on a narrow band of assets and that even if this 
effect existed, its power could be empirically ignored. Another mark of left-
leaning Keynesianism was Abba Lerner‘s (1949, 1951, 1952) ―functional 
finance‖ argument that balancing the budget is not important in itself, and should 
be managed accordingly. Governments could act to end high inflation without 
risking a major depression only by balancing monetary and fiscal intervention 
through incomes policy and a ―functional finance‖ policy that ensures the 
adequate demand levels that guarantee full employment (Colander 1982:552).
136
   
Similarly, the income redistribution effect of Michal Kalecki (1939: Ch. 3; 1942) 
held that far from being stabilizing, the reduction in money wages in a situation of 
unemployment can lead to reductions in aggregate demand and thus more 
unemployment.
137
 ―Functional finance‖ ideas became textbook Keynesianism and 
the basis for policy during the Western postwar expansion.  
Pushing Keynesianism even further to the left were French economists 
like Pierre Masse who read in Keynes‘ work an endorsement of the imperative of 
indicative planning (Estrin and Holmes 1985; Eichengreen 1984; Coddington 
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 ―What eventually became known as textbook Keynesian policies were in many ways Lerner‘s 
interpretations of Keynes's policies, especially those expounded in The Economics of Control 
(1944) and later in The Economics of Employment (1951). . . . Textbook expositions of Keynesian 
policy naturally gravitated to the black and white 'Lernerian' policy of Functional Finance rather 
than the grayer Keynesian policies. Thus, the vision that monetary and fiscal policy should be used 
as a balance wheel, which forms a key element in the textbook policy revolution, deserves to be 
called Lernerian rather than Keynesian.‖ (Colander 1984, p. 1573) 
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 The logic behind this was that if wages decline, then the mark-up between prices and wages 
would increase. This would result in a redistribution of income from wage-earner to profit-earners. 
But if profit-earners have a lower propensity to consume than wage-earners, then the average 
marginal propensity to consume in the economy declines and thus aggregate demand declines. 
This argument was further elaborated upon by Nicholas Kaldor (1956) and Joan Robinson (1962),  






Austro-Keynesians (Gerlich et al 1985; Tichy 1984; 2007) 
and the more rebellious, yet less policy relevant post-Keynesians (King 2003).
139
 
Indicative planners argued that one of the functions of government should be the 
early identification of oversupply, bottlenecks and shortages so that state 
investment could be used on time and in concert with investors to preempt the 
occurrence of market disequilibria. By contrast with ―standard‖ Keynesianism, 
Austro-Keynesians complemented counter-cyclical demand management with 
strong neocorporatist incomes and exchange rate policies.
140
 
Beginning with the late 1970s, it became apparent that the post-Keynesian 
revolution of Joan Robinson was losing steam in the economics profession just as 
macroeconomics began to ―de-Keynesianize‖ and cede more and more points to 
neoclassical orthodoxy (King 2003). Some leading Keynesian economists put up 
a fight.
141
 Speaking from his position as president of the American Economic 
Association in 1977, Franco Modigliani attacked the monetarist insurgency and 
defended countercyclical monetary and fiscal management policies as the 
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 Estrin  and Holmes (1985) saw indicative  planning  as an appropriate  response  to uncertainty  
based  
on Keynes‘ 1926 The  End  of Laissez-Faire  (1973, Vol.  IX). This view was disputed by 
Coddington (1984). But even though that Keynes was less favorable toward planning of all sorts 
in the General Theory, it certainly is the case that French indicative planners such as Masse cited 
Keynes as the father of indicative planning. This may have been an act of ―radicalization‖ of 
Keynes‘ work, but what it matters is that French planners reproduced Masse‘s reading of Keynes 
and so did their Spanish counterparts. John Meade (1970) provides a more general discussion of 
indicative planning within a broader Keynesian context. See Meade‘s Theory of Indicative 
Planning. Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 1970. 
139
  Inspired by Joan Robinson‘s ―Ely Lecture‖ at the AEA in 1971, Alfred Eichner, Jan Kregel 
and others organized what developed into the grouping known as Post Keynesian economics. 
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 According to Austro-Keynesians, ―economic policy tried to stabilize the data most important 
for entrepreneurial decisions, especially wage increase, exchange rates and investment promotion. 
This lightened the burden of the traditional instruments of stabilization policy. In addition these 
instruments were assigned differently: Exchange rate policy was primarily used to stabilize prices 
in the short run, incomes policy to equilibrate the current account in the medium and longer run, 
fiscal policy to stabilize employment‖ (Tichy 2007).  
141




adequate response to stagflation by arguing that the inflation of the 1970s was 
mostly the result of the oil shock of 1973, rather than the result of flawed 
government policies (Modigliani 1977). He argued that expansionary fiscal 
policies could either complement or offset monetary policy in the pursuit of either 
unemployment or anti-inflationary objectives. A few Keynesian macroeconomists 
set out to demonstrate that the embarrassing difficulty to predict stagflation could 
be overcome by incorporating exogenous supply shocks in the standard structural 
models based on the Phillips curve. 
Other prominent neo-Keynesians, however, began to make major 
concessions or simply defected. In 1980, prominent Keynesian James Tobin, a 
scholar who defended a reflationary response to the crisis, ended up agreeing that 
―the price- and wage-setting institutions of the economy have an inflationary bias. 
Consequently, demand management cannot stabilize the price trend without 
chronic sacrifice of output and employment unless assisted, occasionally‖ (Tobin 
1980: 64). Around the same time, Assar Lindbeck, the dominant figure of 
Scandinavian Keynesianism began to accept the basic assumptions of monetarism 
and rational expectations, leading to a paradigmatic shift to the right in the 
economics of the flagship of social-democracy (Blyth 2001: 16).  In less than a 
decade, Keynesianism went from epistemic hegemony to defensive.  
 
The Neoliberal Insurgency in Economics 
At the heart of embedded liberalism was the idea that monetary policy alone 




by factors other than monetary policy: fiscal deficits, commodity price shocks, 
inflation psychology, aggressive labor unions, or monopolistically competitive 
firms.
142
 Beginning with the early 1960s, monetarists attacked this consensus by 
making the twin contentions that an excessive supply in the quantity of money by 
the central bank is the most important cause of inflation, and that the vagaries of 
monetary policy are responsible for the cyclical fluctuations of the economy.
143
 
This controversial argument that did away with neo-Keynesians‘ complex 
accounts of the causes of inflation was built on the classical assumption that 
governments may not know in advance what the real effects of monetary policy 
will be in the long term.
 144
  
According to Milton Friedman (1956; 1960; 1963; 1969), to forestall 
either deflation or inflation, the most important goal of the monetary policy 
should be a public commitment by the government to lock in low fixed rates of 
growth in the money supply (between 3 and 5 percent) plus all commercial bank 
deposits. 
145
 Once accepted, this dissertation eviscerated Keyensian counter-
cyclical policies based on forecasting the rise in demand.  It promoted the 
institutionalization of monetary targets via open market operations, changes in 
interest rates, budgetary spending cuts or quantitative controls of the increase in 
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 Even the head of the Federal Reserve from 1970 to 1978, Arthur Burns, shared this view 
(Burns, 1979; Hetzel, 1998). 
143
 The tenets of classic monetarism were laid out in a string of Milton Friedman classics: Essays 
in Positive Economics (1953), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (1956), A Program for 
Monetary Stability (1960) and ―The Role of Monetary Policy‖ (1968).  
144
 Monetarism rose as an anti-Keynesian restatement of the 18
th
 century classical quantity of 
money theory. This emphasized the stability of the private sector and the insufficiency of 
monetary policy in controlling inflation, and it was built on the classic liberal faith that, in the long 
run, markets are more efficient and productive than  government intervention. For the pre-history 




 centuries see Leidler (2008). 
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 This policy was adopted by the US Fed on October 6, 1979 by lowering and steadying the 
growth in the money supply. This was achieved by varying the reserves available to the banking 




bank credit, all with a view to reduce the effective demand for goods and services 
(Mayer 1978; Leidler 1981; 2008; Hoover 1984; Kindleberger 2006).
146
  
 But the monetarists‘ offensive did not end with monetary policy. They 
attacked government employment regulations by cutting the links between 
monetary policy and the dynamics of unemployment. Friedman postulated that 
there is a natural rate of unemployment whose levels can only be kept low 
artificially, through labor market rigidities (labor unions, minimum wage 
legislation, hire and fire costs). According to his theory, the natural rate of 
unemployment is unknowable.  Therefore, the government‘s attempts to lower it 
are doomed to generate either inflationary spirals if unemployment is set below 
the natural rate, or deflation if it is set above this rate. The most important 
implication of this argument is that there is no permanent trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment; there is only a temporary trade-off.  
During the 1970s, the monetarist onslaught against Keynesianism was 
complemented by two new schools of thought: supply-side and new classical 
economics. Supply-side economics was the product of interactions between 
conservative media and a small group of maverick economists.  It resuscitated the 
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 The key policy implication of the monetarist dissertation was that government should keep the 
money supply steady and expand it slightly each year in accordance with the natural rate of 
economic growth. In practice, this meant that central banks should establish binding inflation 
targets. If they did this, monetarists claimed, the normal market process would keep inflation and 
unemployment low, while avoiding the risk of recession (Kindleberger 2006). While Keynesians 
endorsed a complex mix of monetary and financial policies to forestall the formation of bubbles, 
modern monetarists prescribed the same simple money supply growth rule enforced by a strong 
central bank (Leidler 2008:66). These ideas gained more respectability once Edmund Phelps 
(1967) and colleagues (Phelps et al. 1970) showed how Freidman‘s findings could be derived 




classical liberal dissertation that supply creates its own demand (Say‘s law),
147
 
leading supply-siders to reject the possibility that economic recessions may be 
caused by a fall in demand (Wanniski, 1978; Canto et al 1982).  
But, as Mark Blyth (2002) showed, supply-siders went beyond this 
classical dissertation in two respects. First, they argued that pumping up demand 
would simply lead to higher inflation, if it were not done in conjunction with the 
improvement of markets through deregulation, liberalization, privatization or free 
trade. Given the assumption that unemployment is voluntary, the second 
monetarist intellectual contribution was that government policy may increase the 
labor supply (and thus both productivity and investment) by allowing participants 
in the labor market to keep more of their money (through tax cuts), and to more 
freely enter and exit the labor market (by scrapping minimum wage legislation 
and the deregulation of labor legislation). 
148
  
Second, in addition to tax cuts and labor deregulation, supply-side ideas 
also entailed reductions in welfare benefits. This was not based on the monetarist 
idea that welfare spending can be inflationary, but on the supply-side discovery 
that the labor supply decreases when the unemployed are offered benefits that 
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 The best-known supply-side economists were Arthur Laffer, Jude Wanniski, Paul Craig 
Roberts, Alan Reynolds, Karl Brunner and Robert Bartley. Some have degrees in economics but 
none have a strong record on scholarly work.  
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 The concern with the efficiency losses generated by taxation was first articulated in the postwar 
years by Arnold Harberger‘s Taxation and Welfare, Boston: Little Brown and Co (1974). Working 
with the classical assumption that the added value created by growth trickled down in the form of 
employment-generating investment, the supply-siders emphasized that the tax cuts should be 
directed principally at high marginal income tax rates, a move to be conducted in conjunction with 





give them incentives not to work.
149
 Supply-siders cited no evidence for such 
theses. The fact that welfare state scholarship did not engage with large-N 
research on the ―big welfare-reduced growth‖ dissertation until the mid 1980s 
kept the supply-side argument sheltered from robust attacks precisely at a time 
when social-democrats began to doubt their commitment to the welfare state.
150
 
  Finally, by importing microeconomic ideas into macroeconomics, 
monetarists also argued that regulation created perverse incentives and distorted 
resource allocation as much as it cured other problems. Because supply-siders 
assumed that efficiency was possible only in conditions of private ownership of 
assets and competitive markets, deregulation and privatization emerged as key 
policy recommendations.  
According to the more academically-anchored new classical (or rational 
expectations) approach, real-world business fluctuations could not be explained 
away as market failures (the Keynesian approach), or strictly as the result of 
monetary disturbances (the monetarist foil). Instead, Robert Lucas, Thomas 
Sargent, Neil Wallace and other prominenti of this new tradition also stressed the 
causal role of supply-side shocks, such as technological revolutions, raw materials 
                                                 
149
 In their strong forms, supply-side ideas argued that tax cuts would generate such revenue 
growth that the resulting deficit would be completely financed by the cuts themselves (the Laffer 
curve) and would raise living standards to such a degree that welfare spending would be 
unnecessary. 
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 Significantly, welfare state scholars found the supply-side argument devoid of empirical value. 
Both Korpi (1985) and Friedland & Sanders (1985) found that welfare states have a positive effect 
on growth rates. After disaggregating expenditure categories, Saunders (1985 1986) found that 




price spikes and radical changes in the organization of production. Employment, 
like output, would rise with favorable shocks and fall with unfavorable shocks.
151
  
The new classicals argued that these disturbances could not be remedied 
by the government. On the contrary, echoing the earlier critiques of government 
intervention made by the Austrian School, they argued that interference could 
only worsen them. Where Friedman had argued that policy was destabilizing, 
Lucas and his colleagues used complex mathematical models to demonstrate that, 
if private agents were completely rational and if markets were competitive (two 
assumptions shared by the neo-Keynesian mainstream) it would be impossible for 
the government to stabilize the economy, simply because agents would adjust 
their inflationary expectations and ―outsmart‖ the government.
152
 Consequently, 
the government‘s only policy option was to credibly commit itself to anti-
inflationary policies, whose costs in terms of higher unemployment could be 
addressed by boosting the supply-side of the economy through tax cuts and labor 
market deregulation.  
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 For two key general accounts of new classical economics see Hoover (1988) and Sheffrin and 
Steven (1996) , For more detailed descriptions and evaluations see Hartley et al (1998) and Lucas 
and Sargent (1981).  
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 To make this argument, new classicals adopted John Muth‘s rational expectations 
hypodissertation: if the predictions of an economic model were correct and the agents‘ 
expectations of the future were wrong, then the agents could use the model to remedy their 
expectations and avoid future errors. They applied this argument to a critique of the Keynesian 
assertion that there was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, and they maintained that 
an expansion of the aggregate demand could lower unemployment only because the acceleration 
in prices was not anticipated. The companies that mistook higher market prices for higher real 
returns would be willing to increase output, while workers who mistook higher market wages for 
higher purchasing power would be willing to terminate their unemployment sooner. Yet these 
outcomes would not last, because neither the returns to firms nor the purchasing power of workers 
were really higher when adjusted to inflation. As soon as they realized that expansionary policy is 
not a stimulus to the economy, but is actually an early warning inflation, firms and workers would 
reduce production and increase the unemployment rate. What is more, having made the mistake 
once, they would not be easily fooled again by the same policy, thus depriving state intervention 




The radical attack against government intervention, which was instigated 
by rational expectations, was further strengthened during the 1970s by the 
indigenization of public choice theory in macroeconomics.
153
 William Nordhaus‘ 
(1975) work on the political business cycle, for example, legitimated the 
assumption that bureaucrats and politicians were not seeking to optimize a 
national welfare function, as Keynesians had assumed, but rather were motivated 
by their own strategic interests. Public policy, therefore, was riddled with 
inefficient rent seeking. The most important policy implication was that 
governments should delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank, 
whose vested interest (ensuring price stability) was by hypodissertation a virtuous 
one. Other public choice economists (Choi 1983) went further in attacking a basic 
social-democratic dissertation by trying to demonstrate that welfare states harm 
growth in the long term due to rent-seeking. However, as some reviewers noted, 
they ―employed proxy variables for sclerosis (age of a nation or years of 
democracy) that assumed a fair amount of faith‖ (Esping-Andersen and van 
Kersbergen 1992: 199).  
 
The Neoliberal Revolution in Practice 
Insurgent Ideas for International Organizations 
Beginning with the mid 1970s, the neoliberal insurgency began to percolate in 
international organizations as well as in the political system of the advanced 
capitalist core. The embrace of these ideas by actors with influence in the world 
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 Public choice theory dates back to the work of James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur 




economy gave these ideas a greater weight relative to available alternatives such 
as, say, post-Keynesian or Austrian economics, because they provided policy 
makers puzzled by enduring stagflation with concrete and successful examples.   
As neoliberal ideas were adopted by the European Commission, OECD, 
the IMF and by great economic powers, the pressures to adjust to the new reality 
increased on nation state elites elsewhere. Yet, as the following sections show, the 
endorsement of the neoliberal agenda did not reach a critical mass of center-left 
West European parties until the second half of the 1980s, well after PSOE decided 
its government program in 1982.   
At the systemic level of analysis, the IMF‘s tolerance of Keynesian 
demand management began to weaken just as the Bretton Woods system showed 
its first signs of crisis. As a recent study of IMF policy papers shows, during the 
late 1960s ―a form of ‗monetarism‘ was emerging in the counsels of the IMF, 
which involved not only a focus on monetary aggregates, but, perhaps even more 
importantly, a skepticism about governmental discretion in the conduct of 
economic policy and an enthusiasm for fixed, quantitative targets‖ (Clift and 
Tomlinson 2008: 565).  But it was not until the mid 1970s that the neoliberal turn 
became evident. Scholars attribute this turn to the fact that key policymakers in 
United States
154
 began to push the IMF to embrace select neoliberal ideas such as 
conditional financing and financial deregulation (Vreeland 2003; Harmon 1997).  
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 According to Eric Helleiner, Treasury Department Secretary Simon and Federal Reserve 
Chairman Burns and secretary of state William P. Rogers used their institutions‘ influence in the 
IMF to force Britain in a macroeconomic stabilization package that contained crucial financial 
deregulation reforms (Helleiner 1994: 124-130). The matter appears to have been highly 
―securitized‖, as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft is quotes saying ―I spent more time 
on this matter [Britain‘s financial crisis] during those weeks as anything else. It was considered by 




Simultaneously, monetarist arguments began to gain traction in the British 
and American financial press and central banks at a time when financial markets 
became increasingly hostile to the Labor government‘s adoption of a neo-
Keynesian crisis package in 1974 (Blyth 2002; Helleiner 1994; Wass 2008; Hay 
2010). And since Britain was more vulnerable to financial interests than any other 
European country, she became the trial run of neoliberalism in 1976, when an 
IMF macroeconomic austerity package with financial deregulation clauses was 
forced on a British government trying to fight the collapse of the sterling. 
Historical contingency entered the scene in dramatic fashion, as the left faction of 
the Labor party was one vote away from rejecting the IMF package (Hickson 
2005; Wass 2008). Neoliberal ideas thus scored their first victory at a critical 
juncture of European economic history.
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Following the British crisis, the IMF further enlarged the list of policy 
areas subject to its newly-acquired neoliberal sensibility. Broome and 
Seabrooke‘s (2007) systematic analysis of IMF policy documents concerning 
Western capitalist states evidenced that while the Fund expanded its advisory 
jurisdiction over the tax regime, labor regulations, welfare state and industrial 
policy issues during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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 After 1981, a similarly 
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 Testifying to the importance of this moment, US state Secretary William P. Rogers 
suggestively framed this moment as ―a choice between Britain remaining in the liberal financial 
system of the West as opposed to a radical change of course, because we were concerned about 
Tony Benn precipitating a policy decision by Britain to turn its back on the IMF. I think if that had 
happened, the whole system would have come apart…So we tended to see it in cosmic 
terms.‖(Helleiner 1994: 128). 
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 For example, in 1977, the Fund advised Denmark not only to cut its growing current account, 
which was part of its old neoclassical orthodoxy, but also to adopt neoliberal supply-side measures 
such as the raising of indirect taxation and the lowering of income taxes. Also, in 1981 the Fund 
basically told Sweden to shrink the welfare state, cut industrial subsidies, cut income taxes and 




expanded package was served to developing countries (Polak 1984; Bierstecker 
1990).
157
  The OECD followed a similar line in near-synchrony with the IMF. 
After 1977, OECD reports written for the EEC advocated a standard monetarist 
line plus an emphasis on fixed exchange rates. The most important of these was 
the McCracken report (1977), whose call for austerity policies to address the 
stagflation crisis was couched not only in the new set of neoliberal ideas 
discussed above but also in new political, sociological and psychological 




 In Western Europe, the neoliberal revolution arrived first in the European 
Commission and in Germany. In 1973, even before the first oil shock hit, EEC‘s 
Council of Ministers passed a resolution that in effect represented the first official 
endorsement of monetarist theses. The resolution called on member states to 
―progressively reduce the growth rate of the money supply until it equals that of 
the real GNP‖ (cited in Bernanke et al 44-45).  Subsequently, the Commission‘s 
finance ―ministry‖ (the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
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 After the Latin American debt crisis in 1981, IMF policy advice went beyond deflationary, 
fiscal adjustment, wage restraint and revenue-increasing policy suggestions and began to advocate 
for more structural measures, such as privatization (public enterprise sales, sub-contracting or 
eliminating public sector services), labor market deregulation, tax incentives for private sector 
development, market restoring mechanisms (ending subsidies, interest rate increases and wage 
indexation, trade and payment liberalization) (Polak 1984; Bierstecker 1990). 
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 These narratives used unexamined conservative values and assumptions to intimate that 
implied social-democracy and welfare systems were dead-enders, that government interventions 
are doomed by intrinsic inefficiencies and that high levels of long term unemployment were 
acceptable in the name of cementing incentives to invest. In the analytical framework of this 
influential report, the state-as-investor disappears, yet the ―new‖ state is now the ―minimal‖ state 
of the orthodox neoliberal line. In addition to the neoliberal disciplinarian function (through 
credible commitments to price stability), the state was expected to continue to facilitate social 
consensus through engineering wage and price level agreements with labor and capital, rather than 
act as the public arm of private capital (Keohane 1978: 119-125). OECD reports also began to 
attack generous welfare benefits and labor market regulations, rather than insufficient demand, as 




issued a report in 1975 that recommended monetary supply targets to lower 
inflationary expectations and create the foundations for a new fixed exchange rate 
regime. Known as the OPTICA reports (OPTImum Currency Area), these policy 
papers took issue with the then still reigning neo-Keynesian orthodoxy and turned 
low inflation and fixed exchange rates into top priorities of economic policy at the 
supranational level in Europe (Thygessen 1978).
159
 During the second half of the 
1970s, German-style inflation targeting also became the new orthodoxy in the 
EEC‘s Committee of Central Bank Governors, a platform for policy coordination 
for central bankers (McNamara 1998: 157-158; Thygsen 1979). 
 
Neoliberalism and European Political Economy 
What gave the EEC policy recommendations greater weight in an otherwise 
underinstitutionalized Community was the fact that the monetarist regime  had 
had a trial run in Germany beginning with 1974 (Scharpf 1984; McNamara 1998). 
While monetarist policies had been tried during the postwar years by the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Kurtzer 1993: 163; 228), the fact that Keynesian 
policies were associated with higher growth rates in France, Austria, Scandinavia 
or Italy weakened the case for its diffusion outside Germany and the small group 
of states that ―shadowed‖ its macroeconomic policy.  
This time it was different, however. Germany‘s generous welfare state, 
employment figures and wage levels appeared to weather stagflation better than 
countries that pushed ambitious demand side policies during the second half of 
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 Like American monetarists and rational expectations economists, the OPTICA experts also saw 
much futility in government interventions in wage and price formation and urged member states to 




the 1970s. West Germany‘s constitutionally-guaranteed commitment to price 
stability ensured through an independent central bank had been a mainstay of this 
country‘s monetary policy during the postwar years (Kaltenthaler 2008; 
Holtfrerich 2008; Prasad 2006). Yet it was only in December 1974 that the central 
bank resorted to monetarist inflation targeting, or the use of pre-announced low 
growth targets (around 2 percent a year) for the money stock (M3) with the intent 
of lowering the public‘s inflation expectations.  
This policy move was enabled by the fact that the collapse of Bretton 
Woods relieved the Bundesbank of its most important external obligation (i.e. to 
intervene in the foreign exchange markets), yet the choice for a more rightward 
option was based in explicit monetarist arguments (Issing 1992; 1996).
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Yet Germany-style monetarism was soon to be emulated across Western 
Europe was of a hybrid or ―pragmatic‖ rather than of an ironclad or doctrinaire 
kind. In Germany not even the conservative Bundesbank economists wished to 
conceive of inflation targeting the first step in taking Germany‘s embedded 
liberalism apart. Theirs was a ―pragmatic monetarism‖ that acknowledged the 
limits of price stability for employment and economic growth outcomes while 
allowing for moderate and temporary accelerations of money growth to stimulate 
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 Although the targets were not met until 1979 (Issing 1995), Germany reduced inflation from 6 
percent in 1975 to 2.7 percent in 1978, while not experiencing the stagflation drama of other 
advanced capitalist economies (Bernanke et al 20005: 43-54). As a former Bundesbank official 
argued, ―[t]he choice of a monetary target in 1974 undoubtedly signaled a fundamental regime 
shift. Not only was it a clear break with the past but also a decision to discard alternative 
approaches to monetary policy.3 There were two main arguments in favor of providing a 
quantified guidepost for the future rate of monetary expansion. First, and foremost, was the 
intention of controlling inflation through the control of monetary expansion. Second, the 
Bundesbank tried to provide a guidance of agents‘ (especially wage bargainers‘) expectations 
through the announcement of a quantified objective for monetary growth. Therefore, with its new 





real growth (Bernanke 1999 et al 51; Issing 1997: 72; McNamara 2006; Kotz 
2007; Neumann 2007). The central bank liked not only Modell Deutchland ‗ 
liberalized cross-border capital movements and deregulated domestic bank 
interest rates, but also Germany‘s conservative universal banks, its privilege to 
coin Europe‘s anchor currency and institutionalized skepticism towards financial 
innovations and  (Issing 1994; 1995; Streeck and Yamamura 2001; 2003).  
Friedman‘s idea that monetary policy should be consigned to fighting 
inflation found little support in the Deutschebank and its admirers throughout 
Europe (McNamara 1998; Bernanke and Mishkin 1997: 105). Moreover, inflation 
targeting as actually practiced by West European central bankers contained a 
considerable degree of policy discretion to allow responses to unemployment 
conditions, exchange rates and other short-term conditions (Bernanke and 
Mishkin 1997: 106). 
The German policy success in weathering the stagflation crisis inspired 
other West European governments to do the same (McNamara 1997: 129-140). 
This was not only the case of Britain, where the right wing of the Labor party 
narrowly passed a neoliberal policy package in 1976 (Ludlam 2010; Hay 2010; 
Wass 2008; Rogers 2009; Hickson 2005; Harmon 1997; Hall 1993; Burk and 
Cairncross 1992).  
As early as 1976, conservative governments in France and Italy also 
shifted from expansionary measures to reform plans centered around restrictive 
monetary policy through the adoption of inflation targets, currency stabilization, 




expressly modeled their restrictive policy packages on Modell Deutschland 
(McNamara 1998). The center-left governments of Benelux had ―shadowed‖ 
Germany‘s anti-inflation posture throughout the late 70s by pegging their 
currencies to the deutsche mark while defending deficit-financed countercyclical 
spending, corporatism and the welfare state.  
Yet when Belgian and Dutch conservatives won the elections in 1982 and 
1983 respectively, they not only maintained the D-mark peg, but also embarked 
on deflationary policies that suspended wage indexation, froze benefits, 
institutionalized work share agreements and deregulated part-time work (Smits 
1983; Kurtzer 1998; Hemerijck and Visser 1997; 2000; Bastian 1994).  
As PSOE was drafting its economic program in 1981-1982, neoliberal 
ideas were being embraced by most West European conservative parties, who 
thus were reneging on their participation in the grand postwar socio-economic 
compromise. But as far as the center-left was concerned, even ―pragmatic‖ 
neoliberalism was far from cannibalizing the economic policy identity of a critical 
mass of European social-democratic parties then in government or opposition. 
Rather than a generalized neoliberal swing, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the  
West European center-left offered instead a mosaic of reactions: outsight 
resistance to neoliberalism (British Labor Party, Belgian Socialists, Dutch, 
Austrian and Danish social-democrats), resistance followed by accommodation 
(French Socialists) and early accommodation (Italian socialists, Swedish and 
German social-democrats). It is to the analysis of the expected effects of this 






II. Economic Policy Under the Socialists  
 
The Rise of Spanish Socialists 
It is one of history‘s great ironies that the neoliberal movement away from the 
Spanish ―embedded liberalism‖ of the late 70s was grounded in the political 
success of the Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party. Between 1982 and 1983, the 
PSOE ruled alone, with a strong parliamentary majority, while between 1993 and 
1996 the party formed a minority government with the parliamentary support of 
the center-right Catalan party Convergencia I Unio.  
The PSOE‘s 14 years of interrupted electoral victories could hardly have 
been anticipated in 1975, when it emerged from almost complete obscurity at the 
end of the Franco dictatorship. Although the first free and fair elections organized 
in 1977 were won by the center-right Democratic Centre Union (Unión de Centro 
Democrático or UCD) with 34.54 percent of the votes, the Spanish Socialist 
Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español or PSOE) scored an 
impressive 29.39 percent. The Socialists were then running on a neo-Marxist 
ticket whose radicalism was on a par with that of the Spanish Communist Party: 
nationalization of industry and banking, institutionalization of a classless society, 





 In the general elections of 1979, the UCD-PSOE electoral gap remained 
largely the same. Following dramatic internal developments in 1979, the PSOE 
decided to scrap references to Marxism in its political program and to profess 
allegiance to ―social-democracy‖ (PSOE, 1979a: 4; Gillespie, 1989: 300, 345; 
Gunther, Sani y Shabad, 1988: 407-9; Share 1989; Carr et al 1991). With the 1979 
congress, PSOE put an end to its ―revolutionary reformism‖ period (1974-1979) 
and embarked on ―parliamentary reformism‖ (García Santesmases, 1985:75). This 
turn was electorally profitable and culminated in the winning of three consecutive 
elections in 1982 (48.4%), 1986 (44.3%) and 1992 (39.5%). The outcome of the 
1982 elections was particularly spectacular, as it left PSOE in a position of 
absolute political primacy that lasted until 1992. The political opposition was in 
shambles: UCD disintegrated,
161
 the communists were in disarray, and the 
rightwing Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular or AP) was still weighed down by 
its connection to Franquism (Gunther et al 2002; Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986: 
91-92; Lopez Pintor 1985; Lopez Nieto 1985; Montero 1986; 1987).
162
 In effect, 
the weakness of the communists removed any challenge on the left, while the 
disintegration of the right eliminated the possibility of conservative adversaries 
too. The result of this political dominance was the transformation of the Spanish 
political system into one dominated by a single party. 
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 For a complete story of UCD‘s collapse see  Gunther and Hopkin (2002).  
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 Alianza Popular was established in 1976 by seven top ministers of the Franco era. Until the 
1990s AP failed to get rid of the association with Franquism and to shift from paleoconservatism 




From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism  
―We want the possession of political power for the 
working class [and] the transformation of individual 
or corporate ownership of the instruments of labor 
into collective, social or common property.‖ 




In economic policy terms, PSOE‘s turn away from Marxism led first to a 
programmatic focus on the adoption of Scandinavian and German social-
democratic models of democratic corporatism. The 1979 party program turned the 
party away from neo-Marxism to Keynesianism, with the fight against 
unemployment trumping concerns about low inflation and deficits. In 1979 the 
PSOE secretary-general Felipe Gonzales put this preference in unequivocal terms: 
 
[S]uccess in addressing the problems of the Spanish economy…cannot be 
measured simply by the reduction of inflation or the national debt, but 
rather by the extent to which these measures are able to avoid creating 
massive unemployment and weakening the productive structures upon 




The 1982 program also advocated an economic policy based on public 
investment as ―the motor of the economy‖ and called for left-leaning labor market 
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 Translation by Nancy Bermeo, (1986; 1997: 310). 
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reforms, such as labor sharing policies, a reduced workweek, the maintenance of 
workers‘ purchase power relative to inflation, more spending on unemployment, 
pension benefits, and a more progressive tax system (PSOE 1982). Even more 
impressively, the 1982 program promised the creation of 800,000 new jobs based 
on the following social-democratic logic: 
 
The policy of previous governments, based on rising prices, systematic 
reduction of labor costs, reduction of real salaries or work force numbers, 
and the transfer of the cost of inefficient productive apparati toward the 
poor, has not achieved a stimulation of investment, has depressed demand, 
and has increased the unemployment…It is absurd to think that this 
country will tolerate policies whose only results are the maintenance of the 
old power structure-economic, political and social-at the cost of 




Following the 1982 elections, however, the Socialists swung further to the right, 
in the direction of ―embedded neoliberalism‖ or of what Charles Boix aptly called 
―supply-side socialism:‖ 
 
[O]n the one hand, the cabinet emphasized the need to maintain a stable 
macroeconomic framework as the best means to attract investment and 
maximize long-term growth.  On the other hand, loyal to its social-
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democratic aspirations, it planned to transform the supply side of the 
economy through the direct intervention of the public sector in order to 
ease the set of structural problems--long-term unemployment and 
substantial underdevelopment in vast areas of the country—that beset the 
Spanish economy.  Accordingly, tax revenues were to be gradually raised, 
public savings were to be rebuilt and public spending on fixed and human 
capital were to be massively increased (Boix 1994, part. 2, 1).  
 
 Once in power, PSOE announced policies that reflected their diagnosis of 
the crisis of the Spanish economy using monetarist and supply-side economic 
ideas. Based on this diagnosis, the Socialist government began to focus on 
targeting inflation and the budget deficit. The result was the adoption of a string 
of measures meant to reduce internal demand: cuts in public spending, the 
devaluation of the peseta, increases in interest rates, and the squeezing of credit to 
the private sector. To further reduce internal demand, real interest rates increased 
from 2.4 percent in 1982 to a punitive 8.2 percent in 1982, only to level off 
around between 4 and 5 percent after 1985.  
As early as December 1982, the government devalued the peseta-dollar 
ratio by 7.6 percent with the stated intent of shifting the weight of growth from 
domestic demand to external demand (which would also reduce the balance of 
payments) and to reduce the incentive to speculate on the peseta. Following this 




loss-making public enterprises was cut, which led to a string of bankruptcies in 
high-employment sectors like steel, shipping, mining and textiles.
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The measures adopted by the Socialist government resulted in a rapid 
macroeconomic stabilization during the first three years of its rule: the inflation 
rate dropped by 6.2% points between 1982 and 1985, the budget deficit was 
halved, and the current account went from a deficit of 2.5 percent in 1982 to a 
surplus of 1.4 percent in 1984 (Maravall, 1997: 156). By the end of its tenure in 
1996, the Socialists cut inflation levels to 4.9%. Unfortunately for the 
government, despite the adoption of increasingly tough monetary policies, 
disinflation was an unstable and inefficient outcome. According to OECD 
estimates on Spain, ―the rise in unemployment or loss of output necessary to bring 
inflation down by one percentage point‖ in the late 1980s was ―twice as large in 
Spain as in other EMS countries‖ (OECD, 1992b, pp. 63-65). By 1993, just when 
the party‘s electoral program embraced enough economic liberalism to make the 
party vulnerable to accusations that it stole ideas from its conservative rivals,
167
 
high unemployment struck back by reaching 24% of the active labor force. 
 Yet the exorbitant benefits of the macroeconomic reforms and the 
politically costly deregulation of labor contracts did not trickle down into greater 
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 This industrial ―reconversion‖ was institutionalized by royal decrees no 8/1983 and 27/1984. 
At the end of the process, 83,000 workers were left unemployed. The ensuing social drama 
affected Socialist heartlands like Asturias and the Basque regions and was cushioned by the 
payment of 80 percent of their last salaries to the laid off workers for a period of three years. In a 
dramatic attempt to foil government plans, the workers of loss-making Altos Hornos del 
Mediterraneo, a flagship of the Spanish steel industry, stopped the foundries only after the 
government credibly threatened to cut the fuel supply (Boyer 2001: 259-260). For the most 
detailed presentation of the dismantelement of the integrated Spanish steel sector see Moran et al 
(2008).  
167
 The accusations of programmatic plagiarizing were made by PP and CDS in the May 2
nd
, 1993 
edition of El Periodico and, respectively, of the May 5
th




labor demand, as supply-side theory predicted. On the contrary, the level of 
unemployment, the principal cost of the reforms, went from 17% in 1982 to 
21.6% in 1985, the highest level in OECD. This rise was only temporarily and 
slightly reversed during the 5-year boom experienced by Spain from 1986 through 
1990—when the GDP grew at an annual average of roughly 5%.  
Faced with this situation, the government dramatically liberalized the 
labor market in 1984 and 1993 with legislation that allowed employers to hire and 
fire new workers at virtually no cost (see Dolado & Jimeno, 1997, p. 1290; 
Jimeno & Toharia, 1994). As a result, Spain became the European country with 
the highest proportion of temporary employment (around a third of the total labor 
force).  This policy was based on the supply-side argument that high 
unemployment was causally linked to the high level of dismissal costs imposed on 
employers by a rigid legal framework (Malo de Molina 1985; Blanchard et al., 
1995; OECD, 1992).  
Unfortunately for the proponents of this argument, unemployment 
continued to grow, and the high job turnover encouraged by labor deregulation 
almost bankrupted the public unemployment insurance institution, Instituto 
Nacional del Empleo. This led the government to cut both the replacement rate 
and the share of the unemployed population eligible for benefits by almost 50 
percent (Gutierrez and Guillen 1998).
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PSOE‘s neoliberal drive affected the welfare state as well. Social 
expenditure cuts and the tightened conditions of eligibility for pension benefits 
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 For basic studies on unemployment benefits see Gutierrez and Guillen (1998), Toharia (1997), 




were immediately integrated in the reform package of the government in 1982.
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Social spending grew under electoral and union pressure during the early 1990s, 
only to be reduced again during the last year of office (see table). The most 
controversial cost-cutting measure of the 1985 pension reform law was the 
increase of the minimum working years required to earn a public pension from 
two to eight (Guillén 1999, 9). A new pension reform adopted in 1987 encouraged 
wage earners to subscribe to private pension plans (Chuliá 2007, 530).
170
 Pension 
indexation failed to occur until 1995, and it was only under extreme electoral 
duress that PSOE decided to expand the coverage of the pension system by 
introducing non-contributory pensions in 1990 (Panizo Robles 2006; Lagárez 
Pérez 2001).
171
 The Ministry of Finance imposed caps on payments for the 
injured and the sick, while leaving 18 percent of the unemployed uncovered. 
Finally, the PSOE governments resisted the demands of regional governments to 
offer minimum income schemes for people of working age (Lapara and Aguilar 
1997).  
 
Crafting Embedded Neoliberalism 
The Spanish economic transition under the PSOE rule challenges the existing 
literature on neoliberal reforms, which tends to pit ―neoliberal orthodoxy‖ against 
―statism‖ (e.g. Harvey 2005). The case of Spain shows that these categories are 
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 As a consequence of the expansive measures adopted by UCD governments in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the coverage of the pension system increased significantly, as did expenditures: 
from 5% of GDP in 1980 to 8.3% in 1982. 
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 For an overview of these reforms see San Miguel (1998). 
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far from dichotomous in conditions of increased global economic 
interdependence.  
The Socialist governments who governed Spain between 1982 and 1996 
were instrumental in definitively institutionalizing the ―hard‖ core of the 
neoliberal policy program: macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, the 
deregulation of temporary employment (Boix 1998; Royo 2002; 2008; Maravall 
1997; Perez 1997; Holman 1993). On the other hand, the Socialists further 
expanded Spain‘s welfare state and maintained state intervention in the economy 
by adopting industrial policies that dissented from the hands-off, sector-neutral 
neoliberal policy posture through strategically delayed privatizations, temporary 
tariff protections and continued state ownership of ―national champions‖ (Perez 
1998; Etchemendy 2004; Royo 2008).  
In other words the Socialists adopted what some called ―embedded 
neoliberalism,‖ an economic paradigm whereby the state intervenes on the 
supply-side of the economy (Kurtz and Brooks 2008) and/or institutionalized 
welfare states that compensate citizens affected by market dislocations (van 
Appeldoorn 2008; Greskovitz and Bohle 2007). These forms of state intervention 
included ―open economy‖ industrial policy targeted at ―national champions‖, 
continuing state ownership of competitive sectors (banking, energy, utilities), 




policies; they alter the prices of investment and wages, while encouraging certain 
economic trends over others (Dani Rodrik 2004: 2).
172
  
As in most continental European democracies, Spanish neoliberal reforms 
transformed and even expanded the welfare state, rather than eliminating it. Also, 
the state did not shrink government intervention to the levels demanded by the 
Washington Consensus. Instead, the role of the state in the economy remained 
strong enough that ―varieties of capitalism‖ scholarship considers Spain a ―state-
enhanced‖ type of capitalism, alongside other European Mediterranean countries 
like France, Portugal and Italy (Schmidt 2002; 2006; Royo 2008). In state-
enhanced capitalism (SEC), ―adjustment is firm-led in those domains where 
business now exercises autonomy—in business strategy, investment, production, 
and wage-bargaining—but adjustment is still state-driven in those domains where 
neither business nor labor can exercise leadership—in labor rules, pension 
systems, and the like—or where the state sees a need to reshape the general 
economic environment to promote competitiveness. In either case, the logic of 
interaction is one of hierarchical authority rather than joint-decision or unilateral 
action‖ (Schmidt 2002, p. 144).  
 Spain fits many of the characteristics of the SEC model. After the 
Socialists, the state ceased to act as a ―co-equal‖ coordinator of labor and capital 
and instead privileged its role as enabler of business and opportunistic ally/foe of 
organized labor. After showing some initial support for corporatism (1982-1985), 
the state‘s subsequent reactions to corporatist institutions ranged from neglect to 
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 Rodrik argued that ―the nature of industrial policies is that they complement (opponents would 
say ―distort‖) market forces: they reinforce or counteract the allocative effects that the existing 




hostility. It was only after PSOE lost office in 1996 that Spanish corporatism 
returned, although its institutions apply mostly to the small unionized sector 
(Perez 2001). As a result, for the large mass of workers with temporary 
contracts—the highest in OECD—labor-capital  relations in Spain tend to be 
regulated at the firm level and are governed by a high level of flexibility for the 
employer.  
While withdrawing the state from the labor market, PSOE crafted a ―smart 
developmentalist‖ course on trade and industrial policy. Its protection of domestic 
banks gave Spain a financial system dominated by domestic players with a global 
reach and a network-type corporate governance (Sebastian 2000; Etchemendy 
2004; Salas and Saurina 2003; Crespi et al 2004; Cardone-Riportella et al 2001). 
Similarly, PSOE‘s industrial policy allowed the state to play a more active role in 
sectors deemed economically competitive, such as energy and 
telecommunications, turning many of the firms active in these sectors into global 
players (Etchemendy 2004; Toral 2001;Guillen 2001;  Martin and Toral 2005; 
Seiglie 2005; Medrano 2006; Olivares 2007; de las Casas 2005; del Real 2009). 
At the same time, the wholesale transfer of marginally competitive state-
owned industries to multinational corporations during the 1980s and 1990s made 
Spain more similar to the ―dependent market economies‖ of Central Europe 
(Nolke and Vliegenthart 2009).
173
 Like Poland or the Czech Republic in the 
2000s, Spain‘s global industrial competitiveness during the 1980s and mid-1990s 
relied heavily on low labor costs, medium level technological skills and 
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 For recent scholarly work on East European varieties of capitalism see: McMenamin 2004, 
269; Lane 2005, 245; Cernat 2006; Bohle and Greskovits 2007a, 2007b; Hancké, Rhodes, and 




hierarchical control of Spain‘s most active exporting industries by TNC 
headquarters (Bajo-Rubio et al 1994;  Molero et al 1996; Jarillo and Martinez 
1990; Ferner et al 2001; Barrios et al 2004). The same cross-regional similarity 
can be observed on the role of innovation transfers. Rather than developing a 
strong domestic R&D base, Spain remained an assembly platform for semi-
standardized goods dependent on TNC innovation transfers (Molero et al 1996; 
Biggart 1999; Guillen 1999; Molero et al 2005). Finally, because strong patterns 
of national coordination between labor, state and capital were absent, Spain did 
not develop the strong vocational training institutions of coordinated market 
economies. This failure caused productivity to stagnate against the background of 
increasing wage costs (Meijer 1991; Addison and Siebert 1994; Leclerq 1994; 
Casado 2000; Aguillera 2005; Nestler and Kailis 2009). 
The Socialists‘ apparently conservative commitment to neoliberal ideas 
about monetary and labor policy did not translate into sustained PSOE offensives 
to thoroughly institutionalize a conservative welfare state or to lower taxes on the 
wealthy.
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 On the contrary, on most welfare issues PSOE embarked on adopting 
policies that were consistent with ideas rooted in social-democratic reformism 
(Guillen 2000).
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 More specifically, the Socialists increased social spending after 
1990, albeit without securing convergence with the EC average.As a result, access 
to social services became a citizenship right during the late 1980s, although 
income thresholds were set up for different services (Barea Tejeiro 1997). New 
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 For useful overviews of Spanish social policies see Guillén (1992; 1996). 
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 The adoption of the socialist policies on income redistribution was not revolutionary. The post-
Franco conservative governments reacted to labor union activism by adopting wage and 
redistribution policies that reduced the Gini coefficient from 0.45 percent in 1974 to 0.36 percent 




welfare services were also created. For example, paid maternity leave covered 
100 percent of the last wage stub. However, unlike the clientelism observable in 
other Mediteranean welfare states, such practices remained very limited in Spain 
as a result of adequate funding and professionalization (Guillen and Matsaganis 
2000: 128).  
The resilience of social-democratic ideas under the Socialists was 
evidenced by the adoption of universal health coverage and access to free 
education at all levels based on citizenship (Freire Campo, 1993; 1998) The 
health reform gave universal access to public healthcare to 6 million Spaniards 
not only in form, but in practice as well, even though this entailed a tripling of 
public health spending between 1982 and 1991. The highest share of the health 
budget was financed from taxation in Southern Europe (68 percent).
176
 The 
expansion of coverage continued throughout the 1990s. The same universalization 
affected the pension and education system. After 1990, 2 million more citizens 
were included in the public pension system, and the average purchase power of 
pensioners had been increased by 20 percent during the 1990-1996 period.
177
 In a 
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 Until the 1984 health care reform, only 82% of Spaniards had medical coverage. In addition to 
universal coverage, the government boosted spending on medical equipment and primary care 
(Dorado 1993: 67). In 1984, a government decree turned old infirmaries (ambulatorios) into health 
care centres staffed by multidisciplinary teams and laid emphasis on preventive care. In 1986, the 
General Health Law (GHL) united all public health service networks into a single national system. 
Full universalization was not achieved, however, until 1989. It is important to point out that, 
although, 99.8 percent of the population is entitled to public health care, such a right has not 
become based on citizenship, as in the social-democratic model (Freire Campo, 1998). This has 
been because, by law, public servants and self-insuring enterprises may choose between public 
and private insurance (Guillen and Matsaganis 2000: 130).  
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 In effect, while in 1992 the lowest public pension was at the same level with the minimum 





country with a notoriously inferior education record,
178
 and in which broken 
public schools had led to the exodus of middle-class students towards private 
schools, public spending on education increased by 500 percent between 1982 and 
1992 and made tuition-free college education a citizenship right. This enabled the 
public provision of education for all children aged over 3 years (Valiente 1995).  
The PSOE‘s social-democratic credentials were salvaged by select tax 
policy choices as well. Unlike in the paradigmatic Anglo-American setting, where 
the adoption of supply-side ideas led to a wave of tax cuts on capital and on the 
personal incomes of the wealthy during the 1980s, Spanish Socialists considered 
more progressive taxation to be both a prerequisite for growth and an instrument 
of social fairness (PSOE 1982; 1986; 1990).  
Beginning in 1983, the government launched a crackdown on tax evasion. 
Soon after that, income-tax filings saw dramatic increases. Taxes on income and 
profits increased from 7.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to 10.1 in 1994, with most of 
the increase weighing on upper income brackets (Gonzalo-Paramo and Hernandez 
de Cos 2007: 117; Gunther et al 2004: 357). Although Spanish taxation levels 
remained below OECD levels in 1996, the Socialists had managed to narrow the 
gap considerably by increasing tax revenue as percentage of GDP from 30.1 
percent in 1985 to 34.6 percent in 1985 (Gonzalo-Paramo and Hernandez de Cos 
2007: 117). To this end, the Socialists argued that Spain‘s economy could not 
develop without increasing fixed public capital formation (basic infrastructures 
and transportation), labor productivity and the competitiveness of public firms.  
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 In 1982 Spain had the highest rates of illiteracy and lowest rates of school attendance in 




This argument was also framed to serve a redistributionist discourse by 
emphasizing the job creation brought by public works and the acceleration of the 
rate of growth in underdeveloped regions (Zabalza 1991; Solchaga 1987; 1988; 
2003; Zaragoza 1989).  
 The Socialists avoided market fundamentalism in other realms as well. On 
industrial policy, policy elites endorsed the view that Spain‘s underdevelopment 
could not be addressed by liberating market forces alone, and that the state had to 
invest in national infrastructure and in those private and public Spanish firms that 
had a potential to be internationally competitive (Perez 1998; Boix 1998).  
Significantly, PSOE‘s doubling of state capital investments during the 
1980s (to 24 percent of GDP) was framed using ordo-liberal arguments about 
state-spurred competitiveness, rather than the social-democratic emphasis on 
employment protection . To this end, in less than a decade, Spain had one of 
Europe‘s most modern expressway systems and laid high speed rail at record 
pace. Also, at great cost to employment,
179
 the PSOE government accepted the 
strategy of economy minister Carlos Solchaga to terminate loss-making INI firms, 
restructuring some and privatizing others. 
180
  
The underlying strategy of these measures was to concentrate business 
operations in profitable sectors around a few national champions (Etchemendy 
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 Total employment in INI fell from 216,700 in 1983 to 154,500 in 1989 (Acena and Comin 
1991: 542).  
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 As a result of privatizations, foreign capital became dominant in the production of cars, 
chemicals and electronics. In the consumer electronics industry, for example, the leading five 
firms in 1996 were Sony, BYSE, Electrolux, Fagor and Samsung. In the electronic equipment 
sector, Alcatel and Ericsson dominated the market. In the pharmaceuticals sector, the leaders were 
Bayer and Glaxo Welcome. In the IT sector, the market was dominated by IBM and Hewlett 
Packard. In electric materials, Bosch, Siemens and Brown Boveri were the three leaders. In the car 




2004). Thus, all state energy companies were merged with the large power 
generator Endesa; the iron and steel, aluminium and electronic sectors were 
merged with CSI-Aceralia, Inespal and Inisel respectively; and oil and gas 
companies were consolidated into a single company, Repsol. These consolidation 
measures were completed by the merger of all state banks in Argentaria, Spain‘s 
third largest banking group. Almost all these new major players received state 
protection against foreign competition well after Spain‘s EU integration. 
At the same time, unlike their more neoliberal successors,
181
 the Socialists 
kept the most competitive INI firms in state hands. Subsidies to sectors like steel 
or mining, which had high-employment but lacked efficiency, were declared 
wasteful and then withdrawn against violent protests.
182
  Meanwhile, subsidies, 
special credit lines and even temporary protectionist measures were presented as 
necessary features of a modern ―competition state‖ for sectors and firms deemed 
competitive (auto, telecom, energy, electronics, banking)  (Etchemendy 2004). 
While this policy stance did not break Spain loose of its traditional dependence on 
foreign firms for technology updates in the industry, it was successful in other 
sectors Buesa and Molero (1998: 271-295). Finally, rather than leaving the laid-
off workers at the vagaries of the market, the government subsidized pre-
retirement, paid generous severance benefits, and offered incentives to firms to 
relocate in rapidly deindustrializing zones. Terminated by EU pressures in 1986, 
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 Privatization was especially comprehensive during the first term of PP government (1996-
2000), when Spain‘s largest utilities and industrial groups passed in private hands.  As a result, the 
participation  of the public enterprise sector in the GDP has been reduced from 3% in 1995 to  1% 
in 2002 (Arocena 2004).  
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 The closing of the huge INI steelworks Altos Hornos del Mediterraneo near Valencia triggered 
factory occupations and other forms of worker combativeness. The face-off between government 
and steel workers led to near state-of-siege conditions in the Valencia area. Also, workers in the 




these measures made possible the rehiring of a fourth of the laid-off workers 
(Buesa and Molero 1998; Montero 2002: 38). The tuning of Spain‘s industrial 
engines, it seems, was too complex to be left to market forces alone. 
But how was it possible for the Socialist governments to adopt so many 
policies that were patently against the interests of its electoral base? In the second 
half of the chapter I show how quasi-closed groups associated with the economics 
profession established exclusive jurisdiction over debates on which economic 
ideas were considered legitimate in early 1980s Spain.  
 
III. The Institutions of Translation 
Overview  
In this section I will first introduce the characteristics of the institutional 
infrastructure, which facilitated the policy influence of a few academic 
economists and which was centralized in the premier‘s office, the ministry of 
finance and the central bank. This enabled the formation of a very small and 
cohesive policy team whose insulation from societal pressure was compounded by 
the highly centralized structure of the ruling party. The premier‘s office, the 
ministry of finance, and the central bank were connected by revolving doors, 
which enabled prominent academic economists to have unmediated access to 
decision-making. This institutional infrastructure was not instantaneously 
established, however. Instead, it grew over several decades out of historical 
contingency, institutional entrepreneurship and the internal characteristics of the 





The Primacy of the Finance Ministry 
One of the institutional legacies of Franco was a policy process in Spain under 
Franco took place in a bureaucratic-authoritarian state that was highly centralized 
in the executive branch, but which allowed academic economists a wealth of 
opportunities to advocate new economic ideas. From Franco, democratic Spain 
inherited a prominent role for the ministry of finance within the executive and a 
revolving door between executive offices and the faculty in economics 
departments. Both of these institutional features were further consolidated under 
democracy.  
Under Franquism, the head of state had veto power over the entire process, 
but he rarely exercised this right.
183
 Since the single party and the legislative 
branch were weak, the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) was the epicenter of the 
economic policy process. And inside the hierarchical infrastructure of the cabinet, 
the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda) lorded over all other ministries through its 
discretionary power over budget policy, the personal preferences of the 
minister
184
 and the superior economic training of its staff.
185
 This institutional 
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 Charles Anderson and Richard Gunther‘s authoritative studies of policy-making in Franco‘s 
Spain agree that despite the high degree of centralization of power in the person of the Caudillo, 
Franco chose not to intervene unless the basic norms of the compact that had the pro-regime 
coalition together were tampered with. As one of his biographers showed, this owed a great deal to 
the fact that Franco had few political ideas beyond ―order‖, anticommunism, traditionalist 
Catholicism and obsession with a looming ―liberal-Masonic conspiracy‖ (Preston 1987). 
184
 Decision-making authority in both the Hacienda and the Planning Commissariat was 
concentrated in the person of the minister, who, in turn, was personally accountable to Franco. The 
power in each ministry was concentrated in the hands of a single individual: the minister (Gunther 
1980: 127-143). As a result, the personal preferences of the ministers were so important that the 
sources of policy change could be safely read in the changing preferences of these policymakers 
and their advisory teams. Only if the Chief of State took an active interest in specific issues on 




primacy was only temporarily challenged between 1963 and 1973, when 
Hacienda had to negotiate budget policy with the central institution of indicative 
planning: the French-inspired Plan Commissariat (Comisaria del Plan) (Gunther 
1980: 71-78; 216-221). 
After Franco‘s death, the Spanish political system evolved into a textbook 
example of a consolidated parliamentary democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996). Yet 
the political system and the policy process did not revolutionize the centralism of 
the Franco era. This was due in part to the fact that the 1978 Constitution adopted 
the German institution of the Chancellorship, with the dual aims of ensuring 
executive dominance over the parliament and the prime minister‘s dominance 
within the executive (Heywood 1995; Biezen and Hopkin 2005).  
In this system, the cabinet has the dominant role in tabling new legislation 
and faces low thresholds for issuing decree-laws, which Socialist governments 
used extensively. The collegiality of the executive is severely constrained by the 
fact that, in case of disputes inside the cabinet, the premier has the authority to 
override all ministers and make the final decision (Calvo 1996). The parliament 
can censure the actions of the premier only by proposing an alternative candidate 
with a majority vote (Heywood 1999). The cabinet itself is heavily 
―presidentialized‖ around the institution of the prime minister. The premier is the 
only member of the government designated with the vote of the parliament, the 
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 Once political events terminated the political support enjoyed by the Commissariat in 1973, 
Spanish planners lost all institutional support and Hacienda ruled supreme again.
 
The first post-
Franquist government set this reality in stone in 1976  by transferring all planning functions to a 
secretariat of Hacienda, where planning was definitively buried.
 
 The Plan Commissariat was able 
to challenge Hacienda due to patronage: the new head of the Commissariat was Lopez Rodo, a 
protégé of Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco‘s closest advisor. After Carrero Blanco was assassinated 
by an ETA hit squad, Lopez Rodo lost his ministerial portofolio and the Planning Commissariat 




authority to dissolve parliament, and the authority to appoint and sack ministers. 
And since Spain‘s electoral institutions favor majoritarian outcomes, Spanish 
premiers had strong majorities in the parliament. This was especially the case 
with PSOE premier Felipe Gonzales, whose party had 57.7 percent of the seats in 
the 1982-1986 legislature, 52.6 percent between 1986 and 1989, 50 percent 
between 1989 and 1993.
186
  
 Hacienda also maintained its institutional protagonism in the policy 
process inside the Council of Ministers. Moreover, its powers increased during 
the Socialists‘ first term through its merger with the Ministry of the Economy 
(Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, MEH). The formation of MEH in 1985 was 
tantamount to the formation of a large bureaucratic structure whose policy 
authority concerned all matters of relevance for state-market relations. Hacienda 
did not only control the other ministries through its hegemony over budget policy. 
Like in the times of Franco, MEH‘s epistemic authority was also hard for other 
members of the cabinet, including the premier, to challenge, due to the fact that it 
employed the highest number of highly-educated elite administrators (tecnicos de 
estado). Additionally, because MEH appointees were all closely connected 
intellectually with the Research Service of the central bank, the Franco-era 
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 Some scholars attributed the presidentialization of Spain‘s parliamentary system to a 
democratization process that avoided a clear break with the ancien regime. The decision not to 
purge the Spanish state of Franquist elements ensured continuity in the governing culture (Bar 
1997: 116-117; Fishman 2009). Other scholars emphasized the legacy of the ―pacted‖ transition, 
in which the difficulty of negotiating elite consensus and appease groups with clshing preferences 
(the army, unions, the Church) concentrated power in behind the scenes negotiations among a 
handful of elites and weakened the functions of the parliament and of political party activists 
(Herrero de Minon 1993; Biezen and Hopkin 2005). Finally, some argue that the institutional 
centralization of the policy process reflected the fear of Spanish constitution makers of the risk of 
civil war generated by unstable coalitions and fractionalism that marked the constitution of the 




conflicts between the central bank and Hacienda ended under the Socialists (Perez 
1998).  
Although de jure the premier had absolute power over Hacienda through 
making appointments, the economic policy process was de facto run as a 
―diarchy‖ in which power was split with the premier (Heywood 1998).
187
 
Moreover, in the new constitutional settlement, MEH was insulated against 
parliamentary pressures. During the PSOE years, the premier was also the head of 
the ruling party, and as long as the premier backed the MEH and managed to 
impose internal party discipline, the ruling party group in the parliament could not 
stage a rebellion against the policies of the MEH. The ability to protect the core 
executive against the party was facilitated in Spain by the system of closed and 
blocked lists, which made MPs more dependent on the decisions of the party 
executive than on the electorate. Or, as shown below, the party executive between 
1979 and 1996 was ruthlessly efficient at using this institutional prerogative to 
keep regular MPs out of the business of the executive.  
In sum, the Socialists inherited an executive that was highly centralized 
and revolved around the prime-minister and the ministry of Finance. This 
increased the likelyhood of the adoption of neoliberal reforms if the minister of 
Finance was a neoliberal and was strongly supported by a premier insulated from 
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 This was because the process of deciding the key axes of the government‘s budget policy was 
controlled by MEH, through its privileged position in the Functional Spending Committee 
(Comisiones Funcionales de Gasto), an institution that excludes the premier and whose agenda is 
shaped by the budgetary office of each ministry. But the MEH controls these budgetary offices 
through the practice of limiting appointments for their director position to the ranks of the MEH. 
Moreover, the budget itself is drafted by the General Directory of the Budget (Direccion General 
de Presupuestos, DGP), an institution that until 1996 was entirely controlled by MEH. In this 
process, the premier‘s main function is to mediate and, if needed, unilaterally set disputes. Beyond 




the political pressures of the ruling party/coalition. As the next sections show, this 
is exactly what happened in Spain under the Socialists.  
 
The Academic-Bureaucratic Complex Under Authoritarianism 
Economists and the State in Spain 
Another legacy of Franco‘s years was the remarkable influence of economists in 
the state, a reality shaped by a complex institutional history. Yet the roots of this 
legacy cut deeper in history. 





 yet it was not until the early 20
th
 century that it began to exert a 
significant degree of influence over state institutions via the institutionalization of 
a ―revolving door‖ between the elite sectors of academia and economic policy 
state bureaucracies. This practice meant that prominent economists held joint 
appointments in academia and the state.
189
  
The central pillar of the revolving door was a set of elitist (―mandarinal‖) 
and outward-looking professional norms that privileged a few foreign-trained top 
economists. To use Marion Fourcade‘s categorization (2009), state-economists 
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 The Spanish economics profession emerged during Spain‘s Enlightenment in the late 18
th
 
century, when the first chairs of political economy were established during the reign of the 
celebrated monarch Carlos III (Perdices de Blas 1993:354). A century later, the profession became 
more institutionalized and political economy became a required item in university curricula. And 
as soon as Spain built a parliamentary regime in the late 19
th
 century, economics professors 
became increasingly active in politics and in state institutions (Fuentes Quintana 2001; Velarde 
2001).Out of seventy professors of political economy and public finance, twenty had some 
parliamentary mandate between 1844 and 1923. (Acena 2006: 82). 
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 The case of Flores de Lemus, Spain‘s most prominent early 20
th
 century academic economist 
and, for more than three decades (1905-1936), an influential policy-maker in the ministry finance, 
was but one of the more remarkable examples (Martin Rodriguez 2001: 155-165; Fuentes 
Quintana 2001: 180-236).Flores de Lemus‘ official position was that of director of the Statistics 
Division of the ministry. De facto, however, he was almost like a deputy minister of finance 




relations during this period resembled more the French and the German models 
than either the American or the British models. Unlike in the US system, for 
example, where early economics was market-dependent and had to defend itself 
against accusations of ―charlatanism‖ through and early embrace of scientism, in 
Spain economists had stable career paths insulated from market pressures. Like in 
France and Germany, the economics profession was dominated by an elite cadre 
(―mandarins‖) endowed with prestigious degrees who were tied closely to the 
state. Based in universities or state research institutes, these economists regularly 
worked as advisors or, more directly, as part time high-level public servants in 
economic policy institutions. But unlike in the Franco-German academic ―core‖, 
in Spain the certification barriers required by manadarin status required a 
doctorate in economics obtained in successful capitalist states. 
 The emphasis on international licensing of mandarinal status was the 
result of a pre-civil war cultural legacy: the popularity among Spanish political 
and intellectual elites of a set of ideas dominated by the opposition between 
Spain‘s intellectual decay and Western Europe‘s progress. Triggered by a self-
critical reading of the Spanish military disaster in Cuba (1898), the ideas of the 
―ninety-eighters‖ saw Spain‘s capacity to ―regenerate‖ in increased educational 
opportunities abroad for the country‘s state cadres and intellectuals (Carr 1980; 
2000).
190
 To this end, during the first four decades of 20
th
 century, the Spanish 
state sponsored an agency for ―advanced education‖ (Junta para la Ampliacion de 
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 The most prominent members of this generation of social critics were Miguel de Unamuno, 




Estudios, JAE), an organization that managed fellowships for undergraduate and 
doctoral studies in Western Europe (Sanchez 1988).
191
  
The results of this educational project were spectacular. According to 
Salvador Almenar‘s calculations, as a result of the establishment of the Junta and 
of a clear bias towards the professional employment of returning foreign PhDs,
 
over 80 percent of economics professors and members of Spain‘s three top 
research institutes in 1936 had economics degrees from foreign universities 
thanks to public grants distributed through the Junta (Almenar 1999: 185, ft. 2). 
Once integrated in academia or state institutions, the returning economics 
graduates would expect their closest collaborators to also get a West European 
(preferably German or English) PhD. Flores de Lemus, for example, basically 
demanded aspiring disciples a PhD in Germany as a basic condition for joining 
his ―school‖ and for securing the kind of high-level jobs in state institutions that 
he could facilitate from his mandarinal position (Almenar 2005: 81; Velarde 
2001: 271). 
Franco‘s victory in the civil war initially disrupted the functioning of the 
revolving door.
192
Soon, however, Franco‘s institutional reorganization of the 
economics profession coincided with its reopening.  Prominent economists like 
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 This agency was established in 1907 by the Spanish government as an heir to the private liberal 
foundation Institución Libre de Enseñanza (Sanchez 1988). 
192
 The Junta was dismantled, the economists who ―collaborated‖ with the Republic fled the 
country or retired, professional reviews and research centers were shut down. Engineers and even 
doctors were asked to do economic research in the new economic think-tanks (―institutes‖) of the 
state, something that would have been unthinkable before the civil war. In stark contrast with pre-
civil war governments, under Franco doctoral studies abroad were stopped basically until the 
1960s (Almenar 1999: 187). Economists were free to study abroad, however, but the costs were 
affordable to few and only for short periods. For example, Jose Vergara Doncel, an influential 
liberal economist during both the 1930s and the early postwar decades, took a few courses at the 
University of Chicago at his own expense and used his class notes to teach economic theory back 





Jose Maria Zumalacarregui, Lucas Beltran or Manuel Torres taught at FPSE while 
holding administrative positions in high advisory bodies of the state. Moreover, 
the economics profession was institutionally consolidated with the 1943 
establishment of the first economics department in Spain (The Faculty of Political 
and Economic Sciencies at the University of Madrid, FPSE-UM).
193
 Also, the 
regime established the Superior Council for Scientific Research (Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas or CSIC). 
 This new academic infrastructure was then consolidated with two new 
public think-tanks: the Economic Institute Sancho de Moncada and the Economic 
Section of the Political Studies Institute, each of them having their own 
economics reviews.
194
 The heads of the institutes served as economic advisors to 
Franco, and some of the most prominent names of the post-1959 governments 
(e.g. Alberto Ullastres) were selected from the ranks of the researchers based in 
these institutes. FPSE faculty routinely taught advanced classes or supervised 
projects in these institutes.  
 
The Revolving Door under Bureaucratic Authoritarianism 
As the Francoist state morphed into a bureaucratic authoritarian one during the 
1960s and early 1970s, the revolving door between academia and the economic 
bureaucracy began to see increased movement between the two worlds. Holding 
joint appointments in academia and an economic ministry or in the central bank 
became a mark of professional prominence.The economics reviews of the 
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 Until then economics was trained in law schools. 
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 The economists in the Sancho de Moncada Institute published Anales de Economia, while 




Ministry of Commerce (Informacion Comercial Espanola) and of Hacienda 
(Hacienda Publica Espanola) published the articles of the tecnicos alongside 
those of prominent academic economists.  
Also, academic celebrities divided their time between Complutense and 
research for economic ministries or for the central bank. Enrique Fuentes 
Quintana, one of the ―classical‖ figures of Spanish neoclassical economics and 
mastermind of the Moncloa Pacts, became the new Flores de Lemus: between 
1958 and 1978 he was a prolific and renowned finance professor at Complutense, 
editor of prestigious economics journals, and director of the research service of 
the ministries of finance and commerce. Joan Sarda i Dexeus, another prominent 
Spanish neoclassical economist and mastermind of the 1959 Stabilization Plan, 
was both the director of the Research Service of the central bank and a professor 
of finance at Complutense (Velarde Fuertes 2001; Martinez Vela 2000). After 
1956, younger professors and civil servants like E.F. Quintana, L.A. Rojo and 
Sanchez Pedreno collaborated with technocrats in the finance and trade ministries 
who had a very direct impact on ministers themselves (Gonzales 1979: 29). By 
the early 1970s, Quintana headed the research service of Hacienda, while Rojo 
did the same for the central banks. 
The field of Spanish economics also began to supply an increasing number 
of top-level office holders in the 1960s. While a degree in economics later became 
a necessary condition for access to ministerial and mid-level cabinet positions 
under the Socialists, the rise of economics in Franco‘s cabinets had already been 




to outnumber politicians and right-wing officers in ministerial positions, with 
lawyers and economists being the most numerous. By 1969, 10 out of 16 
members of the Council of Ministers were technocrats who enjoyed an average of 
seven years in office (Lewis 1970: 95).
195
 By the mid 1960s, the institutional 
offensive of these ―young Turks‖ also affected the central bank (Acena 2000; 
Rivases 1991).  
Finally, despite its authoritarianism and centralism, the Franco regime was 
not particularly strict about suppressing economic policy debates. Although 
Franco was adamant about forbidding the existence of formal factions inside the 
Falange and the Cortes, groups organized to pursue ―nonpolitical‖ objectives were 
allowed to exist autonomously from state control (Gunther 1980). Most 
importantly, academics, and even the national media, were allowed to engage in 
debates that dissented from the regime‘s economic orthodoxy.
196
 This 
―nonpolitical‖ pluralism enabled the formation of a diverse spectrum of ideas in 
which economic liberalism would grow in importance over time (Linz 1970; 
1976; Gunther 1980; Fuentes-Quintana 2001). A broad range of schools of 
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 Of the 28 technocrats who served on the as ministers, nine were members of the Catholic lay 
organization Opus Dei, had university posts and combined teaching with government service at 
the subcabinet level. Protected by top level officials who enjoyed Franco‘s complete confidence, 
such as Admiral Carrero Blanco, the Opus Dei ministers provided the government with a new 
generation of young experts (Lewis 1970: 100-101). 
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 Perhaps the most robust piece of evidence that the regime was indirectly supportive of 
intellectual experimentation in the ranks of its ‗semi-loyal opposition‘ of liberally-minded 
economists was that the economic mouthpiece of Franco‘s ‗vertical unions‘ (the De Economia 
review) hosted key debates on the uses of Keynes‘ General Theory, with the disciples of Manuel 





thought spanning the Austrian School and dependency theory
197
 were allowed to 
compete as long as they did not challenge the regime on a political basis.
198
  
By the mid 1960s, the regime authorized the free publication of almost the 
entire work of Marx and Engels (Almunia 2001: 35). In this climate of intellectual 
pluralism, corporatist autarchists, ordoliberals, classic liberals and neohistoricist 
institutionalists were all free to publish, teach, travel abroad and offer their advice 
to the regime. Unlike in Stalinist systems, where pre-war education in Western 
universities was likely to lead to exclusion from the profession, in Spain Western-
trained pre-civil war economists who had not been active on the side of the 
Republic maintained and even enhanced their professional status. Thus, Manuel 
de Torres, the ―father‖ of Spanish Keynesianism, who had written his PhD 
dissertation in the 30s at University of Bologna with Italy‘s arch-liberal economist 
Luigi Einaudi became dean of the FPSE and one of Franco‘s economic policy 
advisors (Zabalza 2001). Lucas Beltran, a Catalan economist who studied with 
Hayek at LSE continued to edit the flagship Moneda y credito, a guaranteed outlet 
for economic liberalism and was instrumental in advising the central bank. 
When the Franco regime ended in 1975, the economics profession was at 
the height of its political and cultural influence and benefited from considerable 
freedom of expression. Academic economists and especially the mandarinal class 
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 The policing of economic ideas was so soft in Spain that the endorsement of ideas as 
antithetical to franquismo as Hayek‘s famous ―road to serfdom‖ bore modest consequences. When 
future celebrity economic theorist Valentin Andres Alvarez was reviewed for his tenure at the 
economics department of the University of Madrid in 1945 after having published a selective 
endorsement of this Hayekian argument in an economics review, the challenge to his candidacy by 
a Falange hardliner had no consequences (Sanchez 2001: 170; ft. 13). 
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 Such challenges had to be open and explicit. Examples included involvement in anti-regime 
student movements or political organizations. For example, in August 1965 several professors lost 
tenure for siding with protesting students. ―Five professors dismissed‖, Minerva, 4 (1) 1965: 135-




came to exert remarkable influence in the state. As the next section shows, this 
legacy was respected by the Socialist government, a decision that had very 
concrete consequences for the range of economic policy options that could 
imagine.But in no other branches of the state did economists exert as much 
influence in the long-term as in the central bank, an institution whose profile 
began to rise in the early 1970s.  
 
The Rise of the Central Bank 
The Central Bank under Franco 
During the early 1970s, the institutional hegemony of the ministry of finance was 
attacked by the central bank (Banco de Espana), an institution that gave academic 
economists a generous conduit through which to influence policy decisions. This 
came after a long period of policy irrelevance in this institution, which was 
qualified only by the attempt of the Research Service director Juan Sarda to raise 
its profile as a knowledge institution. Since Sarda was close friend of Minister of 
Commerce Alberto Ullastres Calvo, he was able to open access between the 
Research Service and the research bodies of economic ministries: E.F. Quintana‘s 
Informacion Comercial Espanola, Secretaría General Técnica del Ministerio de 
Hacienda and Secretaria General Técnica del Ministerio de Comercio. Of 




specific policy issues (exchange rates, trade barriers etc) made possible by the 
Sarda-Ullastres cooperation (Estape 2001).
199
   
But the 1959 liberalization exposed the need for a modern public central 
bank with the ability to undertake monetary policy and supervisory banking 
functions.
200
 This led to institutional reforms in 1962 that strengthened the central 
bank‘s role in policy. The most important aspects of the reform were the 
nationalization of Banco de Espana and a limited expansion of its power in 1962. 
The establishment within the central bank of a Risk Information Center enabled 
the central bank to receive and centralize all data concerning risk concentration in 
the banking system in one department, which enabled the bank‘s Research 
Service to gradually assert a monopoly over high-quality macroeconomic data. 
This gave the central bank a privileged position on risk monitoring and data 
generation relative to Hacienda.  
Yet nationalization did not bring autonomy. Instead, Banco de Espana was 
put under the authority of Hacienda. Consigned to an advisory and execution role 
on monetary, credit and banking policy, the central bank remained marginal in a 
policy process placed under the hegemony of the ministry of finance.
201
 This 
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 During the 1940s and 1950s, the central bank had been little more than a coordinating 
mechanism for private banks. Monetary policy was strictly the province of Hacienda and the 
exchange policy was handled by a special agency of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the 
Exchange Control Institute (Acena 2001).  
200
 The authorities understood that in the absence of a central bank able to supervise the reserves of 
private banks and engage in open market operations, the cabinet had to work with rudimentary 
monetary control mechanisms such as decreed ceiling on the amount of credit to be made 
available by the banks (Gunther 1980: 144). 
201
 During this period, Hacienda interpreted the central bank‘s advisory role so strictly that 
Hacienda officials would merely inform their colleagues in the central bank of their policy 
decisions on monetary and fiscal policy and simply expect the central bankers to execute them. 
Moreover, by contrast with the talent-absorbing Hacienda, throughout much of the 1960s, Banco 




situation began to change during the early 70s, as the political regime of Franco 
was melting down. 
 
Crisis, Democratization and the Rise of the Central Bank 
The first source of change was the adoption by the Cortes of a series of statutes 
that lent the central bank more autonomy vis-à-vis other state institutions. More 
importantly, however, the institutional leverage of the central bank relative to the 




The ensuing financial quagmire alerted lawmakers to the potential remedy 
represented by a stronger central bank and the central bank‘s successful 
management of the banking crisis (1977-1983) expanded the institutional powers 
and the resources of the central bank.
203
 As a result, in 1980, MEH lost many of 
its bank supervision, discipline and sanction roles to the central bank, while the 
latter was further strengthened
204
 with a powerful public-private institutional 
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 The stagflation of the 1970s, the deregulation of the banking sector and growing competitive 
pressures after foreign banks were allowed to set up shop in Spain wreaked havoc with domestic 
banks. A particularly risky move had been the unleashing of deregulation in the absence of the 
establishment of an efficient mechanism of banking supervision in the central bank. As a result, 
when almost 30 banks reached the brink of insolvency between 1977 and 1979, public authorities 
had initially no tool to intervene. Not only was the inspection service of the central bank 
understaffed, but banks were not constrained by disclosure requirements on their holdings (Acena 
et al 2009). The episode made it clear that with respect to the activities of the deregulated bank 
sector, the bulky bureaucracy of the Franco era was basically ―blind.‖  
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 The fact that the interventions of the bank resulted in a single liquidation and 29 saved banks in 
the first two years of the crisis (Acena 2009: 49) boosted its prestige. 
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 Beginning with 1977, the central bank controlled the newly-founded Deposit Insurance Fund. 
Next year, it established the even better endowed  Banking Corporation (Corporación Bancaria), a  
Banking company that received contributions from the central bank itself and from 95 banks, with 





network of intervention in situations of banking crisis.
205
 Even so, the bank 
remained one of the most dependent on the executive power in Europe based on 




Modest as they were, the above reforms gave the bank institutional 
guarantees to exercise freedom in monetary policy and advocacy within the state. 
The most important change was that the central bank was granted the power to 
define the instruments of monetary policy, an issue where, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, the Research Service played a key role. No longer were this 
institution‘s views relegated to advisory roles. Now, the Bank of Spain could 
issue monetary policy reports of its own initiative, an opening that the ―young 
Turks‖ in the bank took full advantage of. As Jose Perez, head of operations and 
bank inspector, said in an interview,  
 
We had an obsession to make available institutions that were solid, 
supported by markets and able to ensure their development. We thought it 
was the obligation of the Bank of Spain to create them. Ortega carried this 
obsession to the Treasury and Martinez Mendez to the National 
Commission of Stocks and Bonds. The result was that the border between 
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 This happened through the adoption by the Cortes of Ley de Organos Rectores del Banco de 
España (1980).  
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 Such proxies include the appointment,  dismissal  and  terms  of office of the chief  executive  
officer  of the bank,  the  resolution  of conflicts  between  the  executive  branch  and the central  
bank, the final objectives  of  the central  bank  as stated  in its charter;  and  the legal  restrictions  









As producer of Spain‘s most reliable economic datasets, the Research 
Service was in the privileged position to shape the yearly reports of the central 
bank, and the parameters of debate of Spanish economics in general, by 
presenting its favored economic theories as uncontestable arguments in the same 
statistical bulletins (Boletin Estatistico) in which it published 400 tables of data on 
the Spanish economy.  In this regard, the ―Rojo network‖ generated by the 
Service made claims to unchallengeable technical expertise guaranteed by very 
competitive entrance exams and elitist training once inside the service, as well as 
to the status of public intellectuals who could shape the debate about which 
economic ideas should be regarded as appropriate in society.
208
  
The fulcrum of this ideational offensive was to ―sell macroeconomic 
stability as a ‗public good,‘ as something valuable in itself and as the most 
important objective of a central bank‖ (Acena 2001: 542). This led to an almost 
single-minded focus on inflation as the root of Spain‘s economic woes, a 
preoccupation that the Service conveyed not only to the executive council of the 
Bank of Spain, but also to economic ministries and to the Treasury (Acena 2001: 
549). Finally, since the Service was staffed by a high number of foreign trained 
economists, it was best placed to closely observe the crisis of Keynesianism both 
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  Interviewed in Acena (2001: 545). 
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 ―Rojo claims intellectual role for economists/Rojo reivindica el papel intellectual del 




as an academic school of thought and as a policy paradigm implemented by real 
world institutions.  
Under the Socialists, the central bank magnified not only its epistemic 
authority, but also its institutional autonomy. During the 1980s, the central bank 
was institutionally subordinated to the cabinet, which maintained the authority to 
appoint the governor, the vice-governor and six members of the bank‘s fifteen-
member general council. Also, the law required the central bank to finance 
government debt with interest-free credits corresponding to 12 percent of its 
expenditures on administration and public firms before seeking permission from 
the Cortes.  
Yet by the early 1990s, both PSOE and the PP endorsed the central bank‘s 
independent status, despite the fact that the measure would have cemented 
deflationary policies in the middle of a recession. Historical contingency got in 
the way, however. A corruption scandal involving the governor of the bank,
209
 
combined with the increasing cost of the government‘s austerity measures, 
delayed independent status until 1994, a year after the 1993 elections. Spain‘s 
controversial decision to join the European Monetary System in the first wave 
made the measure compulsory, and consequently the measure was sold as part of 
the politically popular EU integration (Donnelly 2005: 138). The governor of the 
newly independent central bank was Luis Angel Rojo himself.  
The leading role of Hacienda, the rise of the economists and the epistemic 
primacy of the central bank could arguably have been nullified by factional 
struggles in the government party. After all, as it rose to prominence in national 
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politics, PSOE had a strong left wing, which as late as 1979 gave the party 
political programs that promised the nationalization of the banking sector, 
workers‘ self management and massive income redistribution. And, although the 
radical leftist agenda had been marginalized by 1982 (Gillespie 1990), throughout 
the party‘s first term in office the ―vulgar‖ Keynesian factions from Valencia and 
the UGT constantly challenged the embedded neoliberal agenda of the Gonzales 
governments.   
 
The Revolving Door Under Socialist Rule 
Reproduction, not Revolution 
Rather than reforming it, the Socialists simply reproduced and refreshed the 
academic-bureaucratic complex. These years further consolidated the rise of 
economists in policy. Compared to the Franco rule and the UCD years, the 
Socialist era technocracy was more thoroughly dominated by economists. For the 
first time, administrative and fiscal law professors were definitively excluded 
from the economic posts of the executive branch and the top echelons of the 
economic departments of the civil service.
 210
  
Most importantly, the small network of economists with foreign 
postgraduate or professional experience who were trained and/or based in the 
Research Service, and who had been active in academia, came to control the 
levers of economic ministries and the central bank at the same time (Gutierrez 
                                                 
210
 Administrative law professor Laureano Lopez Rodo was arguably the top economic policy 
decision-maker between 1960 and 1974. Under UCD, finance law professor Jaime Garcia 




1992). Thus, the governor of the central bank (Mariano Rubio), and its vice-
governor (Luis Angel Rojo) as well as the heads of Hacienda and Economy 
(Miguel Boyer and Carlos Solchaga) were all trained by the Research Service and 
shared the same views on macroeconomic policy. For the first time in the modern 
history of the Spanish government, Hacienda and the central bank were no longer 
at odds with each other. The influence of the central bank reached such heights 
during the Socialist years that Spanish economic decision makers ―believed that 
the central bank‘s view reflected virtually unquestionable expertise‖ (Perez 1998: 
139).  
This team ensured consistent advice to Felipe Gonzales, delegitimated 
alternative policy views proposed by epistemically weaker actors in the PSOE (its 
union-connected MPs, the Keynesians centered around the Valencia faction) and 
authoritatively defined what economic choices were possible during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Moreover, some argue that Felipe Gonzales‘ informal access to 
Spain‘s captains of industry before 1982 would not have been possible without 
the contacts of Mariano Rubio and Miguel Boyer, both of whom belonged to the 
liberal upper class of Madrid. And given Gonzales‘ poor training in economics, 
Boyer, Rubio and Rojo had ample opportunities to push their views. As Mariano 
Rubio‘s biographer argues, when Rubio and the premier would meet: 
 
Felipe Gonzales listened to the ‗scolding‘ given by the governor with a 
mixture of interest and resignation. Mariano Rubio did not have great 




more superficial level of economic training, would find himself unable to 
respond to the torrent of detailed arguments put forth by the governor 
(Rivases, 1991: 499). 
 
The Socialists ensured continuity in personnel through their decisions 
about appointments. Jose Ramon Alvarez Rendueles, the incumbent governor was 
reappointed in 1992. Mariano Rubio, the former head of the Research Service 
during late Franquism and a man who boasted a short period of political exile in 
1958 for his involvement with Socialist networks was appointed governor in 
1984. The former Franquist undersecretary of Hacienda and collaborator of the 
Rojo network, Fernandez Ordonez, was appointed as minister of foreign affairs. 
Luis Anjel Rojo himself was confirmed in his post at the Research Service and 
subsequently was promoted as vice-governor (1988) and governor of the bank 
(1992). During his time, he also held positions in the UN and the European 




Throughout the PSOE years, Luis Angel Rojo exercised maximum 
authority and expanded his role by linking the old policy establishment with 
Felipe Gonzales‘ office. A former UCD finance minister described the center of 
economic policy authority during the Socialist years thus:  
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 Rojo became vice-president of the European Monetary Institute in 1994, served on the board of 
the UN Planning and Development Committee between 1983 and 1987 and received the King‘s 




 [t]he entire group of the Franco years was there. Fuentes Quintana, who 
was once an advisor to the General and who was one of the masters of the 
group, was there. Others occupied strategic positions in the state 
administration (…).The entire team formed in the Bank of Spain, and 
whom Mariano Rubio was a perfect epitome of, was an incombustible 
team tied by great friendships among its members. All are sentimentally 
social-democrats and ex officio monetarists. (…) Boyer did not matter 
until he was appointed as PSOE minister. It was upon his appointment that 
the traditional institutional tension between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Bank of Spain disappeared […] The man who knows economic 
theory‖ for real‖ is Luis Angel Rojo; he does not like public exposure, but 
all run for advice to him, including the prime minister, for whom [Rojo] 




The Rojo Network inside the PSOE 
Most importantly, however, PSOE did not only appoint former Research Service 
―stars‖ like Boyer and Solchaga in top economic positions; this party‘s electoral 
victory showed that economists who were still active in the Service in 1982 and 
were considered as trusted experts by Boyer and Solchaga were PSOE‘s only real 
reserve of economists with practical experience. Thus, PSOE activist Luis Garcia 
del Blas became general secretary of Social Security, a ministry he had been 
assigned to study at the Research Service for many years. Guillermo de la Dehesa, 
a liberal economist who would soon move to Britain to head a liberal think-
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 and work as international advisor to Goldman Sachs, occupied top 
positions, first in Commerce and then in the Economy during the first PSOE 
government.  
Finally, Luis Alcaide, a personal friend of both Rubio and Solchaga, 
became head of External Transactions in the first Gonzales government.
214
 After 
some of these players of the Rojo network left PSOE government in the second 
half of the mid 1980s, they maintained their contacts with those members of the 
network who remained and supported the former‘s advocacy of liberal economic 
reforms in various ways. Thus, while he had been generally cautious to express 
his ideas publicly during his tenure, Boyer followed his 1986 resignation from 
government by laying bare his view of Spain‘s economic policy priorities. He did 
this in a summer class, which he co-taught at Menendez y Pelayo International 
University with Jose Maria Vinals, central bank vice-governor, and Guillermo de 




During the Socialist years, the revolving door between academia and 
MEH opened for the first time towards Spain‘s financial sector. To a large degree, 
this was the result of the crisis suffered by the financial sector during the 1980s, 
when the central bank and MEH rescued virtually all industrial banks in Spain. 
Once the crisis ended, MEH experienced a sudden drain of top bureaucrats who 
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 Since 1986 de la Dehesa has been a prominent member of the Center for Economic Policy 
Research. 
214
 ―The flights from the Bank of Spain/Las fugas del Banco de Espana‖, El Pais, October 30, 
1988, p. 52. 
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 According to Boyer, Spain needed near-zero public deficits, more wage moderation, radical 
labor market deregulation, stimulation of private education and a workfare regime in social 
security. The class was entitled ―Economia internacional: opciones de politica economica y su 




had been involved in the resolution of the crisis. MEH minister Miguel Boyer 
went to become CEO of Banco Exterior and was the first president of that 
institution to participate in the Big Seven‘s monthly luncheons (Perez 1998: 151). 
Other departures from the financial industry included the first two heads of the 
treasury, two director generals of financial policy and the Secretary of State for 
the Economy (Perez 1998: 151, fn. 36). 
So far the chapter brought into relief the importance for the diffusion of 
new economic ideas of an institutional context with an executive controlled by the 
premier and the minister of Finance, who in turn depended on advice from the 
central bank‘s research service. It was a world in which a few men could make 
dramatic decisions without much challenge. But since Spain became a democracy, 
at least in theory this policy elite could have been challenged by the ruling party, 
an aspect to which I turn next. 
 
Centralizing Economic Policy in the Ruling Party 
From loose network to democratic centralism 
The tenure of the Gonzales governments coincided with a high degree of internal 
centralization, authoritarianism, personalism and neo-patrimonialism in PSOE. 
This outcome facilitated the adoption of neoliberal socio-economic policies that 
clashed with the party‘s own ideological claims. One of the reasons for this was 
that entrenched fear of democratic breakdown during the Spanish political 
transition institutionalized elite-controlled parties, playing down internal 




Historically, PSOE resembled a loose political network rather than a party 
and some scholars argued that internal dissension in PSOE was one of the 
contributing factors of the fall of the Spanish Republic (Linz 1978: 145-202). 
Haunted by the memory of internal factionalism during the Republic, and mindful 
of the high political cost paid for internal bickering by UCD and the communists 
(Field 2010; Share 1998: 98),
216
 In a short period of time, PSOE leaders built a 
highly centralized and authoritarian party structure, making the party 
unaccountable to its base while suppressing ideological dissent. These features 
made PSOE a highly disciplined political machine during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Lopez Guerra 1984; Gillespie 1990; Share 1998). 
The high levels of centralization in PSOE were achieved during the two 
PSOE congresses in 1979 that represented a genuine Bad Godesberg critical 
juncture for PSOE. Although the agenda included a discussion about whether the 
party should retain its programmatic allegiance to (neo)Marxism, the deeper 
meaning of the debate was whether PSOE should evolve from a mass party into a 
―catch-all‖ party with a moderate ideology, a weak left wing and loose links of 
accountability with the base (Share 1998; Gillespie 1990), a feat achieved through 
a complicated political drama. At first, the party‘s left wing (the so-called sector 
critico) won. Defeated, Gonzales successfully played brinkmanship by deciding 
not to run for reelection as party leader based on information that the sector 
critico did not have a matching charismatic leader. The political drama continued 
when a special congress was called later in the year to settle the dispute. 
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 PSOE leaders interpreted the abortive 1981 military coup as a result of factionalism inside the 




Gonzales‘ proposition to ―de-Marxisize‖ the party finally won, Felipe Gonzales 
returned to his post as secretary general and party governance rules were rewritten 
(Gillespie 1989).  
The resulting party statute put an end to party democracy and emasculated 
the party‘s left. The party executive was entrusted to a lopsided duumvirate in 
which president Felipe Gonzales and vice-president Guerra allegedly shared 
power, although Gonzales always had the last word. Furthermore, the local 
PSOE‘s grassroots units (agrupaciones) lost their avenues to influence the party 
executive. 
The emasculation of the base occurred through the adoption of a winner-
takes-it-all electoral system for party posts and delegates to party congresses and 
the use of bloc voting in party congresses (Share 1989). In theory, the grassroots 
could have controlled the party executive through elections to the Federal 
Committee. Yet between 1979 and 1996 these elections were carried out through 
secret ballot only once (at the 1988 party congress). The high rate of success of 
the party‘s left wing delegates at the 1988 congress inspired the diumvirate to 
maneuver against further experiments with internal party democracy.   
 
Centralization and advocacy for neoliberal ideas 
The protagonism of Felipe Gonzales remained unchallenged until the 1996 
electoral defeat.
217
 In making economic policy decisions, Gonzales‘ relied on the 
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 Gonzales‘ authority derived not only from his being both premier and PSOE president, or from 
his extraordinary ability to build coalitions around himself, but also from a great deal of popular 
legitimacy. Ten years into office, Gonzales was still Spain‘s most popular politician. Indeed, to 




advice of a tight network of young ―pragmatic‖ social-democrats from the Madrid 
party federation (José Maria Maravall, Javier Solana, Joaquín Almunia) and the 
members of the neoliberal ―Rojo network‖ (e.g. Miguel Boyer, Carlos Solchaga). 
Of these, Miguel Boyer enjoyed a privileged position, as his influence over 
Gonzales had been characterized as ―immense‖ (Gonzales 1991: 70; Almunia 
2001; Maravall 2005). 
Although PSOE vice-president and vice-prime minister Adolfo Guerra 
held considerable power and was often hostile to liberalizing measures, he was 
relegated to enforcer status by Gonzales.  Guerra had no veto power over 
economic decisions, where, as both primary and secondary sources confirm, the 
―Rojo‖ network ruled supreme (Gillespie 1990; Perez 1998; Almunia 2001; 
Maravall 2005; Solchaga 2005).
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  This situation was compounded by the fact 




                                                                                                                                     
Gonzales was such a ―sanctified‖ figure for the party that Guerra focused his critique on the 
―neoliberal‖ faction led by Carlos Solchaga, whom he accused of having ―kidnapped‖ Gonzales 
with the aid of bankers and employer organizations (Gillespie 1990).  
218
As vice-premier, he could filter the issues to be considered by the premier on a daily basis 
(Gillespie 1993: 84). Based in the government palace, he controlled a vast intelligence network 
that reporting regularly to his office on the political dynamics within the party‘s central and 
regional structures. Gillespie showed that ― [at] the peak of his success, Guerra's empire was 
depicted as including the party executive and apparatus, the Socialist Parliamentary Group, some 
key positions in the Moncloa (government headquarters), seven ministries, three regional 
governments, two universities and growing influence in the judiciary; while in its principal 
regional fief of Andalucia, the empire extended to the regional government, seven of the eight 
provincial councils (diputaciones), 80 per cent of the municipal councils, the regional television 
channel, cultural and sporting associations, and several savings banks.‖(Gillspie 1994: 5). Since 
the regional PSOE ―barons‖ often acted in concert to challenge the PSOE headquarters in Madrid, 
the ―pacification‖ of insurgencies had been a key condition for pushing the politically costly 
economic reforms of Gonzales‘ governments. 
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 According to Richard Gillspie, the guerristas initially supported the neoliberal agenda but then 
reneged on their commitments due to a power struggle between Guerra and Boyer, missed 
patronage opportunities
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 and the fact that ―[s]ince they controlled the party, masterminded its 





The Psoe Left that Never Was  
Inside the party, but away from executive power and Gonzales‘ inner circle was 
the party‘s left wing (dubbed the Socialist Left/Izquierda Socialista). Formed by 
Madrid, Catalan and Valencian leftist intellectuals and supported by the pro-
PSOE union UGT, the Socialist Left demanded more expansionary 
macroeconomic policies and articulated an ideological critique of neoliberalism 
that was more credible than that of the guerrista sector. 
 But the effects of that vocal critique were muffled by the centralization of 
party institutions and the Socialist Left‘s own internal problems. After 1979, its 
weight inside the party was artificially reduced by the diumvirate and especially 
by Guerra‘s political machine. Even at the peak of their power and in the only 
party congress when the vote was carried out on the basis of secreted ballot, 
Izquierda Socialista did not get more than 22.5 percent of the delegates‘ votes for 
the federal committee that de jure controlled the party executive (Gillespie 1994: 
6).  
In addition to constitutional centralization, the party leadership 
consistently suppressed dissent by cooption, the removal of dissidents from party 
lists or simply by demotion (Gillespie 1989: 336-337). González's predecessor, 
Pablo Castellano and Francisco Bustelo, the ―Keynesian‖ voices inside the party, 
were forced out into political wilderness early on. Another ―Keynesian‖, UGT 
leader Nicolás Redondo, threatened with no avail with resigning his seat in 
                                                                                                                                     
more concerned than the liberal ministers with the effects of government policies on public 




Parliament, an action he was compelled to take anyway in 1987. While some left 
wing activists left the party following the resignation of prominent Keynesians, 
this did not weigh heavily on the top leadership, as PSOE managed to actually 
boost its membership and activist base to almost a quarter million people by the 
late 1980s (Share 1999: 98). 
By the late 1980s, the purges left PSOE without an effective left wing 
(von Biezen 2002). Also, instead of giving policy satisfaction to the base, the 
executive showered activists with jobs in the civil service. In less than three years 
of office, the party de-fanged grassroots critique by offering activists the chance 
to take up no less than 25,000 political appointments in the public administration 
(Gillespie 1990: 131-132). As a result, 70 percent of PSOE‘s 1988 Congress 
delegates were on government payroll (Share 1999: 98). As one student of PSOE 
put it, the result was that PSOE ―became little more than a vehicle for careerism 
and personal advancement‖ (Share 1998: 100) in which ―socialist designs seemed 
to some to have been replaced by designer socialism‖(Gillespie, 1989: 67).  
But apart from its organizational marginalization, the PSOE left wing had 
internal weaknesses as well. Its epistemic weakness on economic issues meant 
that its defense of an expansionary policy alternative was no match for the 
rebuttals issued by neoliberals, especially after the premature death in 1981 of 
Manuel Sanchez Ayuso, the only prominent academic Keynesian in the group. 
Faced with this situation, the sector critico focused instead on the cultural and 
security agenda (abortion, education, NATO membership), rather than on ―old‖ 




the intellectual distance between the Socialist Left academics and UGT unionists 
as well as the skepticism towards Izquierda Socialista of PSOE‘s regional bosses 




To conclude, after 1989 the PSOE diumvirate closed the institutional 
windows of dissent in the party, shutting down potential opportunities for 
challengers to trouble the relatively frictionless world in which a Finance minister 
trusted by the premier and linked to an activist central bank made economic 
decisions. Democracy, it seems, triumphed across Spain‘s political institutions but 
stopped at the doors of the Socialist Party. 
 
Conclusions 
The main argument advanced in this chapter is twofold. First, Spain‘s 
policy elites filtered the effects of the Western neoliberal revolution by crafting a 
redistributive and state-enhanced ―embedded neoliberalism‖ that both reproduced 
and challenged neoliberal tenets. Second, these interpretations of neoliberalism 
took place in a highly centralized institutional environment that facilitated the 
institutionalization of embedded neoliberal ideas.The existence of a revolving 
door between academic economics and the state was compounded by a high 
degree of centralization in economic policy, both in the executive and the ruling 
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 The left alternative asserted itself one more time in 1991, when Socialist Left activists, UGT 
leaders and a variegated assortment of PSOE activists with a communist past organized a broad-




party. This increased the likelihood that economists‘ ideas, emerging out of 
privileged networks, could actually shape policy.  
Yet, the mere existence of this institutional complex does not, by itself, 
tell us where the ideas of these economists came from or how the PSOE executive 
elite reconciled its left identity with embedded neoliberalism in the first place. To 
address this question, we must examine the transnational interventions that carried 







Chapter V - Ideas in the Neoliberal Moment  
 
Overview 
In the analytical framework of this dissertation it was hypothesized that when 
ideas travel from one site to another, the extent to which they resonate with pre-
existing economic ideas matters a great deal. It was also hypothesized that the 
receiving actors can hardly be assumed to passively ―sign for delivery‖ and then 
go on and use the ideas handed down to them without performing any alterations. 
Granted, ideas are disembedded from their original context, objectified or 
formalized by exogenous actors in order to seem universal and thus travel more 
easily. But ideas are also ―edited‖ by domestic translators as they travel through 
various intellectual contexts. In other words, domestic actors do not simply ―cut-
and-paste‖ new economic ideas developed in foreign ―labs‖. Instead, they can be 
expected to act reflexively and interpret those ideas before adoption.  
To test these claims, I first searched the history of Spanish economics for 
the marginalist and neoclassical economic traditions that would have resonated 
with the claims of the neoliberal revolution in Western economics. This analysis 
reveals a significant Spanish neoclassical tradition colored by German ordoliberal 
influences and a neoclassical syndissertation that had moved away from the 
Keynes of the General Theory from the very first moments of its inauguration in 




hybridized neoliberalism with select ordoliberal and developmentalist ideas, thus 
enabling the emergence of an ―embedded neoliberalism‖ that defined the 
boundaries of the Spanish economic consensus during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the ―paths not taken‖, or the sets of economic 
ideas that failed to make an impact in Spain during the critical junctures of the 
transition. 
 
I. The Domestic Resonance of Neoliberalism 
 
The Spanish Neoclassical Tradition 
Late 20
th
 century Spanish neoliberals make much of the fact that contrary to the 
popular stereotypes of Spain as a historically interventionist country, Spain‘s 
liberal economic tradition predates the Scottish Enlightenment, with the Jesuit 
scholars of the Salamanca School articulating many of the theses of classical 




 centuries. In their pro-market 
radicalism, the ideas of the Salamanca School are in many ways so similar to that 
of the Austrian School that libertarian economist Murray Rothbard referred to 
their proponents as proto-Austrians (Rothbard 1976). 
The rediscovery of the Salamanca School by 20
th
 century liberals and 
libertarians in the English-speaking world (Grice-Hutchinson 1952; 1982; 
Schumpeter 1954; Rothbard 1976; Beck 1988; 1995)  played an important role in 




and especially the ―quantititativist‖ and free trade theories, as constitutive of a 
―native‖ tradition linked to Spain‘s own brand of Catholicism (Ullastres 1941; 
Perena 1954; Parraguire 1960; Vilar 1978; Marrugan and Schwartz 1978; Gomez 
Camacho 1985; de Soto 1996; de Blas 2000). In drawing upon this historical 
resource, these economists attempted to make some of the basic tenets of 
neoliberalism look homegrown.  





 centuries modern Spanish economic liberalism grew as an off-shoot of the 
English tradition inaugurated by the Scottish Enlightenment and ―translated‖ by 
early 19
th
 century French liberals.
221
Steamrolled by the academic and policy 
influence of the interventionist neohistorical school during the late 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century, the liberal economic strain reemerged during the interwar years.  
Beginning with the 1930s, Spanish classic liberal economists trained in 
British and German universities (Roman Perpina i Grau, Luis Olariaga, German 
Bernacer, Jose Maria Zumalacarregui) began to attack the neohistoricist ideational 
consensus and its reflections in economic policy. 
222
 This new generation of 
liberals proposed a new narrative about the economic development of Spain that 
would become influential beginning with the 1950s. Its basic dissertation was that 
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 During the late 18
th
 century, the Wealth of Nation circulated in translated and original form, 
while other local Enlightenment authors (Alcala Galiano, Martin Fernandez de Navarrete; Alvaro 
Florez de Estrada) integrated Smith‘s ideas into their own work on public finance (Perdices de 
Blas 1993). Fr. Juan Geddes translated a few chapters from Smith‘s classic in 1777 (Perdices de 
Blas 1993:348). Translations ―adapted‖ the test to avoid the censorship of the Inquisition. The 
most complete translation was published in 1794 (Perdices de Blas 1993‖ 352).Yet it was French 
liberalism (Mirabeau, Say, Bastiat) more than Smith who influenced the rebirth of a Spanish 
liberal strand during the Spanish Enlightenment and throughout the 19
th
 century, when local 
liberal politicians and businessmen employed the classics to defend free-trade and anti-
interventionist arguments (Velarde 1993; Schwartz 1990; Beltran 1976).  
222
 The attack was largely the outcome of the indigenization in Spain of the ―palace war‖ taking 
place inside 1920s German academia between Austrian School liberals and ordoliberals on the one 




whatever Spain had achieved in economic terms was not due to government 
intervention and protectionism, but despite these, with FDI and export-led growth 
playing a pivotal part (Velarde 1994; Love, 2004). As Joseph Love synthesized 
Grau‘s main argument,  ―the growth of the national economy had been achieved 
through a gradual process of export substitution and export expansion. But the 
level of industrial output was largely a function of the absorptive capacity of the 
relatively wealthy Periphery, which could earn foreign exchange. Ultimately 
growth depended on imported industrial inputs and capital goods. Therefore, 
foreign exchange had played a crucial role in long-term growth, even though 
export earnings were a small element in the national product. Since export sales 
depended on foreign demand, trade with the principal industrialized powers, he 
held, was decisive for the Spanish economy‖ (Love 2004: 118-122). 
 
The Ordoliberal Moment 
The rebirth of the Spanish liberal tradition under Franco did not lead in a 
libertarian direction, however. As Spanish liberal economists were nationalists, 
they sought economic ideas that imbricated economic liberalism in a framework 
that still allowed for the economic agency of an enlightened state acting on behalf 
of national interests and as guarantor of conservative social values. This led them 
to embrace the German version of liberalism advocated by the Ordoliberalism, a 
school of thought in economics that emphasized a positive role for the state as 
builder and guarantor of the institutions that ensure that the free market produces 




conservative Catholic professionals who staffed key positions of the Franquist 
state as it advocated compensating the losers of the free play of the market 
through the adoption of a more generous welfare state and of employment 
protection legislation (the ―social market economy‖). 
Spanish ordoliberal microeconomists became the most influential liberal 
faction in Spanish microeconomics during the 1950s and 60s (Almenar 2001: 
502) and their ideas also pushed Spanish neo-Keynesians in a more conservative 
direction. Spanish liberals of the postwar era (Andres Alvarez, Jose Castaneda) 
followed the lead of Ordoliberal celebrity Friedrich von Stackelberg, who was 
instrumental in indigenizing a syndissertation of classical liberalism and German 
ordoliberalism in Spain (Velarde 1990: 45), while contributing decisively to the 
consolidation of a local hostility to Keynesianism (Velarde 2001; Schwartz 2001: 
523-524).  
After his arrival in Madrid in 1943, the German professor demolished the 
Keynes of the General Theory, emphasized the impossibility of planning using 
Hayekian arguments about the low levels of calculus capacity in human minds 
and turned inflation into the source of all evils in the economy.
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 As the 
following episode narrated by eclectic economist and economic historian Juan 
Velarde Fuertes plainly illustrates, von Stackelberg‘s presence in Madrid was 
instrumental in clarifying a viral anti-Keynesian reaction among economists there: 
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 One of von Stackelberg‘s enduring contributions were that the analytic instruments of his 
Principios de teoria economica (1946) served as a basis for the postwar critique of the economic 
interventionism of the Spanish state. Von Stackelberg attacked Keynes capital and interest theories 
with the ammunition of the Austrian school by calling it unscientific, based in an 






 I was working as a teaching assistant for Luis Olariaga. At some point 
[…] he asked me about my bibliography on Keynes. In the bibliographical 
list I included Stackelberg‘s article ―Interest and money: A discussion of 
some modern theories‖. Olariaga endorsed that reference and subsequently 
returned to the point by saying ―Focus on this! Focus on what von 
Stackelberg is saying! We, the Spaniards owe him a great deal, but this 
article alone would justify the necessity of our gratitude.‖ Certainly, this 





And such views were filtered through Stackelberg‘s attack on the General 
Theory as unscientific: 
 
 ―The majority of people expect miracles from science. They want to see 
the scientist as a magician. Physics and chemistry satisfy these desires via their 
technical effects. But political economy is unable to do so. But when a book that 
seems to promise miracles is published, it becomes rapidly popular as well. The 
great success enjoyed by the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
owes its success in part to these circumstances. (Stackelberg cited in Velarde 





As the next sections show, when backed up with von Stackelberg‘s 
prestige and scholarship, such views provided Spanish economics with an 
important resource for an extensive critique of government intervention during ISI 
and indicative planning. Also, the Spanish indigenization of the Ordoliberal 
school definitively shaped the teaching of economics by institutionalizing a 
primary commitment to ―good economics,‖ where good economics meant, as in 
the Chicago School, the rigorous application of standard microeconomic theory to 
macroeconomics, a factor that facilitated the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s. 
At the same time, von Stackelberg and his followers did not deify the 
market and did not evacuate the role of government from the equation.
224
 Instead, 
they legitimated the idea that without the state‘s regulatory intervention, the free 
market has a tendency to produce phenomena detrimental to competition 
(monopolies, oligopolies) and to good government (economic 
monopoly/oligopoly power can be converted into political power).
 225
 Unlike in 
the Anglo-American neoclassical tradition, for ordoliberals, a strong state was 
essential to cultivate a ―liberal interventionism‖ and a ―social market economy‖ 
meant to liberate the markets and socially embed them. To this end, Spanish 
ordoliberals saw the state not merely as a neutral aggregator of individual 
interests, but also, in an explicit nationalist vein, as an enlightened autonomous 
agent entrusted to advance the economic welfare of the nation by increasing the 
competitiveness of the economy though the state-led coordination of economic 
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 Unlike laissez-faire economists, von Stackelberg and his Spanish followers were skeptical of 
Hayekian radicalism by pointing not only to the risks of the emergence of oligopolies and 
monopolies in completely deregulated markets. As a result, the state was called to action. 
225




agents. Finally, rather than concentrate all power in the executive, they argued 
that fiscal policy should be the domain of the executive branch, whilst 
macroeconomic policy should be left to employers and trade unions (Koslowski 
2000). 
As in West Germany, in Spain the institutional entrenchment of the ideas 
of the von Stackelberg network made difficult the adoption of interventionist 
readings of Keynesianism by the economics mainstream.
 226
 Yet German 
ordoliberalism did not diffuse wholesale. First, its adoption was facilitated by a 
considerable degree of cultural entrepreneurship aimed at ―localizing‖ it. For 
example, as representative of  this ―translated‖ ordoliberalism Andres Alvarez, set 
out to make this school of thought seem local by connecting it to the Spanish 
liberal tradition represented  by the work of Ortega y Gasset, a thinker considered 
by Andres Alvarez a precursor of Ropke (Sanchez Alvarez 2001: 173). Second, 
the translation strategy of Spanish ordoliberals also generated views that would 
have been regarded as heterodox by German ordoliberals. For the same leading 
Spanish microeconomist, ordoliberalism was consistent with the case for public 
enterprises and with neo-Romantic nationalist arguments about the responsibility 
of the state for general economic welfare (Sanchez Hormigo 2001: 170-178; 
195).
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 Such opening to the role of the state reduced the intellectual distance 
between Alvarez and neoclassical synthesizers, thus enabling his participation in 
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 In West Germany the furthest advance of Keynesianism was in Karl Schiller‘s syndissertation 
of ordoliberalism and neo-keynesianism in his ―magic polygon‖ (price stability, economic growth, 
full employment and external equilibrium). 
227
 One of the most bizarre aspects of Alvarez‘ work was the cultivation of a mixture between 
ordoliberalism and the reactionary economic romanticism of early 19
th
 century German political 
economist (Adam Muller) whose writings were used by early 20
th
 century corporatists like Othmar 




the drafting of Spain‘s first input-output tables, a crucial policy tool of Keynesian 
macroeconomics (Alvarez Coruguedo 2001: 238-240).
228
  
In sum, Spanish ordoliberalism moderated both the strong Keynesian 
program as long as the neoclassical one. In this way, while the ordoliberal legacy 
―tamed‖ an aggressive Keynesian project in Spain, it also contributed in the long 
run to a de-radicalization of the neoliberal program. 
 
What Spanish Keynesianism? 
Neoliberal ideas did not meet with a great deal of resistance in Spain during the 
1970s, in part because the local version of Keynesianism had already been 
moving in a more conservative direction than in most of the advanced capitalist 
core. Beginning with the 1950s, many Spanish economists adopted the 
―neoclassical (-Keynesian) syndissertation‖ or ―neo-Keynesianism‖ as the 
dominant local translation of Keynesianism and became the ―ruling elite‖ in the 
top economic departments in Madrid, Bilbao and Barcelona.  
By the end of the 1950s, they also secured top positions in the state as 
advisers, government ministers and central bankers (Gonzales 1978; Quintana 
2001; Acena 2001). These men dramatically affected state policy between 1956 
and 1959 by providing the institutional blueprints for the package of liberalizing 
measures that terminated Spain‘s autarkic-corporatist development model (Sarda 
1970; Gonzales 1979; Fuentes Quintana 1984; Muns 1986).
 
During the early 
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 It can be argued that von Stackelberg‘s  silence on political Keynesianism facilitated the 
process whereby some of his followers in the Instituto de Estudios Politicos did not see a problem 




1960s, the policy impact of neo-Keynesian ideas temporarily faded out in 
competition with a more interventionist interpretation of Keynes: the 
developmentalist ideas of French indicative planning (Gonzales 1977).  Of 
particular importance for the subsequent embrace of neoliberal ideas by the 
Spanish economics mainstream was the fact that, during their loss of policy 
influence between 1962 and 1975, neo-Keynesians swung even further to the 
right, stretching the neoclassical syndissertation beyond its limits.  
Spanish economic historians are in agreement that, between the mid-1950s 
and the mid-1970s, interpretations of Keynesianism that were loath to embrace 
bold demand management or planning intellectually dominated economics 
departments and, at critical junctures, key institutions of the state as well (Lluch 
1966; Gonzales 1978; Quintana 2001; Almenar 2001; Velarde 2001). Spanish 
Keynesians used the General Theory to attack the extremely high levels of 
protectionism and interventionism of the ISI model. They noticed that Spain‘s 
ambitious industrialization effort could only be undertaken by increasing exports 
and that, after fifteen years of ISI, Spain‘s exports were decreasing (Buesa Blanco 
1983: 482-284). Most importantly, from the early 1950s on, its proponents 
unequivocally broke with a key policy implication of the General Theory: the use 
of demand-side policies to stabilize economic cycles and foster employment. The 
result was that, for the next two decades, mainstream Spanish neo-Keynesians 
would use Keynes to demand a ―smaller state.‖ As Spanish economic historian 





[w]ith regard to what was customary in other European countries, the main 
difference was that Keynesian macroeconomics [in Spain] was used to 
cool the economy and abandon inflationary fiscal activism (Almenar 
2001: 495).  
 
  Instead of counter-cyclical intervention backed by an expanded fiscal 
power of the state, a consistent concern with inflation and the ―cooling‖ of cycles 
became the foci of the Spanish Keynesian mainstream. As early as the 1950s, 
influenced by ordoliberalism, they turned inflation into the fulcrum of 
macroeconomics and conditioned demand-side policies on structural reforms of 
industry and finance, whose high political cost basically rendered demand-side 
policies inapplicable in the Spanish context. In making these arguments, Spanish 
Keynesians stepped outside the boundaries of the neoclassical syndissertation and 
openly appropriated some of the critiques leveled against Keynesianism by 
ordoliberal and Austrian School economics.  
This early rightward turn in Spanish Keynesianism is apparent in the 
foundational contributions of Spain‘s most prominent postwar Keyensians. The 
views of these three prominent Spanish technopols defined the boundaries of 
Spanish neo-Keyensian orthodoxy until the late 1960s and were ―codified‖ in a 
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 The volume contained the fulcrum of the economic diagnostic and strategies that inspired some 
elements of the IMF-approved macroeconomic stabilization policy package adopted by Spain in 
1959 (Almenar 2001: 494). The contributors also addressed Spain‘s developmental problems 




The inflationary risks associated with demand-side interventionism 
became paramount in the writings of mandarin economist Torres Martinez, a 
figure who was instrumental in popularizing Keynesian thinking in Spain.
 230
  In 
his own research and teaching, however, Torres remained apprehensive towards 
the demand policies suggested by the General Theory and went as far as 




 Other Spanish Keynesians who held great influence in policy followed in 
the footsteps of Torres‘ half-hearted embrace of the General Theory. The 
scholarly and policy work of prominent Spanish neo-Keynesian and Bank of 
Spain research director Juan Sarda attempted to synthesize Keynesianism with 
ordoliberalism and even with some of the insights of the Austrian School (Sarda 
1943; 1948; 1960).
232
 The same attempts to ―tame‖ Keynesianism can be seen in 
                                                                                                                                     
investment, progressive tax reform) and ordoliberal ones (dismantlement of monopolies and 
oligopolies, deregulation of the economy as a means to increase private investment). 
230
 Torres was the dean of the newly founded economics department of the elite Complutense 
University in Madrid. Torres also formed a generation of neo-Keynesian economists who came to 
dominate Spanish economics for the next four decades: Enrique Fuentes Quintana, Juan Velarde, 
Manuel Varela. A well-heeled government economic advisor and economics professor at the 
University of Madrid, Torres popularized the General Theory and introduced the textbook of 
Danish Keynesian Jorgen Pedersen as required reading in his economic theory classes (Velarde 
1974: 250). Torres was also instrumental in ensuring that the contributions of the neoclassical 
syndissertation were quickly translated into Spanish (Acena 2001). 
231
 Torres‘ take on Keynes therefore reflected more the Keynes of the Treatise of Money than the 
Keynes of the General Theory. In one of the earliest Keynesian scholarly contributions authored in 
Spain, Torres critiqued Keynes‘ theory of the causes of unemployment for lacking a 
microeconomic basis. His subsequent work from the late 40s and mid 1950s is marked by the fear 
that expansionary macroeconomic policies would fuel inflation and benefit employers more than 
labor (Almenar 2001: 467-472). Similarly, beginning with Torres, Spanish Keynesians rejected 
the value of any protectionist implications of Keynesian thinking and saw exports as a motor of 
growth (Love 2005). 
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 While accepting the basic tenets of the General Theory as well as the extension of its 
implications by Abba Lerner, Sarda insisted that the contributions of Keynes and Lerner should be 
balanced with the ordoliberal theory instituted by West European governments in the early 
postwar years—namely that repressed inflation was a direct cause of the price controls. While 




the work of Enrique Fuentes Quintana (1951; Anderson 1970: 99-107; Gunther 
1980: 91-95), an economist whose name is generally equated with three decades 
of Spanish neo-Keynesian scholarship and a most prominent policy career.
233
 In a 
touchstone article he published in 1951, Fuentes Quintana introduced the richest 
and most up-to-date presentation of the neoclassical syndissertation to Spanish 
economics (Quintana 1951; 1952).
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 Like Torres and Sarda, he accepted the 
postulate that Keynesianism was consistent with neoclassical economics and 
remained wedded to the point made in his 1951 doctoral dissertation that modern 
Keynesianism was basically built on the mold of the Hicks-Modigliani model. At 
the same time, Fuentes Quintana continued the work of ―cooling‖ Keynesianism 
begun by his mentor Manuel Torres Martinez. He was adamant in arguing for the 
integration of Pigou‘s real balance effect, a dissertation that further diluted 
Keynes‘ diagnosis of the causes of collapse in demand. He challenged 
Keynesianism‘s prioritization of full employment over growth by using the 
charges made against Keynes by von Stackelberg. Moreover, Joan Sarda had been 
                                                                                                                                     
general ideas that dominated the Ordo group‖ (Sarda 1949, in Almenar 2001: 476), Sarda 
vehemently rejected the compatibility between Keynesianism and planning posited by orthodox 
Keynesians. Significantly, in 1960 Sarda went so far as to adopt the then maverick monetarist 
dissertation that the increase of the monetary supply had to be strictly correlated with real growth 
rate (Sarda 1960: 35 in Almenar 2001: 494).  
233
 Fuentes-Quintana also had an academic and policy career that spanned half a century. Most 
significantly, he was a key player in the two most important anti-inflation reform packages of 
postwar Spain: he served as a research economist for the 1959 Stabilization Plan
233
 and as the 
minister of finance during the 1977 Moncloa Pacts. Fuentes taught finance economics at 
Complutense University in Madrid for two decades (1958-1978) and edited the elite economics 
reviews Información Comercial Española between 1958 and 1970 and Hacienda Pública 
Española between 1970 and 1978. He also sat on the board of Papeles de Economía Española, a 
most prestigious Spanish economic review during the 1980s. In policy, he served as a technocrat 
beginning with 1951 and was appointed minister of finance in 1977. During his terms, he was the 
architect of the Moncloa Pacts of 1977 that aimed at stabilizing the Spanish economy and of the 
most dramatic tax reforms of 20
th
 century Spain in 1978. 
234
 The article was entitled ―Wages and employment. Keynesian analysis as cycles theory/La 
teoria keynesiana como analysis ciclico‖ and was published in De Economia, an economics review 




instrumental in popularizing the research materials of the ORDO group shortly 
after their publication in Germany.
235
 
Like Torres and Sarda, Quintana was skeptical that Keyensian counter-
cyclical stimulus packages could work in Spain. He argued that such 
macroeconomic policies could only generate inflation due to the high degree of 
monopolization and the underdevelopment problems of the Spanish economy. 
Indeed, Quintana saw Keynesian demand-side policy as applicable at the 
macrolevel only in developed industrial countries. He essentially argued that, until 
Spain reduced monopolies and exported enough of its excess labor force, the 
applicability of demand-side was limited to specific industries working below 
their potential. Finally, he drew on the Spanish structuralist-liberal syndissertation 
developed by Jose Maria Zumalcarregui, to argue that cheap credit policies could 
lead to increased demand only if credit were targeted at Spain‘s internationally 
competitive sectors, and if barriers to entry were erected to keep foreign banks out 
of Spain  (Almenar 2001: 479-482). 
During the second half of the 1960s, the monumental work of Luis Angel 
Rojo took this Spanish translation of the neoclassical syndissertation to a new 
level. In 1965 and 1966, Rojo published the first systematic accounts in Spanish 
of neo-Keynesian, post-Keynesian and neoclassical literature (Rojo 1965; 1966). 
These volumes were followed by the detailed introduction of the standardized 
neoclassical macroeconomic model for an open economy (IS-LM) (Rojo 1969-
1970). Using his joint appointments as head of the influential Research Service of 
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 Sarda extensively and relatively positively reviewed the classical ORDO volumes of 1948 and 




the Bank of Spain and as professor of finance at the nation‘s leading university 
(Universidad Complutense), Rojo also used the neoclassical syndissertation as a 
platform for building a comprehensive macroeconomic model of the Spanish 
economy. After introducing the emerging debate between monetarists (Friedman, 
Brunner) and Keynesians (Tobin, Kaldor) (Rojo 1971) to the Spanish economic 
mainstream, Rojo diluted his endorsement of neo-Keynesianism by attempting to 
forge a monetarist-Keynesian syndissertation in 1974 (Rojo 1974), in a book that 
was aptly dubbed a ―marker of the external limits of Keynesian economics in 
Spain‖(Almenar 2001: 498).  
But Spanish neoliberals did not go all the way down. Rather than replicate 
the emerging neoliberal paradigm, they hybridized it with select elements of 
previously translated epistemic traditions. The increasing influence of neoliberal 
economic ideas in Spanish academia and policy circles after the 1970s did not 
lead to a replication of ―textbook‖ monetarist, supply-side or rational expectations 
theses. Instead, some of these theses were altered or screened out, while select 
elements of Keynesian macroeconomics, namely developmentalist industrial 
policy and ―social market economy‖ survived. 
By contrast with the prowess of the orthodox academic-bureaucratic 
complex, the interventionist economic agenda inside PSOE during the early 1980s 
was extremely weak. The small Keynesian faction led by Manuel Sánchez Ayuso, 






 Also, Sevilla Segura, one of the few voices within PSOE‘s economic 
team who advocated a more interventionist policy that would use tax policies to 
force private savings in order to invest in high employment was dismissed in 
January 1984 (Boix 1995: 9). Ironically, Spain‘s most prestigious Keynesian, Luis 
Gamir, was a minister in the last UCD government and stayed away from the 
Socialist circles.  
After this point, the economic team within the government was completely 
under the authority of men trained by the Research Service who favored an 
orthodox approach to macroeconomic management.
237
 The Keynesian agenda was 
also assumed by the Socialist union UGT. But UGT‘s Keynesianism was ―thin‖, 
as the union did not have a robust team of economists able to systematically 
challenge the arguments of economic ministers (Royo 2001). Moreover, the 
union‘s institutional position was weakened by a minister of labor who shared the 
views of the economically orthodox Miguel Boyer (Almunia 2001).  
To conclude, in Spain Keynesianism was diluted by the ordoliberal 
critique and by the early 1980s it was more or less a dying tradition that had very 
insignificant representation inside as well as outside the organizational ecology of 
the Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party. 
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 For Sanchez Ayuso‘s ―fundamentalist‖ Keynesianism see his Introduccion a la politica 
monetaria de Espana, Madrid, Tucar, 1976; Crisis economica: hechos, politicas y ideas, Madrid: 
Piramide, 1981.  
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The Spanish Interventionist Tradition 
Developmentalism: From the Historical School to ISI 
In contrast to Keynesianism, developmentalism had a much less undiluted 
substance in Spain. In many respects, interventionism had dominated Spain‘s 
modern economic history. As suggested in the previous chapter, state 
interventionism in the framework of a neo-mercantilist trade regime dominated 
ideational debates and economic policy in pre-Civil War Spain. This largely 
meant the adoption of some of Wilhelmine Germany‘s socio-economic policies: 
protectionism, industrial policy, basic social protection for waged employees, 
state-managed cartelization, etc (Velarde 2001: 350). To a considerable extent, 
the indigenization of these principles was due to the preponderantly German 
education of Spain‘s top economists,
238
 which made German neohistoricism a 






The policy influence of this school of thought came to an end, not through 
intellectual competition with the liberal schools, but through political violence, 
once the Franquists won the civil war.
240
  But the end of the neo-historical school 
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The leader of the neohistoricist group was professor Antonio Flores de Lemus of Madrid 
University, a mandarin who had studied economics in Germany with the very prominenti of 
German neohistoricism: G. Schmoller, A.H.G. Wagner y L. Bortkiewicz.
 
 Flores de Lemus is still 
seen as the most important economist of the first half of the 20
th
 century (Schwartz 2001: 495).  
239
  Launched in the 1840s, the historicist school came to dominate German economics for almost 
a century. As Marion Fourcade (2001) aptly put it, ―its core methodological  credo  defended  the  
unity  of the  human  sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) against the natural ones. Considering  that  
"the  abstract  and  classificatory methods  of  the  natural  sciences  were  inadequate  models  for  
the  study  of the  human  world, it  proclaimed the primacy of historical monographs  and  
empirical work over positivist  methods  and  insisted  that  all  human  phenomena  ought  to  be  
studied in their broad,  and  time bound,  societal context.‖ (406). This foil of German historicism 
was the (neo)classical school of economics. 
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 To escape violence for involvement with the Second Republic, the more left-leaning 




made room for an even more interventionist paradigm. During the 1940s and 
1950s, the state‘s role as investor came in the ―hard‖ form represented by 
Spanish-style import substitution industrialization (ISI). Popularly associated with 
―autarky,‖
241
 the ideas that stood behind this model came to underlie the 
economic institutions of the Franco regime until the foreign currency crisis of the 
late 1950s. The central pillars of this paradigm were the primacy of the public 
sector in the drive for industrialization, continued protectionism, and deficit 
spending as a means to finance industrialization (Love 2004; Perez 1998; Velarde 
2001: 353-354; Gonzales 1977). Following the ideas of Romanian corporatist 
economist Mihail Manoilescu, the new regime endorsed the ―industrialization for 
its own sake‖ paradigm as the only means to overcome the ―agrarian fatalism‖ 
that had slowed the Spanish economy down (Love 2000). In the Spanish context 
this was translated to include select ideas of Nazi macroeconomic theory.
242
 Thus, 
Franquist economists like Higinio Paris grafted these Nazi macroeconomic ideas 
                                                                                                                                     
political right of the group who had passably conservative credentials became gradually 
institutionalized in the economics departments and research institutes of the new regime and had 
to work in research positions subordinate to the control of economists representing the two 
factions of the new regime‘s economists: developmentalists and liberals. The unreformed 
proponents of neohistoricism survived only on the margins of academic and policy circles during 
Franco‘s Spain, often benefitting from the patronage of self-interested Catalan protectionist 
business. The academic tip of residual neohistoricist ideas was Pedro Gual Villabi, a professor of 
economic policy at the School of High Mercantile Studies in Barcelona and an influential name in 
postwar Spanish political life (Velarde 2001: 354).  
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 ―Autarky‖ basically ceased to exist after 1945, when ―industrialization‖ became the new 
developmental mode (Love 2000: 104). The policy was adopted at the end of the civil war and was 
anchored in the Falange and in certain sectors of the authoritarian Catholic group CEDA 
(Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas)(Payne 1988). 
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 This tradition was upheld by a broad spectrum of pre-Civil War advocates, who spanned the 
neohistoricist academic consensus codified by Flores de Lemus and the military developmentalism 
of interwar dictator dictator Primo de Rivera (Almenar Palau 2001: 432; Velarde 2001: 353).When 
filtered through the disciplinary lenses of the engineers‘ profession, then the most influential 
professional group in economic policy (Velarde 1973; Love 2000: 104), this meant the pursuance 
of an engineering optimum, rather than an economic optimum and a dismissal of opportunity 
costs. Since the rejection of class struggle was a constitutive norm of the Franquist coalition 
(Gunther 1980), Spanish ―hydraulic‖ Keynesianism was also hybridized with a preference for the 




about investment and wages onto both Italian centralized industrial development 
and Spanish ―military developmentalism‖ of the de Rivera dictatorship.  The 
resulting hybrid would be large public works financed by deficit, in coordination 
between the state and private corporations, with the exclusion of organized 
independent labor. 
While this ―hard‖ version of ISI lost traction after the 1956 crisis, the 
dissertation of the strategic role of the state as an industrial investor was recycled 
by the indicative planners who came to play a leading role in policy during the 
―developmentalist decade‖ of the 1960s.  At this point, ideas about state-led 
industrialization took a more liberal turn as a result of the ascendancy of 
Keynesianism in Spanish academic departments.  
 
Indicative Planning, Spanish-Style 
Spanish indicative planning emerged from the work of a group of scholars close 
to Franco‘s inner circle.
243
 The most prominent Spanish indicative planner was 
Laureano Lopez Rodo, an Opus Dei technocrat, professor of administrative law 
and protégé of admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco‘s right-hand man (Anderson 1970: 
103-118; Gunther 1980). Between 1962 and 1973, as head of the Spanish 
Planning Commission (Comisaria del Plan de Desarollo), Rodo and his team of 
technocrats crafted and managed Spain‘s French-inspired ―development plans.‖  
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 Rodo‘s main works on economic policy included  Administración Pública y las 
transformaciones socio-económicas, Madrid, 1963 and Política y Desarrollo, Madrid, Aguilar, 
1970. See also his Memorias. El principio del fin, Plaza & Janés/Cambio 16, Barcelona, 1992. 
Among the advocates of this approach in academic economics were Fabian Estape, Agostin 




 In the more interventionist spin put on the Keynesian intellectual legacy by 
French planners,
244
 they saw a way to salvage the state-led development project 
from the attacks of Spanish liberals and neoclassical synthesizers.
245
 Instead, the 
then dominant conservative reading of neo-Keynesianism was frontally attacked 
by a team of economists and administrative law professors who, though 
marginalized by the Spanish economics elite, had a great deal of political backing.  
This team translated French ideas about indicative planning for Spanish 
consumption and gave Spain a replica of French development plans for about a 
decade (Perez 1997: 73; Tamames 1989).
246
 The main problems of indicative 
planning as a heterodox reading of Keynesianism were that it had a faint footprint 
from Spain‘s leading economic departments and research institutes and its support 
in the state depended on patronage. Once its patron, admiral Carrero Blanco, was 
assassinated in 1974 by ETA hit men, indicative planning disappeared almost 
instantly as a coherent school of thought. Yet, some of the planners‘ ideas 
survived the demise of Keynesianism and were subsequently used to establish the 
neoliberal project itself. 
247
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 In most of the developing world, similar attempts to challenge the neoclassical syndissertation 
with a heavier dose of Keynesianism led to development economics (Hirschman 1984: 17-24). Yet 
despite some initial overtures in this direction in mainstream economics reviews like Revista de 
Economia Politica and De Economia, this did not lead to a robust Spanish tradition of 
development economics (Almenar 2001: 496). 
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 While this contestation of the neoclassical syndissertation facilitated a shift in policy after 1962 
towards planned development and industrial policy, the intellectual supremacy of conservative 
neo-Keynesians in academia remained intact, because the more interventionist policy implications 
of Keyensian ideas were made largely by civil servants in the economic policy bureaucracy and by 
a handful of administrative law professors.   
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 The policy influence of the planners was greater than that of any other school of thought during 
the 1960s, and their grip on policy institutions between 1964 and 1974 coincided with a growth 
rate of around 6% a year. Neoclassical synthesizers like E.F. Quintana pointed out that the 
development plans slowed down growth by showing that the growth rate between 1959 and 1964 




The Spanish indicative plan was market-friendly, promoting increased 
competition among firms and raised external competitiveness of Spain‘s industry, 
a feat to be achieved by providing the coordinated information necessary to better 
guide the choices of firms in a mixed economy. This technocratic ideology was 
subordinated to a wider economic nationalist one, in which the stigma of 
economic backwardness legitimized an enduring emphasis on economic 
modernization through the state‘s rationalization of market relations. Also, like 
the neoclassical synthesizers, Spanish planners were ―pro-business‖ and saw the 
state as facilitator of a more competitive private sector. Moreover, both saw 
industrialization as the only means to break Spain‘s underdevelopment.  Yet the 
ideas with which the indicative planning school diagnosed the economic crisis of 
Spanish ISI drew precisely on those insights of Keynes‘ General Theory that had 
been challenged by the advocates of the Spanish neoclassical syndissertation. The 
planners had little consideration for monetary policy,
248
 or for the endorsed 
discretionary state-directed credit allocation as the prerequisite for a ―take-off‖ in 
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 At the Barcelona International Economic Week, Rodo rejected the argument that indicative 
planning generates inflation. A.B.C., September 14, 1971. As argued by Sophia Perez (1998), the 
planners adopted the strong orthodox Keynesian dissertation that monetary policy may not affect 
the endurance of liquidity traps (i.e. the internal demand for money is horizontal, so that further 
injections of money into the economy will not lower interest rates) (Spitzer 1976; Krugman et al 
1998; Krugman 2000). This ran counter to the Spanish neoclassical synthesizers‘ qualification of 
Keynesian economics with the so-called Pigou effect dissertation which claimed positive effects 
for monetary policy in an economy caught in the liquidity trap. To this end, the planners attacked 
the ideas of neoclassical synthesizers by showing that their orthodox 1959 Stabilization Plan led 
the economy into a liquidity trap responsible for severe disinvestment in the private sector 
(Anderson 1970: 103-117; Perez 1997: 68-73). Consequently, the planners advocated bold state 
stimulation of internal demand and showed only moderate concern for the inflationary costs of this 
strategy, a position Rodo defended even as the development plans were losing steam in France in 




comprehensive industrialization (Anderson 1970: 164-167; Gonzales 1980; 
Fernandez Diaz 1981; Perez 1997: 70-75).
249
 
One of the ideas of Spanish indicative planning that survived the 
neoliberal revolution was that of ―industrial champions.‖ Like their French 
counterparts, Spanish indicative planners struggled to embed liberalized trade 
principles in nationalist interventionist ideas, without lapsing either into the 
socializing and autarkic economic agenda of radical left projects, or into the low-
inflation export-led growth strategy embraced by postwar Germany. The state was 
expected to facilitate export competitiveness by increasing the level of industrial 
specialization in the private sector and by focusing public assistance on a few 
firms of ―international dimensions‖ (Perez 1997: 70-72; Cohen 1977; Hall 1986; 
Loriaux 1991).
250
 As the previous section shows, this was one of the ideas that, 
slimmed down and repackaged, tamed the anti-state implications of 
neoliberalism‘s maxim that ―the best industrial policy is no industrial policy.‖ 
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 Easy industrial credit entailed more state intervention than the neoclassical syndissertation 
allowed for and came at the cost of inflation rates that hovered around twice the OECD average 
during the 1960s (Alesina 1987). But, the need for monetary stabilization was mitigated by the 
adoption of another French planning idea: selective credit would maximize productivity growth. 
As Sophia Perez pointed out, ―the idea that monetary expansion could be used as a forcing 
mechanism on the rate of growth required that such monetary expansion be channeled into those 
types of productive investments that would maximize productivity growth over the medium term 
and minimize the damage of domestic inflation to the economy‘s competitiveness‖ (Perez 1997: 
72). In practice, the state would manage these credit flows by using a set of consistent numerical 
projections of the economic future without specific incentives for their fulfillment (as was the case 
in Soviet-style central planning).
 
This idea was buttressed by the phenomenal growth rates of 
France after 1945 despite high inflation rates.  
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 The emphasis on state assistance to large firms was based on the French planning idea that the 
absorption of technological and managerial progress linked to higher productivity could not be 
done in small and medium enterprises. This view ran counter to of American neo-classical 
theorists‘ tendency to assert the superiority of small firms due to their supposed greater flexibility. 
In this causal narrative, the state was to serve as ―crutch and prod in the transformation of industry 
away from an insular world in which small-scale production and intercompany connections 
slowed change toward an international market place in which a more modern industry composed 






The Weak Case for Heterodoxy 
Other left-leaning schools of thought had an even more limited impact in crafting 
a new mainstream in Spanish economics at the time of Keynesianism‘s demise. 
Latin American dependency theory began to influence a younger sector of 
―generation 1968‖ Spanish economists during the early 1970s (Love 2004: 125-
130). In 1970, key structuralist materials had been published in Informacion 
Comercial Espanola (ICE), but the review editors did not find their insights 
applicable to the Spanish context.The editors also felt obliged to demolish the 
structuralist classic text on inflation
251
 by ―twinning‖ it with a monetarist one. 
Returning from Chile, one of the ICE contributors (Gabriel Guzman) formed a 
structuralist group influenced by the ideas of CEPAL. The group grew in the late 
1970s following Raul Prebisch‘s visit in Madrid in 1975. Supported by veteran 
structuralist Juan Velarde Fuertes, Javier Brafia, Mikel Buesa, and Jose Molero 
were particularly active in travelling to dependency theory workshops in Britain 
and Latin America or in organizing workshops with Latin American 
dependentistasin Spain in 1978 and 1979. CEPAL also helped fund the proceeds 
of the 1979 workshop as well as an economics journal (Pensamiento 
Iberamericano) that lasted until 1998.  In several journal articles, book chapters 
and a monograph, the Spanish dependency group applied dependency theory 
ideas to the Spanish situation.  
Yet, during the early 1980s these economists had just finished their PhDs, 
had few publications and therefore had little epistemic authority to deploy. 
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Moreover, like their neo-Keynesian counterparts, Spanish dependentistas did not 
explore the more radical policy implications of Latin American structuralism and 
instead focused on its more technical aspects, such as technological dependence. 
And even so, the policy implications of their well-researched empirical work did 
not systematically challenge the emerging neoliberal consensus that the state had 
no major role to play in R&D (e.g. Donoso et al 1980; Molero 1982; 1983). By 
1990, Latin American references disappear completely from their work on this 
topic and are replaced with neoclassical references (Buesa and Molero 1989; 
1992). In this new epistemic mindset, during the 1990s, Molero and Buesa 
developed Spain‘s most internationally visible research on technology innovation 
in Spanish and multinational firms (Molero et al 1995; Molero and Buesa 1996; 
Molero 1998; Alvarez and Molero 2005). Therefore, the ascension of Molero and 
Bukesa in solid posts at Complutense happened just as they were shedding their 
structuralism and embracing the neoclassical mainstream. 
In sum, the epistemic and the political weakness of non-neoliberal ideas 
was manifest at the beginning of the 1980s. This left the economic policy field 
open to the translation of neoliberalism, an aspect I turn to next. 
 
 





The Institutional Infrastructure of the Neoliberal Insurrection: the Rojo 
Network 
 
“To understand the Spanish economy is to 




      
Almost a decade before the Spanish Socialists were devising their 1982 electoral 
program, monetarist ideas began to transform the field of elite economics in 
Spain. The main translators of the new paradigm were a group of technopols who 
were then straddling the worlds of academia and of the central bank.  Although 
they were Spain‘s most active participants in the Western economics profession, 
these men and women were not the ―Chicago Boys‖ from the popular academic 
narrative on Latin America‘s transition to neoliberalism. Instead, they came from 
the ranks of the former proponents of Spain‘s own version of the neoclassical-
Keynesian syndissertation. Based in the research division of the central bank and 
in Spain‘s most prominent economics department (Complutense University), they 
used their academic and policy pulpits to adapt the new economic orthodoxy to 
the Spanish context.  
During the late 1970s, the low level of institutional autonomy of the 
central bank was more than offset by the extraordinary epistemic authority the 
bank began to develop once its Research Service transformed itself into a 
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revolving door between elite economic departments and the central bank. Indeed, 
during this period the Service became the site of encounter between the most 
cosmopolitan elements of Spanish academic and technocratic elite (Acena 
2001).
253
 In less than a decade, this epistemic offensive made the central bank the 
ultimate professional authority on macroeconomic policy and the center of a 
network of technocrats and academic economists who would play a decisive role 
in the policy process during the PSOE years. As the central bank‘s historian put it, 
―no other European central bank had an institution that was simultaneously an 
academic powerhouse and a policy maker and in which researchers‘ findings 
would impact decision-making so directly‖ (Acena 2000; 2001).  
The architects of this transition began in 1965 were Mariano Rubio, the 
vice-governor of the bank during the late 1960s and  Luis Angel Rojo, the head of 
the Service, an LSE trained economist who had been involved in the drafting of 
the 1959 Stabilization Plan. Mariano Rubio astutely strategized that since the pay 
offered to central bank employees was much higher than in the university system 
and since the central bank only required a morning schedule from its economists, 
the Research Service was in the position to attract young economists with 
academic ambitions. In turn, after his appointment at the helm of the Service in 
1971, Rojo devised a complementary strategy for the ―padding‖ of the Service 
with foreign-trained economists. The strategies paid off and in a few years the 
Research Service became the country‘s most prominent applied research 
                                                 
253
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institution in economics whose role in drafting the central bank‘s yearly reports 
was fundamental and whose published output often rivaled that of the most 
prominent economics departments (Acena 2001).  
During the Socialist governments, the men trained and connected to the 
Research Service and elite economics departments occupied the top economic 
policy posts in the state. Thus, after 1982 the appointments for the Hacienda and 
the Ministry of the Economy were made from the ranks of liberal economists 
trained by the Research Service and Rojo personally and who had spent their 
professional lives using the academia-Research Service revolving door. Rojo‘s 
men restructured the second-tier positions inside these ministries by appointing 
economists with similar curricula (Perez 1998:138). As a result, the identification 
between the new MEH cadre and the central bank ―was so strong, that one can 
speak of a veritable colonization by that institution of the upper ranks of the 
economic policy bureaucracy‖ (Perez 1998: 138).  
What the Socialists did, in effect, was to use appointments as a platform 
for locking the MEH and the central bank in the same ―ecology‖ of technocratic 
elites. Both Miguel Boyer, the minister of finance and economy between 1982 
and 1985, and his successor Carlos Solchaga (1985-1993), had graduated from the 
same economics department at Complutense University, studied with Rojo and 
had remained wedded to Rojo‘s economic views. Between 1969 and 1971 they 
both spent their formative postgraduate training in the Research Service then 
headed by Rojo. Solchaga in particular had been considered a Rojo protégé and 




friends with Mariano Rubio during the 1970s (Gutierrez 1992). In 1972-1974  
Rojo appointed Solchaga as a representative of the central bank in the G20 (Muns 
1986: 267).  Between 1971 and 1974 Boyer and Solchaga received top positions 
in the research service of INI, which, despite being part of a public holding, was 
then trying to replicate the success of the central bank‘s research service at 
becoming the nation‘s first think tank. This meant a lot of collaboration between 
the two services.
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 Research Service economists occupied other top positions in 
the government. For example, Luis Garcia de Blas took the Social Security 
portfolio despite not being a PSOE member (Almunia 2001: 150). 
Boyer and Solchaga had also been heavily involved in the broader 
academic complex the Research Service had been an integral part of by taking up 
teaching positions at Complutense University, as protégées of Pedro Schwartz, 
Spain‘s most prestigious libertarian economist. Since their youth activism in a 
left-leaning student group (Asociacion Socialista Universitaria), Boyer and central 
bank chief Mariano Rubio had been close friends (Gutierrez 1998) and   soon they 
also welcomed Carlos Solchaga as a friend.  
During the 1970s, both Boyer and Solchaga had been regular contributors 
to Espana Economica, an elite economic review established and run mostly by 
Research Service economists who would come to play decisive policy roles under 
UCD and the Socialists and who ―saw all things in the same way‖ (Schwartz 
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 This happened because INI was then under the directorship of Claudio Boada, central bank 
advisor and a former CEO of one of Spain‘s largest banks (Banco Hispano-Americana). Boada 
attempted to make INI more risk-taking and competitive than private enterprises themselves 
(Schwartz and Gonzales 1978: 176-178). To this end, he established the INI‘s Research Service, 
an institution that under Boyer‘s directorship became so influential and reputed for the 
competence of its staff that it began to compete with the Research Service of the central bank 




1998). In addition to the contributions of Schwartz, Boyer and Solchaga, Espana 
Economica benefited from the work of a veritable who‘s who of Spanish 
economic thinking, including central bank prominenti (Luis Angel Rojo, Mariano 
Rubio), ―old guard‖ technocrat-professors (Enrique Fuentes Quintana, Jose Luis 
Sampedro), Spanish international civil servants (executive IMF director Carlos 
Bustelo), and  future PSOE ministers (Ernest Lluch). Boyer‘s and Solchaga‘s 
tenure in the private sector in the late 1970s and early 80s did not alienate them 
from the ―Rojo network.‖ Solchaga became the top economist of the research 
service of Banco Urquijo, an institution known for its decade-long investment in 
the use of expert knowledge as a means to influence public policy and for its close 
contacts with Rojo‘s Research Service. 
 
The Ideas of the Rojo Network 
As the first part of the chapter suggested, when the Socialists won the 1982 
elections, the institutionalization of selected monetarist, supply-side and rational 
expectations ideas in the policy orthodoxy of the central bank defined the 
spectrum of what was considered normatively appropriate in both academia and 
the state. At the same time, the influence of neoliberal economic ideas in the 
central bank and academia was not accepted wholesale by Spanish economists. 




mainstream Spanish economics by blunting some of the revolutionary 
implications it had elsewhere.
255
 
It is perhaps slightly ironic that Luis Angel Rojo, Spain‘s most prominent 
representative of the neoclassical-Keynesian syndissertation during the 1960s, 
became the advocate of the neoliberal insurgency a decade later. Beginning in the 
late 1960s, Rojo and his collaborators at Complutense and the Research Service 
of the Bank of Spain (Jose Perez, Raimundo Ortega, Raimundo Poveda, Ana 
Sanchez) began to pay increasing attention to the then controversial monetarist 
arguments of Milton Friedman. Monetarism found a voice in Spain via Rojo‘s 
1971 book The New Monetarism, a relatively sympathetic review of the work of 
Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer. As early as 
1973, acting on their acceptance of the monetarist dissertation that the money 
supply had a fundamental role in the economy, Rojo and his collaborators began 
to advocate aggregate monetary indicators as instrumental variables in a fiscal 
policy focused on a continuous control of liquidity. By contrast with most other 
capitalist countries, the Research Service of the Bank of Spain persuaded the 
central bank to respond to the first oil shock with a string of decisions meant to 
squeeze the money supply, in order to keep inflation under control and to further 
liberalize the financial system. As Rojo himself put it,  
 
[t]he policies adopted by the central bank in the second half of the 1970s 
were unequivocally based in these ideas. The central bank defined price 
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and GDP growth targets that were to be achieved via the control of 
aggregate liquidity. The same institution determined the level of the 
variation in the monetary aggregate through an instrumental variable 
directly related to that aggregate. The adoption of the monetarist 
dissertation led to the rejection of alternative monetary policies such as 
interest rate management  (Rojo 2001: 351). 
 
If Rojo‘s New Monetarism did not go beyond selective appreciations of 
monetarist insights, with Income, Prices and Balance of Payments (1974), he 
begins to deploy monetarist arguments to attack the same Keynesian 
macroeconomics that he had been advocating throughout the 1960s (Acena 1999: 
195). As the stagflation of the 1970s wore on, Rojo applied the final blows to the 
neo-Keynesian consensus in two studies published in 1976 and 1977 respectively 
(Rojo 1976; Rojo and Perez 1976).
256
 In these volumes, Rojo and his Research 
Service collaborator Jose Perez undertook a very critical review of three decades 
of neo-Keynesian ideas and economic policies, which he and his collaborators in 
the Research Service and the finance department at Complutense had defended 
since the mid 1960s. Although Rojo and his ―network‖ resisted being labeled as 
―monetarists‖, the central dissertation defended in their contributions from the late 
1970s was an unequivocal reproduction of the classical ―quantity of money‖ 
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The first study was a book published by elite press Alianza Editorial (Inflacion y crisis en la 
economia mundial, Alianza Editorial, 1976). The second study was an article published by the 
central bank and co-authored with Research Service chief economist Jose Perez (―La politica 




dissertation, which finds a monetary perturbation behind each bout of inflation 
(Acena 2001: 536; Schwartz 2001: 509): 
 
[…] the authors of this study use ample empirical evidence (including 
Spanish data) to argue that a rapid pace of growth of the money is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for generating rapid inflationary 
processes in the long term; we also argue that a strong acceleration of the 
growth of the money supply has an expansionary effect in the short term 
and that […]although this expansion will have a real effect on production 
and employment, this effect will be smaller [than expected-a.n.] and will 
tend to fade out in inflation as rapidly as the growth of the use of 
productive resources and of the inflationary expectations in the initial 
conditions of the economy. We also submit that in a country seeing high 
inflation levels, the reduction of the pace of growth of the money supply is 
a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for the moderating the 
inflationary process over time. (Rojo and Perez 1977, cited in Acena 2001: 
536; my translation). 
 
 Such ideas were repeated in a 1978 article co-authored with another 
Research Service young economist (Gonzalo Gil) (Rojo and Gil 1979) and, 
increasingly during the early 1980s, in a series of articles published mostly in the 
flagship Papeles de Economia Espanola (Rojo 1980; 1981; 1982a, 1982b, 1983; 




Overall, the academic scholarship and policy ideas put forth by Rojo and 
his collaborators in the central bank called for the depoliticization of economic 
policy.  They assumed that government activism, particularly the use of demand-
side macroeconomic policies, is bound to generate perverse effects. Intolerance 
for budget deficits in the short term became another mantra of Spanish economics 
during the 1980s. As opposed to the Keynesian argument that budget deficits have 
a cyclical component and were just a symptom of insufficient investment and an 
after-effect of recessions,
257
 deficit-slashing was framed with the monetarist 
argument that high fiscal deficits generate inflation and balance of payment 
problems. Like Friedman, Sargeant and Lucas, Rojo and his colleagues insisted 
that neither economic growth nor the reduction of unemployment could be 
addressed by monetary or fiscal policies targeted at aggregate demand. Rehashing 
the arguments of the same scholars, Rojo argued that labor regulations introduced 
prejudicial supply rigidities had to be removed. He also embraced the validity of 
the rational expectations hypodissertation advanced by new classical economics, 
correlatively rejecting Keynesian arguments about inertia in the formation of 
expectations of the future (Rojo 1994; 2001: 567).
258
  
An analysis of the economic ideas underlying the policy position of the 
Spanish central bank demonstrates that Rojo‘s theories did not merely have an 
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 In 1984, in what was a succinct translation of the ―policy irrelevance proposition‖ advanced by 
the same American neoliberal economists, Luis Angel Rojo argued the following: ―[a] drive to 
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risks of stabilizing measures. This, in turn, tends to slow down economic development with strong 
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academic impact (Irastorza 1986). The analysis shows that much of the credo of 
monetarism was accepted by Rojo: the understanding of inflation as a monetary 
phenomenon, the necessity to control a monetary aggregate rather than a rate of 
interest as an intermediate objective, the necessity of the practice to fix, announce 
and meet monetary targets periodically, and the centrality of a stable monetary 
supply and demand.  
 In the years to come, the bank would use these reports not only to 
challenge the Finance Ministry by de facto designing macroeconomic policy, but 
also to change the perception of what was economically appropriate. The fulcrum 
of this ideational offensive was to sell macroeconomic stability as a ―public good, 
as something valuable in itself, and as the most important objective of a central 
bank‖ (Acena 2001: 542). This led to an almost single-minded focus on inflation 
as the root of Spain‘s economic woes, a preoccupation that the Service conveyed 
not only to the executive council of the Bank of Spain, but also to economic 
ministries and to the Treasury (Acena 2001: 549; Solchaga 1996). 
The neoliberal revolution initiated by the Rojo group was strengthened 
during the 1980s by a new wave of Western-trained graduates, who were swiftly 
incorporated into Spanish academia and economic policy institutions upon their 
return. Exemplary in this regard is the case of two students of Rojo: the Oxford-
educated Juan J. Delgado, who became Rojo‘s successor at the helm of Research 
Service, and LSE-trained Rafel Repullo, who was the head of CEMFI, the think 
tank of the Research Service.
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 Moreover, as the next chapter shows, the two 
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most important economists of the PSOE governments (Miguel Boyer and Carlos 
Solchaga) also acted as loyal members of the Rojo network.  
Neoliberal ideas began to make headway outside macroeconomics as well. 
In the field of labor economics, for example, the ministry of finance as well as the 
ministry of labor funded studies that expressed a solid endorsement of supply-side 
theses of the causes of unemployment. Beginning in the early 1980s, prominent 
Spanish labor economists like Luis Teoharia and Lluis Fina began to diagnose the 
growth of unemployment in Spain by deploying what would subsequently become 
the standard neoliberal diagnostic narrative: employment protection legislation 
(hire-and-fire rules, unionization, central bargaining), the crowding-out effects of 
public spending, demographic factors and changes of relative prices generated by 
new processes of staff management (Teoharia 1983; Teoharia and Fina 1987; 
1991).
260
   
The research of these economists directly affected government policy; 
some economists worked for the government (Lluis Fina was a key expert of the 
Ministry of Labor between 1983 and 1985) and some of this research was 
commissioned by the ministry of finance.
261
 During the 1980s, a new generation 
of economists trained in British universities added epistemic weight to these 
arguments by formalizing them.
262
 The Ministry of Labor endorsed studies 
                                                                                                                                     
Expectations Models Too Often?  Interpreting Evidence Using Nagar Expansions" Economics 
Letters (1987) vol. 24, pp 27-32 (with A. Banerjee). 
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 For an exemplary overview of the Spanish scholarship on the causes of unemployment and on 
employment protection legislation see Jimeno and Toharia (1994).  
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 and, suggestively, the ideology of labor market 
deregulation became so mainstream in the PSOE that an edited volume containing 
these ideas and based on a seminary organized by PSOE‘s Pablo Iglesias 
Foundation was published in 1988 with the party‘s endorsement (Garrido 1988). 
In the same year, a committee of experts chaired by Constantino Lluch, a 
prominent PSOE intellectual and labor economics expert,
264
 largely replicated the 
same ideas in a report commissioned by one of the chambers of the Spanish 
Parliament (Lluch 1988).
265
 These arguments were formalized during the 1990s 




The Interventionist Editing of the Neoliberal Revolution  
In macroeconomic policy, the applicability of monetarism was restricted. Spanish 
neoliberals did not restate some of its key theses, such as the stability of the 
money demand, the exogenous character of the money supply, the intrinsic 
stability of the private sector and the intrinsic instability of the public one (Acena 
2001: 537). Well into the 1990s, Luis Angel Rojo, the intellectual leader of the 
nascent Spanish neoliberal school in macroeconomics, remained openly skeptical 
of the new classical argument that firms are not limited by aggregate demand and 
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that workers are always willing to work at the going wage or at an inferior one 
(Rojo 1994: 2001: 568). 
Moreover, Rojo and his teams of researchers and policymakers tried to 
demonstrate the possibility of a syndissertation between the ideas of the 
neoclassical-Keynesian syndissertation, Friedman‘s monetarism and rational 
expectations (Rojo 1982: 56-69). The same positions were articulated not only by 
the prominent research economists from the Research Service (Raimundo Poveda, 
Raimundo Ortega, Jose Maria Bolilla, Gonzalo Gil, Rafael Alvarez, Jose Perez, 
Malo de Molina)(Martin Acena 2001), but also by top PSOE policymakers, like 
Carlos Solchaga, the minister of finance (1985-1993) (Solchaga 1997).  
Similarly, supply-side ideas did not unseat Keynesian tax economics. 
Beginning with the early 1970s, the group of economists working with ―sound 
finance‖ guru Enrique Fuentes Quintana at Complutense and the Ministry of 
Finance, began to advocate fiscal policy ideas that were based in the ideational 
consensus of the ―embedded liberalism‖ of the time (Sanchez Lissen 1997; 
Lagares Calvo 2001). The result of this extensive research endeavor was the 
publication of a detailed reform proposal by the finance ministry in 1973, which 
subsequently became the blueprint for the progressive tax reforms adopted by 
UCD and PSOE governments.  
The Quintana report diagnosed the fiscal crisis of the Spanish state in its 
low and regressive taxes and suggested the adoption of taxation principles then 
mainstream in European democracies (Velarde Fuertes 1994; Fuentes Quintana 




income redistribution through taxation, and the enlistment of tax incentives for 
industrial policy became touchstones of the fiscal philosophy of this group of 
scholars and technocrats.  
The causal argument of the draft was explicitly interventionist and even 
slightly ―structuralist‖ in nature: without an increase in fiscal revenues that could 
be used to finance growth in competitive economic sectors, the Spanish economy 
was bound to languish in its semi-peripheral status. In what sounded like an East 
Asian version of export-led industrialization, the authors of the report argued that, 
since market mechanisms alone were unable to deliver a robust catch-up 
economic performance, the state had to step in to invest in public infrastructures 
and services and to subsidize competitive firms that would take Spain into the 
First World. For this to happen, Spain needed more, rather than less, 
governmental control in its fiscal policy.
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 Ordoliberal ideas about the imperative of building a social market 
economy to generate social peace and support for capitalism, were also an 
important veto point to the wholesale diffusion of supply-side welfare 
retrenchment narratives. Using these ideas, the Quintana report criticized the 
regressive nature of the extant tax system, claiming it punished the poor and 
undermined the provision of basic welfare. To address these challenges, the 
writers of the report endorsed a steep progressive income tax, taxes on luxury, tax 
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 These fiscal policy ideas resonated well with the ―pragmatic monetarism‖ of the neoliberals in 
the central bank, for whom the control of the deficit was as important as the control of inflation 
(Rojo 2001: 352). Progressive taxation provided monetarists with an exit from the constraints of 
political democratization. As Rojo himself acknowledged three decades later, the control of 
inflation and of the deficit pioneered by the central bank in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock, 
could not have been continued after the death of Franco given the political weight of popular 




breaks for employment creation, the stripping of banking privacy, the 
criminalization of tax evasion and the strengthening of tax-collection.   
Subsequently, methodological advances such as the Gini coefficient were 
pioneered in Spain by some of the authors of the report, in order to uphold the 
case of labor reform.
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 The report was subsequently used as a template for the 
fiscal policy reforms of the Moncloa Pacts of 1977 (Lagares 2001: 596-597). The 
same economists who played a major role in the writing of the 1973 Quintana 
report formed the teams of experts hired by the Spanish government during the 
1980s and 1990s to operate generally progressive modifications to the 1978 tax 
statutes. The ideas of the report can be traced down not only in PSOE political 
programs during the 1980s, but also in the writings of the neoliberal ministers of 
the Gonzales governments.  In the 1990s, after having served for almost a decade 
as the effigy of neoliberalism, PSOE finance minister Carlos Solchaga 
systematically criticized supply-side ideas about reducing the ―tax burden‖ 
(Solchaga 1997).  
In labor policy, in contrast with the hardline supply-side position, the 
Lluch report also called for the strengthening of the vocational and continuing 
education system (Lluch 1988: 5). Other central players in policy like Luis Angel 
Rojo (2001) and Miguel Boyer (2001) acknowledged that other structural factors 
like the oil shocks, the slowdown of migratory outflows and the incorporation of 
women into the labor force mattered, yet they emphasized that these factors 
merely amplified the central cause of unemployment: the increasing cost of labor 
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 The Gini coefficient was first used in Spain by Manuel Lagares, the main collaborator of 
Fuentes Quintana. Lagares was a professor of economics and a general secretary of the research 




via wage increases and employment protection legislation at a time when higher 
energy costs demanded wage control. 
Finally, the enduring prestige of ordoliberalism among Spanish 
economists and the surprising survival of select ideas associated with indicative 
planning were significant for the ways in which PSOE governments puzzled over 
trade policy. The embrace of neoliberalism in Spanish trade relations by the 
PSOE governments had been part of PSOE‘s ―return to Europe‖ narrative and was 
therefore extremely powerful for a party that saw the climax of Spain‘s 
democratic and economic development in European integration (Maravall 1991; 
Maravall et al 1999; Holman 1996). At the same time, it did not lead to an 
ideological offensive against all forms of interventions in trade (Jordan and 
Fuertes 2007). On the contrary, the reproduction of the narrative of ―neo-liberal 
globalism,‖ in which the global market is considered the ultimate unit of reference 
for economic activity and the main objective of economic policies (Chorev 2005), 
led Spanish neoliberals to the conclusion that fostering national competitiveness 
in the global marketplace necessitates the liquidation of weak state enterprises and 
the transformation of strong ones into industrial champions.  
To achieve this objective, they used ideas that blended the old ordoliberal 
argument for market-making government policy with the indicative planning 
argument for market-making state-capital coordination mechanisms. In the 
Spanish context this meant state support for high achievers (Etchemendy 2004), 
incentives for industrial diversification and  brakes on mergers and acquisitions in 




2002; Valdivielso del Real 2009). Also, rather than shield domestic firms against 
foreign competitors for the sake of protecting their domestic market niche, 
Spanish policymakers saw industrial policy ideas as a means to external 
expansion (Toral 2008; Molina and Rhodes 2007). In this way, Spanish 
―neoliberals‖ quietly negotiated the terms of the global transition in a more 
interventionist direction, from ―trade liberalization‖, in which governments 
intervened to compensate those who lost out as a result of free trade, to ―trade-
neoliberalization,‖ in which such compensation was theoretically deemed a 
deleterious market distortion (Chorev 2005: 320). 
In conclusion, the Spanish translators of neoliberalism acted as bricoleurs 
who did not merely imitate new economic ideas, but also altered them in 
surprising ways. To do this, they drew on preexisting intellectual legacies that 
pointed in a more interventionist direction.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter makes several claims about how neoliberal ideas were adopted in 
Spain and about how they shaped the course of economic transformations in 
Spain during the 1970s and early 1990s. Thus, it turned out that resonance 
mattered a great deal in facilitating the shift from developmentalism and neo-
Keynesianism to neoliberalism. Since the 1930s, a network of Spanish economists 
with political standing developed a robust neoclassical tradition that paradoxically 
received a boost from Franco‘s takeover of power. Moreover, the subsequent 




of economists in Spain‘s academic-bureaucratic complex. Most importantly, the 
German-Spanish cooperation during Nazism brought to Spain an international 
celebrity of the neoclassical school (the ordoliberal von Stackelberg) and enabled 
him to exert an inordinate degree of influence over the future course of postwar 
Spanish economics as taught in academia and as put in practice by state 
institutions. 
As a result of these developments, Spain and West Germany were the only 
two states in Western Europe where the ordoliberal take on neoclassical 
economics had a strong base. The ordoliberal reading of the neoclassical 
framework had two long-term effects: the neoclassical tradition was saved from a 
libertarian reading and it took Spanish neo-Keynesianism so far to the right that 
the transition to neoliberalism during the 1970s and the early 1980s took place 
without the considerable contention seen in the West. As a result of these 
developments that took place decades before the Socialists came to power, it was 
not surprising that the economists who ruled inside this center-left party found the 
West German model the most compelling. 
But as expected, by itself resonance could not explain why mainstream 
Spanish neoliberalism looked the way it did. The chapter therefore investigated 
how domestic processes of translation caused inherited economic ideas to 
constrain the possibilities for innovation. At first glance, Spanish economists 
embraced neoliberalism and their grip on the government led to the adoption of 
core monetarist, supply-side and rational expectations theses on macroeconomic 




original Anglo-American context and formalized in order to seem universal and 
thus travel more easily.  But upon closer inspection, it became apparent that this 
was neither ―textbook‖ neoclassical economics, nor Chicago School market 
fundamentalism.  
As predicted, the translators did not simply ―cut-and-paste‖ new economic 
ideas developed in foreign ―labs.‖ Instead, the result was a domestic variety of 
embedded neoliberalism that recycled some of the ideas of ordoliberalism but also 
of developmentalism. In this way the Spanish translators of neoliberalism acted as 
bricoleurs who did not merely imitate new economic ideas, but also altered them 
in surprising ways.First, Spanish neoliberals did not see the state just as a 
guarantor of competition. They also saw it as an investor with the long-haul 
perspective that private companies did not have. As a result, Spain‘s neoliberal 
adjustment under the Socialists had very distinctive statist and economic 
nationalist flavor. Second, Keynesian tax policy survived and did not give way to 
world supply-side offensive.  As a result, the expansion of state revenues, the 
principle of income redistribution through taxation, and the enlistment of tax 
incentives for industrial policy became touchstones of the fiscal philosophy of this 
group of scholars and technocrats. Third, the same people who supported a rigidly 
orthodox macroeconomic and supply-side labor policy argued that since market 
mechanisms alone were unable to deliver a robust catch-up economic 
performance, the state had to step in to invest in public infrastructures and 
services and to subsidize competitive firms that would take Spain into the First 




which the global market is considered the ultimate unit of reference for economic 
activity and the main objective of economic policies went hand in hand with a 
―below the radar‖ industrial policy seen as a means for expansion on foreign 
markets in Latin America and beyond. Finally, ―social-democratic‖-sounding 
ordoliberal ideas about the imperative of building a social market economy to 
generate social peace and support for capitalism were marshaled against supply-
side welfare retrenchment ideas. 
Since constructivism rests on the assumption that things could have been 
different, I also sought to explain why alternative economic ideas were 
marginalized in the Spanish economic debate. The heterodox structuralist 
challenge influenced by Latin American dependency theory had little impact 
because its proponents were not yet professionally consolidated at the moment 
when Franco‘s developmentalism was dying. Moreover, their research spoke to 
very narrowly-defined topics and at no point did these economists manage to 
penetrate the academic-bureaucratic complex. By contrast, the proponents of 
Spanish indicative planning were more successful and managed to build their own 
bureaucratic structure inside the Francoist state. Yet their academic footprint was 
shallow and they depended entirely on political patronage. When their patron was 
assassinated, indicative planning vanished from the economic field, although its 
idea that industrial champions ―fed‖ by the state increase the country‘s external 
economic competititiveness was subsequently appropriated by the neoliberals. 
In the theory chapter I expected that these battles to redrew the boundaries 




paradigm shift towards neoliberalism were not strictly endogenous to the Spanish 
domestic context. The translation of new economic ideas in semi-peripheral states 
entails a considerable degree of external intervention. In other words, translation 
is embedded in processes of transnational governance whose workings may 
decide the outcome of domestic economic debates in favor of certain economic 








Chapter VI - Ideas, Agents, and Conduits: Translation and Diffusion of 




Through what conduits were Western economic ideas translated in Spain? In 
order to answer this question, my analysis will examine the evidence for the 
hypodissertation that in addition to IOs and Anglo-American-trained economists, 
the transmission of neoliberalism would be facilitated by transnational party 
networks but less so by think-tanks. The chapter also explores the ways in which 
each of these actors participated in translation. More specifically, I examine what 
kind of foreign training in economics had a real impact, through what 
mechanisms did IOs, internationalized think-tanks and transnational party 
networks intervene in domestic economic debate. The chapter‘s sections are 






Western Graduate Education  
                                                      
“Spain is the problem, Europe is the 
solution.‖ (y Gasset 1963: 521) 
 
The intellectual roots of Spanish embedded neoliberalism are deeply 
anchored in liberal strands of German and British economic thought imported by 
academic economists. In pointing this out this section adds a geographical nuance 
to the findings of previous studies on the diffusion of neoliberal ideas, which 
emphasize foreign graduate education in economics as the strongest socialization 
mechanism in the acquisition of neoliberal ideas but usually focus on Anglo-
American training (Silva 1991; 2009; Valdes 1995; Montecinos 1997; Babb 2001; 
Dezalay and Garth 2002; Fourcade 2006; Kogut and MacPherson 2004; 2008). 
Those ideas constituted the interpretive lens through which influential Spanish 
economists diagnosed the economic problems of their home countries, proposing 
new policy solutions after they returned home.
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But since not all foreign-trained economists affect the policy process, I 
build on Jeffrey Chwieroth‘s (2007) parsimonious argument that economists are 
most influential when they are part of a coherent policy team, especially if they 
control the central bank and the ministry of finance. Based on this observation, I 
                                                 
269
 It was argued that not only do US universities lend domestic economists prestigious credentials 
and access to expensive information. As studies of training in economics evidence (Colander and 
Klamer 1987; Colander 2005; 2009), they also restructure their professional identities through 
apprenticeship, a claim backed with extensive evidence drawn from social network sociology 
showing that one of the main effects of participation in such social networks is the increase in the 
likelihood of reproducing network ideas (White 1992: 67; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
Carley 1999; White 2002; Breiger 2000). In sum, new economic ideas travel through networks of 




assume that proximity to the nervous centers of policymaking is a good measure 
of an economist‘s importance. But, finding that Spain had a bureaucratic-
academic revolving door, I hypothesized that academic economists who also 
served as technocrats would be the most significant players, given their capacity 
to mobilize greater support for new policy ideas through the exercise of expertise 
relative to their non-academic peers.  
The examination of the evidence available in the case of Spain suggests 
that the strong and relatively precocious case for neoliberalism in Spanish 
economics during the early 1980s had deep historical roots. First, Spain had a rich 
neoclassical tradition produced by a pre-civil war generation with foreign 
graduate degrees as well as by a strong microeconomics foundation consolidated 
by a generation of economists mentored during the 1940s by German ordoliberal 
Friedrich von Stackelberg. Second, the hypothesized importance of the 
―American epistemic center‖ became important only after the 1970s, with British 
universities, particularly the group of neoclassical economists at LSE, exerting the 
greatest influence over the formation of elite Spanish economists until then. Also, 
beginning with the same decade, Spanish economists benefited from the 
organization in Spain of important economics conventions and from the direct 
intervention of world economics celebrities in the domestic debate of ideas.   
 
The Temporary Marginality of the Neoclassicals 
As suggested in the previous chapter, 1980s Spanish neoliberalism was not 




basis in both micro- and macroeconomics had deep historical roots that made 
local translation of neoliberalism easier;an insight impossible to unearth through 
an ahistorical approach. These historical roots were not predictable, either, as 
economic liberalism had been an orphan of Spanish economics during the belle 
époque of the gold standard (1874-1914). Spanish economic historian Salvador 
Almenar found nothing less than ―the virtual absence of any influence of 
marginalist (or neoclassical) economics‖ during this period (Almenar and 
Lembert: 2001, 121; Almenar 2000).  
However, beginning with the 1930s things began to change, and the 
Spanish neoclassical tradition was revived as the result of state-sponsored 
economics degrees from Western Europe. As a result of this transnationalization, 
Spanish economists, who had a lasting influence on their profession during the 
postwar decades, had either studied abroad or engaged in various forms of regular 
professional contact with foreign peers.  
This situation was facilitated by their institutional prominence in a 
profession purged by their neo-historical adversaries during Franco‘s early years. 
Also, as celebrity economics professors and journal editors, these foreign-trained 
economists shaped the intellectual identity of the generation of Spanish 
economists who pursued their advanced degrees in economics in the 1950s and 





The Franco regime offered pre-civil war economic liberals generous 
career opportunities in academia and the state.
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 This enabled them to wage a 
―double front‖ war against Keynesian and heterodox ideas in academia and 
against the ISI paradigm initially upheld by the Franquist state (Quintana 2001). 
Lucas Beltran, the towering figure of postwar Spanish economic liberalism, 
studied with Hayek at LSE in the 1930s and then returned to Spain to teach 




Another British-educated economist, Luis Olariaga, edited Economia 
Espanola, a review dedicated to debunking Keynes, the New Deal and other 
interventionist ideas, while advocating the cause of the limited liberal state 
(Zabalza 2010). Jose Maria Zumalcaregui, the founder of Spain‘s first economics 
department in 1943 and a strong advocate of marginalism, had studied with Pareto 
at Lausanne during the 1920s.  During the 1940s, he developed a friendship with 
German liberal economist Friedrich von Stackelberg. Finally, Joan Sarda, the 
chief architect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan and the head of the Research Service 
of the central bank for most of the 1960s, had studied economics before the civil 
war at LSE, where he was drawn to T.E. Gregory‘s militant anti-Keynesianism. 
During his studies in Munich, he became receptive to the influence of Carl 
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 FPSE was from the very beginning put under the control of foreign-trained liberal economists 
(Manuel de Torres, Jose Maria Zomalacarregui) who faced no competition from the erstwhile 
hegemonic neohistorical school, now decimated by ―collaboration‖ with the Republic. 
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 For decades, this review was a safe outlet for advocates of liberal economics and one of the 
earliest Spanish sites of monetarism and rational expectations (Almenar 1983: 103-109). Beltran 





Manger, the founder of the Austrian School, and his disciple, Böhm Bawerk. 
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Sarda‘s international career during the 40s and 50s further consolidated his 
professional cosmopolitanism and offered his Spanish colleagues access to the 




Although the first two decades of Franquism reduced funded opportunities 
for study abroad (largely as a result of financial constraints), the regime imposed 
no limits on freedom of movement. Spanish scholars could thus study abroad with 
their own funds. Jose Vergara Doncel, for example, a prominent professor at 
Complutense, studied at the University of Chicago in 1946 and became 
instrumental in popularizing Chicago School economics in his teaching and 
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 In the words of Fabian Estape, in this academic-technocratic network (Estape unpublished), 
Sarda had ―the maximum scientific authoriship‖ over the design of the 1959 Stabilization Plan. 
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 In 1948 and 1949, Spain‘s World Economy Institute organized research trips to Kiel, Geneva 
and Brussels to study the policy implications of European economic liberalization, an endeavour 
that resulted in a nine volume report published between 1951 and 1961 (Lisssen, unpublished 
manuscript: 16). Joan Sarda had been on these delegations and returned home with an ordoliberal-
keynesian syndissertation that he put together in a classic 1950 economics textbook in whick the 
Keynesian objective of full employment in a mixed economy is simultaneously strengthened with 
ordoliberal arguments about the state‘s role in the social aspects of the market economy as well as 
limited by the ordoliberal principle that full employment and socio-economic rights should not be 
pursued at the cost of monetary inflation (Sarda 1950: 223; 231-232; in Lissen 18; Martinez Vela 
2000). As an economist working for the Venezuelan central bank (1949-1956), he developed close 
contacts with Latin American economists working for the IMF and the World Bank. This enabled 
him to supply his collaborators in Spain with up to date Western economic literature and IMF and 
World Bank research (Estape 2001).  
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 Doncel convinced Alianza Editorial publish Spanish translations of the classic contributions in 




The von Stackleberg Moment 
As access to great Western economics professors became generally difficult for 
Spanish economists during the 1940s and 1950s, one Western economist with a 
Nazi past and a world reputation as a path-breaking microeconomist
275
,Friedrich 
von Stackelberg, came to Madrid in 1943 and gave neoclassical tradition a 
distinct Ordo flavor (Velardes 2001: 357-358). Stackelberg had been a Nazi party 
member since 1931 and an active combat SS officer since 1933. After 1942, he 
became disillusioned with Nazism and Spain offered him an unexpected 
opportunity to leave Germany.  
This came about following the institutional reorganization of the 
economics profession in 1943, the economics section of the recently-established 
Institute of Political Studies (IPS) sought to boost its reputation by hiring a 
prestigious international scholar. The search ended following the decisive 
intervention of Miguel Paredes Marcos, a Falange-affiliated finance professor 
who had studied economics in Berlin and Bonn. Paredes made the case that the 
IPS could benefit from the work of his former professor, Nazi apostate and world-
renowned member of the German Freiburg School. The Spaniards liked his 
admiration for Mediterranean fascism and were very impressed by his 
professional pedigree, for von Stackelberg was not a minor figure in Western 
economics. During the 1930s and 40s he became internationally known for his 
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 Leontieff lavishly praised his work on monopoly competition (Leontieff 1936) and following 
the publication of his last book in 1948, an American Economic Review reviewer called it ―the 
most comprehensive German presentation of microeconomic  theory […] at  a time when many 
American  economists have ceased to believe in  the practical relevance of microeconomics‖(for 
favorable American reviews see also Machlup 1949; Schweitzer 1949; Morgensten 1949). Von 
Stackelberg‘s Theory of the Market Economy was published in German in 1948 (Grundlagen der  





contributions to the theory of monopolistic competition. Economic historians 
agree that few German economists contributed as much to the rapprochement 
between German economics and neoclassical economics as he did (Njehans 1992; 
also see Scherer 2000). 
In the short term, von Stackelberg played a decisive role in strengthening 
the network of Spanish neoclassical economists in two ways. First, his world 
reputation commanded an unprecedented level of authority in a profession whose 
internal status structures gave precedence to foreign academic training. He began 
to teach immediately at the newly-founded Institute for Political Studies and the 
department of economics at the University of Madrid (Complutense). Von 
Stackelberg boosted the reputation of the teams of microeconomists working in 
these institutions by publishing his last contributions to world economics as a 
―naturalized‖ Spanish economist.
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  At the same time, he provided economists in 
this politically isolated country with direct, albeit limited, foreign contact. In 
addition to providing them with bibliographic material, he used his old contacts in 
Germany in 1946 to bring prominent ordoliberal economist Eucken to lecture in 
Madrid (Velarde 2001: 363-364; Lissen, unpublished manuscript: 16). Eucken‘s 
Santander lectures were then edited and published in the same year (Lissen, 
unpublished manuscript: 16). 
Von Stackelberg‘s four years in Spain shaped long-term developments as 
well. First, the German professor‘s friendship with the older generation of 
neoclassical economists (Perpina i Grau, Zumalacarregui, Olariaga) contributed to 
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 Julio Segura (2001: 390-392) and Juan Velarde (1989: 105-106) identified six major 




the strengthening of this economic school of thought in Spain at a time when 
government policy was dominated by ISI (Velarde 2001: 361-362). Second, he 
lent his professional blessing to a group of six young researchers (Valentin 
Andres Alvarez, Jose Castaneda, Miguel Paredes, Jose Antonio Piera, Alberto 
Ullastres  and Jose Vergara Doncel)  who subsequently became crucial actors in 
consolidating a liberal economic agenda in Spanish universities and economic 
policy institutions. Appointed minister of commerce in 1956, Alberto Ullastres 
became one of the architects of the 1959 stabilization reforms and Spain‘s top 
economic minister for the relations with EEC.
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 During the 1950s and 1960s, 
Valentin Andres Alvarez and Jose Casteneda went on to become the dominant 
figures of Spanish economic theory and microeconomics respectively. They were 
both deans of the economics department of Complutense, became members of the 
Royal Academy and internationally visible in their subfields.
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 Castaneda also sat 
on the board of the influential state agency (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas) that regulated and funded scientific research (Villar Saraiilet 2001: 
257).  
In addition to these avenues for shaping the intellectual dynamics in the 
field of Spanish economics, the ―von Stackelberg network‖ economists directly 
impacted the professional training of important policymakers during the Socialist 
years. Alvarez, Castaneda and Vergara Doncel mentored both Luis Anjel Rojo 
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 Ullastres was a minister4 of commerce between 1957 and 1965. Between 1965 and 1976 he 
was the head of the Spanish mission in CE. 
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 The two economists were also among the few Spanish economists of the 1950s who 
participated in international professional debates. Alvarez was the only midcentury Spanish 
economist to have been published in English, which brought him much fame and influence at 
home (Alvarez Coruguedo 2001: 236-237). Similarly, Castaneda‘s reputation among French 




and Enrique Fuentes Quintana, who were also involved in Ullastres‘ 1959 
Stabilization Plan. As head of the Spanish permanent delegation to EEC, Ullastres 
left a lasting impression on Joaquin Almunia, the future Socialist labor minister of 
the first Gonzales government who was stationed as an economist at the 
delegation between 1972 and 1974 (Almunia 2001: 40).  
 
Realpolitik and the Anglo-Saxon Pedigree  
By the second half of the 1960s, English and American economics departments 
reemerged as the main external anchors of the Spanish economics profession. 
This was largely a result of mixed factors: the pre-civil war tradition of studying 
economics in Britain, the institutional entrepreneurialism of the Research Service, 
and the funding opportunities awarded by American overtures towards Franco 




Thus, beginning with 1951, Spain enjoyed a period of international 
opening, first towards the United States, with the signing of the Treaty of Madrid 
(1953), and then towards Western Europe. This was triggered by a geopolitical 
shift in Asia (the rise of Maoist China and the outbreak of the Korean War) and 
by a toughening of the anti-communist campaigns in US domestic politics (Lopez 
2000; Calvo-Gonzales 2007). 
 In exchange for setting up American military bases in Spain, the US 
granted the regime substantial economic aid and began to liberalize student 




on Franco to embrace American ‗embedded liberal‘ economic ideas. When 
Senator J. William Fulbright, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
traveled to the American bases in Spain he was appalled to discover that the 
scenario for the annual joint American-Spanish military maneuvers was ―a 
domestic insurrection in which the American military intervened to save the 
Spanish government.‖ (Calvo-Gonzales 2007: 745). 
During the early 1960s, American grants enabled future central bank 
economists like L.A. Rojo and Pedro Schwartz to pursue graduate studies in 
economics at LSE, where they were mentored by Karl Popper and Lionel Robbins 
respectively, thus renewing the LSE connection of the pre-civil war Spanish 
neoclassical network discussed above. Soon after their return to Spain‘s academic 
and bureaucratic meritocracy, Rojo and Schwartz occupied top positions in the 
economics department of Complutense (FPSE) and in the central bank, where 
they remained for decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, they were both regarded 
as the country‘s most respected names in macroeconomics and economic theory 
respectively, while remaining internationally connected (Almenar 2001). Thus, 
Rojo was Spain‘s representative in the UNDP, the financial committees of G-20 
and the EEC‘s monetary union expert committees. In turn, Schwartz became an 
associate fellow at the University College of London and an active member in the 
Mont Pelerin society. While Rojo and Schwartz studied in Britain at the height of 
Keyenesianism at LSE, the fact that they had liberal mentors enabled them to 
transition rather smoothly during the 1970s from a ―right‖ leaning neoclassical-




In the late 60s and early 1970s, the Spaniards‘ LSE connection to the 
neoclassical economists continued to function. For example, Tomas Esteve, the 
importer of public choice to Spain had taken classes at LSE with neoclassical 
mandarin Harry Johnson. 
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 At the same time, the United States emerged as the 
competing destination for a new generation of Spanish economics graduates. 
Grants offered by the Research Service enabled young economists to study in 
American graduate programs, an opportunity that gave future Socialist Hacienda 
minister Carlos Solchaga one year at MIT. In 1969, Jose Toribio finished his 
Ph.D. at Chicago with Milton Friedman and returned to Spain as a ―hard‖ 
monetarist.
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 He was immediately hired for Rojo‘s Research Service and then for 
Hacienda, before he moved to the research service of Banco Urquijo in the late 
1970s, as a colleague of the same Socialist MEH ―superminister‖ Carlos 
Solchaga. Toribio was credited with the conversion to Chicago School economics 
of Pedro Schwartz and Jose Argandona (Argandona 1972; 1976; 1977; 1985), 
whom reviewers of Spanish economics considered as representatives of the right-
wing of Spanish neoliberalism in the 70s and 80s (Diaz 1983; Argandona 1990).  
Two younger economists, Francisco Cabrillo and Fredric Segura did their 
graduate studies at the University of Southern California, and after their return to 
Spain they divided their time between Complutense, the Research Services of the 
central bank and Banco Urquijo, and Pedro Schwartz‘s libertarian think-tank 
Instituto de Economia de Mercado.  
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 For Johnson‘s influence in Esteve‘s work on monetary policy see Esteve  Serrano (1968; 1980).   
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 For Toribio‘s monetarism see Toribio (1975).  Toribio was research director at several banks 





The same period of time is associated with a new phenomenon: the 
growing international prestige of Spanish economists who were now recruited by 
top American and British economics departments but remained relatively 
involved with debates in Spanish economics. Thus, by the late 1970s Andreu 
Mas-Collell, Rojo‘s teaching assistant at Complutense, was a full professor of 
microeconomics at Berkley and then at Harvard, where he authored the most 
successful microeconomics textbook in American economics departments during 
the 1980s. But during the early 1980s, rather than stay completely immersed in 
American economics, Mas-Collell intervened in Spanish economics reviews (Mas 
Colell 1983; 1985) and had a joint appointment in Barcelona‘s Pompeu Fabra 
University.
 
In 1986 LSE gave Oxford-trained Rafael Repullo a tenured position, 
but after spending one year (1985-1986) teaching at LSE and working as a 
Research Service economist, Rojo‘s former protégé chose the Service. 
During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the 
internationalization of the Spanish economic profession deepened, with a number 
of Spanish economics graduates going to graduate school in elite British and 
American economics departments. Many remained abroad and became global 
academic celebrities, like the Harvard-educated conservative Xavier Salla-i-
Martin. Others returned and took the Rojo network to new heights of 
professionalism. After his graduate studies in economics at Essex and a visiting 
professorship at the University of California - Berkley, Carlos Sebastian, another 





Two of Rojo‘s students, who clothed their master‘s ideas in the latest 
econometric models, returned to Spain with British Ph.D.s to further consolidate 
the epistemic authority of the Research Service. Juan J. Dolado went back and 
forth between graduate studies at LSE, visiting positions at France‘s ecoles and 
the Bank of England, and his job as senior economist at the Service until he 
became Rojo‘s successor at the helm of that institution in 1992. The Oxford-
trained Rafel Repullo was offered tenure at Oxford but eventually was lured back 
to Spain in 1987 by Rojo to establish and head CEMFI, an institute of the 





 Repullo was joined by fellow Oxford Ph.D. and 
(subsequently) Nuffield College and LSE research fellow Manuel Arellano. 
 
Domestic Debates and International Classics 
But Western graduate education was not the sole engine of transnationalization. 
The 1970s also marked the beginning of the direct involvement of neoliberalism‘s 
leading Western advocates into Spanish debates as well as the integration of 
Spanish economists into prestigious international conference and publishing 
networks.  
Thus, Milton Friedman gave talks in Madrid in 1972 and debated 
monetary policy with Richard Musgrave, a Harvard-based Keynesian, in an 
international seminar organized by a local newspaper and attended by top level 
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 Rafael Repullo‘s work from the 1980s takes the classic neoclassical-monetarist syndissertation 
esposed by Rojo in Reullo (1986; 1987a; 1987b; 1988; 1989).   
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bureaucrats of the Franco regime (Friedman and Musgrave 1972).
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 Even before 
the oil crisis wreaked havoc with Western economies, Friedman warned Spanish 
authorities against using increases in the quantity of money for economic 
development purposes and advocated for central bank independence and a robust 
deregulatory reforms of the financial sector. He also lambasted Spain‘s system of 
wage and price controls, suggested that that inflation targeting by the central bank 
was the only guarantee of stable economic growth and made the case for a 
floating regime for the peseta.  
Spanish market fundamentalists also received direct support from 
Friedrich von Hayek, a leading member of the Austrian School of economics. 
Hayek travelled to Spain a few times during the seventies and attended the 
seminar organized by a local libertarian think-tank (Villalonga Foundation), while 
keeping a regular correspondence with its members throughout the 1970s (Huerta 
de Soto 2008: 264; 266). According to Huerta de Soto, Spain‘s best known 
libertarian economist and a member of the seminar, Hayek played a decisive 
influence in shaping the framing tactics of the Spanish libertarian movement by 
insisting that the Villalonga group use Schumpeter‘s dissertation that the roots of 




 century Spanish Jesuit 
scholastics. 
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 Hayek also intervened in local debates by criticizing the programs 
of the UCD governments for their interventionism (Gamir 1980).  
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 The transcripts of the seminar were published in Friedman, M. y Musgrave, R.: Problemas 
económicos actuales. Política monetaria versus política fiscal. Cuestiones españolas. II Semana 
económica internacional organizada por el semanario Mundo. Dopesa, Barcelona, pp. 141-159.  
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During the late 1970s, Western-funded seminars further strengthened the 
positions of Spanish neoclassical economists. The German embassy, in 
collaboration with Germany‘s Ebert and Adenauer Stiftungen, put together several 
seminars on the implementation of ―social market economy‖ in Spain, which 
brought German and Spanish academic economists together.  
For example, a 1979 conference brought to Spain German economists 
from the Universities of Nurnberg, Marburg, Wurtzburg and representatives of the 
federal government. In these seminars, the SME was defined in the Muller-
Armack tradition as ―free markets with social compensation‖ opposed to laissez-
faire economics, to monetarism-prohibition of cartels, the monitoring of 
companies with large economic power, anti-competition practices, eliminating 
barriers to entry, monetary stability and central bank independence. Franco-
Spanish economics conventions sent similar messages. Conservative French 
readings of the 1977 OECD supply-side diagnosis of high unemployment, which 
argued that unemployment was rooted primarily in labor legislation and the 
political veto power of the unions, loomed large in a 1978 Franco-Spanish 
convention of labor economists and sociologists. Soon afterwards, the 
interventions of the French academics endorsing this argument were picked up in 
Spanish economics studies (Garcia de Blas 1989: 7-14). 
The transnationalization of the profession was consolidated in other ways 
as well. In 1981 Spain hosted a convention of Spanish-speaking economists, 
while in 1983 it hosted the seventh world convention of the International 




from the widest possible spectrum of economists, from monetarists (Milton 
Friedman) to Soviet economics (Bogolomov).
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 Such opportunities provided 
Spanish economists with ample opportunities to clarify their intellectual identity, 
which in the climate of the early 1980s generally meant consolidating neoliberal 
positions and attacking heterodoxies (whether libertarian or structuralist) and old 
neoclassical-Keynesian orthodoxy. 
Yet this was not the case of the research trips to British universities 
organized by Quintana‘s Institute of Fiscal Studies. These trips arguably 
contributed to the strengthening of a Keynesian approach to taxation identified in 
the previous chapter. The Institute‘s advocacy of a neoliberal cause (financial 
liberalization) in tandem with a Keynesian one (the expansion of the tax capacity 
of the state to meet the needs of public investment and redistribution) began in 
1970, with the appointment of Enrique Fuentes Quintana as director of the 
institute.  
Like Rubio and Rojo, from the beginning of his tenure at the institute he 
prioritized the consolidation of its epistemic base through the hiring of a large 
number of young economists and the development of communication campaigns 
meant to widely publicize the research of the institute. Through its flagship 
journal (Hacienda Publica Espanola), the institute embarked on popularizing the 
taxation ideas at the basis of continental and British taxation systems. This was 
achieved through special issues of the journal on various aspects of taxation in 
which cross-country comparisons abounded, often via country monographs or 
collections of tax policy documents from Western Europe and North America. 
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The institute also published national monographs on various tax systems in the 
form of portable-size books and sponsored translations of several West European 
taxation textbooks. 
Beginning in the 1970s at the initiative of ―revolving door‖ economists 
Rojo and Fuentes Quintana, the Research Service of the central bank and 
Hacienda‘s own Institute of Fiscal Studies funded regular forms of consultation 
with British, American and Italian economics departments and fellow technocrats 
(Calvo Lagares 2001).
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 The intellectual references of neoliberalism became 
available to Spanish economists through a systematic effort to translate the 
classics. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, Friedman‘s work was almost 
completely translated
287
  and extensively reviewed. The essential readings of 
classical liberalism and of the Austrian School (Smith, Ricardo, Hayek, Marshall, 
Mises) were translated into Spanish as well, with an important contribution from 
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 In 1971, several senior researchers of the Institute for Fiscal Studies travelled to Britain to seek 
advice on reforming the Spanish tax system via special seminars and interviews with British 
economists active in policy. A similar research visit was organized in Italy in following year, 
although this time the focus was seeking the counsel of Italian tax experts in the ministry of 
finance. Finally, the institute invited a number of Italian and British tax economists to lecture or to 
accept visiting fellowships at the institute. The ideas generated by the transnationalized research 
activities of the Institute during the early 1970s provided the ideas that informed Spanish tax 
reforms for the next three decades. 
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  Milton Friedman―La metodología de la economía positiva‖, Revista de economia politica, 
mayo-diciembre, 1958, pp. 355-397. Friedman‘s key work on monetarism is translated by the 
same ICE : Milton Friedman, ―Oferta de dinero y variaciones de los precios y la producción‖, 
agosto-septiembre, 1966, pp.119-126; ―Discusión de la brecha inflacionista‖, agosto-septiembre, 
1966, pp. 139-141.A  few years later ICE published other articles written by Friedman on 
monetary policy:  El papel de la política monetaria‖, enero, 1969, pp. 99-109; ―Impuestos, dinero 
y estabilización‖, enero, 1969, pp. 111-114.Spanish translations of Friedman‘s books appeared 
throughout this period: 1962. Teoría de los precios, Alianza editorial, Madrid. Un programa de 
estabilidad monetaria y reforma bancaria, Deusto, Bilbao. Otra edición de 1970; 1966. 
Capitalismo y libertad, Rialp, Madrid; 1967. Ensayos sobre economía positiva, Gredos, Madrid; 
1970. El balance de pagos: tipos de cambio libres y tipos fijos, Ateneo, Buenos Aires; 1971. 
Dólares y déficit, Emecé, Buenos Aires1971. La teoría cuantitativa del dinero: una nueva 
exposición. Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, Washington, FMI, BIRD, México; 
1971. El sistema monetario internacional y los derechos especiales de giro (DEG), Bolsa de 
Comercio de Caracas, Caracas; 1973. Una teoría de la función de consumo, Alianza, Madrid; 




the libertarian Villanonga Foundation but also from state publishing houses 
(Almenar 467-468
 
). Friedman‘s monetarist ideas were also covered during the 
early 1970s in Spanish translations of American macroeconomics textbooks 
required in Spanish economics departments (e.g. Mueller 1974, chapter 11). 
Finally, during the 1970s and 80s, American economists based in conservative 




In short, the transnationalization of the profession through graduate 
education benefited Spain‘s turn toward neoliberalism.  By contrast, the 
intellectual adversaries of the neoliberals had a much thinner dossier in this 
regard. The structuralists had no foreign graduate degrees with the exception of 
the academically inactive and politically isolated Oxford-trained Luis Gamir.
289
 
By the early 1980s, the largely French-speaking ―diehard‖ Keynesian camp (A. 
Feranandez Diaz, Emilio de Figueroa, Sanchez Ayuso) could not marshal any 
foreign-trained Ph.D.s in their struggle against the neoliberals. Also, with the 
exception of Sanchez Ayuso‘s continuous correspondence with Nicholas Kaldor, 
the Keynesians‘ alternative forms of professional transnationalization were 
reduced to sporadic academic cooperation with a small group of interdisciplinary 
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 For example, an article in a special issue of Moneda y Credito (no 163/1982) on the economic 
crisis of the early 1980s is authored by Walter E. Hoadley, senior research fellow at The Hoover 
Institution. The article is based on a conference paper given by Hoadley in 1982 at the auditorium 
of Banco Hispano Americano.   
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 Luis Gamir, the minister of commerce between 1980 and 1981 was an Oxford PhD in 
economics who studied with T. Balogh, W.M. Corden and other British Keyensians (Diaz 1983: 
826). Gamir was still a Keynesian in the early 1980s, as evidenced by one of his few academic 
writings published in a small academic review (Gamir 1981). Gamir‘s recent official position in 
the UCD and loyalty to the center-right barred him from influencing the Socialists, while his 





French Keynesians (Diaz 1983: 826-827).
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 In 1982, with the premature passing 
of the consistent Keynesian Sanchez Ayuso
291
 and with Gamir‘s entry in the neo-
conservative Alianza Popular (the ancestor of today‘s Partido Popular), 
Keynesianism disappeared from Spanish academic economics and was upheld 
only by the amateur economists of the labor union movement. 
The transnationalization of the economics profession cannot be assumed 
to be the sole conduit for diffusing neoliberalism in Spain. As the theoretical 
chapter shows, some scholars interested in the diffusion of neoliberalism sought 
to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the ―epistemic communities‖ 
framework and emphasized the role of IOs and conservative think-tanks as 
conduits with different diffusion functions. In my theoretical, I also suggest that 
transgovernmental networks and transnational party networks could serve as 
diffusers of neoliberalism.  We must now investigate the nature of these diffusers 
in greater depth. 
 
The Dogs That Did Not Bark: IOs and Think Tanks 
With the support of Washington, Spain joined the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD in the late 1950s. As a result, the ascendancy of conservative neoclassical 
syndissertation as the dominant form of ‗Keynesianism‘ in late 1950s Spain was 
no longer a strictly domestic affair. This is shown by the prominent role of these 
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 This was the case of Emiliano de Figueoas‘ constant presence in Francois Perroux‘ heterodox 
seminar at the College de France during the late 1970s and A. Fernandez Diaz‘ cooperation with 
the French development economists at Mondes  en development  (Diaz 1983: 825). 
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 As the party was debating its electoral program for the 1982 elections, Ayuso wrote in El Pais 
an endorsement of the swing to the left of the British Labor Party. Manuel Sanchez Ayuso, ―La 
estrategia económica, alternativa de los laboristas británicos‖, El Pais, August 7, 1981. For a more 




organizations - especially of the IMF - in the design of the 1959 Stabilization Plan 
and the consolidation of the position of local economists who upheld that 
conservative interpretation.
292
 Finally, without the 1962 World Bank report on 
Spain, the modernization of the developmentalist turn in the 1960s cannot be 
properly understood (Schwartz and Gonzales 1978: 73; Lieberman 1995).
293
  
Yet after the end of these well-covered international intervention episodes, 
IOs began to shape the boundaries of economic debate in ways that were less 
strong than expected as long-term appointments in the OECD, IMF and World 
Bank mattered less and less. However, the privileged contact with the central 
bank over other institutions and the issuing of regular consultation reports 
following fieldwork missions in Madrid enjoyed more receptivity among Spanish 
economic policy makers.  
Thus, beginning in the late 1950s, Spain began to exert its membership 
rights in these three organizations by stationing representatives in their 
headquarters and some of these representatives would return to occupy prominent 
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The currency crisis of 1957 weakened the ISI economists and already in the same year much of 
the elite of the group of neoclassical synthesizers (Ullastres, Rubio, Sarda, Varela, Quintana, 
Sanpedro) joined the government as ministers or as economists of economic ministries and the 
central bank. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that without the explicit blessing of this group 
by the IMF and the OECD this group would have had the same authority to marginalize the 
influence of ISI economists and shape policy in such direct a manner. For the perspectives of the 
protagonists of the stabilization see Fuentes-Quintana (1984: 25-40), Madronero (1959: 81-85),  
Navarro-Rubio (1976: 173-202), Ullastres (1975: 63-92). 
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 Triggered by a 1962 IBRD report revised by Opus Dei minister Lopez Rodo and inspired by 
French indicative planning (Schwartz and Gonzales 1978: 73), Spain adopted several development 
plans between 1963 and 1973. Although the 1962 IBRD report urged the government to make the 
Spanish economy more market friendly by deregulating the economy, it nevertheless did not 
suggest a ―neoliberal‖ course. Rather, IBRD asked the government to increase the size of the 
public budget relative to GDP and to ―make markets‖ by taking a more coordinated approach to 
industrial development (IBRD 1963). This did not mean a return to ISI industrial policy either. 
While basically all industrial firms had been considered of national interest after 1939, now only 
select sectors and subsectors judged by technocrats to have a pull effect on the rest of the economy 




positions in Spain‘s economic policy institutions. In total, 31 Spanish civil 
servants were posted with the OECD between 1960 and 1982 and most of them 
returned home to join economic policy institutions. The number was around 20 
with the IMF during the same period (Muns 1986: 224-226; 261-266; 433-436). 
However, in quantitative terms, the role of the OECD and the Fund as 
graduate school surrogates for Spanish economists was rather more modest that 
one would expect. First, with the exception of Socialist-era central bank governor 
Mariano Rubio, who spent time in the OECD before he embarked on a 
spectacular career in key policy institutions at home,
294
 no other important 
Spanish policymaker spent any considerable amount of time in IOs. Moreover, 
with the exception of LSE-trained Joaquin Muns, who used his IMF experience to 
help push the economic debate to the right, no other Spanish economist managed 
to hold simultaneous positions in IFIs and use their epistemic authority to 
intervene in Spanish economic debates during the 1980s.
295
 
Finally, between 1964 and 1982, no Spanish economist participated in the 
seminars of the IMF‘s Institute, only 3 Spaniards were part of its training 
programs, and barely 28 Spaniards took the Institute‘s classes, a level that a 
historian of IMF-Spanish relations regarded as rather low (Muns 1986: 225). 
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 Mariano Runio worked as an economist for OECD‘s Southern Europe Division between 1959 
and 1962 at the suggestion of Research Service director Juan Sarda. In Paris, Rubio advanced his 
economics education and upon his return he was hired in an important positions for Hacienda 
(general director for financial policy) and then moved quickly through the ranks of the central 
bank going from deputy general director to governor in a few years (Rivases 1991). 
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 Joaquin Muns, an LSE-trained economist and professor at Facultat Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona, served for the IMF as an economist at the heights of the (neo)Keynesian era (1965-
1968) and then as an executive director during the IMF‘s turn to orthodoxy (1978-1981). Between 
1980 and 1982 Muns had a stint as an executive director in the World Bank. During the early 
1980s Muns wrote frequently in the influential economic review Papeles the Economia Espanola, 
where he advocated for price stability over full employment both as an academic as well as an 




Similarly, although it doubled between 1970 and 1972 (from 6 to 12), the IMF 
staff of Spanish origin in 1982 (14 people) was well below Spain‘s IMF quota, 
and only half of them worked as economists, a situation that IMF staff of Spanish 
origin attributed to the scarcity of US-trained Spanish economists and to the 
Spanish government‘s low level of interest in promoting Spain‘s representatives 
(Muns 1986: 262-263; 265 ft.50). Finally, only 2 economists were selected to 
participate in the IMF‘s 2 year training for young economists, a program that was 
regarded as an antechamber for full employment with the IMF.  
In other respects, the OECD and the IMF fared better in influencing 
Spanish debates. Most importantly, beginning in the 1970s, staff from the OECD 
and the IMF‘s Europe and Research Divisions chose the Research Service of the 
Bank of Spain as the main platform for ―technical cooperation‖ with the Spanish 
authorities. Experts based in the research department of the IMF gave talks in the 
central bank, while other Fund experts organized their seminars in the same 
institution (Acena 2001). OECD reports also routinely cited the central bank and 
remained silent on other sources. These forms of external validation proved 
important for consolidating the prestige of the Service as the country‘s most 
authoritative guardian of economic orthodoxy (Muns 1986).  
In addition to organizational empowerment, international organizations 
used their regular reports to give Spanish governments a clear idea of the 
―international climate of opinion.‖ Without the option of using policy 
conditionality, the IMF began to involve Spanish liberal-minded technocrats in 




the 1970s. At first, given that Spanish technocrats had a more conservative 
definition of the neo-Keynesian mainstream than the IMF did at the time, the 
result was that the IMF reports between 1971 and 1976 advocated for a strong 
reflationary effort.
296
 Reacting against the Spaniard‘s constant concern with 
inflation, the 1971 report went as far as arguing that reflationary measures could 
not be expected to generate inflation; on the contrary, the IMF experts reasoned 
that Spanish inflation had structural causes rather than being caused by high levels 
of public spending and that the structural problems of the Spanish economy could 
be fixed only in a high growth environment that necessitated demand side 
policies. And even after the Spanish economy swung back into high growth mode 
in 1973 (almost 7 percent), the IMF suggested that a slightly expansive monetary 
policy was acceptable, while advising the adoption of tax increases to levels 
required by ―the predictable growth of the needs of the public sector.‖ In the two 
years following the oil shock of October 1973, the IMF persisted in this attitude 
and considered that expansive monetary and fiscal policy was a must and even 
suggested a more expansive fiscal policy should the pre-crisis levels of demand 
not be reestablished. 
 However, after the global shift in IMF‘s position in 1976,
297
 its reports 
evince a marked preference for austerity in the face of disappointing growth. To 
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 Interestingly, even before the oil crisis of 1973, the Fund considered that since monetary policy 
is useless to reactivate the economy, Spain‘s lower growth and increasing levels of unemployment 
had to be dealt with primarily via demand-side fiscal policies. 
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 As a recent study of IMF policy papers shows, during the late 1960s ―a form of ‗monetarism‘ 
was emerging in the counsels of the IMF, which involved not only a focus on monetary 
aggregates, but, perhaps even more importantly, a skepticism about governmental discretion in the 
conduct of economic policy and an enthusiasm for fixed, quantitative targets‖ (Clift and 
Tomlinson 2008: 565).  But it was not until the mid 1970s that the neoliberal turn became evident. 




this end, the Fund began to emphasize that Spain should reorient its policy 
priorities from stimulating domestic demand to stimulating private investments 
and exports. Puzzlingly, while the IMF was loath to suggest austerity during 
comparably less dramatic contractions of the Spanish economy in 1970-1971 and 
even suggested a slightly expansive macroeconomic policy in 1973-1974, when 
Spain had one of the highest growth rates in OECD. 
 This is puzzling since after 1976 the Fund saw the contraction of 
domestic demand as the appropriate tool for dealing with only 1 percent growth in 
1975. . Moreover, after 1976, and especially after the second oil shock in 1979, 
the Fund made inflation, public spending and the deficit the fulcra of its reports 
and began to highlight labor market rigidities as an issue to be addressed by 
supply-side measures. The structural causes of inflation mentioned in the 1971-
1975 reports disappeared from the IMF diagnosis and were replaced with 
arguments that traced inflation to the high levels of public spending on welfare 
and public services. Finally, beginning with the 1981 report, the Fund began to 
make use of the ―crowding out‖ dissertation vis-à-vis public investments and to 
consider that one of the best supply-side measures that the government could 
adopt would be further increases in the interest rates in order to reduce  the supply 
of capital available for investment. 
Overall, the importance of the OECD and the IMF in shaping neoliberal 
developments in Spain was limited to giving external anchors to the institutional 
entrepreneurs from the central bank‘s Research Service and, after 1976, to 
                                                                                                                                     
IMF to embrace select neoliberal ideas such as conditional financing and financial deregulation 




strengthening local opposition to demand-side policies through regular reports on 
Spain. These were not insignificant forms of influence, yet the findings strongly 
suggest that elite socialization through professional appointments in IOs was far 
from being a strong mechanism of diffusion in the case of Spain. 
 
The Quiet Dogs: Think-Tanks 
Think-tanks played an important role in crafting and spreading neoliberal ideas 
from the U.S. to Sweden (Blyth 2002; Hay 1996), but my findings suggest that 
they had a minor impact in the case of Spain‘s turn to neoliberalism.  This section 
argues that this owed to the weak linkages between Spain‘s leading neoliberal 
think-tank to form linkages with the business community. 
The pioneer of Spanish neoliberal civil society was the Valencia-based 
Ignacio de Villalonga Foundation, an organization endowed by a banking family 
in 1957 with the purpose of fighting interventionist economic ideas and the 
advocacy of free-market ideas. 
298
 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, to 
pursue these objectives, this foundation embarked on a systematic work of 
translating the essential contributions of the Austrian School and of German 
Ordoliberalism.  
Moreover, starting in the 1970s, its representatives organized what would 
later become a standard mechanism for spreading libertarian ideas in Eastern 
Europe: informal, yet regular libertarian seminars for influential academic elites 
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 In its founders‘ words, the foundation was to promote ―economic doctrines that depart from the 
principles of the free enterprise, private initiative and free market and to fight the theses advanced 
by proponents of socialist and planning ideas that harm all members of the community‖ (Huerta de 




and young economists. The seminar was attended every Thursday by thirty to 
forty people, some of them very prominent,
299
 and even enjoyed the presence of 
von Hayek a few times during the late 1970s (Pascual y Vicente, 1980). At the 
same time, the participants in these seminars self-consciously defined themselves 
against the macroeconomic ideas of the Rojo network and advocated the more 
radical versions of neoliberalism instead: rational choice expectations, supply-side 
and Austrian School economics, ―unedited‖ monetarism and so on.  
By the early 1980s the Villalonga seminar was no longer a prime site of 
encounter for the elite of Spanish neoliberalism‘s libertarian end.  It had been 
eclipsed by the Institute for the Market Economy (IEM), an organization 
established in 1978 by Pedro Schwartz, one of Villalonga‘s leading seminarians.
 
300
  Schwartz wanted to take ―pure‖ neoliberalism beyond the ―talking shop‖ stage 
and give it a stronger policy orientation. To this end, he invited  prominent liberal 
economists into his circle and attracted a number of young economists to co-
author policy reports and academic materials for IEM.  
Throughout the 1980s, IEM was hardly a site of marginals. Schwartz had 
been a celebrity professor of economic theory at Complutense since 1969 and was 
a sought-after consultant for the research services of the central bank and of INI. 
The IEM‘s executive committee was chaired by Juan Sarda himself and, in 
addition to Schwartz, it included prominent British liberal economist Lord 
Robbins and two Spanish economists who were members of the Royal Academy. 
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 During the 1970s the libertarian economic agenda was buttressed by smaller think-tank 





Then, in 1998, he integrated the think-tank into the University of Madrid. IEM 
provided a public policy critique platform for young American and British-trained 
conservative academic economists, who began attacking government policies 
from a monetarist perspective, in a string of systematic studies generated by IEM-
affiliated researchers (Schwartz 1978; Cabrillio and Segura 1979; Segura 1979).  
The most prominent of IEM‘s studies was ―Money and Economic 
Freedom‖, a book-length monetarist critique of the financial policy of the central 
bank authored by Francisco Cabrillo and Fredric Segura. The book argued for a 
complete liberalization of exchange rates and for freedom of international capital 
movements by deploying the theses of Chicago monetarists like Karl Brunner, 
William Meckling and Milton Friedman.   
Yet during the 1980s IEM failed to be a serious challenger to the 
epistemic authority of the Research Service, largely because neither organized 
Spanish capital, nor external actors saw think-tanks as a platform for advancing 
their policy agenda. Instead, as Socialist ministers Carlos Solchaga and Joaquin 
Almunia testified in their memoirs (Almunia 2001; Solchaga 1997), business 
often opposed neoliberal macroeconomic measures and saw that its most 
important demands (labor market deregulation and wage compression) were 
already suitably, consistently and freely advocated for from within MEH and the 
central bank. And by the time business finally realized after 1994 that the political 
deadlock between labor and the government was slowing the adoption of their 
agenda priorities, rather than the government‘s economic ideas, IEM was already 




suitably, consistently and freely advocated for by the Partido Popular and its 
public policy advocacy foundations. 
While think-tanks played a smaller role in diffusion than expected, the 
understudied transnational party networks proved to have a crucial influence in 
facilitating Spain‘s turn to embedded neoliberalism.  
 
Transnational Party Networks 
The inclusion of PSOE into bilateral partnerships with German social-democrats 
in the mid-1970s made an important contribution to clarifying the economic 
policy identity of the PSOE elite. Through frequent bilateral visits, participation 
in each other‘s party congresses, logistical or expert support and even friendships 
among top party leaders, PSOE soon became the Iberian ―pupil‖ of the SPD. This 
had two main consequences: the definitive elimination of a potent source of leftist 
radicalization, in the form of a French-style socialist-communist alliance; and the 
emergence of West German social market economy, rather than of French 
socialism, as an inspiring model of state-market-society relations. Most 
importantly, because during the late 1970s the SPD had already adopted 
monetarism, albeit not the other markers of neoliberalism, the PSOE elite began 
to define ―modern social-democracy‖ as the German blend of balanced budgets, 
strong central bank and a welfare state. As a result, France‘s reflation from 1981 
was never expected to succeed among the economic policy team of the Socialists.  
There were both contingent and structural reasons for the formation of the 




War and the internal politics of the Socialist International played a considerable 
role in giving the ideologically moderate German social-democrats greater 
influence than the radical French Socialists (Pilar-Atunyo 2005). Following the 
October 1973 oil shock, the US and West Germany became acutely concerned 
that the succession problem of the ailing Franco regime, the threats to political 
stability posed by Basque terrorism and the social unrest caused by 
unemployment and decreasing consumptions could strengthen the hand of the 
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) relative to other leftist Socialist organizations.
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Given the high political investment of continental and Nordic social-democratic 
parties and labor unions in the anti-communist agenda of the Cold War, parties 
like the SPD had strong incentives to preempt a strong communist-dominated left 
in Southern Europe. 
This dynamic was strengthened by the internal politics of the Socialist 
International, where the French-backed idea that center-left parties should 
establish alliances with communist parties was being taken seriously by many 
socialist parties in Europe at the time (Atunyo 2005). This internal rift in the 
International was magnified by the strength of communist parties in Iberia and 
Greece, whose ailing authoritarian regimes were most actively combated by 
communists, and where weak socialist or social-democratic organizations were 
expected to be tempted to form alliances with the communists. Moreover, since 
the end of the civil war, France rather than central or Northern Europe had been 
PSOE‘s main base of external operations, French was the preferred foreign 
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 The possibility that PCE could emerge as the strongest challenger to the establishment was real, 
as suggested by PCE‘s control over the labor union Comissiones Obreras, the most active force of 




language of Socialist elites, and Gonzales himself had been elected as party 
president at a PSOE congress organized in the French town of Suresnes with the 
help of the French Socialist Party.  
Yet in the end it was German social-democrats rather than the French 
Socialists who came to exert the most influence over PSOE. There were several 
reasons for this outcome. First, the SPD was better endowed to affect the 
orientation of PSOE, because it was the richest party in the SI. Its party 
foundation (Ebert Stiftung) had decades of experience with transnational party 
assistance, and while the French Socialists came to power only in 1981, the SPD 
had been in Government until 1981, which gave the SPD the benefit of using the 
West German embassy contacts and other government privileges to intervene 
inside Spain. The SPD was the only member of the Socialist International that 
channeled resources towards PSOE before the end of Franquism and that had real 
expertise on the situation of the opposition inside Spain.  
Following the softening of SPD towards the Franco regime after its 1959 
Bad Godesberg convention (Sanz Diaz 2005), Ebert began to make contact in 
Madrid with PSI, a socialist party led by the German-educated anti-Franco 
socialist academic Tierno Galvan and his underground socialist party (PSI). In 
1965, the SPD vice-chairman visited Madrid seeking to show support to the more 
moderate young socialist leaders (Sanchez 2007: 260), a move that was motivated 
by reserve towards the ideological radicalism of the PSOE leadership and which 




a transnational SPD strategy to extend its ideological orthodoxy to the struggling 
Spanish center-left (Sanchez 2005: 209).   
The 1965 operation was carried out covertly through the Ebert 
Foundation, an instrument of the foreign policy of West Germany in the Third 
World during the Cold War, which was deployed by the SPD whenever 
traditional diplomatic channels of influence would not be available. Ebert worked 
closely with the local German embassy and had specialized staff and sufficient 
funds for working with the opposition in authoritarian countries. Between 1966 
and 1975, Ebert used SPD funds for the socio-political formation of a Spanish 
socialist cadre and to promote a German version of social-democracy to Galvan‘s 
party. To this end, Ebert overcame its skepticism of PSI and organized several 
conferences bringing together SPD and Spanish socialist activists, and enlisted the 
services of the PSI for selecting 159 Spanish students to study in West Germany 
on Ebert fellowships.  
At first, the SPD investment in the moderate figures of PSI against the 
PSOE‘s ideologically radical leadership did not pay off, largely due to the fact 
that the fieldwork of Ebert specialists in Madrid revealed that Galvan-led ―young 
Turks‖‘ lacked adequate organizational skills and had poor knowledge of the 
constraints on the possibilities for political opposition in Spain. When PSOE‘s 
chairman Rodolfo Lopis rejected the entreaties of Ebert to use SPD funds for 
cadre training with the argument that Ebert was funded by the CIA, the SPD 




SPD‘s unique experience in forming transnational party contacts with the 
Spanish center-left enabled it to play a decisive role in averting a socialist-
communist front in Spain and, in the long run, it laid the basis for normalizing 
PSOE‘s economic agenda. SPD overcame its skepticism that the ideologically 
more radical yet only superficially Marxist PSOE
302
 had the potential to replicate 
German social-democracy following the perceived danger of a Eurocommunist 
Portugal in 1975 and the PSI‘s decision to openly cooperate with the Spanish 
Communist Party at the same time. This convinced the SPD that PSOE‘s Felipe 
Gonzales team was a preferable alternative because, by this time, Gonzales was 
adamantly opposed to a political front with the communists, a choice he framed 
rather strategically and dramatically as conducive to a repeat of the Spanish Civil 
War (Ortuno-Anaya 2005: 204-205).
303
 
In its endorsement of the sevillanos, the SPD turned a blind eye to their 
recent past. According to Pablo Castellano, former member of the PSOE 
executive in the mid 1970s, the Gonzales-Guerra team was initially gripped my 
―messianic radicalism‖ (Maranon 1996: 233) and searched a relationship with the 
Socialist International and the SPD not because they were more ideologically 
centrist than the sector historic, but out of calculus:  
 
[Gonzales and Guerra] regarded Redondo, Mugica and me as social-
democrats willing to surrender the party to the influence of Willy Brandt. 
                                                 
302
 According to PSOE historian Juan Marichal, PSOE never had a Marxist ideology per se. 
Interview with Marichal in Maranon (1996: 30-42). 
303
 Gonzales‘ argument was that the post-Franquist government would feel threatened by a unified 
opposition and organize a backlash against democratization, an outcome Gonzales associated with 




They scorned membership in the Socialist International […] But it was 
then (in 1974) that they realized that the Socialist International was a 
fundamental piece of the political transition. They began to value the 
Socialist International in a purely instrumental way, as an umbrella. They 
spoke with sheer scorn about both Francois Mitterrand and Willy Brandt. 
They saw them as moderates and pro-American. (Maranon 1996: 233). 
 
What mattered for the SPD, it seems, was the organizational strength of 
the PSOE outside of Madrid. Ebert fieldwork conducted in 1975 had revealed 
that, by contrast with the largely Madrid-based PSI, PSOE had a real (albeit 
sparse) organizational basis throughout Spain and had the potential to get more 
than 25 percent of the vote. As a result, the SPD decided to throw its full weight 
behind PSOE. To this end, it opened an official Ebert office in Madrid led by its 
experienced Mexico director Dieter Koniecki and pushed the Socialist 
International (then chaired by Willy Brandt) to regard the executive team of 
Felipe Gonzales as the legitimate representatives of socialism in Spain.  
At the cost of 15 million DM over the 1975-1980 period, the SPD then 
tasked Ebert with the direct financing and training of PSOE cadre (Konicki 1986). 
SPD chairman Willy Brandt became Gonzales‘ mentor and invited the young 
Spanish party leader to the Mannheim convention of the SPD in late 1975, a 
moment that was tantamount to launching Gonzales internationally and to a 
mentor-pupil relationship between Brandt and Gonzales (Ortuno Anaya 2005: 




of the European Commission in Brussels, welcomed into the European Parliament 
and asked to give interviews to European newspapers. Also, like Ebert Stiftung, 
the SPD-affiliated union IG Metall became intensely involved with the PSOE 
affiliated labor union UGT. Its funds and technical assistance helped the UGT 
resist the entreaties of much stronger Comissiones to form a labor union alliance. 
The most important result of this personalized new partnership was that 
the ―French‖ scenario of a communist-socialist front in Spain was preempted as 
long as the Gonzales team besieged by the Madrid PSOE faction—then open to a 
socialist-communist alliance—was able to control the party. To this end, the SPD 
was ready to tolerate the fact that, in the 1977 elections, with an economic 
program that was in many regards to the left of the communists.  
Indeed, the Germans‘ antipathy towards the communists was so deep that, 
when Brandt visited Madrid in December 1976 to attend the PSOE convention, he 
advised PSOE leaders to take part in the first elections regardless of whether PCE 
would be legalized or not (Whitehead 1992: 304).
304
 This intervention had 
enduring effects, because PSOE maintained its distance from the communists 
even after the Cold War ended.
305
 Following German advice, they also went as far 
as abandoning their formerly fierce opposition to Spain‘s NATO membership, 
then a litmus test of broader ideological positioning (Rodrogo and Torreblanca 
2001; Kneuer 2007). 
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 When the Socialists lost its parliamentary majority in 1993, it sought the support of center-right 
Catalan party Convergencia i Unio, rather than of the now more ideologically mainstreamed 




But the SPD-PSOE partnership also gave PSOE a concrete template of 
social-democracy with Modelldeutchland characteristics. Besides the fact that 
Germany emerged as an inspiring model during the late 1970s for many other 
European countries, in addition to Spain, owing to its success in avoiding 
stagflation (McNamara 1998), Spain‘s Ebert Foundation worked hard to give the 
German model a more concrete face.  
In what amounted to a classic case of transnational advocacy, Ebert helped 
the establishment of a PSOE political foundation (Fundacion Pablo Iglesias) to 
serve as a platform for its organization of more than 2000 seminars and 
symposia
306
 and published various studies meant to demonstrate the virtues of 
combining fiscal rectitude, central bank independence, corporatist industrial 
relations, progressive labor regulations and a robust welfare state.
 307
  
To this end, Ebert organized 12 international conventions of constitutional 
law professors that advised the Spanish Constitutional convention in 1977, thus 
enabling the adoption of German constitutional institutions in Spain.
308
 Ebert also 
paid for the conferences of economics professors from various German 
universities as well as of middle and high-level German government bureaucrats. 
In 1978 it went so far as to bring unions and employer organizations together 
from both countries (Documentos Ebert 1978; Koniecki 2007). In its advocacy for 
                                                 
306
 ―Fundacion Ebert: 30 anos an Espana,‖ (2006), on file with the author. These aspects are 
addressed at large by Dieter Koniecki himself in ―Ein Erfolgeicher Politischer 
Demokratisierunkprozess‖, paper presented at the joint conference on democratization in Southern 
Europe by Ebert and Korea Democracy Foundation, Seoul, June 18, 2007. 
307 “Nueve años como 'hombre de la Ebert' en España”, El Pais, 17 January 1985.  
308




German-style social market economy, Ebert was aided by the German Embassy 
and joined by its rival, CDU‘s Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Echevarria 1980).   
 
Conclusions 
So far this study showed that by themselves, the crises of the 1970s, the political 
turmoil that followed the death of Franco and external reactions to the stagflation 
crisis of the 1970s did not contain a clear prognosis as to what was to be done. 
Given the systemic uncertainty generated by these events, policymakers had no 
recourse to calculable risk technologies. Instead, it was only through a coherent 
set of ideas that they could provide a certain diagnosis of the economy and reject 
alternative courses of action. The ideas espoused in Spain under Socialist rule 
drew heavily on the innovations of the neoliberal (counter)revolution in 
economics. These ideas were constructed within transnational social networks and 
diffused within specific social and national structures. 
This chapter fills in a gap on the Spanish transition to neoliberalism by 
showing that its neglect of the external dimension of this transition provides us 
with an incomplete story. Specifically, this literature does not tell us where 
neoliberal ideas came from in the first place and how these ideas in particular 
came to dominate the debate in the centers of the economic policy process. Where 
existing scholarship merely tells us that there was a ―Rojo network‖ that came to 
control economic policy, I provide an analysis of how the network was formed, 
why it was significant given a certain domestic and external institutional context, 




how the influence of this elite group was magnified by both contingent 
developments and structural factors. 
 I also show how both the institutional legacy of the Franco regime and the 
selective empowerment strategies of international organizations strengthened the 
advocates of embedded neoliberalism in significant ways. In sum, while domestic 
institutions played a part, we cannot get an adequate picture of the emergence of 
Spanish neoliberalism without looking at the intersection between domestic and 
external agents of diffusion and the resulting translation of neoliberal ideas.  
The findings presented in this chapter have a broader value than telling the 
untold stories of the Spanish economic transition. They speak to existing theories 
on translation of neoliberalism. First, the chapter provides existing literature with 
a specification of the conditions under which foreign-trained economists can 
actually influence policy: a government centralized around a coherent policy team 
acting in synergy with the central bank, a highly centralized ruling party with a 
solid majority and a dynamic revolving door between academic departments and 
economic policy institutions.  
Second, the evidence confirms that that the formation of an intellectually 
homogenous policymaking team dominated by like-minded economists 
occupying key bureaucratic positions is important because, in the absence of 
competing ideas invested with epistemic legitimacy, the chief of government 
could have received consistent advice about which options were ―correct‖ and 
thus he was better positioned to resist various political constraints (labor union 




Third, this study challenges the focus of the current scholarship on 
economists and international organizations. Because the SPD-PSOE relationship 
proved to be crucial for facilitating PSOE‘s move towards its own brand of 
embedded neoliberalism inspired by Germany‘s ―social market‖ model, I hereby 
plead for the inclusion of such networks in future studies on the translation of 
neoliberalism. 
Fourth, in the light of the expectations formulated in the theory chapter 
about ―who diffuses‖, it was surprising to find weak evidence for a significant 
role of think-tanks, transbureaucratic networks, and other suspected forms of 
diffusion agency.  
Fifth, as expected, the role of IOs as ―surrogate graduate schools‖ for 
national policy elites was found to be weak, although their selective 
empowerment of neoliberal arguments and institutions was important.  
Finally, the evidence shows that one can find the main external anchor for 
the Spanish academic profession at the time of the transition to neoliberalism in 
Britain rather than in the United States. This is a finding that should challenge 







Chapter VII - The Romanian Economy before the Neoliberal Moment 
 
 
I. The Puzzle of Romanian Neoliberalism 
The embrace of neoliberal reforms by the successors of the Romanian Communist 
Party is one of the most intriguing transformations of European political economy 
given Romania‘s extreme history of neo-Stalinist development, even by Eastern 
Bloc standards. Like Spain, pre-communist Romania had a long history of neo-
mercantile economic development marked by high levels of state intervention. 
And like in Spain, in Romania in-depth neoliberal reforms were carried out by 
left-leaning governments with a nominal social-democratic ideology. Unlike in 
Spain, however, the transition to neoliberalism was more contested, took much 
longer and eventually institutionalized a neoliberal development model that is one 
of Eastern Europe‘s least socially egalitarian. 
 
The endpoint: Romania‟s “disembedded neoliberalism” 
In addition to acquiring the generic markers of neoliberalism (low inflation, low 
budget deficits, FDI promotion, etc),
309
 Romania mostly radicalized the neoliberal 
agenda to the right on tax, welfare and investment incentives and challenged it 
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from the left only on labor market regulation. A recent comparative study of 
former communist states argued that far from being the ―neo-communist‖ country 
of the 1990s, by the mid 2000s Romania ―out-liberalized‖ the EU core in many 
regards and joined the Baltic countries in the category of ―radical‖ reformers, 
while the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary ―stagnated‖ as moderate 
reformers (O‘Dwyer and Kovalcik 2007). The Western part of the Eastern bloc 
seems now split between countries where the neoliberal project has been 
radicalized, or ―pulled out‖ from society via a right-libertarian economic agenda, 
and a zone where a more socially-embedded neoliberal economic regime reigns.  
Thus, by the mid 2005s Romania became a supply-side tax territory. 
When the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) left office in 2005, Romanian 
neoliberalism was heading towards ―market fundamentalism.‖ First, tax 
institutions were highly regressive and pro-cyclical: a flat and high VAT, 
Europe‘s lowest dividend tax (5%) and capital gains tax (1%), negligible levels of 
taxation for the self-employed and small firms (3%), years of tax breaks for large 
foreign investments, regressive property taxes and non-taxation of profits made 
from real estate transactions. The PSD‘s tax cuts operated between 2000 and 2004 
were the boldest for the entire 1990-2010 period
310
 and it was the PSD reformists 
rather than the center-right political parties that first advocated for a ―flat tax‖ in 
the first place. 
311
By the end of the 2000s, it became clear that these policies 
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worked not only against building a more just economic system, but also against 
the neoliberal commitment to balance budgets
312
 and keep FDI inflows coming 
(Socol et al 2007; 2009).
313
  
By contrast with the generosity of the tax system towards the 
economically better-off, Romanian neoliberalism was not compensated by a 
strengthening welfare state (Deacon 2000; Sotiropoulos et al 2003; Fenger 2007; 
ICCV 2010).
314
 Throughout the 1990s and into the mid 2000s, levels of spending 
on health, education and welfare remained the lowest not just in the EU, but also 
relative to the ex-communist states that joined the EU between 2004 and 2007. 
Romania resembles the Baltic countries in that total social spending was at half 
the EU-27 average and the same held for social welfare spending (Eurostat 2009). 
With the exception of pension budgets and going against the egalitarian social 
values of the electorate,
315
 between 1991 and 2009 all ex-communist governments 
either froze or cut spending on health, education and unemployment benefits 
(ICCV 2010). Such policies made possible the increase of the social inequality 
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 It is suggestive that the IMF had been against the flat tax as early as 2003, as it found no 
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 Since the public sector invested too little in infrastructure, by the end of the 2000s large foreign 
investors became skeptical about Romania due to the high costs of transportation on Romania‘s 
outdated roads. For example, in 2008 Mercedes chose high-tax Hungary for a large investment 
despite the entreaties of the Romanian government. The maintenance of the Romanian railway 
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 Fenger (2007: 25) classified Romania alongside with Georgia and Moldova in the category of 
―developing‖ welfare states, a term reserved for extremely liberal welfare systems. 
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 Although the Romanian public was as supportive of welfare values as West European publics 




(Gini) coefficient to Europe‘s highest level in less than a decade (Zamfir 2001; 
Tesliuc et al 2003; ICCV 2010).
316
  
Finally, FDI incentives in Romania are among the most generous in 
Europe and FDI promotion became a substitute for industrial policy. Based on the 
idea that state management or domestic private capital was unable to build 
globally competitive and high-employment firms,
317
 the PSD government set the 
privatization rules such that foreign investors would be privileged.
318
 Legislation 
adopted by the PSD government gave foreign investors such privileges as the 
right to carrying forward their losses for 5 years from the taxable profit exemption 
from payment of custom duties for equipment and prodded municipal authorities 
to exonerate them from the payment of local property taxes.
319
 A special 
government agency gave large foreign investors both free consulting and direct 
access to the cabinet.
320
 According to his adviser, the premier intervened 
personally whenever the executives of multinationals voiced complaints.
321
 In the 
context of Romania‘s imminent EU membership, this strategy worked. Between 
2001 and 2005 Romania attracted more FDI than Poland and the Czech Republic, 
three times more FDI than Greece and was overtaken in the region only by 
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 The job creation record of the FDI remained low, however. In 2005 all new foreign investment 
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 The most relevant statutes for FDI promotion were Law no 332 of 2001 and the Fiscal Code of 
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Turkey, with the sharpest spike being recorded between 2002 and 2004.
322
 In 
2005 the world automotive industry invested more in Romania than in Germany 
and Spain (Larive 2006). 
 The PSD appeared to endorse more interventionist institutions only in one 
respect: hire-and fire regulations. Thus, according to the World Bank‘s Doing 
Business Report (2005), in Romania hire-and-fire regulations and union rights 
were among the most pro-worker in the world (far ahead of Sweden, Germany 
and France) (see also Trif 2004; 2008; Ghebrea 2005; Kotzeva and Pauna 2006). 
Yet this ―workerist‖ victory was hardly the result of social-democratic activism in 
the government and the ruling party.  The code was written by labor union 
experts, employers had no expertise to counter the ―European standards‖ used to 
sell it and the minister of labor happened to be the only labor union activist to 
have a post in the executive. Neither the PSD nor the rest of the executive were 
particularly interested in this code.
323
 Indeed, following the furore over the labor 
code stirred by the more technically sophisticated foreign investors (then barred 
from tripartite negotiations), the government backtracked and was open to almost 
all modifications demanded by them. 
This is more than a Romanian story. The Romanian translation of 
neoliberalism shares the same right-libertarian tendencies as the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria and Serbia with regard to taxation welfare, and investment incentives 
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(Eurostat 2010; Larive 2005). Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries spent 
much less on social services than other postcommunist states like Hungary, the 
Czech Republic or Slovenia, where a more righted marketisation-plus-social 
protection (Polanyian) balance made social budgets came closer to and even 
outstripped those of wealthier countries like Spain. As a result of cushioning 
neoliberal policies with more redistributive institutions, Slovenia and Slovakia 
have lower poverty rates than Sweden, and the Czech Republic and Hungary have 
lower poverty rates than such symbols of social-democracy as Norway or Finland 
(Eurostat 2010; Greskovits and Bohle 2007).
324
 At the same time, labor 
regulations bring Romania closer to the neo-corporatist Slovenia (Buchen and 
Wiesbaden 2005; Ciuca et al 2008; 2009; Gebel 2008).  
 
The Weaknesses of Orthodox Accounts 
How did this more socially disembedded variety of neoliberalism come to 
Romania? Why did left (ex-communist) governments
325
 in this country take 
almost a decade to adopt its institutions? Why were alternative economic policy 
paths not taken? What explains the ex-communists‘ half-hearted embrace of 
neoliberalism between 1990 and 1992, their resistance to it between 1992 and 
1996 and of their full-fledged, albeit somewhat ―edited‖ transposition of 
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neoliberal orthodoxy between 2000 and 2004. Political scientists who discussed 
these three political episodes have provided several incidental explanatory 
frameworks based around two core factors: institutions and economic structures. 
 
Institutionalism 
For some scholars the observed variation in the economic reform profiles of the 
ex-communists should be sought in the institutional cohesion of reform 
governments. Thus, Grigore Pop-Eleches attributes the failure of the neoliberal 
macrostabilization of the Roman government to the clashes occurring within the 
ex-communist party between the ―reformist‖ camp around Roman himself and the 
―leftist‖  group loyal to president Iliescu (Pop-Eleches 2009: 219-220).
326
 Once 
the ex-communist party split and the leftists won the 1992 elections, the eclectic 
policies of the Vacaroiu government (1992-1996) are then explained by virtue of 
them being a minority government whose reformist agenda was ―edited‖ by the 
populist demands made by its left-leaning parliamentary allies (Greater Romania 
Party or PRM, Romanian Workers‘ Party or PSM and the Party of Romanian 
National Unity or PUNR) and by the electorate (Pop-Eleches 1999; 2009: 221; 
225-226).  
 This is a powerful account that survives a crucial case: the failure of a 
Romanian center-right government to carry out its ―shock-therapy‖ agenda 
between 1996 and 2000. In the next chapter this study uses Pop-Eleches‘ insights 
to propose several observable implications of the hypodissertation that the 
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institutions of the policy process matter. Yet I go beyond Pop-Eleches‘ work by 
providing an account of why the neoliberal agenda failed even when the ruling 
coalition was not fragmented, as it was the case of the 1992-1996 government. 
Secondly, Pop-Eleches does not tell us why Romanian governments had 
heterodox and neoliberal policy agendas in the first place. Finally, his argument 
that the coalition partners of the 1992-1996 government were leftist and exacted 
an interventionist price for their parliamentary support for the government is 
overstated. Although these parties shared an economically statist ideology 
(Tismaneanu 2003: 271-273), the agenda of the politically stronger PRM and 






For the materialist tradition in political science the turn to neoliberalism is the 
result of shifts in the interests of domestic capitalists (Chibber 2003; 2003). Taken 
to the postcommunist context this explanation is particularly difficult to translate 
because here, where there were no capitalists to speak of, the impetus for 
neoliberal reforms came from within the state. As Eyal and Szelenyi re minded 
us, during the 1990s Eastern Europe experienced ―making capitalism without 
capitalists‖ (Eyal and Szelenyi 1998). Even more bluntly, Gil Eyal noted that  
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[h]ad private proprietors played a major role in the transition to capitalism, 
this sense of moral duty would have been immediately intelligible in terms of 
their material interests, and easily dismissed as ideology. In the absence of a 
capitalist class, however, it is not self- evident why the bearers of such ideology 
have appointed themselves as the ``footmen,'' holding the door open for a class 
that is yet to arrive; and in particular, why such advocacy has taken the form of a 
calling (Eyal 2000: 49).  
 
Yet once most of the socialist economy was privatized, it became possible 
to consider the role of domestic capitalists in advancing a neoliberal agenda, a 
task of particular relevance in countries like Romania, where the neoliberal 
agenda had not been so vigorously pursued.  
Catalin Augustin Stoica‘s work on the postcommunist business elite and 
Tom Gallagher‘s historical excursus on the years in office during the early 2000s 
provide such materialist explanations (Stoica 2004; Gallagher 2005). For these 
scholars, the agenda of business elites with socio-economic anchors in the 
Stalinist past can be deduced from their structural positions in the postcommunist 
economy. Catalin Augustin Stoica (2004) suggests that former RCP cadres who 
were widely represented in the communist successor parties needed to buy time to 
convert their political capital, organizational experience and managerial skills into 
economic capital, and, therefore, had no interest in an early and radical break with 
the past. Once a critical mass of such capital was amassed, one can expect them to 




But if Stoica does not draw an explicit causal link between the economic 
interests of the ex-communist elite and economic policy, Tom Gallagher does. 
According to the latter, the adoption of neoliberal reforms during the early 2000s 
was the result of an alignment of the interests of domestic capitalists and state 
managers. Since the ex-communists (PSD) were overall a cohesive political party 
between 2000 and 2004, this domestic oligarchy had its way and Romania saw 
neoliberal reforms precisely under the political party that had been historically 
most opposed to market capitalism and had made political fortunes from a left-
populist agenda. 
More specifically, the PSD state managers entered office as political 
representatives of a cohesive and tight-knit class of large business owners with 
cadre pasts and whose wealth was made possible by the rigged transfer of public 
assets into private hands using the state‘s own information and financial 
resources. This class calculated that the rent-seeking benefits awarded to them by 
Romania‘s EU integration were greater than the costs that EU-mandated 
neoliberal reforms imposed on their strategic class interests: corporate power 
unchecked by EU environmental and labor standards. What about their growth 
under state patronage? There was no loss here, Gallagher argues. PSD patrons 
were very good at hiding those EU-banned linkages with captured state 
institutions from naïve eurocrats.  
Why did business think that EU membership rewards were worth the bet? 
Gallagher argues that the domestic oligarchy wanted to entrench its networks of 




accessing even higher rent opportunities while ensuring that its non-competitive 
relationships with the state would remain. To trick the EU into accepting Romania 
as a member state, the PSD-oligarchy coalition gave lucrative infrastructure 
projects and sold premium state factories and banks to West European 
corporations who happened to be major political donors in key EU member states. 
Since this powerful oligarchy controlled the political game and the PSD 
maintained a monopolistic approach to political and administrative power, the 
result was a form of crony ―political capitalism.‖   
Tom Gallagher provides an instructive and rich account of how close the 
PSD leadership was to business elites yet his account has several weaknesses. 
First, it is not clear that the preferences of this interest group were consistent with 
the Brussels Consensus. Immediately after the PSD lost the 2004 elections, 
leading business executives in the politically powerful textile and food industries, 
known for their proximity to the PSD, lambasted the potentially devastating 
effects that EU environmental regulations were bound to have on their chances of 
survival. As leading PSD sponsor Dinu Patriciu, a billionaire and owner of an 
international player in oil processing (Rompetrol) company flatly declared that 
 
EU integration costs money, it does not bring money. It‘s not 
Santa. We [Romanians] should adopt the American model to 
be competitive in Europe rather than ape [European] legislation 
for the sake of an [EU] checklist.
328
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Second, if interest group preferences are mediated by institutions acting as 
―brokers‖ that aggregate conflicting interests into coalitions that then project their 
interests into policy outcomes, as some materialists suggest (Gourevitch 1985; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1995), one wonders what, say, the central bank or the 
Finance Ministry had to say about the agenda of the businessmen who ―captured‖ 
the ruling party. Unfortunately, such aspects are not systematically addressed in 
Gallagher‘s account. 
Finally, it is not entirely clear how this explanation would travel back in 
time to the early 1990s, when no previous episodes of transition from socialism to 
capitalism were available to enable interest groups to ―read‖ what their structural 
positions told them and, consequently, what their interests were. This was a 
period when some state managers seemed comfortable staying state managers, 
rather than going private, while others acted as predatory capitalists bent on 
looting the best resources of the state firms they once managed. Predatory 
businessmen with resources drawn from the complicated networks of the socialist 
economy played neo-patrimonial games with the state not only during the 2000s, 
but also during the mid 1990s. If all these facts are accurate, then what was new 
about the predatory capitalist class of the 2000s that made it so homogenous and 
so clear-minded about its preferences? Could a standard interest-group 
explanation focusing on formal organizations (capital, labor) do a better job?  
The limitations of this approach have been critically assessed in the theory 




would provide an inconclusive account at best. Thus, Romania had a much more 
robust labor union mobilization during the early 1990s relative to other states in 
the region could suggest that even if the 1992-1996 government was committed to 
a neoliberal reform package, union pressure would have killed it. Yet labor unions 
were not a homogenous interest group opposed to market reforms. This was a 
period when some labor unions bitterly opposed privatization and FDI while 
others strongly supported the economic agenda of center-right parties. One of 
them (Cartel Alfa) was actually a proponent of ―trickled down‖ economics and an 
ardent supporter of privatization with foreign investors.
329
 
 Moreover, labor mobilization was not strong enough to deter the 
government from carrying out painful price liberalizations, firm liquidations, and 
disinvestment in social welfare. And when pro-worker hire-and-fire regulations 
were adopted in 2003, it was not as a result of labor struggle but of the superior 
expertise of labor union experts. As a World Bank resident economist familiar 
with the negotiations for the 2003 labor code put it: 
 
We watched with disbelief how the union experts in labor 
legislation basically dictated the code to the Ministry of Labor 
as employer organizations sat idly by. In Romania it‘s the 
opposite of Western [policy] contexts. Here labor expertise is 
superior to employers‘. It‘s incredible! […] I guess it‘s because 
labor unions benefited from years of training at the expense of 
their Western colleagues, whereas business was too fragmented 
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and really not taking the technicalities of labor market 





If domestic business was so weak on expertise when it faced such direct 
and immediate threats, then how can one expect it to perform as a more 
competent and united interest with regard to more complex and causally distant 
policy issues? Indeed, when a US think tank (Center for International Private 
Enterprise) performed a diagnostic evaluation of over 20 business associations in 
2000 it found that the overwhelming majority had limited involvement in public 
policy and the rest focused only on sector-specific issues (CIPE 2007).
331
 This 
situation changed towards the end of the PSD term yet, as the last chapter shows, 
this was not a transformation endogenous to Romanian capital, but was the result 
of a transnational political process whereby business associations were basically 
represented by INGOs and IFIs in their struggle against the ―unions‘‖ labor code.‖ 
 
Structuralist Explanations 
For scholars who privilege the explanatory role of material structures, the policy 
zig-zags of the ex-communists are the inevitable outcome of external and 
domestic economic pressures. Yet structuralist accounts point in two different 
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directions. For structuralists who give primacy to domestic economic pressures, 
the ex-communists resistance to neoliberal reforms between 1992 and 1996 was 
the inevitable result of the structure of the Romanian economy in the aftermath of 
meltdown of national-Stalinism. Thus, in the only existing book on the Romanian 
postcommunist political economy, Liliana Pop (2002; 2006) argued that the 
structural imbalances of the Romanian economy at the end of 1989 made the kind 




Romania is a crucial case study for the structuralist hypodissertation 
because its fall in output in the 1990-1993 period was the most dramatic in the 
region and its access to international capital markets was practically blocked.  
Additionally, the costs incurred on this country by the embargoes on Iraq and 
Yugoslavia (running at 8 times the total IMF and World Bank funding for the 
1991-1996 period) were particularly taxing on its economy. These were external 
shocks of inordinate magnitude that according to the structuralist approach 
demanded a severe domestic adjustment along neoliberal lines and deprived the 
government of the funds necessary to do counter-cyclical spending if it so desired. 
A different structuralist answer can be given to the Romanian puzzle by 
looking at scholarship that saw the neoliberal turn in developing countries as the 
result of the interplay between drastic changes in domestic and international 
economic structures and the increasing leverage of international financial 
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enterprise reform. The authors concluded that ―when one looks at differences in terms of progress 
of restructuring it seems likely that these can be best explained by preconditions rather than by 




organizations over domestic policy choice (Poznanski 2000: 232; see also 
Schleifer and Treisman 2000; Aslund 1999; Drazen and Grili 1993; Williamson 
1994; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). According to these accounts, the 
occurrence of intense crises incurred high economic costs for delays in 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment, a process associated with the reduction 
of the strength of domestic opposition to them. Therefore one could hypothesize 
that by contrast with the domestic structures literature, a deep recession and 
structural imbalances combined with tight international conditionality should be 
correlated with a high probability of neoliberal reforms.  
However, as the next chapter shows, the adoption of heterodoxy by the 
Vacaroiu government (1992-1996) at a moment when the recession was at its 
worst and the economy in its most unbalanced undermines the structuralist 
argument. Additionally, from a comparative perspective, much less dramatic 
external constraints led to a much more neoliberal course in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia or the Baltics, and this course was largely maintained even when 
the ex-communists returned to power.   
As for international conditionality, it is puzzling that none of the ex-
communist governments fully complied with IFI demands to undertake market 
reforms despite the fact that until 1995 they had no access to international private 
capital markets and no domestic savings to draw on. This also happened despite 
the fulfillment of IMF and World Bank agreements with the Romanian 
government (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004): clear and formal demands 




swiftly at a time of systemic crisis), credible threats to withhold rewards (the 
failure of the 1990-1992 government to comply led to suspension of 
disbursements) and the policy process had few veto players (the Vacaroiu policy 
team was cohesive and strongly backed by the President). 
The structuralist account for the early 2000s better fits the evidence. The 
near-default reached by Romania in 1998 as a result of the East Asian and 
Russian financial crises combined with the beginning of EU membership 
negotiations in 1999 steeply increased the costs of the heterodox and left-populist 
posture of the ex-communists. To obtain labor peace, the government appeased 
labor unions with an interventionist labor code but had no alternative when it 
came to monetary, fiscal policy, welfare policies, industrial subsidies and 
privatization. This account is particularly compelling. Shunning the EU‘s 
orthodox monetary and fiscal targets would have led to Romania‘s exclusion from 
EU membership, which would have led to the political extinction of the ruling 
party (Phinnemore 2000; Light and Phinnemore 2001).  Similarly, the 
demonstration effects of a near-default situation in 1998 could have reasonably be 
assumed to spur PSD leaders to adopt tighter monetary and fiscal policy with 
greater commitment. Indeed, as one PSD historian put it, 
 
In 1998 many in the party‘s left reasoned that a replay of the 
1992-1996 statism was impossible. The IMF had tightened its 
conditionalities and the European Commission was just as 




on monetary policy, fiscal policy and so on. It was a double 
conditionality that the party never faced in the past. Of course, 
there was considerable leeway in other policy areas, like labor 
or taxation policy, but on the big items, like deficit or inflation 
the choice was clear: compliance or no chance that the PSD 
could take Romania into the EU. 
 
Yet the pressures of international capital markets or of EU integration did not 
come with specific instructions about the need to have a flat tax, the exact 
specifications of employment protection regulations and puts no ban on industrial 
policy. Indeed, such pressures never do. As Wade Jacoby cautioned,  
 
Central European states know that the EU has relatively few tools to constrain the 
corporate tax policies and are often allied with well-informed and powerful 
Western firms poised to defend their policy discretion (Jacoby 2010: 421).  
 
Other scholars have shown that transition governments could achieve the policy 
objectives favored by financial markets not only through cuts in public 
expenditures, but also by increasing the taxation burden on the successful 
individuals and companies (Royo 2000; Mosley 2003).
333
 In other words, the 
leverage of international organizations was not deterministic and left some room 
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for maneuver that the Nastase/PSD government (2000-2004) used largely to 
further a left-populist agenda.  
Finally, the most systematic scrutiny of the EU enlargement effects on 
Romania to date (Phinnemore 2010) established that EU conditionality was much 
more flexible and less meritocratic than many thought at the time (Vachudova 
2005). This was made possible by a sense of inevitability about EU enlargement 
among EU elites, their fear of ―Kosovoization,‖ the European Commission‘s 
strong reputational incentives to ―finish‖ the enlargement and the strong pro-
Romania lobby.
334
 Indeed, the case of EU-Romania relations strongly suggests 
that ―[l]ack of compliance with EU conditionality need not be sufficient cause for 
a state to be denied progress in its integration with the EU. Early and unmerited 
upgrades in a non-member state‘s relations are possible […] [T]here are multiple 
reasons reflecting inter alia geopolitical and strategic concerns, whether shared by 
the EU as a whole or by influential groups of member states, the actions of the 
Commission and the agenda-setting and constraining effects of rhetorical 
commitments, timetables and the dynamics‖ (Phinnemore 2010: 305-306). 
 
The Argument  
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 According to Phinnemore, ―[p]rominent among them was France. Others, primarily for geo-
strategic reasons, included Italy, Greece and the UK. Indeed UK support intensified following the 
2003 war in Iraq 
and reflected, in part, gratitude for Romanian support for the US and its allies. Its position was 
shared by Italy and Spain. Romania also benefited from the suppressed or embryonic nature of 
most opposition 
to its accession. The fact that the Netherlands was holding the Council Presidency during the 
second half of 2004 clearly helped. As one participant observed, the Netherlands behaved 
‗impeccably‘. Various member state politicians and electorates had their reservations about 
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In the next four chapters I argue that in conditions of uncertainty generated by the 
transitions from ―socialism‖ to ―capitalisms‖, neither initial opposition to 
neoliberalism, nor its subsequent ―translation‖ for the Romanian context are 
telegraphed from material constraints nor from the formal/informal institutions of 
the economic policy process.  
Instead, I argue that, as in the case of Spain, these outcomes can be 
properly understood by examining when neoliberal economic ideas became 
dominant in the revolving door between epistemic elites and state institutions. 
Once again, it was only when alternative ideas became marginalized to an 
institutionally coherent policy team that consistent neoliberal reforms became 
possible in the first place. While in Spain neoclassical economics had become 
dominant during late Franquism, in Romania the epistemic terrain was more 
contested and it took several years after the political transition for such ideas to 
constitute the agenda of key stakeholders in the policy process. 
But how did neoliberal ideas became dominant and how did alternative 
economic models end up being removed from the menu? Like in Spain this 
happened as a result of the intersection of external and domestic political 
processes. More specifically, the ideational entrepreneurialism of external social 
forces (IOs, state aid agencies, INGOs, think tanks, transnational party networks) 
played a necessary role both in building new epistemic elites ―from scratch‖ and 
also in coopting local epistemic elites who had been exposed to Western 
economics during the authoritarian era. But the resulting coalition of advocates 




entered coherent policy teams and provided politicians with strategies of 
economic action.  
Again, as in the case of Spain, foreign training in economics and the 
revolving door between epistemic networks in the central bank and academia 
were the prime movers behind the translation of neoliberalism. Also, the 
expansion of the European social-democratic network towards the communist 
successor party was essential for its rightward shift on economic policy. Yet the 
Romanian case was marked by a two peculiarities. First, IOs mattered much more 
in the socialization of policy elites than they did in Spain. Second, new actors 
were prominent in the case of Romania: Western development agencies, think-
tanks, organized foreign capital and private international consultants.  
What about alternative ideas? During the early 1990s strong policy 
constituencies (ruling party experts, the Presidency until 1992, prominent 
economists in the ―institutes‖ inherited from socialism) advanced a socialist 
market economy alternative that was more similar to Vietnamese and Chinese 
models than to the East European ones. Another strong policy constituency 
(ruling party experts, the Presidency after 1992) advanced various adaptations of 
the more left-leaning or ―embedded‖ neoliberalism of the kind seen in Spain, 
broadly consistent with the social compensations and neo-corporatist institutions 
of continental varieties of capitalism.  
The birth of Romanian economic(neo)liberalism came after more than a 
century when state-led development models dominated Romanian economic 




some were institutions, but some were economic ideas. When neoliberalism 
arrived in the last decade of the 20
th
 century, such material, institutional and 
ideational legacies acted as filters for the new economic paradigm. The second 
half of this chapter is therefore more than a historical background. Since the 
historical narratives that mediated the reception of neoliberalism included stylized 
stories of Romanian ―capitalist‖ and ―socialist‖ experiences, the evaluation of 
such experiences is essential for understanding how historical legacies mattered in 








Romania‘s capitalist development in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries 
embraced a neo-mercantile model of development shaped by a translation of 
German and French ideas about ―late development.‖ During the second half of the 
20
th
 century, the national-Stalinist development model eliminated private markets 
entirely and radicalized the state-led development model by ―indigenizing‖ a 
Stalinist development model. When national-Stalinism ended in 1989, 
neoliberalism encountered a strong initial resistance, with reform socialism and 
then heterodoxy dominating the policy process. It was only after almost a decade 
of convulsions that the neoliberal project was embraced by pivotal policy elites. 
 
State and Capitalist Development in Modern Romania 
After 1989 Romanian liberals resuscitated the liberal project and, for lack of a 
better local experience, they drew on this country‘s short liberal century (1848-
1938) for legitimizing narratives. That Romanian economic liberalism had been 
marked by elements of neo-mercantilism and that its performance had been 
relatively poor, were the kind of facts that were conveniently obfuscated in 
postcommunist liberal discourses. By contrast, for communist successor elites this 




for advocating heterodox and left-populist economic ideas. Meanwhile, since the 
official history of the communist regime had been far from nuanced in its critique 
of the Romanian liberal experience, it took almost two decades until respected 
scholarship faced the unflattering parts of this experience more systematically 
(Murgescu 2010).  
 
The breakdown of feudalism and the advent of liberalism 
 At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, the Romanian Principalities (Wallachia and 
Moldavia) had feudal economies subject to the patrimonial governance 
characteristic of their Ottoman masters. The patrimonial status quo was based on 
a compact between large landowners, lesser nobles and the slim layer of urban 
bourgeoisie whereby the landlords would distribute rents and security in exchange 
for political primacy over the overwhelming majority of the population, the 
peasant class. Yet during the third decade of the century, the status quo began to 
crumble under the pressure of liberal ideas and social forces.  
The liberalization of trade for the Ottoman Empire‘s Romanian 
Principalities in 1829 improved access to capital accumulation for local 
landowning and land-leasing elites. The increasing sophistication of Western 
capitalism led to the adoption of new consumer tastes that flooded the middle and 
upper classes alike with new marks of status (Western fashions, architectural 
styles, university education etc.), while lowering marginal rates of saving and 
private investment. Simultaneously, the lesser nobility‘s reliance on military 




of increasingly mechanized warfare and external economic liberalization. While 
large landowners could comfortably withstand the pressures on savings and 
investment by increasing the country‘s primary export (Romanian wheat exports 
experienced a brief ―golden age‖ between 1829 and 1838), the lesser nobles and 
the urban craftsmen saw dramatic downward social mobility (Georgescu 1972; 
Janos 2000: 65-103). 
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By the 1840s the social forces that were losing out in the new economic 
order (the small gentry, the peasants, the urban bourgeoisie) found an unexpected 
ally: the offspring of the great landlords, who were returning home from France 
and Germany with university degrees and a determination to put the feudal status 
quo under the hammer.
336
  Following the example of the Ottoman-educated Greek 
princes who ruled the Romanian lands in the eve of the 19
th
 century, the 
propertied classes began to adopt French education as a new mark of 
respectability.  However, the members of this Western-educated elite had few 
prospects to put their Western university degrees to use in the fossilized state and 
economy of the Romanian Principalities, and few of them desired the life of a 
landlord.  Thus they sought to change the government system itself by seeking 
independence from the Ottoman Empire and modernizing the state using 
institutional templates from Louis Philippe‘s France.
337
 To this end, they 
mobilized the resentment of those who did not benefit by the status quo, by 
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providing a political diagnosis of their woes, which resulted in a state-building 
project inspired by nationalism and economic liberalism.
338
  
Facilitated by the administrative, educational and constitutional reforms 
introduced in the 1830s during one of the several periods of Russian 
occupation,
339
 the coalition between the French-educated intelligentsia, 
―enlightened‖ landlords, urban middle classes and peasants staged a liberal 
political and social revolution in 1848. Its prompt repression by a joint Ottoman 
and Russian military operation sent the crème de la crème of the liberal elite back 
to France. After they secured French support, the liberals returned to the 
Principalities in the 1850s. This time, however, they had moderated their agenda 
in order to make it resonate with the conservatism of their protector, French 
Emperor Napoleon the 3
rd
, and to strike a pact with the status quo elites. 
Reassured, the conservative landlords willingly joined the new liberal project, 
which led to the internationally-recognized union of the Principalities in 1859, a 
German monarch in 1866, and independence from the Ottomans in 1877. The 
resulting liberal project was further boosted by the union with the Russian 
province of Moldavia as well as with the relatively wealthier Habsburg provinces 
of Transylvania and Bukovina in 1918. 
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 Although it facilitated the reproduction of the feudal order, the Russian Governor-General 
Kisseleff reestablished Romanian monarchs to Wallachia and Moldavia, gave the Principalities 
and pseudo-constitutional government and established the beginnings of a secular educational 




The 48-ers and their political heirs reveled in rhetoric that blended 
Romantic nationalism and political liberalism.  ―Reason‖, a faith in progress, 
citizenship, the progressiveness of a bureaucratic state, liberal rights, separation of 
powers, and the market economy loomed large in their discourse. But they were 
also practical men who institutionalized constitutional government, civil and 
political rights, modern courts and state administration, commercial codes and 
procedures and a three-tier public education system, all drawing heavily on the 
model provided by the France of the Third Empire.  
Conservative critique notwithstanding, the liberal state began to deliver 
many of its promises. With some exceptions, the Parliament was open to the 
public scrutiny, freedom of expression and assembly was generally observed, and, 
brutal jaquerie repression aside, the police were generally more restrained and 
procedural than in other parts of the global periphery. Most importantly, the 
judicial system was effectively autonomous, as evidenced by judges‘ defiance of 
the executive power on a systematic basis. Universal male franchise was adopted 
in 1923, putting an end to notables‘ democracy, and the system allowed for 
regular change in government between Liberals and Conservatives until 1923, and 
between Liberals and Agrarians during the interwar period.
 340
  
However, at no point did this system come very close to its idealized West 
European models. Until 1923 it excluded the Jewish population from citizenship, 
341
 and it proved remarkably efficient at integrating parties and the civil service 
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into a neo-patromonial oligarchic parliamentary system (Rotschild 1972; Barbu 




From economic liberalism to neo-mercantilism 
The political economy of the Romanian liberal century (1848-1938) was a classic 
case of neo-mercantile development.
343
 Until 1880, mercantilists and free-traders 
vied for supremacy and for a while, under Prince Cuza (1859-1866) it seemed as 
if free trade liberals had won the debate. In an attempt to insert Romania into the 
world capitalist system as an exporter of agricultural commodities, during the 
1860s and early 1870s, these new leaders attempted to emulate the reigning 
orthodoxy of classic economic liberalism and the limited liberal state: free trade, 
competitive advantage, with public investment in the legal and physical 
infrastructures needed by the state.
 
 Echoing Adam Smith, Prince Alexandru Ioan 
Cuza announced to the Great Powers soon after his inauguration in 1859 that  
 
[w]e can be thankful that no artificial industry exists on our soil that owes its 
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 During elections, the bureaucracy of the judete (boroughs) would put pressure on the electorate 
to vote ―the correct way,‖ or would routinely falsify the results. This corruption, not surprisingly, 
made the government party the winner. Political change would occur when a party managed to 
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 Montias notes that ―Cuza‘s position was in part only theoretical because Romania at that time 
was not entirely free to determine its tariff policy but was restrained by the Paris Convention of 
1858 whereby the principalities recognized their dependence on Turkey with regard to commercial 





To institutionalize a modern capitalist internal market system, the new state set in 
place a modern system of property rights based on an unmediated translation of 
the Napoleonic Code Civil, while land and labor became commodified. The 
system of commercial law and courts was adopted to secure modern internal and 
external trade flows. It was a genuine Polanyian ―Great Transformation‖ 
engineered with French institutional models in mind.  
Soon, however, the preference for a neo-mercantilism colored with 
ethnocratic undertones became dominant. Between 1877 and 1878, just as the 
country was winning its independence from the Ottomans and a strong domestic 
bourgeoisie was emerging, the aging ―48ers,‖ now safely ensconced in political 
and economic supremacy, experienced a fall in the prices of Romania‘s main 
export (agricultural commodities), radically challenging arguments for free trade. 
This challenge further reverberated in debates on state-nation relations, leading to 
an increasingly popular interpretation of laissez-faire through ethnocentric frames: 
in the absence of state intervention, ethnic minorities were expected to continue to 
dominate the ranks of the urban bourgeoisie, the class upon which liberals relied 
upon for their nationalist economic modernization plans.
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Following this exogenous price shock and such interpretations of its 
causes and effects, the liberal modernization project swung dramatically in a neo-
mercantilist direction.  Industrial growth replaced international competitiveness as 
a top policy priority and new schemes were put forth to turn the state into a 
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 Even pragmatic liberal politicians like Ion.C. Bratianu passionately used references to an 
essentialized ancient history to forge a local liberal myth.
 
Thus, Bratianu saw liberalism in the very 
origins of Romanian nation, a member of what he called the ―Graeco-Latin race. On the genetic 




―midwife‖ of ―infant industries.‖ Like in the Iberian Peninsula and other parts of 
the European periphery, the turn to neo-mercantilism occurred via the emulation 
of Western ―late developer‖ strategies based on the protectionist teachings of the 
German historical school in economics.  
Following the intellectual lead of A.D. Xenopol, the Romanian state 
devised mercantilist strategies that were supposed to provide the resources needed 
to enable domestic industries to ―leapfrog‖ the technological barrier between them 
and the countries of the developed capitalist core:  cheap industrial credit, higher 
import duties on industrial imports, preferential freight rates, taxes that 
encouraged the accumulation of capital in large firms (Montias, 1979; Janos 1979: 
94-100; Lampe et al 1982). This approach culminated with the adoption of 
legislation in 1924 that discouraged foreign investment and introduced new 
protectionist measures. While the Romanian government fostered the labor 
demand of the urban economy with an effective educational system (at least in the 
cities), until World War I it actively worked to depress the wage level through 
labor codes that outlawed agricultural strikes and made rural-urban labor 
migration difficult (Turnock, 2007: 1-31).  
This neo-mercantile capitalist system made considerable progress towards 
socio-economic modernization. Some of the juridical bases of capitalist 
modernization (a sophisticated legislation and court system) were in place. After 
advancing at a snail‘s pace, urbanization grew at a somewhat faster pace between 
1930 and 1941 while educational progress gathered momentum.
346
 After 1918, an 
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expanding and relatively competitive industrial base ―inherited‖ from Austria-
Hungary in southeastern Transylvania and the Banat could arguably have 
constituted a launching pad for large-scale industrialization in the future. Most 
significantly, industrial production increased by 80 percent between 1925 and 
1938 (Turnock, 1970: 547). The oil industry in Southern Romania and the gas 
industry in Transylvania expanded at an impressive pace, with both Romanian 
and foreign engineering competing for new projects. The increased output of 
these industries in turn fostered the quick development of the chemical industry.  
By the end of the 1930s, high tariffs, bold state investment and planning 
schemes laid the basis for a modern steel industry. The development of high value 
added sectors such as aircraft and electrical equipment in these regions and in 
Bucharest itself was particularly encouraging and proved to be the basis for the 
subsequent communist industrial take-off (Turnock, 2007: 17-31).  
Yet when the first ―globalization‖ came to an end on the eve of World 
War One, Romania was still heavily agricultural, industrialization was slow by 
regional standards,
347
 and the country lagged further and further behind in the race 
to catch up with the economies of the capitalist core. The situation did not change 
dramatically during the twenty years of peace that came after November 11, 1918. 
Despite its abundant natural resources, a large internal market, relative proximity 
                                                                                                                                     
1914 to 30,424 in 1934), giving Romanian citizens one of the few universal opportunities for 
upward social mobility. During the 1920s, the hegemony of the literary, juridical and 
philosophical establishment in universities was gradually challenged by the emergence of the 
disciplines demanded by industrial modernization: engineering, architecture, economics, and 
social sciences. The development of sociology in particular merits a special note, given the 
remarkably high profile of Romanian contributions and the consolidation of schools of thought 
around prominent scholars like Gusti or Sperantia.  
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 Despite hundreds of bills meant to encourage industrial development, the Romanian economy 
did not manage to reach the ―take-off‖ stage experienced by Russia and Austria-Hungary, its 




to Western markets and a bureaucracy committed to state-led development, the 
performance of the Romanian economy between 1860 and 1938 was poor. During 
this period, a gap grew not only between Romania and France, but between 
Romania and other European countries that had a similar GDP in 1860 (Sweden, 
Hungary) (Bairoch 1976, 289; Murgescu 2010). 
As a result of this slow industrialization, less than 3 percent of the labor 
force was made up of industrial workers in 1913. Also, despite massive 
employment in the bureaucracy, only 25 percent of the labor force was employed 
outside agriculture in 1938. Although industrial growth was average by regional 
standards, capital consolidation was very low: after decades of mercantilist 
policies, the capital stock of industrial firms with more than 25 workers totaled 
barely 1.5 percent of the total capital stock (Roberts). The domestic share of total 
capital holdings in industry increased from nearly rock bottom in the 1879s to 
about 60 percent in 1938. However, even though the transmission belt between 
Romanian industrialists, bankers and the state functioned flawlessly throughout 
the liberal era, and despite the state‘s increasing assertiveness to limit the 
participation of foreign capital, Romania remained dependent upon West 
European investments to sustain its economy (Hitchins 1992: 1071). 
The performance of the liberal project looks mediocre in other respects as 
well. For a state with one of the highest percentages of bureaucrats per employed 
population in Europe, tax receipts were negligible and the state‘s financing of 
expenditures with foreign debt made debt servicing one of the biggest budget 




resources left and gave its public servants wages whose low levels generated 
incentives for extra-legal collection of revenues, most frequently from Jewish 
entrepreneurs. 
Although the Romanian land reform of 1921 was the biggest land 
redistribution in Europe (outside the Soviet Union),
348
  it reduced already low 
productivity in agriculture and it did not ameliorate the social underdevelopment 
problems of the Romanian village.
349
 While a public pension system for waged 
employees was in place,
350
 the picture looked dire with regard to the social 
development indicators of the peasantry and urban poor.
351
 Finally, it is far from 
clear that despite some progress, the educational system was structured to address 
an industrial take-off.
352 
 The result was that, by the 1940s, Romania‘s living 
standard,  literacy and access to medical services were on a level with other 
peripheral European countries (Yusoglavia, Turkey, Portugal) and behind both its 
immediate Western neighbors (Hungary, Poland) and non-European peripheral 
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 Rotschild, 1972, p. 291. 
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 After the 1921 reform the average yield of cereals per hectare fell by 24 percent. Janos (1978: 
103).  
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 A public pension system was created very early based on the Bismarck template with two 
statutes: Legea Missir (1902) and Legea Neniţescu (1912), unified in 1933. Following the activism 
of sociologists, after 1929 a network of community welfare initiatives sprung up (Zamfir 1999).  
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 Despite significant investments in education (16 percent of public revenue between 1918 and 
1938), almost half of the population was illiterate in 1938 and only Albania and Serbia hosted 
fewer doctors per capita (1.1. doctors per 10,000, which was less than in India at that time). See 
Janos, 99. Between 1871 and 1935 the infant mortality rate remained the highest in Europe: 19.2 
deaths per hundred (or 120,000 per year during the interwar years), largely the result of poor 
nutrition and farm work during pregnancy. The death rate in the population as a whole was also 
the highest in Europe (a disturbing 21/1000 as late as 1935). Well into the boom years of the 
1930s, the rural population remained dramatically disease-ridden, deprived of basic healthcare and 
constrained to live in precarious hygiene conditions (Hitchins: 337). 
352
 If indeed interwar Romania, with its backward agricultural economy, had more university 
graduates (2 per 1000) than the heavily industrialized Germany (1.7 per 1000), the overwhelming 
majority of students were trained in law (in the early 20
th
 century there were more lawyers in the 
Bucharest bar than in the Paris bar)( Rotschild, 1972, 320). Most graduates graduated in 
humanities and classics, while engineering and economics graduation numbers lagging further 




countries (Chile, Mexico) (Jackson and Lampe 1982; Ben-Ner and Montias 
1991). 
 
The Great Depression and the end of the liberal project 
The economic turmoil triggered by the financial crisis of 1929 dealt a heavy blow 
to the modernization project of liberal elites. Faced with the first spasms of the 
crisis in 1929, the new Agrarian Party government applied a macrostabilization 
package demanded by the foreign banks that financed the bulk of the government 
deficit, with the French central bank playing the leading role.  
Thus, faced with the massive transfers of hard currency made by the local 
chapters of foreign banks, the central bank decided to stick with France‘s ―Gold 
Bloc‖ and refused to introduce convertibility controls until 1932, which led to an 
unprecedented hemorraging from the hard currency stock. Second, fiscal policy 
was contractionary.  Budget deficits and state spending were cut, leading to cuts 
in wages for the state‘s numerous employees or for their non-payment for several 
months. Third, the protectionist laws of 1924 were scrapped. Foreign capital was 
welcomed, with some of the foreign loans being paid by granting lucrative 
monopolies (telephones, road building and matches) to the foreign lenders.
353
  
The macrostabilization package ended up aggravating the state of the 
economy and leading to debt rescheduling negotiations in 1933. The terms were 
humiliating: foreign banks demanded, and ultimately attained, a decision to put 
the country‘s finances under the control of a joint committee of the League of 
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 For example, the 30 million dollars loan made by the Swedish Krueger House was paid with 




Nations and representatives of foreign banks (Axenciuc 1997: 361).  As foreign 
banks began to reduce their exposure in Romania, as the world demand for 
Romanian grain and oil fell, and as domestic demand remained constantly low, 
the economy entered into a tailspin. The fall in demand led to a deflation rate of 
30 percent and to a collapse in the real value of wages of 27 percent. Between 
1929 and 1933 gross output and industrial production were halved and almost 500 
factories entered bankruptcy. As a result, almost a third of the industrial labor 
force became unemployed and state receipts fell by almost 40 percent. 
The social costs of the macrostabilization were considerable. There were 
370 industrial strikes, some of them concluding with the shooting of large 
numbers of strikers by gendarme and army regiments sent to quell the protests.  
Yet the social downfall of the crisis did not lead towards a more socially 
embedded liberalism, as it did in other agricultural European states at that time 
(e.g. Denmark). On the contrary, the failure of the Agrarians to stick to a more 
socially progressive agenda strengthened the hand of authoritarian social 
forces.
354
 The weakness of the Marxist left exacerbated the situation: the social-
democratic vote was largely insignificant, and the communists‘ subservience to 
Moscow as well as their questioning of Romania‘s borders with the USSR made 
them largely insignificant even when they were allowed to compete in 
elections.
355
 Against this background, the far-right became increasingly successful 
at attracting the votes of peasants and urban lower middle classes.
 356
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 For an in-depth account of Romania during the Great Depression see Axenciuc (1997) and 
Muresan (1998).  
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 The leadership of the Romanian communist party spent most of the interwar period in prison. 




As world demand for grains and oil picked up in 1934 and as the state 
boldly increased domestic demand through a spike in military orders, the output 
grew again after 1934. Yet the liberal project had been politically damaged, 
because the authoritarian forces grouped around the monarch, who was inspired 
by fascist corporatism and far-right parties, took control of popular discontent. As 
a result, the liberal project came to an end in 1938 when King Carol the Second 
dissolved the Parliament, instituted single-party rule and terminated the long-
standing constitutional regime. 
Inspired by the ideas of Mihail Manoilescu, a precursor of dependency 
theory who was a appointed as a government minister (Love 2001), the new 
regime launched a ―mainline‖ developmentalist strategy: forced industrialization, 
public investment in high technology and large agribusinesses and proto-
indicative planning. Abruptly terminated in the summer of 1940 by the 
dismemberment of Romanian territory at the hands of the temporary German-
Soviet alliance, this state-led developmentalist project was at least a qualified 
success in the view of historians (Janos 1979: 105-106). 
Romania‘s involvement in World War II on the side of Nazi Germany 
until 1944, and later on the side of the Allies, led to massive destruction and 
plundering of the economy and to almost a million dead. The Romanian 
constitutional regime briefly reemerged between 1944 and 1947, only to be 
                                                                                                                                     
communists scored 13 percent in the former Czechoslovakia, 7.9 percent in Poland, and 20 percent 
in Bulgaria.   
356





suppressed yet again and for a much longer period of time by an entirely different 
kind of state-led developmentalism and authoritarianism. 
 
National-Stalinist Development 
National-Stalinism as a political paradigm 
The advent in Romania of a political regime anchored in the tenets of Leninism 
and Stalinism was made possible only by external intervention. Due to severe 
state repression and its own disputes over Romania‘s borders with the Soviet 
Union, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was an inconsequential political 
force before 1945.
357
 Without Soviet occupation, the Romanian Communist Party 
would not have posed any serious challenge to the liberal ancien regime.  
Inaugurated in 1948, the regime was at first dominated by RCP chairman 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej and, after 1965, by Nicolae Ceausescu.
358
 RCP 
representatives used the Marxist idiom and called themselves ―socialist‖ in order 
to legitimize and rationalize their claim to power. But as Katherine Verdery put it,  
 
 [i]n Ceausism as much as in perestroika, the meanings of terms and 
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 The communist vote in interwar Romania (0.6 percent) was extremely low by regional 
standards, as the communists scored 13 percent in the former Czechoslovakia, 7.9 percent in 
Poland, and 20 percent in Bulgaria.   
358
 For extensive analyses of the political system under Romania‘s ―dynastic communism‖ see 
Raport Prezidential (2006), Tismaneanu (1989; 1991; 2003), Chirot (1979), Fischer (1989); Jowitt 
(1971); Shafir (1985); Verdery (1991). 
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 Verdery showed that in the Romanian context, the ―indigenization‖ of Marxism in its Marxist-





 In reality the political regime that ruled in Romania between 1948 and 1989 is 
better characterized as ―national-Stalinist‖ (Tismaneanu 2003). The presence of a 
few key markers made the Romanian regime deserve the ―Stalinist‖ label: the use 
of Stalin‘s doctrine on the ―aggravation of the class struggle along with the 
development of socialism― (i.e. systemic and violent repression of dissent plus 
hypercentralization of political power), the personality cult (especially during 
Ceausescu‘s sultanist phase), the emphasis on ―socialism in one country,‖ and the 
forced collectivization of land.
360
 During the Ceausescu years the centralization of 
political power took Romanian authoritarianism into a ―sultanistic‖ phase (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). After destalinization had already been used as a mechanism for 
removing opponents inside the party since Gheorghiu Dej, Ceausescu managed to 
reduce the collective party leadership to an empty shell. As a result, by the 1970s, 
the regime was already controlled by Ceausescu, his family and a small retinue of 
uncritical Politburo members (Tismaneanu 2003).  
 According to Vladimir Tismaneanu, the nationalist-Stalinist ideological 
artifact embraced during this period opposed the innovations of reform-minded 
                                                                                                                                     
subordination of Marxism-Leninism to the discourse of the Nation (Verdery, 1991: 139). Of 
course, there was some variation within this ideological paradigm. While the period between 1948 
and 1957 was more internationalist and less nationalist, the revisionist Stalinism begun1957 and 
ended in 1971 rediscovered the Nation as a central ideological category. After 1971, the nationalist 
component remained, yet it was merged with the cult of the leader and his family (―sultanism‖ 
Linz and Stepan 1996). 
360
 Arguably, while some of the political innovations associated with Leninism were also 
constitutive of these ―varieties of Stalinism‖ (the leading role of the party, the institutionalization 
of autocracy within the party, near-complete nationalization of the means of production, the use of 
the secret police beyond the conditions of war communism, militaristic labor disciplines), they 






 merged state, party and (sultan) family power and then 
turned its formerly strategic
362
 and initially ―liberalizing‖ embrace of 
nationalism
363
  into an exercise in laundering right-wing nationalist practices: 
ethnocentrism, militarism, the cultivation of the exclusivist subjectivities 
(Tismaneanu 2003: 32-34; Petrescu 2009).
364
  
But Romanian national-Stalinism went beyond putting neo-Stalinism in 
the company of anti-internationalist and ethnocratic ideology. By the 1980s it 
began to integrate distinct elements of fascist origin: the cult of the ancestors, 
organic or Herderian definitions of the nation, the encouragement of xenophobic 
attitudes vis-à-vis the Hungarian and the Roma and, after institutionalizing 
amnesia with regard to Romania‘s active role in the Holocaust, the regime 
tolerated and even encouraged anti-Semitic sentiment.  
   
As an authoritarian regime, Romanian national-Stalinism legitimized the 
suspension of civil and political rights. Being Stalinist, it had no qualms about 
employing the police state against perceived political opponents. This resulted in 
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 National-communism was a critical reaction to the Soviet interpretation of Lenin‘s legacy and 
manifested an opening to debate that was radical enough to lead to the Yugoslav experiment or to 
political experiments in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. These experiments were 
rooted in ideas more akin to those of Italian or Spanish communist parties than to the Soviet line: 
the questioning of the Leninist dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the intellectual divorce 
with the dissertation of the leading role of the party, the commitment to a multiparty system, the 
radical critique of Stalinism.  
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 In a recent article Dragos Petrescu showed that the consolidation of the strategy to use 
nationalism as a form of power consolidation by Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu took about eight 
years (1956-1964) (Petrescu 2009). 
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 In a classic study in the cultural anthropology of Romanian intellectual life, Katherine Verdery 
demonstrated that the ―indigenist‖ discourse dramatized by Ceausescu after 1971 came to 
undermine the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, as this author insists, ―to a 
considerable extent…the Party was forced on the terrain of national values (not unwillingly) under 
pressure from others, especially intellectuals, whom it could fully engage in no other manner.‖ 
(Verdery 1991: 122, emphasis in original). 
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bureaucratically organized maltreatment, incarceration and extermination of large 
numbers of people and particularly of the administrative and political apparatus of 
pre-communist regimes.
365
 As a result, the emergence of the kind of anti-regime 
civic networks that made Polish, Czechoslovak or Hungarian reforms possible 
was much more constrained in Romania.
366
  
The regime‘s record with regard to its purported social base was highly 
problematic as well. Its claims to be a ―workers‘ and peasants‘ state were 
consistently undermined by its suppression of autonomous labor unions, the de 
facto transformation of collective farm workers into a lumpenproletariat and the 
imposition of low living standards whenever its accumulation strategy so 
required. Thus, attempts to organize independent workers‘ unions, such as the 
2,400-strong Workers‘ Free Unions (SLOMR) during the late 1970s,
367
 were 
quickly stifled. Following the 1977 coal miners‘ strike, hundreds of strikers were 
deported and imprisoned.
368
 Similarly, workers‘ strikes in the industrial city of 
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A 2007 Romanian Presidential commission chaired by professor Vladimir Tismaneanu 
estimated the number of political prisoners at about 2 million, yet refrained from giving a specific 
figure on fatalities caused by political repression. The most egregious forms of political repression 
took place between 1948 and 1964. 
http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/files/fstore/z_is/staticpages/Raport.pdf.  Jowitt persuasively argued that 
―the high incidence of uncritical emulation by the Romanian elite is to be explained not simply in 
terms of Soviet demands for detailed emulation, but also in terms of the elite‘s uncertainty as to 
how to achieve and ideologically and politically correct breakthrough.‖ Jowitt 1973, 198-232.  
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 Despite this, public and radical forms of regime contestation were orchestrated with great risks 
both by the intelligentsia and the industrial working class. For a comprehensive overview see 
Comisia Prezidentiala (2006) http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/files/fstore/z_is/staticpages/Raport.pdf.   
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 See O. Ionel and D.Marcu (Eds.), Lupta mea pentru sindicate libere in Romania, Iasi: Polirom. 
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 For the militant history of the Jiu Valley coal miners see Vasi (2003). For an overview of the 
institutions  of workers‘ subordination under national-Stalinism in the 1970s see Nelson (1981).  
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In another ironic historical parallel with the most unsavory aspects of 
social repression during Romania‘s neo-mercantile capitalism, the costs of capital 
accumulation were transferred by the state on to the peasants. These were forced 
to accept subsistence pay, meager social benefits, forced ―relocations‖ and long 
working hours (which led, in turn, to high levels internal migration, subversion of 
work, anomie and alcoholism). As for the remaining private peasantry, despite 
being heavily taxed, they were excluded from many social programs (Iordachi and 
Dobrincu 2009).  
Finally, during the 1980s drastic cuts in consumption and social services 
ended up undermining the very claims of socio-economic progress that much the 
regime‘s claim to legitimacy hinged on. Draconian spending cuts and the banning 
of medical imports during the 1980s led to severe shortages in medical supplies. 
In the late 1980s even basic items like insulin or single use syringes were hard to 
come by and some of the weakest members of society (childless retirees, orphans 
and abandoned children) were interned in abysmal conditions. 
 
National-Stalinism as a socio-economic paradigm 
After an initial uncritical embrace of orthodox Stalinism during the 1950s, the 
regime rebelled against Soviet plans to integrate Romania into a common market 
and impose upon it an economic profile that entailed decelerating industrialization 
and prioritizing agriculture.  
In 1963, as a result of this opposition, Romanian Stalinists posited a 




independence. This meant commitment to a state-led effort to turn Romania from 
an agriculture-dependent developing country into an industrial middle-power. It 
also meant a coordinated policy to urbanize the majority of its population, ensure 
full employment and universal access to social services, build a scientific 
superstructure and collectivize all high-yield farming land. 
The ―thaw‖ of the mid 1960s also entailed a slight liberalization of the 
private agricultural market,
370
 the substantial increase in industrial investment to 
nearly 35 percent of GDP and the correlative disinvestment in agriculture.
371
 To 
fund this systemic transformation, the state applied a forced savings strategy and 
began to borrow from abroad. 
This entire economic system rested on central planning
372
 and the 
domestic sources of the public budget were SOE profits, the tax on SOE profits 
and wage taxes.
373
 Yet SOE executives spent much time on negotiations with the 
state bureaucracy for the granting of case-by-case exemptions. Social spending 
and subsidies consumed between 20 and 30 percent of the public budget (Croitoru 
1993: 92). Exports to CMEA were subsidized by CMEA members, as the prices 
were determined by the average of the last five years.   
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 As a result of liberalizing farmers‘ markets in cities, although private farmers owned less than 
10 percent of arable land, they supplied around 20 percent of domestic demand (Ionete 1993: 38).  
371
 In 1980 investment in agriculture was 4 times smaller than in industry (Ionete 1993: 42). 
372
 This meant that the state planned output, wages, sales, loses, investments, and import and 
export prices. Rather than represent a function of supply and demand, prices were a planned 
indicator serviced by the public budget, with the latter functioning as a money pot that covered 
both investments and loses. Prices were also divorced from the exchange and interest rates. This 
meant that hard currency shortages became product shortages whenever imports of raw materials 
and technological inputs were required. 
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 The RCP and the intelligence service (Securitate) ran enterprises of their own (Gospodaria de 
Partid) that were heavily subsidized, tax exempt and had off-the-book operations. Their activities 
ranged from agriculture to foreign trade. Ceausescu‘s gigantic People‘s House (the world‘s second 




 What distinguished this development model from other forms of state 
socialism, especially after the 1970s, was the absence of any form of private 
property in industry and services, the near complete state control of agriculture, 
the subordination of household consumption of both private and public goods to 
industrial development, and resistance to any market devices in inter-firm and 
employment relations. Other conservative East European regimes (post-1968 
Czechoslovakia or East Germany) attempted to balance full employment, 
individual consumption and industrialization priorities. Yet at the center of the 
Romanian model was a consistent commitment to industrialization at the expense 
of other priorities, even after Romania became more industrialized than its Central 
European peers.  
As far as industrialization was concerned, the result was qualified success. 
The levels of the industrial investment sustained by the Ceausescu era were very 
high by regional standards.
374
 Despite considerable appropriation of Romanian 
factory equipment and raw materials by the USSR,
375
 between 1953 and 1968, 
Romanian industrial production grew proportionately faster than that of any other 
European country.
 376
 This made Romania almost as industrialized as Hungary 
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 Net investment obtained through a combination of forced savings and foreign borrowing grew 
from 18 percent during 1951-1955, to 34 percent through foreign loans in 1971-1975. Even with 
the difficulties of the 1980s, net investment was still 27 percent between 1981 and 1985 (Montias 
1981). 
375
 Daniel Turnock claimed that the joint Romanian-Soviet companies set up after 1945 ―had 
drained the country of raw materials to the extent of several times the amount of reparations 
actually agreed, all in return for Russian manufactures at inflated prices. It has been calculated that 
the various forms of exploitation accounted for eighty-six percent of the total national income 
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1944 and 1948 (Turnock 1970: 546). 
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 Citing data from B.R. Mitchell‘s European Social Statistics 1750-1970 (Columbia University 
Press, 1976), Daniel Chirot shows that between 1950 and 1968 Romania‘s industrial production 





and Poland and nudged it closer to the industrialization levels of East Germany 
and former Czechoslovakia (Turnrock 1974).  
By the 1970s, this industrial ―take-off‖ gave the Romanian economy a 
more modern outlook as well as consistently high output growth rates (68 percent 
per decade between 1950 and 1974). By 1989, Romania was the most 
industrialized European country, with 53 percent of the GDP being generated by 
industry (Ionete 1993: 73).
377
 The share of manufacturing in exports grew from 7 
percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 1989 and given that in 1980 already 60 percent of 
exports went to the capitalist core the progress can hardly be ignored (Cojanu 
1997: 88-89). The range of industries represented was not just heavy industry, 
where output rates were higher than in developed states.
378
 There was a growing 
element of sophistication in chemicals and engineering. According to the data 
collected by Swiss development economist Paul Bairoch (1976), between 1950 




The new regime also proved resourceful at increasing the pace of social 
modernization. Weakly urbanized in 1950 (even by the low standards of Iberia, 
Greece and Eastern Europe), Romania had narrowed the gap considerably by the 
1970s.
380
 Unlike in many other developing countries and in contrast with interwar 
Romania, the proletarianization of the peasant populations was achieved without 
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 In 1989 the highest rate of participation of industry to GDP among OECD countries was 38 
percent (World Bank 1990).  
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 In 1988 Romania produced more steel per capita (605 kilograms) than the US (363 kilograms), 
Sweden (577 kilograms) and France (319 kilograms) (Ionete 1993: 74).  
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 It needs to be remarked, however, that on this measure Romania was not nearly as fast as 
Bulgaria or Poland. For a more extended discussion on this issue see Berend (1996). 
380
 However, by the end of Romanian Stalinism the three Mediterranean countries were much 




the attending emergence of giant slums and mass unemployment. Large numbers 
of urbanizing peasants experienced a remarkably short journey from rural misery 
to indoor plumbing, central heating, mass tourism, affordable fashions, 
entertainment and modern mass transit based around an extensive rail network.
381
 
Mass culture was simultaneously controlled, manipulated and made accessible to 
the widest number of citizens, while the strictures of the traditional extended 
family were loosened by the wide availability of industrial jobs, subsidized 
housing and the social safety net. Between the mid 1960s and the late 1970s, even 
a small mass consumption culture began to spread in cities. For the first time in 
the country‘s history, society achieved full social mobility.
382
 
 National-Stalinist Romania also followed other state socialist states in the 
world race over literacy rates, size of industrial labor force, the slashing of 
mortality rates, universal access to social services (health, childcare, paid 
vacations) and the advancement of the sciences. Old age pensions became de 
facto a citizenship right and minimal wages were set well above subsistence 
levels.
383
 General mortality was also dramatically reduced as a result of better 
nutrition, better hygiene and free access to modest, yet relatively modern 
healthcare. The number of doctors per 10,000 people increased from 1.1 in 1938 
to 20 in the mid 1980s, while the number of hospital beds per capita was close to 
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 In 1989 the rail network density was the fourth largest in Europe (47.8 kilometers per 1000 
square meters), with electrified links accounting for 32 percent of the total network.  
382
 The most comprehensive study of Romanian urbanization until the 1980s is still Ronnas 
(1984).  
383
 Education and health were key concerns, if only because Stalinist regimes‘ claim to legitimacy 
rested more on performance in meeting basic needs than on procedural justice. From this point of 
view, the contrast with the procommunist years is stark. Infant mortality rates in Romania 
plummeted from being the highest in interwar Europe (139/1000 live births) to significantly lower 





West German levels. 
384
 Illiteracy, which stood at around half the population in 
the late 1930s, was virtually eliminated. In some respects, such as female 
participation in the labor force, a core factor in breaking traditional societal norms 
on marriage, the Romanian communist regimes scored higher than even some 
developed industrialized states.
385
 Free kindergartens, affordable lending libraries, 
bookstores, cinemas, theatres, etc. were also made widely available, at least until 
the late 1970s.  Employee and welfare benefits gained during the social-
democratic experience in the West became taken for granted and were topped by 
local innovations: subsidized basic goods and services and guaranteed full 
employment.
386
   
One of the contradictions of this economic model was that the ambition to 
industrialize meant at least an instrumental opening to Western finance and 
industry, a course that the regime pursued vigorously for fifteen years (1966-
1981). In bold contrast with its brutal response to those who advanced reform 
socialism and an expansion of household consumption, the accumulation strategy 
pursued by the regime made its external economic relations unique for the 
CEMEA zone: export-led growth targeted at both Western and Eastern markets, 
joint ventures with Western (especially West German and French) companies and 
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 See Berend (1999: 167). 
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 Catalin Zamfir, ―Poverty in Romania‖, 
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/complabstuds/russia/Poverty_in_Romania.doc. 
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 In terms of welfare, the contributory welfare system was nationalized in 1949 (Mărginean în 
Zamfir, 1998) and universal social citizenship was instituted, with the state and its enterprises 
sharing the costs of an expanded array of social security services (Zamfir, 1999). While the system 
was generous and professionally delivered, it nevertheless did not cover unemployment (whose 




entry into the Bretton Woods institutions.
387
 The country‘s anti-Soviet foreign 
policy, its recognition of the statehood of West Germany and its rapprochement 
with the United States during the Nixon presidency enabled Western technology 
transfers that ranged from car and truck plants to military helicopters.
388
  
Yet when the regime‘s core norm (the conflation of economic and political 
independence) was challenged by the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the IMF‘s 
threat to impose policy conditionality on Romania as the country was on the brink 
of default, Ceausescu decided to guard the orthodox industrialization program, not 
only at the cost of completely disconnecting the country‘s economy from global 
financial and industrial capital, but also of compressing basic necessities (food, 
energy and health) to wartime constraints. 
 
The Meltdown of National-Stalinism 
Shock Therapy, Stalinist-Style 
The economic failure of the national-Stalinist development model had both 
structural and contingent causes. Despite its remarkable growth rates, the model 
was ridden with systemic imbalances. First, the continuing expansion of steel, 
petrochemicals and machinery industries meant high levels of energy 
consumption and potential vulnerability to exogenous supply shocks.
389
 Second, 
the ambition to give Romania a comprehensive industrial structure able to 
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 Romania was the only CMEA country with a generalized trade agreement with the EEC and, 
until 1982, with the IMF. Hungary also joined the IMF in 1982. 
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 From automotive to military helicopters, Romanian-West German and Romanian-French joint 
ventures accounted for most of the major technology transfers of the 60s and 70s, a pattern curbed 
only by the turn towards a crude form of import substitution during the second half of the 1980s. 
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 In 1989 the consumption of primary energy per GDP unit was 4.5 times greater than the 




manufacture almost everything locally,  ―from needles to jets, ― made it necessary 
for the bulk of investments to be directed toward new industries, while equipment 
producing traditional lines remained antiquated (Montias 1991). Third, some 
economists argued that the attempt to decentralize decision-making at the firm 
level during the late 1970s paradoxically ended up increasing shortages and 
putting the public budget under increasing strain (Croitoru 1993: 92-94).
390
  
Yet even with these imbalances, the economy continued to perform well 
as long as external financing were available at low and predictable interest rates 
and its high levels of energy efficiency were not subject to exogenous supply 
shocks. The first oil shock did not affect communist Romania as much as it 
affected other developing countries, because the country was able to supply 86 
percent of its energy needs from domestic sources and to extract preferential trade 
deals with oil-rich Arab states.
391
 While decreasing demand in the European 
Community reduced the share of exports to developed states, growing demand in 
LDSs, with which the Ceausescu regime developed strong relations, grew 
considerably. IMF and World Bank loans, access to Western sovereign finance 
facilitated by détente, and Romania‘s ambivalence towards USSR all contributed 
to reducing the likelihood of a potentially deteriorating external position.  
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 According to Croitoru, by allowing state firms more control over profits initially reduced the 
investment burden assumed by the public budget. At the same time, the government thought that 
the more autonomous SOEs would be able to deal with world prices for their inputs. As the 
assumption proved mistaken, in the end the government had to step in and cover the deficits thus 
incurred by SOEs or to allow them to increase the prices demanded for their output which, in turn, 
forced the government to spend more on price subsidies. The combined effect of these measures 
was the emergence of systemic shortages (Croitoru 1993: 92-93).  
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 The average CMEA country was able to have a little more than half of these resources covered 




The situation changed dramatically after 1979. First, the second oil crisis 
affected the Romanian economy more than the first because of the unprecedented 
industrial expansion of the 1970s increased demand for oil.
 392
 More specifically, 
although Romania had maintained a low level of the debt-service ratio by the 
standards of both newly industrializing and East European countries, in 1978 it 
began to increase its level of foreign debt to pay for the imports demanded by 
growing excess demand. 
393
 Second, this exogenous supply shock also coincided 
with a peak in Romania‘s oil production and increasing dependence on Soviet oil, 
a turn that questioned one of Ceausescu‘s core foreign policy priorities: autonomy 
from the Soviet Union.
394
 Finally, the energy crisis was compounded by a capital 
shock: in 1979 private international capital became considerably more costly 
following the United States government‘s move to suddenly increase interest rates 
in 1979. For Eastern Europe the consequences were even more dramatic as a 
result of the ―second cold war‖ that characterized the early Reagan presidency. As 
a result, by 1982 Western credit to Eastern Europe had nearly dried up. Romania 
and Poland were thus forced into debt rescheduling, with Hungary narrowly 
escaping the situation. 
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 Between 1948 and 1963 the regime‘s foreign policy had been thoroughly subservient to 
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Gheorghiu-Dej and had been a mainstay of Ceausescu‘s rule. See Farlow (1964: 14-24). While 
this foreign policy objective was genuine and served well the legitimacy of the regime, some 
historians argue that Ceausescu‘s foreign policy did not represent a strong challenge to the unity of 




After two years of struggling to meet its international financial 
obligations, in 1982 the Romanian government sent a letter to its main creditors 
and informed them that it could no longer afford to carry on servicing the 
principal of its external debt to commercial banks. Faced with this situation, the 
international banking community formed a Steering Committee which began 
rescheduling negotiations.   
It was not until August 1982 that the country reached a debt-rescheduling 
agreement with its major fifteen Western creditor governments, with the 
agreement becoming effective on December 30, 1982.
395
 The situation was so 
dramatic that the expenses of the Romanian national airline and of the state‘s 
embassies were paid in cash via embassy mail. With energy dependence on Soviet 
oil increasing
396
 and with a ―Polish‖ scenario whereby the IMF and international 
financial capital disbursing further loans based on policy conditionalities, 
Ceausescu watched as both pillars of his policy (industrial development and 
sovereignty) were in peril of crumbling. 
Faced with this situation, Ceausescu shifted course dramatically in the 
1981-1986 five year plan: all foreign debt was to be paid by the end of the decade 
and no new debt was to be contracted. As a result, between 1980 and 1983 non-
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socialist convertible currency imports fell by 43 percent, whereas they decreased 
only by 5 percent in GDR.
397
  
The depth of austerity and the pace of the improvement in its trade deficit 
was far in excess of what markets expected and constituted a ―sui generis shock 
therapy‖ (Daianu 1999:9). The early payment of foreign debt also came at the cost 
of increased export quotas for both industry and agriculture, all while aiming for a 
40 percent cut in energy costs. Imports of Western technology were drastically cut 
and Ceausescu ordered its substitution with local manufactured products and 
fuels. As a result, total imports in 1983 were only at 77 percent of their 1980 
levels. As research institutes could neither replicate nor reinvent imported 
technologies overnight, late orders and low quality of output had serial correlation 
effects throughout the economy. The result was that between 1980 and 1989 the 
losses of state firms increased by 450 percent and profits fell by over 150 percent 
(Ionete 1993: 104-105; 199). 
The distribution of the costs of adjustment was clear: the investment rate 
was reduced from its high 1970s levels, although it was to remain Eastern 
Europe‘s highest.
398
 Since Ceausescu perceived the debt crisis as an onslaught on 
his regime‘s development strategy, industry remained the main beneficiary of 
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dwindling budget resources. As a consequence, its share of the national economy 
increased from 70 percent in 1981-1985 to 80 percent in 1987 (Cojanu 1997: 89).  
 By contrast, households and public services were to bear most of the 
burden. Spending on health, the hallmark of the regime‘s social progress, was 
dramatically reduced. Suggestively, the building of a new coal power plant 
(Centrala Termoelectrica Anina) cost nearly three times more than the annual 
budget for health and social assistance (Ionete 1993: 43). Investment in consumer 
goods industries decreased while a wage freeze and dramatic cuts in both personal 
consumption and the budgets of public services compounded the difficulties. 
Locally produced consumer goods and foodstuffs were earmarked for export,
399
 
with eerily empty shelves, unheated living quarters and hour long lines becoming 
the new reality of consumer life in urban areas.
400
 Sectors that were key for late 
industrial development (telecom, higher education) saw important funding cuts, 
while others (industrial research) were increased.
401
 At the same time, work 
intensity increased, with higher quotas with no extra pay and working Sundays 
becoming the rule for factories ordered to meet increasingly ambitious export 
schedules. While other socialist states saw only modest and temporary declines in 
household consumption, Romania decisively entered a neo-Stalinist version of 
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―structural adjustment‖ in 1982: rationed food and fuel, power and heating 
shortages, and reduced supplies for public hospitals and schools.
402
  
By April 1989 the regime could report the full repayment of its foreign 
debt.
403
 The decision to pay the foreign debt ahead of time deprived the economy 
of between 2 and 3 billion dollars a year between 1981 and 1988, with deleterious 
effects for technology imports and, as a result, for the quality of exports and the 
pace of annual industrial growth, which decreased from 3.3 percent during the 
1970s to 2.6 during the 1980s. But despite the unprecedented levels of the forced 
consumption squeeze, the state was unable to keep investment rates steady. 





Revolutionary Politics at the End of History 
Unlike the negotiated transitions in Spain and elsewhere in Central Europe, the 
Romanian authoritarian regime died in a violent fight following the convergence 
between an unsuccessfully repressed revolutionary movement and a regime 
breakdown.
405
 Contrary to skeptics‘ assumptions, it quickly became clear that the 
high levels of police repression, constant surveillance and the absence of a robust 
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 While in the 1971-1980 period the annual growth rate averaged 11.2 percent, during the 1980s 
it went down to 2.6 percent. But the crisis if national-Stalinism became apparent in 1989 when 
official statistics acknowledged a GDP contraction by 5.8 percent as a result of falling industrial 
and constructions activity (Ionete 1993).  
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network of anti-government activists did not prove to be insurmountable obstacles 




Started in Timisoara, a former multiethnic Habsburg city in the southwest, 
the movement spread throughout most large cities, with the spontaneous alliance 
of the industrial proletariat and the intelligentsia playing the leading role. The 
regime‘s attempts to put down the movement failed despite the deployment of the 
entire repressive toolbox of the police state, from the ―milder‖ arrests, city 
blockades and curfews to fire-at-will orders given to armored army regiments 
deployed on city boulevards.
407
 On December 22, 1989, Ceausescu‘s flight by 
helicopter, the abandonment of his power circle by the repressive apparatus and 
his execution a few days afterwards ended Romanian national-Stalinism, but not 
before hundreds more had died in various forms of urban warfare whose exact 
contours remain to this day an object of great controversy.
408
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According to a 
recent account, ―[t]he mass mobilization, widespread violence, spontaneous creation of local 
revolutionary councils, breakdown of the revolutionary coalition and the subsequent fierce 
struggle between the revolutionary contenders on Romania‘s cities all would seem to belong to the 
repertoire of revolution rather than a coup d‘etat. Moreover, even if Ceausescu had fallen in a 
coup, this need not have prevented the events in Romania bearing the name Revolution‖ (2005: 
268; 277).   As the same author suggests the problem is rooted in the export of a local 
terminological idiosyncrasy: ―The politically inspired reductionism which resulted the rejection of 
the Leninist model of revolution in favor of an idealized reading of the liberal variant imposed an 
impossibly narrow definition of revolution onto the political debate in Romania. Not only did the 
revolution have to be an entirely spontaneous mass uprising untainted by previous plotting or the 
meddling of foreign powers, but also the new leadership had to derive from the crowd and be 
totally unconnected with the previous ruling group‖ (Siani-Davies 2005: 277).  
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 The loss of life and limb was gruesome for a few days of protest but the figures were severely 
inflated by international press agencies who reported thousands of dead in Timisoara. In fact, the 
shooting left 70 dead in Timisoara prior to December 22, 1989. In the whole country 689 died and 
1,200 were wounded, most of them after Ceausescu‘s overthrow.  
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After the overthrow of Ceausescu, popular mobilization prevented former 
prime-ministers from forming provisional governments, and a group of officials 
within the RCP who had been marginalized by Ceasusescu and a few protest 
leaders with or without dissident pasts formed the National Salvation Front 
(Frontul Salvarii Nationale or FSN), an organization that proclaimed itself on 
television as the new authority in the land. The leader of the group was Ion 
Iliescu, one of the reformist RCP high-ranking officials demoted by Ceausescu 
during the seventies and a man who had been expected by Western and some 
Romanian elite circles to be a Romanian Gorbachev.  
The FSN Council announced the end of the leading role of the single 
party, a ―democratic and pluralist system of government‖, free elections, 
separation of powers, the ―deideologization‖ of education, human rights and other 
liberal reforms. On the economic front, the announced policy priorities suggested 
a few vaguely formulated measures that could be associated with gorbachevite 
reform socialism: the restructuring of the economy in accordance with the criteria 
of profitability and efficiency, the end of ―administrative-bureaucratic methods of 
centralized economic management‖ and the fostering of ―free initiative and 
competence‖ in the management of all economic sectors.  
However, the new power structures approximated a Thermidorian 
reaction, with elements of the ancient regime co-existing alongside 
transformational social forces. Thus, six of the nine founders of the FSN belonged 




repression of the protests in Timisoara.
409
 The real power inside the system rested 
in the Council‘s Executive Bureau, which was headed by Iliescu, who was also 
appointed as head of state. Likewise, the regional and municipal FSN 
administrators basically recycled the ―second echelon‖ of the RCP.  
At the same time, the FSN formed a provisional government headed by 
Petre Roman, a 43 year-old French-educated engineering professor who was the 
son of another dissident RCP figure but was among those who stormed the RCP 
headquarters. The reformist technocratic elite of Ceausescu‘s vast 
industrialization complex was also better represented in the executive than aging 
perestroika figures.
410
 Finally, eight dissident intellectuals were also part of the 
national council of the Front, yet they were completely outvoted by the other 128 
members and most left the Front once the council decided to turn it into a political 
party on January 23, 1990. 
This power structure was soon challenged from below by grassroots labor 
mobilization. Soon after their formation in many medium and large state 
enterprises during or in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, workers 
councils occupied factories and began to act as the soviets promised in the 
propaganda,  with the removal of old management and workers‘ rule over the 
board. By late January, however, the central FSN headquarters managed to 
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 Although 20 out of the 31 Ministers were a part of the former communist elite, the most 
numerous were two categories that suggested a more reformist profile: second generation 
technocrats with no RCP positions (Nicolae Ceausescu. Nicolae Stefan, Adrian Georgescu, 
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control workers‘ councils through a series of legislative acts that basically 
converted them into unions and ―NSF councils‖ respectively,  before they began 






In the months leading up to the May elections it became clear that the Revolution 
did not usher in a clean-cut transition to capitalism and liberal-democracy. Just as 
the termination of the sultanist order had made Romania the exception in the 
Eastern Bloc, the new political and economic order brought by the revolution was 
marked by slow democratization and timid economic reforms. 
Rather than proceed with Polish-style ―shock therapy‖ or even with the 
more ―gradualist‖ Hungarian or Czechoslovak reforms, the provisional 
government adopted instead a limited liberalization program: the dismantlement 
of central planning, partial land restitution, the selective liberalization of trade, 
and the legalization of private enterprises. Other measures suggested mere 
concern with winning the founding elections. Thus, despite near-zero 
unemployment and falling productivity, the workweek was cut down to five days, 
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wages were increased across the board and the state‘s meager hard currency 
reserves were spent on long-denied imports of consumer goods.  
During the first few months of 1990 the Front did not assert a clear 
ideological stance on the economy. In January 1990 Silviu Brucan, the  FSN‘s 
eminence grise, labeled the Front ―a political organization without a defined 
ideology‖ but then added that ―the only ideological label that can be considered 




Brucan was right. The basic elements of a local translation of reform 
socialism can be detected in the public statements made by Iliescu and the 
economic ministers of the provisional government. For example, Iliescu‘s New 
Year‘s speech and the first public statement of the ministers of the Economy and 
Industry did not mention market reforms and were limited to the main pillars of 
the perestroika laws adopted by the USSR in 1987 and 1988: decentralization of 
economic decision-making, restructuring as an alternative to liquidation, the end 
of ―megalomaniac investments,‖ the elimination of price controls in farmers‘ 
markets.
413
 Private ownership in services, small manufacturing and foreign trade 
sectors also became acceptable.  
 The search for ―a third way between plan and market‖ and a vocal 
critique of Polish ―shock therapy‖ characterized the press interviews of economic 
ministers. 
414
 Iliescu‘s initially radical resistance to market reforms was also 
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strongly suggested by the fact that while the RCP was banned on January 11, 
1990, 
415
 it was claimed that in December 1989 Iliescu‘s first option for prime 
minister was Ilie Verdet, one of Ceausescu‘s premiers during the 1970s. It was 
only following pressures from Silviu Brucan that Iliescu ended up appointing 
Petre Roman, a young academic invested with much symbolic capital from 
entering the Party headquarters and proclaiming the end of dictatorship from the 
balcony.  Basically it was only in the spring of 1990 Iliescu and provisional 
government ministers began to refer more frequently to the transition from the 
command economy to the ―social market economy.‖ 
Yet the economic reforms of the provisional government further 
magnified uncertainty in the economy. Most importantly, the dismantlement of 
central planning institutions and the reticence to build planning institutions 
adjusted to the market economy created new bottlenecks and injected a systemic 
dose of disorder in the system. 
 
The Woes of Democratization 
Political liberalization also proved problematic.  After the pre-communist (or 
―historical‖) political forces (the Agrarians, the Liberals, the Social-Democrats) 
reemerged, the FSN announced its intention to form a political party on January 
23, 1990. Its claims to revolutionary legitimacy combined with its control over the 
single TV station, high circulation newspapers and extensive parts of regional and 
industrial power structures gave the Front a crushing electoral advantage in the 
founding elections. Unsurprisingly, historical parties as well as student and liberal 
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intelligentsia organizations that emerged from the revolt with a radicalized anti-
communist identity vigorously contested the decision. 
Pending the organization of the founding elections in May 1990, the FSN 
conservatives abandoned their initial opposition to a multi-party system and 
acquiesced to the establishment of a provisional parliament in which the Front and 
other political parties had an equal number of representatives. Yet the 
fragmentation of the opposition (36 parties) gave the front a dominant position 
inside the provisional parliament. Faced with this situation, the historical parties 
and its supporters in the civil society radicalized its contestation of the Front 
through the occupation of Bucharest‘s main square for weeks in a row in what 
was Eastern Europe‘s longest street demonstration for liberal-democracy.   
The protest began on April 22, 1990 and ended on June 13
th
, 1990. It 
involved thousands of participants on a daily basis and its basic aim was to 
delegitimize FSN as a political force closely connected with the national-Stalinist 
past. Their protest was drawn mostly from the ideological radicalization of a 
substantial sector of the popular insurrection, with the initial anti-Ceausescu 
platform being replaced by an unequivocal anti-communist one. For this anti-FSN 
coalition, the domination of the FSN by reform communists was evidence that the 
anti-communist core of the revolution had been betrayed and therefore that the 
political marginalization of the front was the basic condition of democratization 
(Pavel and Huiu 2001). The protest soon evolved into a social movement whose 




the FSN-controlled political sphere.
 416
 However, despite the robust mobilization 
of the opposition, the Front‘s victory in the May 1990 elections was crushing: Ion 
Iliescu was voted president with 85 percent of the votes and the FSN became the 
strongest political party with 66 percent of the votes.   
What became apparent by the spring of 1990 was that the Front was a 
divided organization. On the Front‘s reform wing were the younger technocratic 
elite who came of age during the best years of the thaw during the late 60s and 
early 70s and who had become completely disillusioned with the possibilities of 
reform socialism. Grouped around the figure of the provisional premier Petre 
Roman, they sought to use the Revolution as a platform for ushering in genuine 
liberal-democratic pluralism.  
By contrast, the party‘s status quo elites had grown up politically before 
the thaw, had become marginalized as Romanian national-Stalinism was 
acquiring sultanist characteristics and in 1989 still hoped that reform socialism 
was the most desirable and realistic solution. Skeptical of genuine political 
pluralism, these ―gorbachevites‖ had more authoritarian impulses and flirted for a 
while with the idea of editing the definition of democracy in a less liberal 
direction. Apart from their ideology, the left did not hesitate to mobilize industrial 
workers, especially the miners, in violent confrontations with FSN‘s challengers: 
the ―historical‖ parties and the liberal civil society.  
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The ex-communists did not emphasize a strong programmatic identity 
until 1991. At first, the label of ―social-democracy‖ was used to defend reform 
socialism but gradually it began to incorporate some of the Third Way‖ critique of 
―classical‖ social-democracy. By 1993, the argument that the withering of the 
Scandinavian model was inevitable in a globalized economy was popularized by 
the party executive in parallel with the conflation between ―modern‖ social-
democracy and the more economically liberal ―social market economy.‖ This 
rhetorical rightward shift was used to temper the party‘s initial commitments to 
social welfare, but it was limited by advocacy of forms of state intervention that 





Through the Ashes/Riches of National-Stalinism 
On the economic front Romanian policy elites faced formidable challenges and 
the most dramatic of these were external. First, the hard currency reserve was 
depleted to a little over 100 million dollars
418
 and access to IFI and international 
private capital was basically blocked. Contrary to the optimistic assessments of 
the World Bank, financial markets did not feel obliged to see too many 
advantages in the fact that the Romania had no foreign debt. Instead, potential 
creditors saw the country‘s self-exclusion from international finance a source of 
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risk that far outweighed the benefits of lending to a zero debt country.
 419
  
According to reform minister Adrian Severin, Phare, IMF and World Bank loans 
were blocked throughout 1990 because of the same problem.
420
Consequently, 
private international finance did not become available to Romania until 1993, 
making Romania a ―most likely‖ case for giving in to the demands of IFIs.  
The drama was further compounded by geopolitical events. In 1991 about 
3 billion dollars were lost as a result of the Gulf War and Iraq‘s decision to renege 
on his financial and trade obligations with Romania.
421
 The embargo decided 
against Yugoslavia was estimated by reform minister Mircea Cosea in 1993 to 
have led to similar loses as the war in Iraq (Cosea 1995: 123).These amounts were 
considerable given the fact that Romania needed 1.5 billion dollars to completely 
right its balance of trade in 1993. Foreign markets in the Eastern bloc collapsed. 
At various stages during 1990 and early 1991 exports to CEMEA based on 
contracts made during the Ceausescu years ended and were not renewed, which 
generated a dramatic fall in exports and the reduction of hard currency reserves in 
the spring of 1991.
422
 
Domestic challenges abounded as well. Massive investment in new 
industries during the 1970s and 1980s left old heavy industries with antiquated 
equipment (Bel-Nir and Montias 1991). The Ceausescu regime left behind 
ongoing housing and infrastructure projects that hired half a million people and 
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that could have constituted the basis of a ―shovel-ready‖ public works strategy 
only if so many of them had not been so prohibitively expensive or of dubious 
public use (Ionete 1993).
423
 After years of suppression of technology imports that 
led to decreasing quality in industrial output, state firms spent scarce foreign 
currency resources in procuring these technologies again in 1990, putting pressure 
of the rate of exchange.  
High-employment firms dominated the labor market: 1000 firms with 
more than 1000 employees provided jobs 85 percent of industrial workers and 
supplied 85 percent of all industrial output. By contrast, forms with less than 500 
workers accounted for 4 percent of total output and 6 percent of total industrial 
output (Daianu 1999: 8-9). As a result, a frontal assault on the privatization front 
was costly. Once planning was dismantled by the provisional government, 
information and transaction costs for firms skyrocketed (Daianu 1994).  
Finally, freed from decades of repression and reveling in the new 
freedoms of association, labor mobilization was at its highest. Soon after their 
formation in many medium and large state enterprises during or in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution, workers councils occupied factories and began to act 
as the soviets promised in the old propaganda,  with the removal of old 
management and workers‘ rule over the board. Nevertheless, even after their 
suppression, labor pressure led the provisional government to fund large wage 
rises paid from the state‘s investment funds,
424
 introduce the five-day workweek 
and maintain price controls and an overvalued exchange rate.  
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Yet the national-Stalinist experience left some usable legacies for 
capitalist development. In theory, not only that there was no foreign debt, but 
several developing countries owed Romania 2.9 billion dollars. The country had a 
large labor force whose skill-pay ratio was later discovered by foreign investors to 
be one of the most attractive in the world. Thus, wages were at 7 percent the 
German level, the education system required at least 10 years of schooling and an 
extensive network of vocational schools supplied a large army of semi-skilled 
industrial workers. Hundreds of industrial research institutes provided a large pool 
of highly-skilled technical personnel and the university system churned out one of 
the highest number of engineers per capita in Europe.  
Faced with these challenges and opportunities, the first democratically 
elected government attempted to emulate the neoclassical gradualist transition 
program adopted by several states in the region in 1990. Yet the fragmentation of 
the policy team owing to very different diagnoses of the ills of the Romanian 
economy severely constrained the government‘s freedom of action. By 1992 
Romanian market reforms received a more heterodox flavor and strayed away 
from the neoliberal repertoire. A century and a half of state-led development 
under both ―capitalism‖ and ‗socialism‖ could not be wiped out over night in a 
country that was traumatized by Stalinism but in contrast to Central Europe had 
neither the disappointments of reform socialism, nor an elite of neoclassical 




Chapter VIII - Policies and Institutions in the Neoliberal Moment 
Overview  
This chapter compares the stages of economic reform in Romania after 
1989. The first part of the chapter examines the extent to which Western 
neoliberal ideas were put in practice in Romania between 1990, the first year of 
transition and 2004, the year when Romania completed negotiations for EU 
membership.  
The second part examines the extent to which I show that unlike in Central 
Europe, neoliberalism had a more tortuous route in Romania. The first 
postcommunist government (1990-1992) was only partly committed to adopting 
the main policy recommendations of the Washington Consensus. As its reforms 
led the country into a recession whose deleterious effects were unique in 
peacetime, a heterodox backlash under the second freely elected postcommunist 
government (1992-1996) sought a third way between neoliberal orthodoxy and 
reform socialism. After the ex-communists lost the 1996 elections, a center-right 
coalition announced that the economic growth achieved by the heterodox was 
unsustainable and initiated a ―shock therapy‖ neoliberal reform in which both 
domestic and external audiences invested exaggerated expectations. The socio-
economic results of this reform, worsened by the East Asian crisis and the Kosovo 
wars, were much worse than the reformists expected and consequently the 
coalition was swept out of office in the 2000 elections. Back in office and pressed 
by EU integration, the ex-communists embarked on the most systematic and 




the standard market institutions of the West European ―Third Way‖ and even 
outbid their Western peers by tackling highly regressive right-libertarian tax 
reforms that both the EU and the IMF criticized.  
The last part of the chapter analyzes the dynamics of domestic economic 
policy institutions in order to find answers to the puzzle of why ex-communist 
elites with neoliberal agenda failed in the early 1990s but were successful in the 
early 2000s.  
More specifically, it examines the role of institutional coherence, or or the 
fact that a group of like-minded actors control the economic policy decision 
making in the cabinet and the cabinet itself is institutionally autonomous from the 
pressures of competing actors who may oppose or damage the translation process. 
In the theory chapter I hypothesized that without institutional coherence the likely 
result will be struggle and delayed translation of neoliberalism in the policy arena. 
I further added that it is reasonable to expect that coherence is unlikely to protect 
translation processes from challengers if the policy process is not centralized in 
the cabinet and if the head of the cabinet does have institutional tools to shield the 
policy team from the potential challenges made by ruling party/coalition. Each of 
these claims about the institutional filers for the political power of economic ideas 
will be analyzed in separate sections.Were these shifts deteremined by the politics 
of the institutions involved in the policy process? My analysis confirms the 
argument made in the case of Spain: the likelyhood of putting neoliberal ideas 
into policy practice increases with the degree of centralization of economic 




reforms are tried, the control of the ruling party by the executive power and the 
autonomy of the prime-minister relative to the head of state proved to be decisive 
in the success of reforms.  
 
I. Postcommunist Neoliberalism in Practice 
Neoliberal Ideas and the Postcommunist Transition 
Intellectual Uncertainty and Transition Economics 
In the wake of 1989, Eastern European publics were unambiguous that the ―return 
to Europe‖ was one of the most important outcomes of their revolutions (Berendt 
2009; Ost 2005). In terms of how the economies of socialism were to be 
transformed, it soon became clear that Europeanization was defined by Western 
elites not merely in terms of generic economic liberalism, but rather in terms of its 
socially-disembedded variant: neoliberalism. In this way the principles of the 
market economy were conflated with a school of thought that had been marginal 
less than two decades ago (Kolodko 2002; Roland 2004: XXVI).
425
 It is against 
this external ideational pressure that the Romanian economic transition took 
place, initially by defying regional trends and then by adjusting to them. 
 It is uncontroversial that the economic practices that shaped the 
expectations of the ―West‖ about the reforms in the ―East‖  were a projection of 
the neoliberal policy framework that already held sway throughout the developed 
capitalist core and parts of the semi-periphery hit by the debt crisis of the 1980s 
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 The intellectual anchor of neoliberalism in conservative political philosophy (Sommers and 




(Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001: x). Yet the transition to capitalism in Eastern 
Europe had two idiosyncratic characteristics. First, it took place at the peak of the 
neoliberal (counter) revolution in economics, a time when non-neoliberal 
alternatives were at their historical nadir .
426
 Second, the transition occurred at a 
point of maximum intellectual uncertainty: the Washington Consensus framework 
of the 1980s had not been developed with socialist economies in mind.
427
 While 
Western neoclassical economists had a long experience with macroeconomic 
stabilizations in their own countries, they did not know how stabilization works 
when basic market conditions could no longer be assumed. They also had no 
experience with privatizing or even restructuring a state sector that produced 
almost all of GDP in a business environment where the state was the only 
investor.
428
 Like political science, before 1989 economics was taken by surprise 
by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and had no entrenched templates with which 
to operate. 
 The result of this uncertainty was reliance on causal narratives rather than 
any pretense of doing science (Roland 2004). These narratives were loosely 
modeled on the Western reaction to the stagflation crisis of the 70s and the debt 
crisis of the 80s and constituted a development program of neoclassical origin 
known as ―transition economics.‖ Over time, leading Western scholars and 
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 Basically by 1990 the debates within Western economics were largely limited to debates within 
the neoclassical paradigm (Lawson 1994; Arestis 1996; Helleiner 1996; Jayasurya and Rosser 
2001). 
427
 Indeed, while the transition from embedded liberalism or developmentalism to neoliberalism 
within the context of capitalist systems had been covered extensively in the literature, the cross-
systemic transition from socialism to capitalism was not (Murell 1993;1995; Kolodko 2000; 2002; 
Roland 2000; 2004; Popov 2000; 2007). 
428
 For example, the first evidence that state companies were able to restructure without massive 
asset dissipation was not produced until 1993, in a paper published by Brookings and authored by 




various old and new economic institutes
429
 refined the components of this 
program and popularized its ideas while enlisting the research innovations of 
Eastern economists (Eyal and Bockman 2002).  
Two hastily assembled off-shoots of neoclassical economics vied for 
supremacy in the battle of ideas over East European reforms: shock therapy and 
gradualism. Despite their differences, both proposed institutional resolutions to 
the East European economic transition that facilitated the adoption of neoliberal 
rather than of welfare capitalism or some kind of ―third way‖ between them. 
 
Neoliberalism Through Shock Therapy 
 
―Only the rent-seekers benefit from 
slow reform‖ (Aslund 1997: 186). 
‗‗[T]he market revolution has gone 
hand in hand with a democratic 
revolution‘‘(Sachs 1995: 50). 
 
Shock therapy was the mainstream version of transition economics embraced by 
powerful external agents such as IFIs, Western state aid programs, EU 
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 Roland (2004: xvii) brought out into relief the William Davidson Institute at the University of 
Michigan, the Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of 
Economics, LICOS at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the Center for Economic Research and 
Transition (CERT) at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh, the Center for Economic Research and 






 and loan rescheduling creditors‘ organizations like the London 
Group and the Paris Group (Kiss 1993; Steward 1997; Vreeland 2003; Berendt 
2009; Pop-Eleches 2009). It was also the path taken in the early 1990s by the 
poster cases of success: Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states. This 
approach urged the immediate adoption of orthodox macrostabilization programs, 
price liberalization, export-led growth, privatization of state enterprises and 
opening to FDI (Sachs 1989; Lipton and Sachs 1990; Berg and Sachs 1992; 
Fisher and Gelb 1991; Aslund 1991; 1995; Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny 1992; 
Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994).
431
  
Yet shock therapy went further than advocacy for the basics of the market 
economy and demanded the institutionalization of neoliberal capitalism. In the 
long term, the challenge was to take Eastern Europe into the economic agenda 
pursued by neoliberals in the West: permanently balanced budgets, price stability, 
privatization of parts of the welfare state, deregulation of product, credit and labor 
markets, trade liberalization, market-determined real exchange rates, neutral 
industrial policy, shifting the tax burden from companies to labor, lower marginal 
income tax rates and so on.  
The causal story about the past and the future proposed by ―shock 
therapy‖ neoliberals was parsimonious and appeared to address the dissatisfaction 
of East European revolutionaries with the socialist economic model, reformed or 
otherwise.  Since 1989 was cast in a ―state versus society‖ mold by the 
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 The fact that West European leaders and institutions with social-democratic credentials 
advocated a version of neoliberalism that they were hesitant to embrace in their own countries 
remains an insufficiently elucidated aspect of early post cold war history. 
431




revolutionary discourse of the day, the neoliberals argued that the state had to be 
consequently shrunk and put in the service of a market society system that would 
demand less and less of it.
432
 In this way, the evisceration of the state was 
dubiously framed as a reaction to democratic demand from the grassroots.
433
 As a 
result, more gradualist strategies beckoned the specter of reform stalemate at best 
and democratic collapse at worst.
434
  In this political narrative inspired by 
libertarian political theory (Walters 1992: 101; Woo 1994: 288), the only 
legitimate opponents to market reforms were the already privileged and hated 
members of the nomenklatura, while civil society (including labor) was assumed 
to have an interest in a neoliberal transformation (Aslund 1994: 63; 1997: 14; 
Sachs 1995: 50). The basic idea was not just ―capitalism‖ but the de-politicization 
of economic debates. As a Western advisor to the Russian government put it, 
 
[T]he transition process is dependent on how well developed civil society 
is, because the better developed it is, the sooner other, more representative 
forces will defeat the state managers (Aslund 1992: 63); [e]conomics must 
gain superiority over politics (Aslund 1996: 227). 
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 Havel‘s ―citizens against the state‖ metaphor (Havel and Keane 1990) was instrumentally 
mobilized-often by Havel‘ opponents- in a libertarian key and was reduced to mean citizen revolt 
against ―big government‖ (Eyal 2000). Even before any relevant statistical correlations could be 
put forth, the virtuous circle of transition tied political liberalism and shock therapy into a 
frictionless relationship (Ost 2005; Eyal 2000; Berendt 2009).  
433
 By contrast with this elite narrative, public opinion surveys found that the citizens of the region 
valued economic rights as much as they valued liberal-democracy, the advocates of neoliberal 
reforms treated social-democratic demands for economic rights as a psychological pathology of 
communism that had to be cleansed through austerity (Berend 2009). 
434
 Recent research has established that the increase in liberalization achieved in Eastern Europe in 
1995-2005 had a positive and significant effect on economic growth, but that the level of 





This radical political theory discourse enabled a radical economic theory 
one. The neoliberals argued that after a ―big bang‖ dismantlement of the old 
economic order, macrostabilization reforms would lead to the automatic 
adjustment of firm incentives by imposing hard budget constraints on state firms 
and expose them to the disciplines of competition and the price mechanism. The 
process would weed out the inefficient firms that taxed the public budget and 
reward those that created wealth. Crafting a kind of ―reversed Marxism,‖ the 
regime shock therapists argued that in order for this transformation to be 
successful, the property regime had to be changed as fast as possible. Rather than 
keep the state involved in efficient state firms, they had to be sold to private 
investors
435
 and the privatization proceeds were to be used to make up for the 
state revenue naturally lost in the ―transformative recession‖ (Kornai 1991) 
triggered by macrostabilization and the collapse of inefficient state firms. 
The core of the IMF programs for the region was not industrial 
competitiveness but macrostabilization. In turn the macrostabilization strategy 
was shaped along monetarist lines: it saw excess demand produced by excessive 
money creation as the main source of external imbalances, which, in turn, affected 
countries‘s capacity to borrow money from international markets. The basic 
remedy was monetarist as well: the money growth rate should be aligned with the 
desired rate of inflation. This meant the adoption of quantitative ceilings on 
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 Mutations suffered by Western microeconomics during the 1980s enabled these economists to 
couch their arguments in universal reasons why state enterprises had to be privatized immediately. 
As Roland (2004:XVIII) showed, until 1986 in general equilibrium theory there was no difference 
between private and state-owned firms as long as they acted in a competitive environment where 
they maximized profits. Yet the introduction of incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart 
1986; Hart and Moore 1990) showed that if contracts are incomplete (the case of state ownership) 




domestic creditand a floor on international reserve. None of these was assumed to 
have dramatic consequences for output save for an initial correction.In addition to 
stabilization, getting prices right in a one-off policy move was seen as the best 
way to replace the planning mechanism as the best way of allocating resources. 
―Soft‖ credits to state underperforming state forms were to be cut and a quick and 
massive privatization program was seen as an efficient means to address the 
structural problems in the ―real economy‖ (Wolf 1990. IMF et al 1991; Gemekas 
and Khan 1991).  
Another central vector of shock therapy was the neoclassical dissertation 
of the spontaneous formation of market institutions. It was suggested that as a 
result of simultaneous macrostabilization, deregulation and privatization, the 
emergence of such institutions should be expected to occur immediately and 
simultaneously.
436
 In other words, where the state withdrew, markets would 
automatically grow. This haste to recode East European economies so quickly 
was anchored in the political argument that the longer the institutions of state 
interventionism were maintained, the more the anti-market social forces will 
mobilize to increase the social costs of both economic and political transition 
through rent seeking, spoilage and the potential for regression to statist 
authoritarianism.
 437
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 The overnight introduction of legal codes would ensure property rights and commercial 
procedures while the state‘s suspected drive to carry out ―predatory taxation‖ of private economic 
agents (as it had supposedly happened in Gorbachev‘s late term) was to be kept in check by 
international donors. 
437
 The neoliberals made an exception when it came to the role of the state in stimulating human 




Powerful as it was, the neoliberal shock therapy model did not capture the 
entire spectrum of transition economics. Not all neoclassical economists were 
shock therapists and, at the boundaries of the discipline, a number of 
institutionalists and social scientists proposed their own templates. Had these 
alternative models prevailed, the East European transition would perhaps have 
looked more like Slovenia‘s or, less likely, an approximation of the ―Beijing 
Consensus‖ plus liberal-democracy. It is to the examination of these alternatives 
that I now turn.   
 
Challenging TINA 
The most publicized foil to the shock therapy was the gradualist approach 
(Svejnar 1989; Roland 1991; Clauge and Raussner 1992; Murrell 1990; 1992; 
Wei 1993; Kolodko 1994).
438
 Its main claim was that institutions that make 
capitalism possible do not emerge by themselves and require forms of state 
intervention that build off existing institutional legacies. Or, since these 
institutional legacies of state socialism were diverse, they required that policies 
should be context-sensitive in terms of content and pace. By contrast with make-
it-or-break-it shock therapy, gradualism allowed reformers to experiment, do 
bricolage, learn and mobilize usable elements of the institutional legacy of 
socialism in what some aptly called ―trajectory adjustment‖ (Eyal, Szelenyi and 
Townsley 1998:8). 
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 The subsequent literature confirmed these initial insights (Stark and Bruszt 1998; McDermott 
and Kogut 2000; McDermott 1992; Verdery 2003).
438
   The shock therapy reform program was 
attacked by a number of sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists (Szeleny 1991; Comisso 




Rather than talk about transition, as neoliberals did, these scholars 
emphasized instead the term ―transformation‖ in order to emphasize that reforms 
should be open-ended rather than tied to neoliberal capitalism as the final 
outcome. They suggested that market reforms should strengthen rather than 
weaken public institutions (administrative capacity, rule of law).
439
 Rather than 
focus on equilibrium and allocative efficiency as objectives of reform, as the 
neoliberals did, the gradualists were more interested in the mechanisms that 
produce growth (Murrell 1992: 4).
440
  
Less convinced that privatization per se was superior to state ownership, 
they advised for a more cautious course on the issue of property and some went as 
far as dramatizing the connection between hasty privatization and the fall in 
output.
441
 Opposed to shock therapists, who treated unemployment as a marginal 
concern, they feared that its sudden growth could imperil output.
442
  
Gradualism was not embraced by any major international player involved 
in the economic transformation of Eastern Europe and its proponents were less 
central in the Western economics profession. What is more, it took almost two 
decades before Western economists attacked the fulcrum of shock therapy: 
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 The large-N analysis of Popov (2007) for all communist countries shows that the institutional 
capacity of the state had a dramatic effect on performance, leaving illiberal democracies in the 
worst of all worlds. He also found that while both authoritarian and democratic regimes can have 
strong rule of law and can build efficient institutions, authoritarian regimes do a better job in 
maintaining efficient institutions than democracies under weak rule of law. 
440
 This was because the rampant uncertainty generated by the waning of quality information after 
the termination of planning institutions or by the weakening of control over both management and 
labor could not be eliminated overnight through market incentives. 
441
 Murphy et al (1992) claimed that if the state failed to enforce production quotas for state firms 
under the system of dual pricing, the transfer of resources to the private sector with market prices 
was bound to create bottlenecks and shortages in the state sector, leading to a large fall in output. 
442
 Some gradualists argued that the sudden increase in unemployment to 10 percent of the labor 
force accepted by the neoliberals as natural, would lead to tax increases in the middle of a 




comprehensive price liberalization (Popov 2007). This challenge had been 
proposed by Chinese economists in the early 1990s (Li 1996; Lau et al 1996),
443
 
yet given China‘s reputation in Eastern Europe after the Tienanmen moment this 




Neoliberalism with Brussels‟ Face 
As the nineties wore on, the shocktherapy-gradualist debate died down. 
After years of falling output and job destruction rates the like of which had hardly 
been seen in peacetime, most ex-communist economies stabilized and 
―graduated‖ from IMF structural adjustment programs. By the late 1990s, as 
Eastern Europe had developed market institutions, transition economics was 
gradually replaced by what came to be dubbed the Brussels Consensus. This new 
economic program emerged as West European policy elites were crafting the 
EMU and consisted of several ideas that built off the Washington Consensus.
445
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 The Chinese argued that the transformation of socialist economies into market economies resist 
the immediate adoption of price liberalization, deregulation and privatization and should focus 
instead on de-monopolization and dual-track pricing.
443
 In addition, the sudden termination of 
central planning would lead to increases in the costs of finding suppliers and markets for state 
firms used to receive this information from the planning bureaucracy, leading to disorganization. 
The combination between dual prices, export-led industrial strategies based on an undervalued 
currency, gradual liberalization and strategic liberalization were superior in this conceptualization 
to neoclassically-inspired models of economic transition. 
444
 Recent longitudinal data for all former communist states confirmed the wisdom of the Chinese 
approach (Popov 2007). While China, the only country that carried out price deregulation 
gradually, via the dual-track system while developing coherent export-led industrial policies 
experienced no recession during their market reforms, recession lasted two years in Poland, 3-4 
years in other Central European states and 5 years in the Baltics. Romania returned to growth in 
1994 but a new shock therapy whose effects were worsened by the East Asian crisis sent it back 
into recession until 2000. 
445
 The name ―Brussels Consensus‖ was given by the same John Williamson, the father of the 
―Washington Consensus.‖ In addition to such Washington Consensus imperatives as monetary and 
fiscal discipline, trade liberalization and privatization-plus-deregulation, the Brussels Consensus 
also ―locked‖ countries in the more carefully specified and ―policed‖ institutional constraints of 




The emphasis was on price stability, strong preference for automatic stabilizers
446
 
and deficit ceilings versus discretionary fiscal policies, central bank 
independence, privatization of public services and financial deregulation (Artis 
and Winkler 1999; de Grauwe 2000; Dixit and Lambertini 2001; Buti et al 2001; 
Winkler 2003). Its basic thrust was that neither fiscal, nor monetary interventions 
on aggregate demand could alter the level of potential output or the rate of 
unemployment. Instead, it was posited that their only effect would be increases 
above the level of ―core inflation,‖ a highly undesirable outcome. To make such 
commitments credible, a new mechanism was added: should the European Central 
Bank (ECB) disapprove of national fiscal and monetary policy, the EU apparatus 
has had the power (and the proclivity) to intervene.
447
 
This, however, was hardly a paradigmatic shift. With the exception of a 
few qualifications such as environment policy, gender equality stipulations and 
safety regulations in the workplace, the neoliberal model of the early 1990s was 
largely reproduced by the demands made by the EU integration process that began 
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 The counter to ―symmetric shocks‖ (same shock in all countries) was ECB-coordinated 
monetary policy and ―asymmetric shocks‖ (one shock in one country) was to be managed 
adequately by letting automatic stabilizers (welfare institutions) work rather than through 
―discretionary‖ fiscal policy. As the financial crisis that began in 2008 showed, a shock with 
correlated effects among countries overcame the capacity of automatic stabilizers and ECB‘s 
interest rate policy to adequately stabilize demand. 
447
 As one observer put it, ―[w]hy does the EMU apparatus inhibit and constrain discretionary 
national fiscal policies if these are the sole consistent solution to optimal stabilization? The strong 
preference for automatic stabilizers versus discretionary fiscal policies, and the imposition of 
deficit ceilings, only rely on the presumption that governments typically have objective functions 
inconsistent with monetary stability and fiscal discipline. The model has shown that it is necessary 
to consider what this alleged inconsistency is all about. If national governments attach, say, more 
weight to output variability than does the ECB, but if they all still share with the ECB the same 
targets of core inflation and potential output, no distortion arises in the determination of the long-
run levels of inflation and otuput in the EMU as a whole. Eventually, there only remains the case 
that governments are indeed not well-behaved in that they endemically aim at output target(s) 
inconsistent with the ECB core-inflation target in the long run. In other words, the EMU system 
has not been designed to host well-behaved national governments, and the sole serious argument 
for preserving it in its present form is that the architecture of the system provides the best shield 




in earnest in 1997. The ―social acquis‖ or the EU legislation on welfare and labor 
issues remained minimal (Cerami 2005; Bohle and Greskovits 2005).
448
 Similarly, 
the Brussels Consensus hardly contributed to the reception of core values of the 
redistributive institutions of the member states (Juhasz 2006).
449
 Unsurprisingly, 
then, from the standpoint of the EU, ―enlargement was more about economic than 
about social integration and convergence‖ (Keune 2006: 112).  
So far, this chapter has shown that in the aftermath of 1989 shock therapy 
and, to a lesser extent, neoclassical gradualism dominated the West-East flows of 
economic ideas as well as the output of internationally prominent East European 
economists like Janos Kornai. Both were consistent with the neoliberal program. 
To what degree and at what pace did they become practice in Romania?  
 
 
The First Neoliberal Experiment 
―American prosperity and social justice grew out of the 
struggle of uneducated cow- boys apparently in search 
of their selfish interests with the pistol in the right hand 
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 In addition to these market-conforming mechanisms the Brussels Consensus also talks about 
the objective of a ―social-market economy‖ (article 3 of the EU ―Constitution‖), an objective that 
has remained in tension with the objective of tight fiscal and monetary policy. A vast literature 
explores the constraints imposed on European welfare states, employment performance and neo-
corporatism by EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact (Pochet 1999; Martin 2004; Martin and 
Ross 2004; Zeitlin et al 2005; Navarro and Schmidt 2008). 
449
 Moreover, as the first wave of ex-communist states was joining the EU in 2004, the European 
Central Bank‘s fall bulletin indicated that health services, the backbone of the European social 
model, could no longer be sustained as universal (Navarro and Schmitt 2005: 621).Navarro and 
Schmitt also showed that some EU political leaders, ―even some within the social democratic 
tradition, of reducing social benefits, with a guarantee, however, of a minimum benefit for 
everyone. That minimum would be complemented with privately funded provisions of services 




and the whisky bottle in the left hand […] Of course, 
during the stage of the primitive accumulation of 
capital humanist values are bound to suffer, but when 
resources are missing one has to prefer development 
over social welfare, because without the former you 
can‘t accumulate anything.‖ Adrian Severin, Economic 
Reform Minister, 1990-1991 (Severin1995: 50). 
 
Embedded neoliberalism 
Between 1990 and 1992 Romania‘s neighbors adopted ―big-bang‖ strategies of 
transition to free-market capitalism.
450
 Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic 
liberalized all prices, adopted orthodox macrostabilization packages, began a 
massive restructuring of state firms and embarked on privatization via a giveaway 
of assets.
451
 A comparable strategy was tried by the first democratically-elected 
Romanian government led by prime-minister Roman. Yet deprived of the political 
cohesion enjoyed by the first center-right governments in Central Europe and 
challenged by Eastern Europe‘s most contentious labor organizations, the first 
Romanian neoliberal experiment ended up being much more constrained than in 
Central Europe. 
What made these reforms neoliberal in the aggregate was the orthodox 
spirit of the ―commanding heights‖ of economic policy. First, fiscal policy 
emphasized austerity at all costs and against the party‘s left wing Roman 
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 For the IMF description of the Roman reforms see Demehas and Khan (1991).  
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unsuccessfully pushed for the liberalization of exchange and interest rates. This 
was despite the fact that country was in the middle of a catastrophic recession that 
destroyed almost a third of the total output. Second, price liberalization was 
informed by neoclassical shock therapy assumptions about the self-regulating 
nature of demand and supply. Third, the tax policies of the Roman cabinet 
strongly suggested that inward foreign direct investment took precedence over 
fostering national industrial champions. Finally, multilateral and regional trade 
liberalization replaced selective neo-mercantilism, opening the economy to 
greater import competition.  
Other market reforms were not neoliberal per se. Instead, they were meant 
to meet the basic requirements of a market economy and would have been 
compatible with neo-Keynesian ―embedded liberalism.‖ Putting small and 
medium enterprises in private hands, breaking up monopolies, making most prices 
sensitive to demand or corporatizing state-owned industrial firms were measures 
that would have been consistent with non-neoliberal mixed economy models of a 
neo-Keynesian or developmentalist mold. Additionally, many of the elements of 
Williamson‘s original Washington Consensus (legal security for property rights, 
competitive exchange rates, moderate marginal tax rates)(Williamson 1989) did 
not top the agenda of the cabinet.  
Moreover, as the premier admitted, the cabinet‘s ambition to drastically 
cut industrial subsidies was severely constrained by high working class 
mobilization and the mass character of the revolutionary process that made 




Roman‘s team did not show a strong appetite for conservative welfare and tax 
policies. Instead, between 1990 and 1991 the executive adopted a tax system that 
was steeply progressive and increased social public expenditures on education, 
health and pensions even more than the Spanish government did (UNDP 2000: 
129). Nor was there any enthusiasm for privatizing basic services, which were 
safely ensconced in non-privatizable French-style regies autonomes.  
This ―editing‖ of neoliberalism in the Romanian context suggests that the 
Roman cabinet was hardly an epitome of the radical East European reformism. 
While it is true that the postcommunist elites that formed Petre Roman‘s political 
circle had been the most ardent free marketeers during the second half of the 
1990s (Severin 1995; Ionita 1998), in 1990 and 1991 they were merely at a point 
when they struggle to strike a middle point between neoliberal and social-
democratic priorities. Unlike his Czech, Hungarian or Polish counterparts, Roman 
himself saw Gonzales‘ Spain rather than Chile as the right model for finding a 





The Roman cabinet began his term facing international hostility. Following a 
dramatic episode of violence against the opposition in June 1990 that was abetted 
by president Iliescu, Western governments and the EU put Romania in a political 
doghouse (Vasi 2004; Gledhill 2005).
453
 Yet this government soon signaled that it 
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 Interview with prime-minister Petre Roman, Adevarul, August 7, 1991. 
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 On June 16 a few thousand miners came to Bucharest to help ―clean up‖ the University Square 
of anti-government demonstrators. The violence left 6 dead and 560 wounded. For an in-depth 




was far from representing a neo-Leninist political force and embarked on a string 
of market reforms meant to force the economy on a market-regulated mold.
454
  
Upon his inauguration in June 1990, the Roman government faced the 
daunting task of liberalizing an economic system that was burdened by a string of 
problems that were much more dramatic than those of other postcommunist 
states.
455
 The economy was completely subordinated to state control and, as a 
result, managerial elites had no experience with even the most modest kinds of 
market reform. Money and prices fulfilled mostly an accounting function. 
Deprived of technology imports, heavy industry failed to improve its energy 
consumption record. Romania was also exceptional because the Ceausescu regime 
had compressed household consumption nearly to wartime levels for almost a 
decade. As a result, the government faced much more severe challenges to 
compress consumption even further with a ―big bang‖ or ―shock therapy‖ 
macroeconomic adjustment strategy. Finally, the mobilization of labor during the 
revolution resulted in the removal of technocratic and party cadre from 
management, leading to the breakdown of labor discipline, productivity losses and 
the disruption of inter-enterprise management linkages. 
The complexity of the situation was compounded by external factors. The 
gradual breakdown of the former communist common market (CMEA) and the 
constraints put on deficit financing by a very low hard currency reserve (120 
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 The firm commitment of his government to economic liberalization was acknowledged by the 
center-right opposition, by scholars known for their mordant critique of the FSN (Ben-Ner and 
Montias 1991; 1994; Gallagher 2005: 98) as well as by the European Commission (Commission 
1997). 
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 An extensive description of the policies of the Roman and Stolojan governments from official 




million) weighed heavily on economic decisions. The country‘s unique foreign 
debt profile was an ambiguous advantage, as reentry on international capital 
markets proved impossible until 1994. Even sovereign lending was not possible 
until 1991.  
The Roman government responded to the mounting internal and external 
economic challenges by declaring macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, 
price and wage liberalization and the withdrawal of subsidies as the most 
important objectives of its term. This strategy was predicated on a diagnosis of the 
country‘s economic woes that minimized demand-side issues, blamed industrial 
labor for running factories into the ground and failed to explain why the state 
destroyed its control mechanisms over its own firms in the first place, as if the 
state‘s ‗withering away‖ was a natural phenomenon of transition. Faced with such 
confusion and citing largely anecdotal evidence, leading representatives of the 
Roman executive diagnosed the beginning of the fall in industrial output and 
productivity in industrial action, labor absenteeism and mysterious disruptions in 
the delivery of raw materials.
456
 According to Finance minister Theodor Stolojan,  
 
Under the pressure of workers and trade unions, the new 
administrative management teams from most enterprises 
(elected by popular vote) rejected the old norms for output, 
labor input and other costs but did not replace them with a new 
economic system based on profitability. These actions and the 
state‘s failure to assert itself as an owner chaotically ended the 
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old equilibrium criteria and mechanisms and opened the gates 
for the massive de-capitalization of state-owned enterprises 
(Stolojan 2000: 7). 
 
Stolojan was only partly right. An IMF overview of the Roman reforms 
showed that a large decline in industrial output in early 1990 was indeed caused 
by ―civil disturbances‖ following the fall of Ceausescu, yet the decline ― was 
partially reversed in midyear, so that by June 1990 industrial output was about 90 
percent of its average 1989 level‖(Borebsztein et al 1993:13). This was hardly the 
sign of an impending economic catastrophe.  Granted, worker-controlled 
management did not make the jump from central planning to a form of market 
system. But could inexperienced state firm managers be realistically expected to 
navigate a market system whose contours were not clear to Stolojan himself? 
Indeed, the situation was worsened by the increasing opportunities for arbitrage: 
factories producing transportable merchandised that was competitively priced on 
the international market sold their output directly to the workers, who began 
week-end tourism to neighboring states with duffel bags of roll bearings and other 
such products, leading to disruptions in the supply chain.
457
  
Yet at no point did the Roman government produce more than anecdotal 
estimates of the weight of such arbitrage activities relative to the government‘s 
decision to control state firms. Stolojan was also right that the ―state‘s failure to 
assert itself‖ made economic life even more uncertain, yet was unable to say what 
the causes of this failure were the first place. Stories of predatory labor, 
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managerial incompetence and the premier‘s conviction that most of the Romanian 
industry had scrap iron value appeared to make sense, the lack of systematic 
evidence for their verisimilitude notwithstanding.  
This reading of the situation led to a strategy meant to discipline labor and 
state ownership by marketizing supply and demand dynamics along neoclassical 
lines. Unlike in the case of market socialism, any form of planning and price 
massaging was rejected and the main pillar of the Roman government‘s reforms 
was price liberalization, a process that unfurled in three stages over a period of 
eight months between November 1990 and July 1991.
458
 The main objective of 
the reform was to use the price mechanism to marketize the economy and to 
alignment domestic prices and international prices. Additionally, according to the 
prime-minister, price liberalization was expected to ―get the prices right‖ before 
privatization, eliminate supply gluts and reduce the incentives for corruption and 
―internal sales‖ to workers.
459
 To this end, the Roman government used the 
failures of reform socialism in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland as demonstration 
effects for comprehensive price liberalization.
460
 
In addition to price liberalization, the government pushed for tight 
monetary and fiscal policies. An IMF-supported stabilization program adopted in 
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 In April 1991, the list of foodstuffs exempted from the November price liberalization was 
drastically cut, leading to price increases of 250 percent. Fuel, gas and electricity prices produced 
by state monopolies were initially exempted but by mid 1991 they were left to increase. Only 
basic foodstuffs (bread, butter, vegetable oil, milk, butter) and services (state rents, public 
transportation) were exempted. Some liberal ministers (Reform‘s Adrian Severin and Commerce‘ 
Constantin Fota) wanted to simultaneously liberalize all prices in a one-off move and to devalue 
the Leu with more than 100 percent so as to bring it closer to its real value and generate market 
confidence. While they expected a high initial inflation, they expected this scenario to control 
inflation much better than then the gradualist scenario did (Severin 1995). 
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 Interview with premier Roman, Adevarul, November 23, 1990. 
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1991 tightened fiscal and monetary policy. As a result, Romania ran low budget 
deficits and the money supply was kept below inflation levels just as the national 
currency was devalued multiple times. Real interest rates remained negative, 
however, and a two-tiered exchange rate system was allowed. Despite the 
dramatic fall in output, the main objective of fiscal policy was explicitly to reduce 
aggregate demand based on the argument that demand was already too high and 
the biggest problems were in the territory of supply (Croitoru 1993: 94).
461
  
At a time when unemployment saw its greatest growth, the Roman 
government left the unemployment budget on a surplus. The same austerity drive 
continued under the provisional government led by Theodor Stolojan, the former 
finance minister of the Roman government who was known for being an advocate 
for near-zero deficits (Severin 1995: 96).
462
 In the spring of 1992 Stolojan raised 
interest rates above inflation, devalued the Leu significantly and exerted and 
violated the budgetary autonomy of state firms by appropriating their hard 
currency earned from exports.
463
 Nevertheless, output fell by 14 percent in 1991 
and 10 percent in 1992, the unemployment rate tripled and the inflation rate grew 
further. Ironically, the inflation rate (December to December) went from 37 
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 To make its fiscal targets credible, a few months into its mandate, the Roman government 
announced hard constraints on fiscal policy in the form of budget deficit targets: 2.4 percent for 
1991 and 1.9 percent in 1992. The evidence that this was more than rhetorical performance was 
the fact that in 1991 the budget deficit was at 1.9 percent, that is bellow the budgeted level. From a 
budget deficit of 5.5 percent in 1989, Romania went to budget deficits bellow 2 percent in 1990-
1991, with the resulting surplus being used to cover the losses of SOEs. It is also suggestive that 
for most of 1991 the budget was on surplus. For an in-depth description see Croitoru (1993).  
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 Stolojan‘s stabilization program began by using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor via a 
managed float and the launching of a few strong devaluations. Unfortunately for the government 
this strategy led to increases in the exchange rate, a crisis in the balance of payments, significant 
cuts in the real wage and the deepening of recession. The argument for low budget deficits 
resonated well with the technocrats as the under national-Stalinism near zero deficits under all 
circumstances were taken for granted (Dijmarescu 1993: 10). 
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percent before the IMF stabilization package to 200 percent after the package was 
implemented, while wage earners lost more than 30 percent of the value of their 
earnings. The industrial base of national-Stalinism was withering away rapidly.
464
 
In the winter of 1991 the Roman government also announced the ending 
of the dual exchange rate regime and the convertibility of the national currency 
(the Leu) using the argument that it was a key measure for attracting FDI. Yet 
their enthusiasm for unconditional convertibility was tempered by central bank 
and Finance economists who argued that since the country was basically out of 
foreign reserves, the measure could only be passed if the hard currency gains of 
exporters were expropriated, an option endorsed by IFIs and adopted by the 
subsequent government in late 1991 (Severin 1995: 66-69; 70-71).
465
  
As the government feared that the state monopolies‘ strategies were 
leading the economy into hyperinflation, in early 1991 the cabinet successfully 
pushed for massive privatization and highly competitive fiscal incentives to attract 
foreign direct investors. The government also corporatized SOEs
466
 and cut them 
loose from the obligation to transfer their profits to the state budget. Behind this 
policy was the idea that once emancipated from the ―tyranny‖ of government, 
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 The decline was concentrated in industry: 18 percent in 1990, 22 percent in 1991 and 20 
percent in the first half of 1992. 
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 This created incentives for firms to transfer hard currency deposits abroad. Faced with the 
situation, the Stolojan government withdrew the measure, declaring that the expropriation was a 
one-off event. With BNR support, the liberal ministers BNR also pushed for the liberalization of 
interest rates with the argument that the resources for industrial investment are best left to the 
commercial banks (Severin 1995: 71; 74-77). 
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 The reform divided SOEs into two groups: regies autonomes and open joint-stock commercial 
companies. The former group, designated as ―strategic‖ for the national economy included 400 








But neither the Roman, nor the caretaker government that succeeded it in 
late 1991 advocated for a radical neoliberal strategy in socially sensitive areas 
such as taxation or the labor market. Even the government‘s ―ultraliberal‖ reform 
minister Adrian Severin rejected the assumption that markets are self-regulating 
devices (Severin 1995: 64), while for Finance minister Eugen Dijmarescu, 
 
The squeezing of demand through diminishing credit cannot be 
accepted as a price of reducing inflation at a historical juncture 
when output is at half the level of the potential of the economic 
structure. (Dijmarescu 1993: 8).  
 
Additionally, labor unrest was systemic and much of the premier‘s 
schedule was dedicated to negotiating with strikers. Spectacular episodes of 
industrial action increased the costs of government plans to shut down inefficient 
firms with the result that in Romania state firms were relatively slower in 
shedding excess labor compared to neighboring countries.
468
 Consequently, on 
more employment-sensitive economic fronts, the Roman government either 
temporized (privatization of large state enterprises) or did nothing (the elimination 
of exchange rate controls, the appropriation of funds from profitable enterprises to 
pay for the losses of other state firms). Support for large SOEs that ensured 
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 In 1991 only 4.5 percent of total investments was financed by the public budget. 
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employment for 30 percent of the labor force was seen as essential for a country 
with mobilized labor and almost a decade of very harsh deprivations, although the 
Finance and Labor ministers seemed ready to accept very high levels of structural 
unemployment as the natural feature of Romania‘s new economy.
469
 Also, 
although it refrained from investing in shovel-ready public works already 
launched by the ancien regime, the Roman government spent public money on the 




Finally, neither was tax policy a local version of popular Reagan-era 
supply-side ideas. Personal income tax was steeply progressive, with tax brackets 
ranging between 6 and 45 percent. Socially vulnerable categories (students, 
pensioners) were tax-exempt and enjoyed price subsidies for transportation. 
Against the opposition of some ministers,
471
 the tax reforms of 1990 made 
corporate tax reforms were progressive as well, with income tax rates ranging 




The failure of embedded neoliberalism 
                                                 
469
 Eugen Dijmarescu, minister for economic strategy, Adevarul, October 24, 1990; interview with 
labor minister Catalin Zamfir, Adevarul, April 10, 1991.See also Eugen Dijmarescu (―Limite si 
alternative ale tranzitiei,‖ Oecononica 1993. 
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 This, however, met the weak capacity of factory-level management used to receiving orders 
from central planners. The result was a considerable level of non-use of public investment funds. 
471
 Some economic ministers were in favor of lowering corporate taxes at the risk of running a 
higher budget deficit (Severin 1995: 94-96; Dijmarescu 1994). 
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 Since large SOEs failed to break themselves down into smaller firms and since large 
multinationals were deterred by the high marginal tax rate, in November 1991 the Stolojan 
government reduced the 66 corporate income tax rates to two: 30 and 45 percent respectively. The 
new tax policy punished small capital and encouraged large foreign investment, with three to five 
year tax breaks being offered to all new investments outside of services and with an additional 50 




For the first time since the 1970s, stores were filling up as a result of price 
liberalization. In order to make up for the remaining shortages and with a view to 
encouraging a ―primitive accumulation‖ of private capital, the informal cross-
border barter networks that emerged in early 1990 were allowed to set up tax-
exempt ―flea markets‖ and ―peasant markets‖ that provided cheap apparel, 
electronics and other consumer goods manufactured in Yugoslavia and Turkey.  
Yet inflation rose to 89 percent by the end of the year and, despite the 
sharp fall of productivity levels, labor mobilization in an environment without 
corporatist institutions led to a rise in wages above inflation. Inflation wiped off 
private savings as well as the propensity to save, which further reduced the state‘s 
capacity to borrow money for investment. Moreover, the data showed clearly that 
both the supply of goods and their quality began to decrease significantly only 
after prices were liberalized (Pillat 1991). By early 1991 it became clear that price 
liberalization carried out in an economy dominated by large state-owned 
monopolistic firms and executed before wage negotiations looked more like a 
form of rent extraction, as supply monopolies unilaterally jacked up prices. This 
led to decreasing consumption and failed payments and as myriad firms found 
themselves unable to pay the new prices to monopolistic suppliers. In turn, this 
generated a dramatic collapse in output and in tax receipts.  
Price liberalization in the conditions of the Romanian economy (a high 
degree of monolpolization and government administrative oversight withdrawn 
overnight) also worsened the country‘s external economic competitiveness. The 




devaluations led to increases in the price of Romanian exports and thus to a 
deterioration of the balance of trade. As foreign debt went from negative to almost 
a billion dollars by the end of 1991, foreign investors failed to see the virtues of 
macrostabilization and spectacular tax breaks and invested merely 36 million 
dollars in the economy (Croitoru 1993).
 473
  
Unfortunately for the government, the corporatization of state firms and 
the dismantlements of all forms of state planning and control ended up 
decapitalizing firms and putting the public budget under stress. The profits of 
most SOEs decreased significantly and the state deprived itself of the revenue that 
profitable SOEs could have transferred to its accounts. At the same time, large 
loss-making SOE ended up demanding subsidies and failing to pay taxes, with the 
result that state revenues collapsed from 52 percent of GDP in 1989 to 34 percent 
two years later, with asset stripping taking place on a large scale (Croitoru 
1993:98).  
Privatization was a failure as well despite the adoption of relatively bold 
legislation in mid 1991. At the end of the day, local capital was too sparse and, 
despite offering foreign investors institutional support, the lowest wage levels in 
the region, a highly-skilled labor force and years of tax breaks and other facilities,
 
474
 Romania attracted only a fraction of the value of the foreign capital invested in 
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 The central bank estimated that 78 percent of foreign debt was owed to the IMF (Croitoru 
1993: 74). 
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 A UNDP report in November 1991 showed that Romania was second to Hungary in terms of 
the tax incentives for FDI, but low investment in advocating for Romania as a destination for 
investors. Interview with Misu Negritoiu, ARD director, Adevarul, January 11, 1992.  The 
Romanian Development Agency was set up in 1990 to draft legislation for encouraging foreign 
investment and for easing the access of foreign investors to the domestic market. The agency was 






 Furthermore, the cabinet‘s enthusiasm for FDI was 
curbed by key actors of the policy team (e.g. president Iliescu) who thought that 
FDI was best for the service sector rather than in industry.
 476
 
Overall, the results of the ―embedded neoliberalism‖ of the Roman and 
Stolojan governments were catastrophic. While WW 2 and the attending German 
and Soviet looting destroyed 34 percent of Romania‘s GDP, in only two years 
after 1989 the figure went up to 30 percent, with the greatest destruction taking 
place between 1990 and 1992. Per capita FDI was the lowest in the region in real 
terms and the average foreign company had less than 50,000 dollars in capital.
477
 
By the end of 1992, the unemployment rate climbed to 9.2 percent (almost a 
million people), with the heaviest burden pressing on those younger than 30, 
whose unemployment rate was at 62 percent. Purchase power was halved relative 
to 1990 and exports were done by almost fifty percent as the economy continued 
to hemorrage billions of dollars as a result of the embargo on Yugoslavia. 
478
  
The first Romanian neoliberal experiment ended up in political drama. At 
the end of September 1991 the Jiu Valley coal miners went on strike, boarded the 
trains to Bucharest and after putting riot police on a desperate flight they forced 
                                                                                                                                     
Agency headed by a US-trained economist (Misu Negritoiu) and became known for an aggressive 
lobby inside the government and the Parliament for opened towards FDI. 
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 Foreign investors cited political uncertainty, restrictive land owning rights, distance from West 
European markets and a reputation for contentious labor as the top deterrents. Statement by J.P. 
Seroussi, chairman of the Foreign Investors‘ Association, Adevarul, November 30, 1993. The 
government also government blamed the low level of professionalism of SOE managers in 
advertising their forms for sale. Interview with Eugen Dijmarescu, Adevarul, September 28, 1990. 
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 Interview with president Ion Iliescu, Adevarul, December 12, 1990. 
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 Adevarul, January 16, 1993. Also, in January 1992 only 20 foreign companies had capital 
ranging between 1 and 45 million dollars. Adevarul, February 13, 1993.  
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the government out of the building and, hours later, out of power.
479
 The FSN‘s 
left wing and, surprisingly, some in the center-right opposition stood by as the 
first elected government fell to a combination of labor direct action and obscure 
political machinations inside the ruling party.
480
 The damage done to the already 
problematic unity of the FSN could not be repaired. Half a year later, the party 
split, with Roman taking over the party and with Iliescu‘s followers forming a 
new party, the FSN. A caretaker government led by former Finance minister 
Theodor Stolojan ruled until the elections brought to power the left wing of the 
FSN, which had formed its own party (FDSN) in the spring of the same year. 
 
The Heterodox Moment  
The State Returns 
Unsurprisingly, the next ex-communist government changed the tone and blamed 
the economic fiasco of the Roman and Stolojan governments on their skepticism 
about the viability of public enterprises and about the role of the state more 
generally. In his inauguration speech, president Iliescu committed himself to 
subordinating all market reforms to ―social justice for the many‖, while framing 
―the ideology of non-interventionism and the self-regulating market‖ as 
―incompatible with the demands of modern economy.‖
 481
  
In late 1992, the program of the new cabinet headed by Nicolae Vacaroiu, 
a former planner, dramatically announced that ―the state was back.‖  Its main 
                                                 
479
 Roman and his ministers resigned so as to facilitate a political solution to the crisis. 
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 The delegation of the miners who besieged the government palace negotiated directly with 
president Iliescu, the de facto leader of the FSN. 
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argument was that the structural bottlenecks inherited from the socialist economy 
and the recession could not be solved by liberal economic reforms that generated 
stagflation and that the government had to take a more active and ideationally 
heterodox role.
482
 The fulcrum of the Vacaroiu strategy was clear: the 
achievement of a balance between macroeconomic stabilization, trade 
liberalization and employment maintenance, with a clear preference for reducing 
unemployment rather than inflation constituting the central norm of the 
government program. 
483
 These objectives were achieved through five policy 




Playing with the Fundamentals 
The fiscal and monetary policies of the heterodox Vacaroiu cabinet combined 
sound finance and demand-side elements. Yet unlike Latin American heterodox 
programs (Mann and Pastor 1989; Paus 1992), the Romanian macroecononomic 
heterodoxy did not include reflation, price freezes or foreign debt time-outs. On 
the contrary, fiscal policy was tightened (the budget deficit was kept around 2 
percent) until macrostabilization was definitively achieved in 1995 and a 
functioning foreign exchange market was implemented. If until 1993 interest rates 
hardly mattered for the decisions of economic management, in 1993 the 
government began to adopt real positive interest rates. Aided by positive interest 
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 The government program of the Vacaroiu cabinet can be found in Adevarul, February 22, 1993. 
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 The preference for full employment over low inflation is clearly stated by Iliescu in an 
interview to Adevarul on September 16, 1992. 
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 Industrial output reached levels as high as 9.4 and 6.3 percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively. 
While this growth was correlated with a high volume of unsold industrial products, that volume 
was gradually reduced and correlated with substantial increases in exports, investments and 
household consumption.
 
The value of exports was highest in textiles (28 percent of the total), steel 




rates, tight monetary policy reduced inflation from over 200 percent in 1992 to 50 
percent in 1994. Macroeconomic stabilization facilitated favorable credit ratings 
from major international agencies
485
 and Romania‘s reentry into international 
private financial markets in 1995 through a series of syndicated loans. Trade and 
current account balances improved dramatically. Most importantly, the economy 
began to grow (to 7 percent in 1995) and to create jobs. 
At the same time, the Vacaroiu government stepped outside orthodoxy 
when it diagnosed the postcommunist recession in demand-side factors and 
structural bottlenecks that would be eliminated not through market reforms, but 
through economic growth. As a result, the state‘s investment as a percentage of 
GDP nearly doubled relative to 1992 and once macrostabilization was achieved in 
1995, the budget deficit was left to rise and was financed in an inflationary way 
through the injection of base money needed to cover the losses of agriculture and 
regies autonomes.   
Another unordthodox measure was the use of a multi-faceted price system 
rather than across-the-board liberalization that factored in industrial policy 
concerns as well awareness that the vertically-integrated mobopolistic structures 
inherited from national-Stalinism could not take the shock of market-clearing 
prices on energy and raw materials. Also, rather than combat inflation through a 
reduction in the money supply, monetary policy focused on breaking inertial 
inflation through a temporary freeze on wages. Most importantly, however, after 
macrostabilization showed its first successes in 1994, the government decided to 
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 In 1995 Romania was rated BB+ by JCRA and BB- by the big Western credit rating agencies. 
According to Daianu, these inflows fended off a major balance of payment crisis in 1996 (Daianu 




kick-start demand through public purchases of domestically produced industrial 
goods and an automatic indexation of the minimum wage.
486
 To the chagrin of the 
EU and IMF, the foreign exchange policy was tied to industrial policy
487
 and 
government purchases took place through close auctions that favored domestic 
manufacturers.  
 
Reinventing industrial policy and state ownership 
The heterodox were not opposed to privatization per se, yet they rejected the view 
that private ownership for all state firms was an appropriate strategy in the long 
term.
 488
 During the heterodox period, the contribution of private capital to GDP 
doubled, so that in 1996 private firms accounted for the majority of GDP.
489
 Yet 
their ambitions to privatize were modest as they wanted an economy with state-
owned industrial champions ensuring full employment and in competition with 
new companies set up by foreign investors. The premier insisted that his reform 
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 This to the resignation of the more liberal elements of the government. For example, Misu 
Negritoiu, state minister for economic strategy, resigned in 1993 citing ―deep disagreements as to 
the ideas that should inform the reform process,‖ the coordinated weakening of his institution by 
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 Interview with Misu Negritoiu, Presidential economic advisor, Adevarul, January 19, 1993. 
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 However, slow privatization gave the private sector only 27 percent of the labor force and 7.5 




scenario meant ten to fifteen more years of dominance of state ownership of the 
economy and mixed economy.
 490
  
Rather than embrace the neoclassical dissertation that privatization in 
postcommunist countries should be applied to all state firms as soon as possible 
and at any sale price, prime-minister Vacaroiu argued that such a strategy may 
hold for firms with few employees, but the right way to privatize high 
employment sectors was in the sequence adopted by capitalist countries during 
the 1980s: restructure SOEs and then sell them at a profit. In this argument he 
rejected the mainstream ―transition economics‖ model for whom private 
ownership was desirable even at an initial loss to the state budget, and in which 
restructuring was best left to the new owners.
491
 
More specifically, the heterodox reasoned that since 15 percent of the 
GDP and over a million jobs were concentrated in subsidized state enterprises, a 
neoliberal transition strategy entailed not only prohibitive social costs but also a 
major self-defeating cut in aggregate demand and the weakening of the country‘s 
export capacity.
492
 Moreover, many of them could be saved with improved 
management and cheap credit.
493
 As for the rest of the industry, they saw the state 
both as owner of strategic industries and as investor in industrial champions, with 
1960s Japan and France being offered as inspiration. The result was that by 1997 
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state firms accounted for more than 84 percent of total employment.
494
  The share 
of the private sector in industrial production was only 24 percent and remained 
concentrated in the small and medium firms of light industry (food processing, 
textiles and furniture).
495
    
By contrast, non-strategic state firms were privatized as they did not 
problematize the government‘s full employment-efficiency trade-off.
496
  But even 
here the state did not let the market rip. First, it kept ownership over 51 percent of 
the shares in large SOEs, with the rest of the shares being dispersed as private 
and/or unsellable property.
497
 For all other forms the preferred method of 
privatization was to sell SOE assets to employees at giveaway prices (the MEBO 
method) and to ban employee‘s associations from selling their stock for five 
years.
498
   This privatization method limited the likelihood of takeovers for the 
sake of improved governance and reduced the possibility for changes in the firm‘s 
employment. By contrast with MEBO privatizations in central Europe and Russia, 
this method was carried out in Romania such that it resulted in overwhelming 
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 By 1994 almost all retail trade was private (INS 1997), yet the rest of the economy was still 
socialist, as the state owned 90 percent of economic assets. In 1996 Romania had a state-
dominated market economy, rather than a capitalist one: the state owned the banks and the 
industry. 
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 During the 1980s less than 1,000 SOEs were privatized worldwide. In 1993 Romania had 6,000 
SOEs. Author interview with Nicolae Vacaroiu, January 12, 2009. 
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 Subsequent studies established that all forms of privatization used in Romania (MEBO, 
voucher and direct sale) had a positive impact on firm performance (Earle and Telegdy 2001). For 
other overviews see Negrescu (2000). 
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498
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 More than a third of industrial firms in the state‘s 
portofolio underwent this kind of transactions by the end of 1997.  
 
A Developmentalist FDI and Trade Policy  
Foreign direct investment was subordinated to a state-led development strategy 
rather than treated as a policy objective in its own right.
 500
 Like other 
governments in the region Vacaroiu‘s struggled to offer FDI incentives. Tax and 
profit repatriation guarantees were one of its first measures and the generous tax 
incentives of the previous governments were maintained.
501
 
However, the same government did not have a neutral position regarding 
the type of investment it wished to attract; rather, they offered incentives to 
foreign investments that would update the technological outlook of Romanian 
industry and made the purchase of shares in SOEs contingent upon maintaining 
current levels of employment. Unlike other postcommunist governments, the 
Vacaroiu government did not try hard to act against labor union resistance to 
privatization,
 502
  nor did it intervene to remove the obstacles faced by foreign 
investors in their dealings with local municipalities.
503
 Most intriguingly, the 
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 The industrial action of the labor union blocked the sale of farm equipment plant Semanatoarea 
to Italian giant New Holland.  
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 For example, IKEA waited in vain to hear back from the Bucharest town hall about availability 
of land for its first store and it took Coca Cola one year to be able to buy land for its factory. 




government was bitterly opposed to the access of foreign investors to economic 
activities it deemed ―strategic‖ and did not allow foreign investors to own land.  
The commercial policy of the Vacaroiu government was strictly tied to 
industrial policy: while imports of raw materials went untaxed, high tariffs within 
the permitted limits of the Europe Agreements were applied to industrial products 
who posed a competition to ―viable industrial sectors.‖
504
  Given the strictness of 
EU constraints on free trade, industrial copyright, and the perceived technological 
lags forced upon the industry by Ceausescu‘s 1980‘s autarky, the heterodox were 
not hostile to trade liberalization as long as it facilitated innovations in equipment. 
To this end, foreign firms who made such imports paid no customs tax, and lower 
duties or outright duty exemptions for pre-determined goods benefited many local 
firms.
505
 The trade policy of the Vacaroiu government served industrial policy 
through export prohibitions and export quotas applied to cheaply-produced raw 
and semi-processed materials, keeping higher value added exports competitive. 
 
Full Employment or Social Policy? 
The previous sections showed that the salvaging of the industrial legacy of 
socialism informed many of the economic policies of the Vacaroiu government. 
Social policy was no exception. Against neoliberal prescriptions, the governments 
defended the subsidization of basic needs (heating, electricity, drugs), the ―social 
clauses‖ in the adoption of the VAT
506
 and the universal character of health, 
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 When the Vacaroiu government adopted the VAT in 1993, it took Sweden as an example in 




education and pensions. 
507
 Similarly, tax policy remained steeply progressive and 
balanced social fairness with fiscal consolidation.
508
 At the same time, the 
government solved the full employment-welfare state trade-off in favor of the 
former, by cutting the already low levels of spending on health, education and 
pensions inherited from the Roman government. Indeed, one could argue that full 
industrial employment after two years of deindustrialization had been the most 
important social policy of this government. Finally, rhetorical commitment to the 
―Scandinavian model‖ notwithstanding,
509
 the heterodox political leaders never 
outlined their vision about how the neo-corporatist institutions of this model could 
be fostered in Romania.
510
 Also, after an initial radical critique of social 
inequalities, the heterodox revealed that social equality took a backseat to 
building a domestic capitalist class.
511
   
The mainstream view in the media and especially in the first new TV 
station with national coverage (Pro TV) was that heterodoxy was unsustainable 
anyway as it was based on external borrowing and inflationary risks that 
threatened to lead Romania towards the economic disaster of heterodox Bulgaria 
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 Rather than generate a local reading of Scandinavian egalitarianism, the government program 
of the Vacaroiu cabinet emphasized that its policies were meant to transform the social structure 
into one ―dominated by small owners of land and capital‖ and to ―stimulate and facilitate 




and away from the gleaming success of neoliberal Central Europe. Granted, the 
macrostabilization program was losing steam and inflation in 1996-an electoral 
year, it should be added-was at 57 percent. But the growth rates were as high as in 
Central Europe and job destruction was less dramatic. Given the structural 
challenges of the Romanian economy, these were not minor accomplishments, 
especially in the light of the economic disaster that hit Romania in 1997 and 1998.  
But what ultimately undermined the legitimacy of their project was the 
predatory means through which a domestic class was allowed to emerge and the 
fact that the loss of purchase power incurred during the 1990-1992 period was not 
significantly reduced. The most important of these was that the government 
simply let many in the management of state companies to set up private parasitic 
companies that made profits from the arbitrage opportunities awarded by their 
privileged access to valuable information. And the closest one was to the 
nomenklatura networks that constituted the government‘s power base, the higher 
the chances of getting rich in this way were. As one of the scholars who studied 
this practice closely put it, they went ―from good communists to even better 
capitalists‖ (Stoica 2004; 2005). Extensive media exposure of these cases 
eventually delegitimated the claims of the heterodox that they were delivering a 
less unfair kind of capitalism that their center-right opponents. In a country where 
between 1990 and 1996 prices grew 120 times and wages only 70 times, this did 
not go down well. 
The years to come showed that things could be much worse for those who 




of 1996, however, they thought things could be much better with the political 
alternative, threw the heterodox out of power and ushered in political forces that 
gave neoliberalism a real chance. 
 
Neoliberalism through Shock Therapy 
Waiting for Balcerowitz 
The FSN lost the 1996 elections with 21.5 percent of the vote but remained the 
largest party in the Parliament. The winner of the elections was the Democratic 
Convention, an ideologically mixed coalition made out of two nominally social-
democratic parties (Roman‘s Democrats and the heir of the interwar Social 




Although the Convention and the new president Emil Constantinescu ran 
on a center-left platform, they authorized the government led by prime-minister 
Victor Ciorbea to draft an economic reform package that went beyond the 
paradigmatic ―shock therapy‖ neoliberal reforms of the Balcerowitz government 
in Poland (Pop-Eleches 2009: 228).
 513
 Indeed, according to the EIU country 
report for the 1st quarter of 1997, this was the most radical shock therapy package 
tried anywhere in the region (EIU 1997). Restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
was declared a strategic objective and so was the battle against inflation. The cut 
in the money supply was carried out simultaneously with the scrapping of the dual 
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2001; Pridham 2002; Diamond 2002). 
513





exchange rate and its replacement with a floating exchange rate regime, a measure 
that created an exit window for potential investors in the equity market. 
Government spending on public services was halved and the foreign exchange 
market was substantially liberalized.
514
 The export bans and quotas established by 
the Vacaroiu government were terminated. The tariffs on imports of agricultural 
products were significantly reduced and those on industrial products were reduced 
below the levels required by the still phantom-like EU integration process. 
The recipe for economic growth shifted from heterodoxy to supply-side 
economics: tax cuts for firms, cuts in the tax applied to high wage earners, the 
reduction of income brackets. The complete liberalization of products and 
services was under consideration as well.
515
 The government embarked on a 
massive withdrawal from the ownership of industrial assets, and the public 
ownership funds that managed SOEs were converted into investment funds 
(Negrescu 2000). Industrial policy was almost completely eliminated in the name 
of the neutrality of the government vis-à-vis business competition. Public service 
outsourcing, multiannual planning, and New Public Management procedures were 
put on the agenda.  
 
The failure of the neoliberal experiment 
 
―Ironically,  a program  that was meant  to  advance  
reforms  negatively  affected  the  emerging  
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entrepreneurial class,  and  encouraged  the  
expansion  of  the  underground  economy  because  
of  the  degree  of austerity involved. The expansion 
of the underground economy was a response  to a 
powerful shock. As thermodynamics  tells us, 
―nothing gets lost in the universe‖ (Daniel Daianu, 
central bank chief economist, 1999: 16). 
 
By the end of 1997, it became clear that this shock therapy was the death 
toll of the years of growth as well as of macroeconomic stability. Inflation shot up 
from 57 to 154 percent in one year
516
 and in just a few months in 1997 the GDP 
fell by 7 percent, inaugurating a three year recession.
517
 The contraction of 
domestic demand substantially reduced the current account deficit, but 
unemployment levels increased sharply, and almost a quarter million private 




Labor protest stopped the privatization of several large enterprises and as 
poverty rates doubled among wage earners and quadrupled among business 
owners (Tesliuc, Pop, Tesliuc 2001: 50) social tensions grew. In the absence of 
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viable welfare or employment options, over 60 percent of the unemployed became 
subsistence farmers living in rural pockets of poverty that were increasingly 
deprived of medical services in what was the first urban-rural migration in the 
country‘s history (Zamfir 1999; 2001).
519
 The disaster was compounded by the 
fact that the halving of public services budgets tripled the debt of public 
institutions and especially of public hospitals. In an eerie throwback to the late 
Ceausescu years, emergency services functioned with makeshift solutions, and 
hospital staff began to expect patients to pay for surgery supplies out of pocket.  
As state subsidies to agriculture were ended without warning and 
simultaneously with a sudden reduction of import duties on food, many large state 
farms, some of them the pride of socialism, filed for bankruptcy. As privately-
owned subsistence farms failed to spontaneously increase their productivity and 
foreign capital did not rush in to establish large agribusiness, the result was an 
immediate collapse of agricultural output and a permanent balance of trade deficit 
for agriculture. For the first time in its history, Romania became a net food 
importer. 
The crisis in agriculture soon led to a banking crisis, as the bankruptcy of 
large state firms led to the non-payment of loans to two large state banks (Banca 
Agricola and Bancorex). Fearing a collapse of the entire banking sector, the state 
bought the bad assets of these two banks at a cost of deteriorating deficit figures. 
And since external debt became unavailable and it was decided that the central 
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bank‘s independence should be strengthened, the government issued a vast 
number of T-bills that left firms with even more difficult access to credit. 
To make matters worse, instead of delivering results in its anti-corruption 
campaigns, the Convention delivered an endless flurry of corruption cases of its 
own, while the quality of expertise and interdepartmental coordination was 
merely a shade of the FSN‘s past (Pop-Eleches 2009: 231-232). Also, the support 
of the IMF withered away quickly and in the winter of 1997 the Ciorbea 
government faced an end to IMF financing and net capital flows. Faced with this 
situation, the Convention slipped into coalitional warfare and citing the premier‘s 
incompetence, Roman‘s Democrats left the government in December 1997. A 
new government led by Radu Vasile, an academic economist, was formed in 1998 
to deal with a worsening political and economic crisis that had been compounded 
by two external shocks: the Russian financial crisis and the Kosovo war.  
Romania experienced the worst of all worlds. As labor union mobilization 
slowed down the pace of industrial restructuring and privatization, the fragile 
Convention governments lost IMF and World Bank financing while pushing on 
with austere and pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies. This further depressed 
domestic demand at a time when foreign investment was leaving the country and 
new international investments were hard to come by given the uncertainty 
triggered by the East Asian and Russian financial crises. Consequently, the GDP 




Desperate, the Vasile government encouraged unprocessed timber 
exports
520
  and used the last options on the neoliberal menu: a firesale of industrial 
assets with the aid of foreign consultants; and tax increases on wages and 
consumption (VAT) to pay for the tax cuts on capital. The number of privatized 
large SOEs almost quadrupled, so that the share of labor working in the private 
sector doubled.
521
 The sale of these big ticket items, all of whom were very 
profitable, was far below the prices demanded by the 1993-1996 governments. In 
effect, the government sold almost 40 percent of its enterprises for a total amount 
of 2.1 billion dollars through an opaque process whereby the state‘s inspectors 
were forbidden to investigate the sales. Even so, FDI increased sluggishly and its 
total value was only slightly above the 1996 levels.  
After four years of reforms, government statistics acknowledged that wage 
levels were at almost half their level of 1989 and that even though a slight growth 
rate of 1.6 rate was real, the cost was further decreased in domestic household 
demand and in the gross value of wages. The proportion of people living in 
poverty doubled.
522
 Public and private investment fell almost by half and 
according to the OECD the fall in GNP adjusted by purchase power parity further 
increased the wealth gap between Romanian citizens and their peers in Western 
Europe by an additional 5 percent. During this time Romania saw a second wave 
of deindustrialization, with industrial output in 2000 being 20 percent lower than 
                                                 
520
 The growth in unprocessed timber was made possible by the privatization of forests and the 
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 The country‘s trade profile changed, with an increasing shift towards 
lower value added exports.
524
  
The electoral cost was immense: the approval ratings of the CDR, still 
high after a punishing first year, began to fall precipitously after 1998, reaching 4 
percent during the 2000 elections. To the shock of his supporters, president 
Constantinescu announced his withdrawal from the presidential race and the 
Liberals abandoned the sinking CDR ship, perhaps saving themselves from the 
disaster of not being elected to Parliament. At the polls, the Agrarians (National 
Peasant Christian Party), until then the gravity center of the coalition, did not even 
reach the electoral threshold necessary to enter the Parliament, whereas the other 
former Convention members were reduced to a third of their 1997 votes. Pushed 
to run as a presidential candidate, Isarescu got only fifteen percent of the votes, 
and far right politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the scourge of liberal-democracy, 
emerged as the main candidate against Ion Iliescu.  
   
The Third Way, Romanian-Style 
The ex-communists return 
The 2000 election was a historical example of ―politics of dejection‖ (Pop-
Eleches 2001). As one observer put it at that time, ―[w]orse than a defeat for the 
coalition, this spelled a defeat for politics and political parties and a return to the 
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populist environment of 1990, with its hatred for politicians and parties and a 
preference for strong leadership‖ (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001: 231). The Agrarians 
were wiped out and the Liberals and the Democrats saw their lowest electoral 
scores. Iliescu defeated the red-brown Vadim Tudor in the second round of the 
presidential elections, and although Iliescu‘s party had the highest number of seats 
in the fourth Parliement, Vadim Tudor‘s party came in second.
525
  
Despite their strong showing, the ex-communists did not have enough 
mandates to form a solid majority. But rather than ally with the ―red-brown‖ 
Greater Romania Party, their former ally in the 1992-1996 government, they 
sought the support of three smaller parties situated in the political center or on the 
center-right: the Liberals, the Hungarians and the small center-left Humanists. 
The ex-communists, it seemed, were no longer the party that once espoused statist 
reservations towards economic reforms and conveniently flirted with illiberal 
ethnic politics.  
Further evidence for this ideological mainstreaming was provided by the 
new political party program of the PSD, which was a sample of ―Third Way‖ 
centrism: macroeconomic orthodoxy, privatization, deregulation, free trade, tax 
cuts for business, and industrial policy centered on attracting FDI. The program 
also called for increased social welfare spending, but this time FSN‘s erstwhile 
staunch collectivism was replaced with references to individual responsibility, 
active labor market policies, and benefits that were to be conditional, means-
tested and targeted (Programul 2000; Abraham 2006). Also, before the elections, 
Iliescu‘s communist successor party merged with the liliputan Social-Democratic 
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Party of Romania (PSDR), the historical heir of interwar Romanian social-
democrats. The oldest Romanian member of the Socialist International, PSDR 
was the gateway to the international respectability that Iliescu‘s party now saw as 
vital.   
 
Disembedded Neoliberalism and the Romanian Third Way 
In 2001, led by Adrian Nastase, the party‘s ―young Turk‖ party chairman, the 
cabinet announced it would cut inflation to 25 percent,
526
 introduce a mandatory 
private pension ―pillar,‖
527
 and keep the deficit below the Euroland criteria. Its 
rush to cut corporate taxes and employers‘ social security contributions was 
watered down only by the IMF‘s worries that tax reforms could negatively affect 
the deficit.
528
 The budget deficit was reduced from 4 percent in 2000 to 1.6 
percent in 2004, a feat attributed to better management and tax collection.
529
 
Indebtedness was at half the eurozone minimum
530
 and Romanian bonds sold at 
record-low spreads.
531
 For the first time, all IMF and World Bank agreements 
were completed by a willing and coherent cabinet led by a man for whom 
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orthodox macroeconomic policies were defined as constitutive of the very 
definition of modern social democracy (Nastase 2004b).
532
   
The disinflation strategy also went better than many expected; inflation 
dropped to 17.8 percent in 2002 contrasted with the estimated 22 percent. In the 
course of the same year, Finance and BNR announced a strategy of cutting 
inflation below 10 percent by 2004.
533
 As output increased, the BNR reduced 
interest rates and suggested a relaxation of monetary policy. The 2003 budget 
aimed for a budget deficit of 2.65 percent, which was very low by regional 
standards,
534
 a measure justified by the Ministry of Finance by the need to cut the 
inflation rate and address the problem accumulating inter-firm debts (arrears). Tax 
collection improved, although it was affected by the objective of privatizing 
enough large SOEs so that the government‘s external audience (IMF, EU) could 
be convinced of the government‘s free market credentials.
535
 
At the same time, further decreases in the budget deficit through budget 
cuts were considered harmful. The objective of cutting inflation below 10 percent 
was to be made in the ―real‖ economy through such means as wage controls, the 
partial privatization of pensions and the privatization or liquidation of the 
remaining state-owned enterprises. But rather than radicalize the liberal agenda, 
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ministry of Finance advisors suggested an increase in spending on health and 
education, which were at the lowest level in the accession states. 
Once a part of the ideological repertoire of the political right, corporate 
income tax cuts and a reduction in the tax wedge on high income individuals 
became statements of the social-democratic ―reformism‖ espoused by the PSD. In 
2002, the minister of Finance Mihai Tanasescu declared that the high taxes and 
social security contributions had to be reduced, because they stifled growth and 
increased the social security deficit.
536
 The move was successful, and beginning 
with the 2003 budget the government asked that social security contributions of 
employers be reduced.   
In the summer of the same year, Finance and the central bank pushed for 
an even more radical overhaul of the tax legislation. First the BNR governor 
announced that taxes in Romania were ―suffocating‖ capital. Tanasescu agreed 
and suggested that the solution was tax cuts and the expansion of the tax base.
537
 
Corporate income tax was subsequently cut from 25 percent to 19 percent, and 
earners of medium wages got a substantial tax cut. By contrast, while small 
pensions were tax-exempt, the average value of tax cuts for small wage earners 
making as little as 65 euro a month was set at the value of 2.30 euro, the 
equivalent of a kilogram of meat.
538
 Few expected that Finance could persuade 
the premier and the party executive by September that progressive income tax 
should be replaced with a flat tax of 23 percent, while corporate taxes were 
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decreased and real estate transactions or dividends would basically stay untaxed.
 
539
   
In addition to tax cuts and streamlined tax legislation, private business was 
regaled with a single-stop incorporation office, a West European accounting 
system, regular consultations with the premier and Finance on the drafting of new 
bills and government passivity at collecting all due corporate taxes.
540
 
Additionally, given the ministry‘s official position that corporate taxes were too 
high, the execution of almost a billion in back taxes due by small firms was left to 
painstakingly slow procedures.
541
 Finally, even though an estimated two million 
Romanians worked in the informal sector, thus depriving the budget of 1 billion 
euro, the cabinet denied labor unions‘ demand to crack down on informal labor as 
a strategy to ease the tax burden on employers. 
Privatization progressed at the fastest pace after 1989. The Nastase 
government opposed no resistance to IMF and World Bank demands to privatize a 
set list of 20 large SOEs and lay off specific numbers of personnel from 
government ministries and state firms.
542
 In Spain the government used capacity 
cuts to sell heavy industry and engineering firms to transnational corporations, but 
state industrial interventionism increased in firms deemed by state managers to 
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have a serious potential to be global players. Unlike Spanish Socialists, the PSD 
privileged multinational capital over domestic capital or state ownership as 
Romania‘s manufacturing and financial sectors were being integrated into 
regional and global markets.  
With the help of private consultants paid from World Bank loans, strategic 
elements of the energy sector were privatized, and the sector itself was marketed 
as the establishment of the Electric Energy Stock of Exchange. The Nastase 
government privatized the formerly ―strategic‖ heavy industry, petrochemicals 
and the largest state banks. The ―pearl of the crown‖ was the highly profitable oil 
company Petrom, which was sold to Austrian state-owned oil company OMV 
after the government invested heavily in Petrom‘s pipelines and vast oil station 
network. Another Western state company, Italy giant ENEL, became the electric 
monopoly provider for almost half of the country, while French and German 
companies bought butane gas monopolies.  The armaments industry was 
restructured and partly privatized. Ninety mines and quarries were shut down, 
with paltry World Bank microcredit (1.7 million dollars) being used to deal with 
the frustration of the unemployed. Privatization also touched public utilities 
companies for the first time. The result was the sacking of 33,000 workers, with 
EU funding barely paying for a small portion of the severance wage.
543
 
For the first time an ex-communist government liberalized energy prices, 
thus relinquishing one of the last instruments of export subsidies and social 
protection, with the average cost of utilities overtaking the level of the average 
wage in 2002. The promised agricultural subsidies were cancelled, and in 2002 
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workers saw a wage freeze, leading to the denunciation of the social pact by two 
of the largest union confederations. Telecom and financial markets were fully 
deregulated, and the externalization of the yet unprivatized public services began 
in full swing. 
By contrast, the government‘s record on redistribution was much weaker. 
New programs (feeding and busing schoolchildren, generous maternity leave, 
home assistance for the elderly) were introduced and public access to utilities in 
urban areas was improved. The unemployed also benefited from better public job 
search programs. Yet welfare spending stagnated and began to look more and 
more like workfare. The resulting conservative welfare state reduced 
unemployment by facilitating the draining of the labor market of almost a third of 
the active population via migration and informal employment.
544
 These forced 
employment strategies worsened the problems of the welfare state by ―extracting‖ 
the activities of millions of people from the tax base. Finally, the failure to fund 
and organize an effective and responsive labor training system reduced the 
likelihood that Romania could become a high-skill export economy. 
The unemployed who did not emigrate got the roughest deal of all as the 
level of the benefits ensured that unemployment meant a rapid descent into the 
underclass. The deliberate policy to shrink benefits and to grant them for barely 
half a year had been grounded in the neoliberal idea that living on unemployment 
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benefits should be as unattractive as possible. And unattractive it has been. By 
law, unemployment benefits exceed the poverty threshold only for workers with 
twenty years of seniority. By contrast, the youngest unemployed Romanians were 
eligible for unemployment benefits set at 82% of the official poverty threshold.
545
 
The prospect of being on the dole was so discouraging that only a third of the 
Romanians who were registered as unemployed received any benefits at all. 
Moreover, a tenth of the poorest Romanians, most of them Roma, had been left to 
fend for themselves. 
The problem was compounded, perhaps ironically, by the fact that the new 
generations of vocational school graduates and retraining programs, the backbone 
of any manufacturing-based economy, had inferior skills to the workers who were 
trained during state socialism and its immediate aftermath. This obsolescence and 
decay of the vocational system worsened as the government bought into the 
popular neoliberal narrative that vocational education was a thing of the past and 
unduly infringed on the choices of students at an early stage. 
Labor paid more in tax than capital did and the government came close to 
adopting an extremely regressive flat tax of 23 percent in 2003. The reform of the 
health sector was emblematic for this Romanian ―Third Way‖ in that it struck a 
middle course between universal access and marketisation. Thus, the debts 
accumulated by public hospitals were paid off from the public budget, over 90 
percent of the prices of drugs bought by poor retirees were covered by the state, 
the facilities for the chronically ill were considerably expanded and each county 
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hospital was granted decent emergency and surgery rooms.  This period also saw 
an unprecedented increase in the budgets for the purchase of high tech medical 
technology and ambulances for major hospitals. At the same time, the government 
encouraged the emergence of a two-tier medical system. Payments to private 
health insurers became entirely tax-deductible and as the more profitable hospital 
services were externalized and privatized, private insurers were allowed to 
compete with public providers.
 546
 With the assistance of World Bank experts, 
underperforming hospitals were closed, and New Public Management principles 




The Legacy of the Romanian Third Way 
Overall, the Nastase cabinet was relatively successful. The economy grew steadily 
at the average rate of 5.5 percent and the growth of industrial output and 
productivity suggested an improvement in the structure of industry and its 
competitiveness. In four years, the dollar value of Romanian exports doubled, 
with machinery and chemicals dominating the country‘s export profile. Industrial 
employment increased, with 40 percent of the labor force working in 
manufacturing. Romania was finally on the map of large direct investment flows 
and by the end of Nastase‘s term Romania‘s EU integration dossier was closed.  
To anyone familiar with the country prior to this economic fiesta, the 
changes of the last decade are too dramatic to ignore. A real estate boom radically 
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revised the sweep of sleepy villages and urban neighborhoods. A diverse 
restaurant, café, and art scene appeared almost overnight in large cities. 
Implausibly luxurious shopping malls began to dot cityscapes, catering to the 
increasingly sophisticated tastes of the growing middle class. The simultaneously 
loved and hated Dacia 1300 automobile, the symbol of the socialist proto-
consumer's society of the 1970s, almost became a museum exhibit. For the first 
time in the country's modern history, large numbers of Romanians traveled abroad 
for pleasure, reveled in conspicuous consumption and financed new apartments 
with mortgages. 
These were not just cosmetic changes. The boom altered the social fabric 
of Romanian society. Billions of euros were made from largely untaxed real estate 
speculation. The local elite of bankers, industrialists, and legal professionals grew, 
made ever more conspicuous claims to upper class status, and generated new 
tastes for yachts, customized luxury cars, Western university education, and villas 
in a new residential genre: the gated community. At the same time, the ranks of 
the Romanian middle-class were joined in fewer numbers by the usual suspects of 
post-communism (corrupt government employees, racketeers, small 
entrepreneurs, NGO types), and more by university-trained professionals. These 
began to be competitively employed by multinationals, dynamic local firms, and 
academic niches tied to the industry and EU research funding. 
Fueled by cheap credit and labor shortages that fed wage increases, the 
new wealth of the educated middle class changed the culture of social interaction. 




consumption) were gradually junked in favor of sophisticated consumerism and 
investments of disposable income into the vortex of real estate speculation. Some 
of these transformations were financed with cheap credit disbursed by newly-
privatized banks. Yet the biggest engines of these systemic changes had been 
regressive tax policies, foreign investment, and migrant remittances. As the 
economy boomed, the tax system was completely rebuilt to downgrade the 
redistributive effort, and to privilege the twin political objectives of fostering a 
robust Romanian middle class, and increasing Romania's attractiveness to global 
capital.  
With a penchant for exercising discreet constraints on the freedom of the 
media, the PSD rule was nevertheless marked by considerable restraint on the 
authoritarian practices originating in its Leninist legacy (Tismaneanu 2003).
548
 
Even its critics acknowledged that its constitutional reforms strengthened the 
institutions of liberal democracy (Gross and Tismaneanu 2005). Similarly, its 
nearly flawless cooperation with the ethnic Hungarian party UDMR, now its most 
loyal political partner, eliminated Romania‘s potential for ethnic warfare and 
made the country a textbook model for students of ethnic reconciliation (Pop-
Eleches 2008:470).  
Yet despite its socio-economic successes, despite its manipulation of the 
media during the elections,
549
 and despite the party executive‘s control over 
                                                 
548
 For a critical assessment of government-media relations under Nastase see Blatman and 
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Romania Actualitati, Europa FM, Radio 




regional political elites, the PSD narrowly lost the 2004 parliamentary and 
presidential elections to a center-right alliance formed by the Liberals and the 
Democrats unified under the figure of Traian Basescu. As 2004 drew to a close, it 
became clear that with the crucial help of a programmatically reformed ex-
communist party, the transition to liberal-democracy and to neoliberalism had 
gone beyond the tipping point.
550
  
As the next chapter shows, much of this variation in policy was anchored 
in distinct sets of policy ideas that translated various economic paradigms in the 
Romanian context. Yet before those ideas are discussed in greater detail it is 
important to probe the conditions under which they mattered. If indeed ideas do 
not float freely, then what modulated the causal impact of ideas on policy? So far 
the study established that systemic political and economic uncertainty opened up 
political spaces for advocates of various economic ideas. Yet the second half of 
the chapter shows that institutions mattered as well. This argument is explored by 
testing one of the hypotheses formulated in the theory chapter: [n]ew economic 
ideas shape policy the most when the policy process is highly centralized and the 
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 Pro-business policies, clear prospects of EU membership, and a cheap and relatively skilled 
labor force led to a spike in foreign direct investment. In less than five years, nearly all state-
owned banks, utilities, and oil companies were purchased by West European corporations. The 
manufacturing sector underwent a similar buyout, and, as a result, gleaming Western-financed 
factories began to churn out French cars, Finnish mobile phones and Italian designer fashions. 
Foreign investments changed the export structure as well. By 2007, automobiles, industrial 
equipment, and other machinery accounted for the largest share of Romanian-made goods injected 
in global trade flows, thus ending the postcommunist dependence on exports of textiles and raw 
materials. Moreover, because of a dependable network of public engineering programs, urban 
Romania attracted the first substantial investments in high-end industrial niches like software and 
industrial design. While most of this new investment created low-end industrial and service jobs, it 
was a boom for many university-trained professionals who demanded (and got) salaries several 
times greater than those of semi-skilled workers or government employees with the same 
education. When Renault announced that it would open a large research and development facility 
and began a hiring spree in the engineering departments of Romanian campuses, many felt that the 
developmental shift from assembling Western products to designing and manufacturing them 




advocates for the new ideas form coherent policy teams in the state. It is to the 
exploration of this institutionalist argument that I now turn. 
 
II. The Institutional Context of Economic Policy 
National-Stalinism bequeathed an institutional order that was highly centralized. 
But when the ―sultan‖ that kept this order together was killed in 1989, 
fragmentation and institutional conflict became the most important challenge to 
reformers.  As a result, the capacity of the postcommunist institutions that 
mattered in economic policy (the ruling party, the president, the cabinet, the 
central bank) to effectively assert effective control over policy was an important 
variable in ensuring that policy was guided by some economic ideas rather than 
others.   
 
Ceausescu’s Institutional Legacy 
Sultanism and the Power of Planners 
After 1989 the Romanian economic policy process inherited the deadweight of 
highly centralized governance structures. A variety of Leninist authoritarianism, 
the constitutional order of Romanian national-Stalinism was based on single party 
rule. Formally, the Grand National Assembly was the legislative power and the 
supreme form of authority in the state, yet de facto it functioned like a classic 
rubber stamp parliament (Tismaneanu 2003).
 551
 Although some separation of 
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 The Grand National Assembly had the right to appoint and revoke any state institution, 




powers was institutionalized in the Constitution (e.g. the prime-minister was 
appointed by the Grand National Assembly), Ceausescu personally controlled all 
appointments made in the upper echelons of the executive, legislative and judicial 
power. A single politically controlled ―vertical‖ labor confederation (UGSR) 
smothered worker dissent and acted as enforcer of RCP and factory management 
authority (Kideckel 2001). 
With regard to the economic policy process, outside of Ceausescu‘s 
cabinet the most powerful institution was the State Planning Committee (CSP). 
Expanded by Ceausescu in 1975, this institution was staffed by elite economics 
departments. Basically, the young economists who were hired here had to be in 
the top one percent of their class and foreign training in mathematical economics 
generally led to quick promotion in its structures.
 552
 The Planning Committee was 
much stronger than the Finance ministry and the monobank, both of which had 
been relegated to policy execution functions.  
But while in the case of Spanish authoritarianism the leading economic 
policy institutions (Planning and Finance) benefited from Franco‘s non-
interference in economic affairs, for Ceausescu economic policy was one of his 
most important preoccupations and he therefore dominated the drafting of 
economic policy strategies and punished the bureaucrats who showed the slightest 
resistance. When leading chief planner Emilian Dobrescu voiced dissent in 1982, 
he was promptly sacked and transferred in research in a different institution. 
According to the vice-chairman of this institution, during the late 1980s the 
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 Author interview with Nicolae Vacaroiu, State Planning Commission economist. After 1989 




objections of the planners to Ceausescu‘s self-defeating move to sell 80 tons of 
gold to pay foreign debt from the monobank reserves were promptly brushed 
aside.
553
 Also, when Florea Dumitrescu, the BNR governor and loyal servant of 
Ceausescu‘s inner circle suggested that the payment of the foreign debt ahead of 
time irritated foreign creditors he was marginalized and eventually sacked.
554
  
The centralization of economic policy was not a constant, however. 
During the late 1960s as well as during the late 1970s the regime attempted a 
decentralizing reform by setting up the centrale (‗centrals‘), an intermediary 
between the central planning institutions and state-owned enterprises. While some 
scholars saw these reforms as leading to a kind of ―socialist corporatism‖ with 
real decentralizing effects (Chirot 1980), for others it was just an exercise in 
―simulated change‖ (Shafir 1985; Tismaneanu 1999).
555
 At any rate, what remains 
is that during the 1980s Ceausescu defied revisionist experiments in economic 
governance taking place in neighboring countries and reasserted control over 
economic decision-making and continued to defend Stalinist practices (Ionete 
1993).  
Centralization also marked the governance of the ruling party. Recently, 
research showed that this gave the elites of communist successor parties in 
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 Statement by Ghoerghe Stroe, vice-chairman of the State Planning Committee, Jurnalul 
national, March 24, 2009. 
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 Interview with Florea Dumitrescu in Jurnalul national, March 31, 2009. For Dumitrescu‘s  
firing see Hotărârea Comitetului Politic Executiv al CC al PCR de la 17 martie 1989, published in 
Scînteia, march 18, 1989. 
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 As Tismaneanu put it, ―[f]ar from emulating the Soviets in their limited relaxation, the 
Romanian communists leaders further tightened their grip over society. The only occasions when 
the Romanian communists were one hundred per cent on the Soviet side were when Moscow was 
restoring Stalinist practices. For instance, not only did Dej and his Politburo warmly endorse and 
offer logistical support for the Soviet crushing of the Budapest uprising in 1956, but they used the 
specter of the ―revisionist‖ danger in order to wage an appalling witch hunt within their own party 




Romania a very high degree of autonomy and turned the party rank and file into 
a-ideological opportunists used to unaccountable and ideologically fickle 
leaderships (Pop-Eleches 2008: 476-477). Between 1948 and 1967 the regime had 
an oligarchic internal structure but after a brief opening during the late 60s and 
early 70s, the rank-and-file input into the party‘s decision-making process was 
basically nil.  Nicolae Ceausescu‘s appointment as both the head of the RCP and 
the chief of state, with unfree and unfair elections guaranteeing de facto his life 
tenure, gave party life a distinctly personalistic flavor. Moreover, during the 
1980s Ceausescu‘s attempts at establishing a dynasty became more apparent, as 
his son Nicu was increasingly regarded as successor and his wife Elena became 
increasingly involved in the making of important appointments.
556
 Around the 
Ceausescu family, a dozen high-ranking conservative upper bureaucrats and RCP 
leaders formed an opaque and uncritical ―inner circle.‖ Outside the family and the 
inner circle, bureaucrats and Party leaders with potential influence frequently saw 
transfers to other duties, away from the centers of decision (Tismaneanu 2003). 
 This high degree of power centralization in the leader‘s family and their 
―retinue‖ made some political scientists label Ceausescu‘s late rule as ―dynastic 
socialism‖ (Georgescu 1988) or ―sultanism‖ (Linz and Stepan 1996).
557
 Basically, 
opposition to Ceausescu from within the party-state apparatus could only be 
clandestine and conspiratorial. This made dissidence ideologically stunted. Thus, 
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 According to Tismaneanu (1999: 158), Ceausescu‘s foreign minister Stefan Andrei confessed 
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preventing Elena Ceausescu from succeeding her husband at the top of the party and state 
structures.  
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when formerly high-ranking members of the regime protested in 1988 by writing 
a letter read on Radio Free Europe (the so-called ―Letter of the Six‖), they blamed 
the socio-economic morass on Ceausescu and his ―clique‖ and called for minimal 
reforms rather than for reform socialism or perestroika (Tismaneanu 1999; Brucan 
1998; Tanase 1998).
558
   
Yet this institutional legacy did not telegraph automatically into the 
postcommunist political order and had to be reengineered after the successor 
elites settled their ideational struggles. Indeed, after the ―sultan‖ was slain, the 
RCP was formally disbanded and the State Planning Committee morphed into a 
weak ministry.
559
 After the revolutionary fervor ended, the postcommunist elite 
did not manage to reestablish policy centralization until the battle of ideas within 
the communist successor party between ―reformists‖ and ―conservatives‖ was 
definitively adjudicated in favor of the latter, with the splitting of the FSN into 
two different parties in 1992. In the meantime, institutional strife reigned.  
 
The Policy Process Under Democracy 
Institutional conflict (1990-1992) 
Between 1990 and 1996 Romanian politics was dominated by communist 
successor parties. Despite the fact that the RCP had been banned, most analysis of 
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 For an assessment of the Letter of the Six, see Tismaneanu (1989). For an in-depth story of one 
of the writers, see Brucan (1998). In essence, ―[b]itter critics of the personal dictatorship, they 
never questioned the legitimacy of the party‘s monopoly on power […] There was no liberal 
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post-communist parties classified FSN as a communist successor party 
(Tismaneanu 19994; Ishiyama 1995; 1997; Pop-Eleches 1999; 2008). After FSN‘s 
splinter in 1992, this label was generally applied to the more economically leftist 
PDSR (relabeled PSD in 2000), while Roman‘s Democratic Party (PD) was 
considered a successor party only by some (Tismaneanu 1994; Pop-Eleches 
2008).
560
 This institutional continuity at the political level was not a Romanian 
idiosyncrasy, as ―[e]ven the more hard-line faction of the FSN, which aligned 
itself with Mr. Iliescu against Roman‘s reformers, actually had lower levels of 
personnel continuity with second and third-echelon Communist Party officials 
than their Hungarian counterpart‖ (Pop-Eleches 2008: 469).  
Yet communist successor party rule had a number of characteristics that 
prevented the adoption of the neoliberal package desired by the reformists of the 
Roman team. First, the hierarchical structures of the central government 
malfunctioned. The FSN‘s decision in early to choose institutional continuity 
rather than rupture with the ancien regime enabled dissenters in the state 
administration to subvert the reformists appointees in the cabinet, with the 
repertoire of resistance ranging from foot-dragging to sabotage.
561
 Ministerial 
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 Pop-Eleches (2008: 468) argued that ―[f]rom the point of view of institutional continuity, the 
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 As in post-Franco Spain, the administrative elite was left intact largely because from the very 
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orders were not conveyed or were conveyed erroneously. Bureaucracies with 
decades of experience in central planning became suspiciously unable to come up 
with a list of potentially competitive state firms that deserved subsidized state 
credit (Severin 1995: 81).
 562
 Further down the line, the boards of state enterprises 
pressed by mobilized labor would often defy government orders to use state 
subsidies for investments in technology and use them to pay wage increases 
instead. As the first year of reforms wore on, the central administration watched 
passively as state firms emancipated themselves almost completely from state 
control.  
Second, institutional strife plagued the life of the inter-ministerial 
relations. The most consequential front line was between the amateur economists 
at Reform and Commerce (Adrian Severin, Anton Vatasescu), who espoused an 
unadulterated shock therapy, and the professional economists at Finance, Industry 
and Economic Strategy (Eugen Dijmarescu, Mircea Cosea). The conflicts 
between the two factions erupted with regard to major policy issues. When the 
                                                                                                                                     
the purges of the administrative apparatus in general and especially those lay-offs based on 
personal or political record. And since we did not have clear criteria for deciding on the criteria for 
government service examinations, we at least wanted to end the unfortunate experiment  from the 
early 1990s when the management of firms and state institutions was made based on the vote of 
the employees from the FSN councils, who thus acted like workers‘ soviets‖ (Severin 1995: 22).  
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 The removal of the culprits was impossible as well. According to Reform minister Adrian 
Severin, ―[i]n the very Secretariat of the government it we were unable to fire a deputy state 
secretary even after issuing three ministerial orders to this effect because his bosses would move 
him to a new job while keeping him in the same office to do the same kind of work every day […] 
When we found out that Marin Stelian, one of the state secretaries in the ministry of finance and 
Gheorghe Stroe, the vice-governor of BNR were undermining the negotiations with the IMF, the 
World Bank and the G 24 with their Ceausescu-era argument that we don‘t need credits and 
foreign assistance, we asked that they be laid off immediately. We made a similar request in the 
case of state secretary Nicolae Vacaroiu, who practically tried to jam the process of price 
liberalization due to his inability to understand the mechanisms of the market economy. But the 
finance minister Theodor Stolojan, who had a polite inhibition when it came to his former bosses, 
admitted that while our request was legitimate, he nevertheless merely demoted these people or 
transferred them to other government institutions […] where they continued the resistance and one 




neoliberals pushed for a big bang reform that would liberalize prices, the rates of 
interests and the exchange rate in a one-off move to put the economy in a real 
equilibrium, they were opposed by the social-liberals who argued that the social 
costs and the effects on industrial output engendered by the ―big bang‖ would be 
prohibitive. Finance vetoed the adoption of a ―flat‖ tax on corporate income and 
successfully pushed for the adoption of a progressive one. Finance also opposed, 
albeit unsuccessfully, the granting of autonomy to the central bank and, contrary 
to the stated positions of the neoliberals informed the IMF and the World Bank 
that positive real interest rates were not on the agenda (Severin 1995: 71, 74-78; 
92-93). In all these confrontations the prime-minister did not show evidence of 
enough authority to settle the disputes. In fact, Roman worked with a kitchen 
cabinet from which the members of the Iliescu group (Nastase, Dan Mircea 
Popescu) felt excluded (Nastase 2004: 50). The eventual outcome was a weakly 
cohesive cabinet whose internal tensions climaxed in the resignations of some of 
the key economic ministers in the spring of 1991.
563
 
The institutional weakness of the FSN rule between 1990 and 1992 was 
further complicated by tense cabinet-ruling party relations. The root of the 
problems was the ideological polarization of the FSN over economic reforms and 
Roman‘s misguided decision to staff his cabinet with politically-weak ministers.  
On the liberal ―right‖ of the FSN political establishment was Roman‘s faction: a 
group of younger academics, technocrats and government ministers who went to 
university in the 60s and 70s and who joined the system against the background of 
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the liberalizing moves made by Ceausescu after 1968. None had studied in 
Moscow, some studied in the West and almost all had had academic, research or 
government positions that enabled them to have contacts with the West. Their 




On the left there was a heterogeneous coalition of reform socialists and 
―red-brown‖ nationalists opposed to the reforms of the Roman government. 
Although it enjoyed dubious support in the party as a whole, this faction 
controlled strategic positions in the Parliament. Alexandru Barladeanu, the de 
facto leader of the reform socialists was the speaker of the Senate. Dan Martian, 
his closest collaborator, was the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. A heterodox 
economist (Alexandru Albu) was the head of the Economic Commission in the 
Chamber of Deputies.
565
 These men were the last specimens of Romanian reform 
socialism (Hanson 1991). They had been at the helm while national-Stalinism was 
achieving breakneck growth and who had diagnosed its economic failure in the 
late 1980s in Ceausescu‘s mismanagement and rigidity (Davies 2005: 196-197). 
As a result, for them the endpoint of transition was not neoliberal capitalism but a 
local version of market socialism. 
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(1953-1955), deputy premier (1955-1968). Barladeanu, a former member of the RCP‘s executive, 
the mastermind of the economic reforms of the 60s and 70s and, after his conflict with Ceausescu, 
one of the signatories of the ―Letter of the Six‖. For Barleadeanu‘s politics and economic ideas see 




Roman‘s institutional challenges were compounded by his insistence to 
form a cabinet cut off from the party structures backfired and soon after its 
inauguration the executive lost the full support of the ruling party and allowed the 
Presidency to undermine its reformist drive. None of the economic ministers of 
the Roman cabinet came from the FSN socialist and the nationalist circles that 
identified themselves with Ion Iliescu.
566
 Consequently, far from neo-Leninist 




From the fall of 1990 Barladeanu mobilized FSN parliamentarians against 
the cabinet‘s version of price liberalization and privatization reforms. Ion Iliescu 
first tried to mediate the conflict, yet by the winter of 1990-1991 he sided with the 
Barladeanu‘s obstructionism.
568
 By January 1991 the cabinet‘s reformists and the 
socialist-nationalist FSN elite were engaged in an all-out war. The leftist coalition 
managed to score important victories. Thus, the BNR was forced to intervene to 
keep real interest rates negative, so as to ensure cheap industrial credit. As a 
result, the government‘s decision to liberalize interest rates was de facto defeated 
(Severin 1995: 71; 74). Also, the leftists successfully demanded caps on the 
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 The only minister who had a prominent position in the FSN (Bogdan Niculescu-Duvaz) 
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 The neo-Leninist unity seemed more real only very early on in 1990, when the FSN began to 
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bosses at the village level where the revolution had minimum effects on old power structures. To 
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Kligman (1992: 122-130) put it, ―If certain communist structures survived was not because the 
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profits of ―unproductive capitalists‖ (small retailers), took food off the list of 
items whose prices were to be immediately liberalized and vetoed the 
government‘s proposition to eliminate seniority benefits from the labor 
legislation. The same coalition also vetoed the imposition of across-the-board 
―hard‖ budget constraints for industrial debtors and actively sabotaged the 
government‘s collective bargaining negotiations (Betea 1998).
569
  
Faced with this resistance, Roman pushed for a political resolution of the 
conflict inside party structures. Surprisingly, the party‘s extraordinary convention 
of March 1991 endorsed the premier‘s reformist program. Yet this political 
victory was short-lived. The FSN left led by Barladeanu continued to hamper the 
adoption of liberalizing reforms and especially the cabinet‘s privatization 
legislation, a strategy that could not have been possible without the ideologically-
inconsistent support of center-right MPs. By the fall of 199, FSN‘s internecine 
warfare reached its climax. After the forced resignation of the Roman 
government, the FSN executive stripped Ion Iliescu of the support of the FSN. At 
its March 1992 party convention the party split: Roman‘s team maintained control 
over FSN and the party‘s left wing formed a new party, the FDSN (The 
Democratic Front of National Salvation). 
 Outside the field of the political system, the executive was bitterly 
opposed by one of Eastern Europe‘s strongest labor movements.
570
 Labor 
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militancy was the unexpected result of labor legislation that created no incentives 
for labor union cooperation
571
 and maximum incentives for competition. The FSN 
hoped that such legislation would make new labor unions fight among themselves 
while the FSN would control labor through the successor of the communist-era 
―transmission belt‖ union (The National Confederation of Free Romanian Trade 
Unions or CNSLR)(Kideckel 2001).
572
  
Unfortunately for the FSN, labor‘s militancy during the revolution proved 
stronger that did incentives for internecine struggle. Over two thousand labor 
unions emerged in early 1990 and CNSLR failed to establish itself as a 
hegemonic union, as two equally large confederations (Blocul National Sindical 
and Cartel Alfa) successfully disputed its authority beginning with the summer of 
1990.
573
 Instead of diluting incentives for industrial action, labor union 
competition among the 13 major confederations generated incentives for 
radicalizing industrial action as much as it did for cutting separate deals with the 
government.
 574
 Rather than consensus, labor-management relations were marked 
by spectacular forms of contention: the blocking of main national roads, factory 
occupations and violent expulsion of management from factory grounds.  
                                                 
571
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 The FSN coopted CNSLR by allowing it to adjudicate the vast assets of the ―transmission belt‖ 
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 . Labor unions had earned freedoms of labor organization that were on a par with those of 
continental European peers. The freedom of worker association was constitutionally guaranteed 
(art 37 of the Constitution) and Law no. 51/1991 guaranteed rights for labor union organizers that 
were superior to those from France and Italy. Law 54/1991 criminalized the limitation of union 
rights  
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 At crucial moments, labor organizations overcame their differences and 
negotiated as a relatively united front with the government. This was the case of 
the first bipartite pact of December 1990. This episode was particularly suggestive 
of labor power: the cabinet was forced to accept the demands of labor leaders that 
that the negotiations be broadcast live in prime time on public television (Severin 
1995: 58).Similarly, a new labor protest repertoire became widespread in 1990, 
encouraged by the FSN‘s claim to embody revolutionary power: most dramatic 
firm-level episodes of industrial action would end only with the direct mediation 
of the prime minister, typically on the very site of the strike. 
 
Institutional cohesion (1992-1996; 2000-2004) 
The ideological clarification brought by the 1992 split of the FSN ensured party 
unity during the term of Nicolae Vacaroiu, an uncharismatic premier who 
governed over a ―presidentialized‖ cabinet.
575
 Coming from the elite ranks of the 
central planning technocracy,
576
 endorsed for the job by Iliescu‘s economic 
counsel Tudorel Postolache and devoid of political ambitions,
577
 Vacaroiu was the 
projection of the president‘s power in the cabinet. Indeed, during this period the 
Presidency was the dominant power institution in the state (Abraham 2006: 122). 
The result was relatively frictionless institutional cohesion. In bold contrast with 
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 Only a small number of liberals (Theodor Melescanu, Mircea Cosea, Iosif Boda, Marian 
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Roman‘s days in office, the president, the premier and the chairmen of the two 




Iliescu‘s trust in Vacaroiu was so strong that the premier was allowed to 
appoint his own ministers, although only one (the minister of Tourism) was a 
FDSN member.
579
 Even though some of Iliescu‘s team members asked that 
Vacaroiu be sacked because of his dull and awkward public presence,
580
 the 
president supported him all along. Moreover, when Misu Negritou, the president‘s 
only liberal economic policy advisor
581
 stepped up his criticism of Vacaroiu‘s 
intentions to relax fiscal policy in 1994, the president reacted by letting him 
resign. At the same time, the PDSR became a presidential party and was so tightly 
controlled by Ion Iliescu that party insiders went as far as labeling this period as a 
―presidential regime.‖ (Abraham 2006: 98). As a result, one cannot find evidence 
for any institutional clashes between the president, the cabinet and the ruling party 
during the entire term of the Vacaroiu government.  
Similarly, the Vacaroiu government was the most stable in Romania‘s 
post-Stalinist history, as evidenced by its few and superficial reshuffles, none of 
which affected the economic ministries (Flonta 2003).
582
 The unity of the FDSN 
rule between 1992 and 1996 allowed the government to weather new spike of 
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Vacaroiu‘s poor communication skills harmed the party‘s electoral fortunes. See Boda (1999: 105-
129) and Dobrescu (1997: 46-55).  
581
 Negritoiu was perceived by the neoliberals as one of theirs (Serbanescu 1993: 49). 
582
 Every year during his term, Vacaroiu changed between 2 and 4 ministers and the majority of 





labor union protests between 1993 and 1994 and to make the top labor 
confederations sign the first tripartite social pact in 1995. In exchange for wage 
increases, the government obtained social peace, although not electoral support.
583
 
Institutional cohesion and stability also marked the third spell in office of 
the ex-communists, this time relabeled as the Social democratic Party (PSD). The 
Nastase government was as quietly disciplined as the Vacaroiu government and 
its economic ministries were not affected by reshuffles. By contrast the 
―presidentialized‖ cabinet of the 1992-1996 period, however, Nastase‘s term 
marked by a weak Presidency and a strong cabinet, a shift that was formally 
ratified in the new Constitution passed in 2003. This situation was facilitated by 
three main factors. 
First, Nastase‘s successful centralization of power in the party executive
584
 
and the ―pacification‖ of regional bosses through a complex system of favors and 
rents that ensured the autonomy of the executive. Despite the adoption of 
primaries in the fall of 2004, the party executive remained untouched.
585
  The 
exposure by the media of these rents and of the ostentatious consumption, abuses 
and patronage networks of the regional party bosses (dubbed ―barons‖ by the 
media) ended up ruining the party‘s electoral fortunes in the 2004 elections
586
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 For an extended discussion on this topic see Gallagher (2005). The corruption of the ―barons‖ 
was recognized in 2005 by Nastase himself who deplored that the party executive ―did not have a 
coherent reaction‖ to the emergence of ―abusive behavior or the existence of consolidated 
economic networks‖. He argued that ―if we took such measures earlier the PSD‘s electoral 




despite the fact that it was under the Nastase government that PSD‘s MPs were 
forced to choose between business and politics.
587
  
Second, for the first time in the party‘s history, the cabinet developed 
mechanisms to completely control the rank-and-file and to buffer the pressures of 
president Iliescu. Thus, Nastase was both head of the cabinet and of the party, key 
ministers occupied strong party positions (two vice-residents and the party‘s chief 
strategist) and some of the new technocratic recruits who were not even party 
members in 2000 (Finance minister Mihai Tanasescu and foreign affairs minister 
Mircea Geoana) ascended to vice-presidential positions.
588
 Buffeted, Iliescu and 
his more left-leaning economic advisors (Gheorghe Zaman and Florin Georgescu) 
generally supported the economic policy course of the cabinet and opposed the 
cabinet only on the issue of the flat tax in 2003.
589
  
With the party under his control, Nastase appointed a US-trained 
technocrat at Finance and replaced the Convention‘s state secretaries in all 
economic ministries with technocrats still in their late twenties and early thirties 
(Nastase 2004). The same reshuffle happened in the special economic agencies 
(privatization, foreign investment, capital markets). This was a different breed of 
technocrats: most had studied economics abroad and many had worked for private 
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consultancies.  In the hiring process the premier privileged Western education and 
theoretical over practical training, as he saw socialization in the traditions of the 





In sum, the institutional cohesion of the policy team seems to have been a 
necessary condition for the capacity of the government to adopt neoliberal 
reforms. Although the Roman cabinet showed remarkable determination in 
advancing a local version of embedded neoliberalism, its reforms were eventually 
derailed by the obstructions of the ruling party‘s left wing, of the president and 
even of parts of the state bureaucracy. Outside the boundaries of the political 
system, labor mobilization added to the pressure and in September 1991 the most 
militant wing of the labor movement took down the Roman government. 
Institutional problems grounded the more radical neoliberal program of the 
Convention government (1996-2000). In this case, coalitional warfare and the 
same president-cabinet scuffles taking place against the background of renewed 
labor mobilization prevented the cabinet from carrying out its shock therapy 
program.  
By contrast with these two episodes of institutional lack of cohesion, the 
heterodox program of the Vacaroiu government (1992-1996) and the ―Third 
Way‖ reading of neoliberalism during the Nastase cabinet (2000-2004) were 
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carried out without much friction. In both cases party centralization, a strong 
premier and a supportive/weak president enabled the fulfillment of the cabinet‘s 
agenda and the ―taming‖ of labor pressure.  
Yet the Spanish case also suggested that neoliberal ideas were more likely 
to become policy if the central bank‘s institutional position vis-à-vis the cabinet 
was strong. This meant that this institution developed de facto autonomy from 
Finance or that networks of economists based/educated by the central bank 
occupied important positions in the cabinet.  
 
The Sluggish Rise of the Romanian Central Bank 
As the next chapter shows, the advocacy of neoliberal ideas in Romania had a 
strong base in networks of economists connected with the central bank. Yet 
Banca Nationala a Romaniei (BNR) was much slower than its Spanish 
counterpart in asserting its institutional prowess. In the immediate aftermath of 
1989, BNR was a weak actor subject to the pressures of the executive, despite the 
external support it enjoyed from IFIs. It was only in the late 1990s, when IFI 
made central bank autonomy an object of conditionality, that BNR was able to 
effectively support the neoliberal agenda in front of the executive.  
But, as in the case of Banco de Espana, epistemic prowess proved to me 
more important than institutional consolidation, as soon after 1990 BNR quickly 
occupied the higher ground in economic expertise, aided by IFI resources directed 
at improving the technical training of its staff. This enabled the BNR to function 




neoliberal agenda in other economic policy areas as well. The EU integration 
process and the ideological shift in government during the second half of the 
1990s consolidated the soft power of the BNR with hard power: de facto 
independence. 
 
From monobank to central bank 
Before 1989 the BNR was little more than a socialist commercial bank 
(monobank). Most of its activities consisted of managing state subsidies to the 
industry and all foreign operations were carried out through a separate state bank 
(Banca Romana de Comert Exterior). The BNR had lost its statute as a central 
bank in 1952, following a dramatic political purge during which the regime 
arrested its leadership on sabotage charges, fired its Western-trained economists 
and hired a new generation of economists with fresh Soviet degrees.
591
 In theory, 
the BNR was completely subordinated to the State Planning Committee and the 
Ministry of Finance. 
592
 Yet de facto during the 1980s the BNR governing board 
remained completely subordinated to the whims of Ceausescu personally. 
This situation changed radically after the end of the Ceausescu regime. 
With IMF and World Bank expertise,
593
 in September 1990 the BNR received a 
new statute (Legea no. 34/1991) which stipulated that financial flows between the 
government and state firms be henceforth carried out by commercial banks and 
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592
 Interview with BN governor Mugur Isarescu, Adevarul, September 8, 1990.  
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that the main function of the BNR would be price stability,
594
 with the former 
objective playing a central role in the first press interview of the new governor.
595
 
The new statute gave the bank a considerable degree of autonomy relative to the 
executive and, most importantly, almost complete control over its budget.  
In practice both of these prerogatives were violated by the cabinet during 
the first half of the 1990s. For example, in 1991, BNR was forced by the cabinet 
to run real interest rates below inflation in order to feed cheap credit to 
unprofitable state companies. 
596
 The IMF defended the BNR in 1993 against 
government pressures to subsidize loss making state firms, forcing them to 
borrow money at market interest rates. But eventually the government managed to 
force the central bank to demand the lowest interest rates on the market for 
strategic sectors (as opposed to firms) such as agriculture, energy, exports.
597
 All 
in all, the heterodox treated the central bank like a development bank and 
plundered its resources at will. In spite of heavy borrowing (over 1.5 billion 
dollars), by the end of 1996 the hard currency reserves of the central bank stood at 




On the road to central bank independence 
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As its epistemic superiority consolidated, the institutional vulnerability of the 
central bank was drastically reduced in 1998, with the adoption of a new statute 
(Legea no. 10/1998) that restricted government borrowing from the BNR by 
setting a market interest rate on central bank advances to the public budget and by 
capping the maximum amount of government deficit to be covered with central 
bank credit. The test of the political prowess of the BNR was that between 1998 
and 2004 the cabinet never dared to demand central bank credit.
599
 The influence 
of central bank economists in the executive grew. The BNR chief economists 
Daniel Daianu became minister of finance in 1998 and governor Isarescu became 
premier in 1999 and presidential candidate for the hapless Convention in 2000. 
The reforms also turned institution in one of the few clear winners of the 1997 
―transformational recession,‖ with BNR reserves soaring from 600 million in 
1996 to 2.6 billion in 1997 (Daianu 1999: 15). BNR‘s increasing resources 
enabled it to attract the best graduates of DOFIN, Romania‘s only graduate 
economics school with some international reputation, while the Finance ministry 
was left with the second tier.
600
  
The 2003 reforms made under the EU integration calendar gave the central 
bank freedom from instruction from the cabinet, sole competence on determining 
the exchange rate regime, prohibited all direct credit to the public budget and gave 
the BNR complete control over its expenses and revenues.
 601
  In ECB fashion, the 
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 The new statute was in compliance with ECB requirements. This was certified by the European 




BNR board was freed from the obligation to publish the minutes of its meetings. 
The BNR‘s only political obligation was to submit an annual report to the 
Parliament.  
 
BNR as epistemic power 
Yet, like in Spanish counterpart, the BNR shaped economic policy in more subtle 
ways. Immediately after 1989, its greater control over its earnings enabled an 
entrepreneurial new governor (Mugur Isarescu) to endow the bank with a team of 
young macroeconomists selected from the elite niche of the department of 
mathematical economics. When drastic budget cuts and bad management 
deprived economics departments of economic journals and books, the BNR made 
access to the latest literature one of its priorities. By 1991 BNR sponsored 
scholarships abroad for its staff and funded the institutes who could assess the 
costs of industrial reconversion.
602
  
Like in Spain, the top economists in BNR and the governor himself were 
also star professors at ASE, the leading economics department. This was the result 
of the fact that the BNR‘s generous budget allowed for the payment of 
competitive salaries for the elite of ASE economists. Moreover, by the late 1990s 
the BNR informally patronized its own private think-tank (CEROPE) staffed by 
economists that either worked for the BNR or had co-authored research projects 
with BNR economists in the past. CEROPE soon emerged as the leading and 
                                                                                                                                     
amendment was that the governor could be dismissed not by the Romanian Parliament rather than 
by the European Court of Justice (Commission 2004: 87). 
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highly elitist voice of orthodoxy and served as a laboratory for preparing the 
macroeconomic dossier of Romania‘s EU integration during the early 2000s.
603
 
While the Research Service of the BNR did not raise to the prominence of 
its Spanish counterpart, nevertheless some of the biggest names in the governors‘ 
circle of advisors (e.g. Cristian Popa) came from the same professional ecology: 
the elite postgraduate program run within ASE by Moisa Adler. As the next 
chapters show, Adler was the septuagenarian eminence grise of Romanian 
mathematical economics and one of the few Romanian economists who had 
become conversant in Western neoclassical finance economics during national-
Stalinism. Adler had been deeply involved with the BNR establishment: his sister 
ran the BNR‘s research service and he was an informal advisor to the central bank 
governing board. These relationships and Adler‘s own professionalism gave the 
BNR economists who constituted the central bank‘s epistemic core a degree of 




This chapter makes two claims. First, neoliberalism was not the only choice on 
the menu of postcommunist rulers. Few ex-communists morphed into committed 
neoliberals overnight and alternative paradigms were available and were 
effectively carried out. An ex-communist government wedded to a heterodox 
economic agenda ruled between 1992 and 1996, leaving behind a stabilized 
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economy that was marked by high levels of state intervention. It was only in 1997 
that a neoliberal ―shock therapy‖ package was tried with generally poor results. 
The only successful neoliberal reform program was carried out by the ex-
communists between 2000 and 2004. Qualified by Third Way characteristics, this 
program definitively altered the deep structures of Romania‘s political economy 
on the cusp of its complete integration in the European Union.  
  The second claim is that neoliberal ideas neither floated freely, nor 
became powerful independently of the characteristics of the economic policy 
process. Rather, they were more likely to shape economic institutions when the 
policy process was effectively centralized in coherent policy teams. Although the 
neoliberal reform agenda was strong in the first postcommunist cabinet, the 
conflicts between the president and the cabinet, as well as among the cabinet 
members and within the ruling party led to stop-go reforms rather than to the 
bolder reforms adopted by Central European and Baltic governments. By contrast, 
a relatively coherent heterodox agenda was quietly implemented between 1992 
and 1996 despite much greater economic and international political challenges. 
Coalitional warfare crashed the radical shock therapy program of the center-right 
between 1996 and 200, while the Third Way reading of neoliberalism under a new 
ex-communist government after 2000 was again carried out relatively smoothly 






Chapter IX - Ideas in the Neoliberal Moment  
 
Overview 
This chapter analyzes the translation of neoliberal ideas in Romania after 
1989. It begins by examining the extent to which neoliberalism could have 
resonated with domestic economic theories and finds that Romanian economics 
had not been historically friendly towards the neoclassical tradition. Also, the 
country‘s development model after 1948 had seen no experimentation with the 
―soft‖ forms of market socialism adopted by Hungary and Poland. Yet beginning 
with the 1960s marginalism was semi-clandestinely discovered by Romanian 
academic economists working in the cracks of the academic-bureaucratic complex 
and engaging in transnational dialogues with Western peers via the common 
language of linear programming. 
Yet this opening did not lead to a systematic engagement with the 
neoclassical tradition, as the tightening of the authoritarian policing of economics 
during the 1980s limited the space for such an outcome. As a result, when the 
regime fell in 1989 the field of economics was dominated by reform socialists and 
heterodox economists. This path-dependence negatively affected the chances of 
neoliberal ideas to dominate the debate until the second half of the 1990s. 
The last part of the chapter traces neoliberalism‘s rise during the early 
1990s and its dominance beginning with the late 1990s. Yet I show that domestic 




paradigm. Instead, I show how domestic economists worked to replicate but also 
to recast the neoliberal theoretical models via editing, bricolage or, in short, 
translation. The result was a variety of neoliberalism that had radicalized the 
libertarian tendencies of the ―original.‖  
 
A Clogged Sieve: Interventionist Legacies for Neoliberal Flows 
Interventionism Before National-Stalinism 
Beginning with the second half of the 19
th
 century Romanian economics was 
dominated by interventionist and eclectic thinking. Basically all the leading 
economists of the pre-Stalinist era advocated development strategies based on 
protectionism, state intervention and the mixed economy (Murgescu 1990). The 
dominant figures of Romanian economics came from a generation of economists 
who had been thoroughly influenced by the ideas of French neo-mercantilism and 
of the German Historical School. This was particularly the case of the interwar 
period, regarded as the golden age of the discipline, the key representatives of 
which are still revered in Romanian economics departments (Aligica and Evans 
2009).  From the national-liberalism of Vintila Bratianu
604
 to the ―agrarian 
                                                 
604
 For example, Vintila Bratianu, a leading economist and Liberal Party politician whose thinking 
dominated policy-making in the interwar years, was as enthusiastic in supporting ―sound finance‖ 
as in his advocacy of industrial protectionism, the nationalization of oil and gas industries and the 
subordination of FDI to national priorities. As a finance minister between 1922 and 1928 and, in 
the words of one historian, ―the de facto architect of Romania‘s economic policy, a field in which 
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practice. For an evaluation of the results of this developmental course see Ioan Saizu, 




economics‖ of Virgil Madgearu and Ion Raducanu, interwar Romanian economics 
saw in interventionism the way out of peripheral underdevelopment.
 605
   
The most dramatic manifestation of the Romanian interventionist tradition 
was the corporatist import substitution industrialization theory of Mihail 
Manoilescu, the only Romanian economist whose work enjoyed world popularity 
and some policy impact outside Romania.
606
 According to Manoilescu, 
industrialization was the only way out of backwardness for countries like 
Romania, an objective to be pursued by transferring surplus labor from agriculture 
to industrial activities. A dependentista before dependency theory became 
fashionable in political economy, Manoilescu made an even more forceful case 
for autarkic industrial development as the only way to counter structural 
constraints on Romanian attempts to break out of the periphery.
607
  Interestingly, 
the central actor in this paradigm was no longer the industrial bourgeoisie, but a 
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 Both Madgearu and Raducanu were German-style mandarin professors and also served as 
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state bureaucracy placed in lockstep with an authoritarian regime.
608
 With 
Manoilescu the interventionism of Romanian economics reached its apex and 
transitioned into a form of heterodoxy shaped by a state-dominated authoritarian 
corporatism. 
By contrast with the popularity of interventionist economic ideas among 
the economists (and politicians) of the Romanian liberal era, economic historians 
have not detected any strong push for the classical liberal economic program. The 
great Romanian economists of the first half of the 20
th
 century were very familiar 
with marginalism, yet they never developed systematic research agendas in this 
tradition (Love 1996: 14). It was only in the late 1930s that a few young 
economists with Western PhDs returned home espousing German Ordoliberalism 
or the neoclassical-Keynesian syndissertation that previous chapters of this study 
found in the case of Spain (Kiritescu 1992).  
While the mastery of marginalist economics and particularly of its 
neoclassical variant was being rewarded in some quarters in postwar Western 
Europe and North America, in Romania these tradition were  soon to be 
―blacklisted‖ by the advent of Stalinism in 1948.
609
 Yet after a decade of enforced 
intellectual homogeneity, dissidence became possible in the guise of mathematical 
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 For the system to work, he proposed that smaller ‗corporations‖ (organized interests) be 
granted autonomy and encouraged to offer policy feedback, yet they would remain subordinated to 
state interests. The reader of Manoilescu‘s work can notice an eerie resemblance between his 
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economics. As  a result, select elements of the neoclassical tradition were 
marshaled by domestic economists in critical discussions about socialist 
economics. Ironically, the neoclassical tradition known but dismissed by 
Romanian economists in the regime of untrammeled intellectual freedom of the 
liberal era was rediscovered by a small group of socialist economists working in 
the cracks of the repressive intellectual fields of Romania‘s brutal national-
Stalinism.  
 
Soviet Interventionism and Dissent 
Romanian Stalinists reorganized the economics profession almost from 
scratch. The transformation was not without violence.
610
 The epicenter was still 
the Bucharest-based Academy of Economic Sciences (ASE), but, as in Franco‘s 
Spain, the regime set up a number of large economics ―institutes‖ inside the 
Romanian Academy, a research body inherited from the liberal era. The institutes 
served as government think-tanks and were expected to do the most advanced 
research. Elite economists routinely taught at ASE, did research for the 
Academy‘s institutes and, in some cases, served for the Planning Commission as 
well (Balas 2000). During the same decades, some institute researchers also 
worked part-time for the Finance ministry (Kiritescu, 1992: 339). Like Franco‘s 
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Spain, national-Stalinist Romania had its own version of the academic-
bureaucratic complex.  
After the brutal repression and politically imposed hegemony of Soviet 
economics of the 1950s,
611
 the next two decades brought some pluralism at the 
margins of the discipline. This was a part of a broader reconsideration of the role 
of technical expertise. The regime seemed to understand that the increasing 
technoscientific complexity of its ambitious economic modernization plans could 
not be successfully pursued while a sizeable part of the technoscientific elite was 
either in prison or demoted to menial jobs.
612
 As a result, by the early 1960s 
younger technocrats drawn from enterprise management, planning boards, 
technical expertocracy and academic personnel began to achieve greater political 
prominence.
 613
 Although their agenda was not exactly market socialism, it 
nevertheless included more decentralization in planning and policymaking, more 
scientifically-based management, more economic liberalizationmore feedback 
from lower-ranked corporate bodies (especially from intelligentsia organizations), 
etc.
614
 The ideas these reformist technocrats operated with drew on conceptual 
innovations that were closer to the ideologically neutral paeans of technocracy to 
                                                 
611
 As Balas remembers, economic textbooks were translations of Soviet originals. These were  
―[d]ogmatic rather than analytical, proclaiming such ―economic laws‖ as the continuous 
improvement of living standards and the balanced development of the different branches of the 
economy […] everything pertaining to the economics of socialism was considered ideological and 
as a result was treated with the same rigidity as the tenets of a religion.‖ (Balas 2000: 327) 
612
As a result, after the mid 1950s ―more university professors, architects, and engineers were 
given managerial and state executive positions. More artists and writers who had shared in  the  
privileges  granted  intellectuals under the  Carol II  and  Ion Antonescu dictatorships went  back  
to  the  posts they  had previously occupied and were more feted than ever before.‖  Ghita Ionescu, 
“Social Structure: Rumania under Communism,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 317, The Satellites in Eastern Europe (May, 1958), pp. 53-62  
613
 See Ionescu 1964, Jowitt 1971, Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political 
History of Romanian Communism, Berkley: University of California Press, 2003. 
614




be found in both East and West during those times than to revisionist state 
socialism per se.
615
 And it was in these spaces of technical neutrality that the 
seeds of dissent grew.  
During the ―thaw‖ of the sixties and seventies economics continued to be 
dominated by Soviet orthodoxy, yet its translation gradually gave birth to a 
hybrid: the nationalist-Soviet syndissertation.
616
 The increasingly assertive 
nationalism of the Ceausescu regime spilled into the field of economics and 
inspired some mainstream economists to anchor Soviet economics in pre-
communist interventionist local traditions such as the industrial structuralism of 
Manoilescu.
617
 Beginning with the 1970s, the strategy of the Ceausescu regime to 
turn Romania into a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement facilitated the 
emergence of a local syndissertation of Latin American structuralism and the 
reigning Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. A group of economists experimented with 
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―long cycle‖ structuralist economics, with select contributions from Kondratieff, 
Wallerstein and Braudel playing prominent roles (Postolache 1988).  
This ideational bricolage did not affect the core of Romania‘s adoption nof 
Soviet economics. Yet the nationalist-Soviet and structuralist-Soviet hybrids saw 
a number of challenges beginning with the 1960s. First, some leading economists 
imported Western methodologies (e.g. input-output analysis) used in the 
neoclassical syndissertation. Perhaps puzzlingly, far from triggering the regime‘s 
ire, such innovations were welcomed and even integrated in the planning techno-
structure as tools for dealing with the chahlenges of planning an increasingly 
complex industrial and agricultural modernization program. The US study trips of 
three mathematical economists (Emilian Dobrescu, Aurel Iancu and Gheorghe 
Zaman) enabled them to publish a slew of studies on economic growth modeling 
based on the input-out models used by Kondratieff at Harvard. The result was the 
development of an input-output model for Romania‘s communist economy, an 
enterprise that demanded considerable local innovation in the translation 
process.
618
 Like in Daniel Bell‘s visions of the future, input-output analysis was 
being used as intensively in Bucharest as it was used in the capitals of Western 
capitalism. 
Yet methodology was not the only terrain of encounter with the tools of 
mainstream Western economics. An even bolder challenge came from economists 
who practiced mathematical economics by drawing on the substance of 
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 For example Iancu qualified the IO model he studied at MIT and Harvard by discussing the 
role of such factors as the price mechanism in a command economy, sustainable development and 
intangible models. Particularly interesting was a methodological innovation that made input-
output modeling ―travel‖ in a non-market economy where prices did not reflect supply and 




marginalism. Brilliant young economists like Tiberiu Schatteles, Ihor Lemnij and 
Egon Balas became familiar with Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav syntheses of 
marginalism and socialism (―market socialism‖) and worked with the latest 




Thus, as early as 1957 Egon Balas published a book with a house close to 
the single party (Editura Politica) in which he proposed a syndissertation of 
Keynesian and Marxist-Leninist economics via the incorporation of such 
Keynesian concepts as ―underemployment equilibrium‖ into the Marxist critique 
of capitalism.  In 1972 Tiberiu Schatteles used the Austrian School critique of 
socialism-without citing any sources- to expose the problems central planning.
 620
 
At the time he left Romania Scatteles‘ monetary theory had already reached the 
point where it was solidly anchored in the quantity theory of money.
621
 In 1976, 
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 The rise of these economists was facilitated by a perceptible relaxation of ideocratic repression. 
According to Egon Balas, a leading mathematical economist, during the 1950s ―the use of 
mathematical techniques was disparaged as a sophisticated way of obfuscating the simple facts of 
exploitation‖ (Balas 2000: 349). Yet by the 1960s mathematical economics was cautiously 
accepted as a tool of improving planning and made its way into the calculation devices of the State 
Planning Committee. This allowed mathematical economists to engage systematically with 
Western economics and to confuse ideological censors. 
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 Schatteles knew the Austrian School well and had been a self-styled follower of Morgenstern. 
What made economists like Morgenstern particularly legit in a 1960s Romanian economics 
institute was that mathematics and such Western authors‘ ―anti-politics‖ provided emancipation 
from ideology and censorship. For it was back in the 1930s he had become known for challenging 
the aprioristic bases of Hayekian and von Mises‘ liberalism with the argument that, like socialists, 
they proposed ideological rather than value-free templates and that their propositions could be 
determined on praxeological rather than empirical and mathematical bases. Moreover, 
mathematics gave social prestige.  
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 Yet‘s Schatteles‘ approach was opposed to the monetarist tradition inaugurated by Irving 
Fisher.His critique was based on the argument that it is plagued by a certain ―econometric 
impressionism which often omits the fact that those statistical correlations that are sold as 
predictions neglect the mechanism that produces statistical signals […] the model that is produced 
by the structure of statistical signals is not necessarily identical with the model of the real objet 
that emits the signals recorded by the statistician.‖ As a result, he hybridized the quantity of 
money equation with von Neumann‘s growth model. Interview with Schatteles in Aligica and 




Ihor Lemnij published a book whose main argument was that the socialist system 
could not generate technical progress unless it was drastically reformed along 
more market-friendly lines (Lemnij 1976).
 622
 During the same decade, Aurel 
Iancu (1972; 1974) and Constantin Kiritescu (1979) published books on economic 
growth and respectively international finance that were marked by ideologically-
detached reviews of the latest innovations in the Western economic discipline. 
Under the cover of arcane mathematical languages, it seemed that engagement 
with Western economics went far beyond the basics.
623
  
Yet unlike in Spain, the repressive apparatus often intervened to crush 
dissent. Public critique of the country‘s development strategy could lead to 
demotion or marginalization even if the critique was formulated using Marxist 
positions (Daianu 1999; Aligica and Evans 2009: 40). After Egon Balas published 
an article in a popular magazine of the Hungarian minority (Korunk) in which he 
advances some of the ideas of Yugoslav market socialism, the editorial board had 
to apologize publicly for ―ideological blindness‖ (Balas 2000: 347). When the 
same author published a book that undertook a Marxist critique of Keynesianism, 
he lost his academic job, the book was withdrawn from circulation and the author 
was thrown out of the party (Balas 2000: 348-353). Some prominent economists 
were banned or fired if they voiced opinions or tried to criticize even minimally 
the regime's views or policies (Igor Lemnij, Alex Olteanu, Sorin Covrig). In other 
cases critical economists got away with reprimands (Dăianu, 1999; Aligica 2002). 
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 As Schatteles put it, ―[e]conomists did not enjoy much consideration in Romanian culture. 
Fortunately, mathematicians were respected by almost everyone, including by those who did not 
feel too comfortable in this science […] The study of economics had always been too politicized 








The tightening of the authoritarian regime during the 1980s further 
constrained the space for dissent. But although the policing of the field of 
economics was harsher, it was not airtight. One department chair remembers that  
 
[w]ithin the frame of the scholarly inner-circle debate, the spreading of 
―un-official‖ ideas, the sharing of Western printed books, the almost 
―samizdat‖-like fashion of distributing not-available-on-the-shelf printed 
matter, was common in the chairs of political economy of the major 
universities throughout the country (Maniu, unpublished manscript). 
 
And while the incentives for conformity increased, not all economists 
conformed. In October 1982 Emilian Dobrescu, the most capable linear planner in 
the state bureaucracy was fired over his opposition to Ceausescu‘s early debt 
repayment and austerity program. Five years later, three leading economists 
(Constantin Ionete, Tudor Bugnariu and Mircea Stoica) wrote a samizdat critical 
study of the economy and circulated a copy among some economists (Ionete 
1993: 193 ft. X; 203). Ironically, the document modestly suggested Hungarian-
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 By 1980, Gheorghe Preda, Tiberiu Scatelles, Igor Lemnij had left the country. Author interview 








What proved to be of decisive importance after the revolution was that the 
spaces for staying up-to-date with developments in the Western economics 
profession did not fully disappear during the 1980s. Some of those who stayed 
continued to read whatever Western economics literature was available at the 
American Library or in the library reserves of their own departments and 
institutes. As Daianu remembers: 
 
I learned the ―technical‖ language [for my critique] as a student, when I 
found in the American Library my own alma mater; here I found P. 




Critically, many found a protected professional ecology in the Cibernetics 
Institute established in 1972 by Manea Manescu, Ceausescu‘s premier
627
 and a 
second-rate economist infatuated with cybernetics,
 
a field he understood very little 
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 The authors demanded better wage incentives, a 10 year moratorium on unproductive 
investment, encouragement of small firms, emphasis on heavy industry, more investment in state 
agriculture, complete liberalization of private agricultural trade. 
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 Daniel Daianu, ―Sa scrii (critici) inainte de 1989‖, in Jurnalul National, October 9, 2007. 
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 Manescu had been a premier between 1974 and 1979 and a member of the Politburo almost 
continually between 1969 and 1989. Ironically, as mathematical economists used his Institute to 
talk Western economics, Manescu acted as enforcer of the Ceausescus in firing prominent central 
planners who opposed the forced savings strategy of the 1989s. Interview with dissident 
mathematician Mihai Botez carried out by Vladimir Tismaneanu. Source: 
www.tismaneanu.wordpress.com. Manescu had established the Cibernetics Institute as the 
advanced arm of the Institute of Economic Sciences, the elite economics university. A statistician 
and planner, Manescu was in awe with the possibilities that linear programming and obtained the 
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 Here, many mathematical economists a patron and an environment where 
they could keep up-to-date with Western literature and maintain correspondence 
with leading US economists. 
629
  Here, under the thin cover of ―know your 
enemy‖ pretenses and arcane technical languages, professors Gheorghe Preda and 
Moisa Alter quietly organized seminars that discussed the latest debates in 




The young generation of economists who grew to occupy key positions of 
power in the revolving door between academia and public policy after 1989 
(Daniel Daianu, Theodor Stolojan, Mugur Isarescu, Lucian Croitoru, Cornel 
Tarheaca, Valentin Lazea) grew professionally in these seminars. Some had been 
mentored by the generation of dissident economics of the 60s and 70s. All had 
advanced mathematical skills, fluency in several Western languages and research 
agendas that were both sheltered from ideological debates and dependent on 
Western methodological innovations. 
Perhaps ironically, the other important site of engagement with Western 
economics was equally close to the nervous centers of the regime: the university 
of the Romanian Communist Party (Academia Stefan Gheorghiu, known as the 
―Party school‖). In this institution the multilingual faculty in the international 
political economy and the international law departments had premium access to 
recent Western academic publications and media. The faculty had no professional 
incentives to study this literature other than for superficial propaganda jobs. Yet 
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since the assistant professors hired were the crème de la crème of the university 
system they created a subculture whereby evidence of familiarity with the latest 
developments in the capitalist core was highly rewarded (Severin 2001). The level 
of debate was less technical and more interested in intellectual frameworks and 
politics than in mathematical modeling. This opened the field of debate to non-
economists who acquired their knowledge on the historical dramas that marked 
the rise of neoliberalism from pop-academic books and newspapers rather than 
from the American Economic Review.  
As the next sections show, when the authoritarian regime collapsed, the 
mathematical economists had both the skills and the intellectual availability to 
become translators of neoliberal transition economics during the early 1990s and 
of the Brussels Consensus later on. They looked down on the Stefan Gheorghiu 
faculty and labeled them ―storytellers.‖
631
 Yet through their access to office, it 
mostly the ―storytellers‖ rather than the ―technicians‖ who had a chance to put 
together a partial reform program between 1990 and 1992.  Before the ideas of the 
―technicians‖ captured public policy, for years they faced a professional terrain 
bitterly contested by anti-neoliberal intellectual frameworks. It is to this 
contestation that I now turn. 
 
Resisting Neoliberalism in the Neoliberal Moment 
The Paths Not Taken: Reform Socialism and Keynesianism 
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During the early 1990s the most radical contestation of neoliberal economics was 
put together by local advocates of market socialism, a set of ideas that had been 
declared dead by their erstwhile proponents in Central Europe (Kornai 1993; 
2008). The socialists had made their careers when Romania‘s economy grew at 
breakneck rates and became Europe‘s most industrialized. Unlike their peers in 
Central Europe, they had not felt the disappointments of reform socialism and 
understood little of Western economics (Aligica and Evans 2009). Consequently, 
they critiqued Ceausescu‘s economic ideas and agreed that more market-based 
competition was needed, yet  were keen to salvage the basics of the socialist 
economy: planning, state control over most of industry and agriculture, 
administered prices, etc (N.N. Constantinescu 1990; 1991; Vacarel 1990; 1993).  
The overwhelming majority of market socialists were academic 
economists and economic experts affiliated with the bureaucracy. All belonged to 
a newly-established association (The General Association of Romanian 
Economists or AGER)
632
 whose public mission was to search for a ―third way‖ 
between capitalism and state socialism (AGER 1990). Headed by one of the 
orthodox economists of the regime (N.N. Constantinescu), AGER had chapters 
throughout the country, established its own publishing house and claimed to 
represent the voice of 50,000 economists. The socialists published their views on 
economic policy in a small circulation newspaper (Economistul) and in the 
supplement of the most popular national daily (Adevarul) known for its criticism 
of the socio-economic reforms adopted by the Romangovernment. The AGER 
elite had a reliable political voice in Alexandru Barladeanu, one of the architects 
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of Romanian economic reforms during the 1960s and, until his marginalization by 
Ceausescu, the country‘s most respectable socialist economist.
 633
 Now a believer 
in modest gorbachevite reforms and a staunch opponent of the market reforms 
adopted in Central Europe, he used his power position as the president of the 
Senate, advisor to president Iliescu and informal leader of the left wing of the 
FSN to foist the reform plans of the Roman government (Severin 2005; Betea 
2005; Abraham 2006).  
In the aftermath of 1989 the socialists diagnosed the economic failures of 
Ceausescu‘s economic model in his abandonment of the technoscientific core of 
socialism.
634
 For them what failed in 1989 was not socialism but the pathological 
outgrowths of ―Ceauschism.‖ Socialism had been bled dry by the fact that the 
austerity of the 1980s had cut off crucial imports of technology, thus decreasing 
the competitiveness of Romanian exports.The combination between increasing 
centralization in decision making and the unscientific investment of forced 
savings in energy-intensive projects had smothered the managerial capacity of 
firms to adjust and of the state to fund competitive sectors. 
Given this diagnosis, the reform socialists thought that the only desirable 
alternative was the socialist market economy. 
635
 Rather than scrap planning 
altogether, they endorsed a variant of planning that factored in market signals and 
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Constantinescu addressed the Parliament during debates on the company law (Severin 1995: 186). 
A Moscow-trained economist and former head of the Central Planning Commission, Barladeanu 
had been marginalized because he opposed the increasing of the rate of forced savings from 20 to 
30 percent of GDP during the 1970s. 
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 The socialists were keen to critique the replacement of linear planning with the Stakhanovite 
elan that ended up destabilizing ―production factors.‖ 
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talked about breaking giant down state-owned firms into smaller, worker-
controlled units, like in the Yugoslav model.
636
 Rather than embrace 
macroeconomic austerity and accept concomitant rises in unemployment, they 
wanted to relaunch investment, keep full employment and maintain state 
ownership over most of the industry for the foreseeable future. Some of them had 
built political capital out of opposing Ceausescu‘s unrealistic forced savings and 
his early debt repayment and saw in Romania‘s lack of foreign debt leeway to  
obtain the external financing needed to  restart of the investments that  socialist 
market economy called for.  The socialist economists also pleaded for the 
institutionalization of equal relations between private, public and cooperative 
forms of property as the best guarantee of ―economic pluralism,‖ a concept they 
saw as tied to political pluralism and presented as a guarantee against a return to 
the oligarchic capitalism of Romania‘s pre-Stalinist past.
 637
  
Another path not taken was that of Keyensianism. Its domestic advocates 
(Vasile Pillat, Eufrosina Ionescu) played down the crisis potential of the structure 
of the socialist economy or of the transition to the market economy itself. Pillat 
even saw a significant comparative advantage in the country‘s exceptionally 
strong external position (Pillat 1991). Instead, they blamed price liberalization in 
a market with large monopolies and oligopolies as the prime cause of the serial 
breakdown of a large slice of the state-owned industrial sector after 1989. Rather 
than hope that market institutions would appear spontaneously, they argued that 
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(general Victor Stanculescu).  
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former socialist economies were best served by a gradualist approach executed 
within a neo-corporatist institutional structure and with the mixed economy as the 
final destination. 
Ionescu used the contributions of the neo-Keynesian Joan Robinson to 
warn against the likelihood that such economic reforms in Romania could only 
lead to yet another form of the Western oligopolistic market.
638
  She warned that 
macroeconomic stabilization and price liberalization could trigger a catastrophic 
recession rather than transformational one through forcibly compressing internal 
demand and lowering the expectations of investors. Similarly, while attacking the 
idea that neoliberal capitalism should be the end of the transition and framing the 
neoclassical tradition as an ―abstract, asocial and irrelevant to address our quest 
for what kind of market economy we can and wish to build,‖ and indeed no more 
than an instrument of the economically powerful,
639
 Pillat pleaded for a 
syndissertation of Keyensianism and the Romanian structuralist tradition of 
Manoilescu (he called it ―national economy theory‖).
 640
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 Pilat critiqued the ―shock therapy‖ solution of forcing competition on the socialist economy 
through trade liberalization by giving the example of GDR, where not even West German aid 
could prevent the collapse of East German economy. He labeled monetarism and rational 
expectations as ―extremist‖ and deplored the institutionalization of these ideas in IFIs. He 
systematically critiqued the assumptions of neoclassical economics from the positions of Joan 
Robinson, Gunnar Myrdal and E. Chamberlin and Pilat also used the work of institutionalist 
Romanian-American economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen to critique of the universalist 
pretensions of neoclassical economics (Pillat 1991: 9-15). Vasile Pilat used his contributions in 
Oeconomica to critique the assumptions of ―naked‖ neoclassical economics, an interpretation he 
saw as a ―the economic variant of Darwinism (Pillat 1997: 19).He attributed the endurance of 
neoclassical economics to political factors. ―Why is it that the dominant Western economic 
thought keeps avoiding the object of study of economics and prefers instead to remain stuck in 
theoretical assumptions and propositions that are wholly irrelevant to contemporary economies 




This position entailed a gradualist approach to transition based on large 
state investments financed by foreign debt and deployed to absorb excess labor, 
create market institutions and the pillars of a neo-corporatist wage bargaining.
641
 
Moreover, rather than treat labor as a mere production factor, Pillat argued for its 
incorporation in the national economic policy process. The structuralist-
Keynesian syndissertation he advocated also suggested that given the basic 
structural flaws of the Romanian economy (large monopolies and oligopolies), 
price liberalization was bound to trigger inflation because in such conditions the 
basic function of prices as rational mechanisms of allocation was inoperable and 
served instead a monopoly/oligopoly rent mechanism. Given the same structure, it 
was argued that the abandonment of any form planning was the prime generator 
of the disorder and uncertainty that led to inflation and loss of output. Therefore 
indicative planning and a tight state control over its firms were needed at least 
until market institutions matured.
642
   
In sum, the Romanian economic profession had enough socialist and neo-
Keynesian opposition to prevent a quick neoliberal turn. Moreover, it was not 
surprising that the external environment notwithstanding, the reform socialists 
thought they had a real chance to shape the economic transition. The country‘s 
electoral mood was on their side: the ex-communist FSN had won the May 
elections with a landslide, Iliescu‘s gorbachevite ideas were then delivering 
                                                                                                                                     
economic relations are basically reflective of economic interests, dominant interests shaped 
dominant economic ideas at a national and international scale‖ (Pillat 1991: 12). 
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 Pillat critiqued the decision of the government in early 1990 to cut the workweek to five days, 
reduce production quotas and increase wages as output and productivity was falling. Like 
Keynesians, he thought that wages and productivity should be correlated (Pillat 1991: 9-10).  
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political capital. Yet these economic ideas failed to shape the policy debate 
despite the impressive number of economists that upheld them. The fact that all 
leading socialists had a hectic relationship with the FSN, failed to present detailed 
templates of what the Romanian version of the socialist market economy would 
look like and were challenged on their own turf by heterodox economists 
contributed to the quick marginalization of their ideas. Moreover, unlike their 
heterodox or neoliberal foes, they were slow to come up with research couched in 
econometric models at a time when quantitative research was becoming a 
language of power under pressure from the IFIs. As a result, by the mid 1990s 
market socialist economics had written itself into irrelevance. 
As for Keynesians, neither Popescu nor Pillat managed to make followers. 
Moreover, Popescu stopped publishing and Pillat reduced his ambitions to 
building a methodology for multiannual industrial policy (Pillat 1995).  It was 
only in the late 2000s that a small and equally peripheral generation of young 
scholars began to publish studies inspired by Keynesian ideas (Caraiani 2007; 
2008; Ciurila and Murarasu 2008). As a result, Keynesianism was never a real 
competitor and remained alive in economic debate only in the diluted forms 
encountered from the Western macroeconomics textbooks translated into 
Romanian after 1990. Like the socialists, the neo-Keynesians enjoyed no external 
support at a time when neoliberalism was at its apex in the Western economic 
profession. Therefore, unlike their neoliberal competitors, neither the socialists 
nor the neo-Keyensians could offer potential followers status incentives, 




methodological metrics or output produced by recent Nobel prize winners and 
prestigious academic or financial organizations. 
 
The Temporary Veto of Heterodoxy 
Unlike socialism and neo-Keynesianism, the third non-neoliberal economic model 
(heterodoxy) ―stuck.‖ A basic intellectual template for the policies of the 
Vacaroiu government (1992-1996), the heterodox agenda was tantamount to the 
institutionalization of a statist variety of capitalism through gradual reforms. Built 
off ideas derived from continental and Nordic neo-corporatism, French dirigisme 
and early postwar East Asian developmentalism (Dobrescu and Postolache 1990: 
110-112; Zaman 1990; Cosea 1995), heterodoxy emerged as a robust alternative 
to the neoliberal template of transition to the market economy.  
Unlike the socialists and the Keyensians, the heterodox carried domestic 
political clout. During the first half of 1990 ex-planners based in the National 
Institute of Economic Research (IER) formed a special commission tasked by the 
provisional government to outline a long-term economic strategy. Published in 
May 1990,
 643
 the document informed the economic strategies of the Vacaroiu 
government.
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 The premier had been a protégé of one of the luminaries of 
heterodoxy (Tudorel Postolache) and one heterodox mandarin (Gheorghe Zaman) 
went on to serve as economic advisor to president Iliescu between 1992 and 1996 
while two of the younger members of the group (Mircea Cosea, Florin 
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 The heterodox ideas were largely replicated by the government program of the Vacaroiu 
cabinet. See Strategia de reforma economic-sociala a programului de guvernare, February 1992, 




Georgescu) became the ministers of Economic Reform and of Finance 
respectively.
645
 The heterodox message was also bolstered by the most 




Heterodox ideas constituted the only intellectual program that addressed 
the dilemma of the ―conservative‖ wing of the communist successor party: while 
reform socialism risked further international isolation, the neoliberal transition 
strategy risked the destruction of the socialist industry, an asset the ex-
communists valued as a symbol of national sovereignty.
647
 Basically the political 
power of heterodox economic ideas could not be understood without examining 
their resonance with the premium that the conservative sector of the ex-
communist elite put on industrialization and domestic control over the economy 
as quintessential markers of national sovereignty.  
As a result of their nationalist understanding of the economy, for Iliescu 
and the left of the FSN the radical market reforms adopted by Romania‘s Western 
neighbors were a form of external economic aggression that bred not only 
suspicion of Western advice, but also triggered bold foreign policy moves such as 
a new partnership with the Soviet Union in 1991. In a recently released transcript 
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 As chapter seven suggests, this understanding of sovereignty as linked to the economic primacy 
of the state had deep roots in the syndissertation of nationalism and (neo-)Stalinism that 
characterized Romanian economic policy after 1964. After 1989 this economic nationalist 
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of a conversation that President Iliescu had with Gorbachev at the moment when 
the treaty was signed, the Romanian leader made it clear to his Soviet counterpart 
that he saw resistance to radical market reforms as a security issue: 
 
Iliescu: We are the object of both external and external pressures. Neither 
the IMF nor the World Bank want to give us loans. Why? The US gets 
involved […] 
 
Gorbachev: Don‘t you think the West wants to run us into the ground and 
then buy us for a penny? 
 
Iliescu: Undoubtedly:  They are taking advantage of our difficult situation 
(…) External and domestic foes go hand in hand. Given this, the treaty we 
conclude today is of great importance. (Oprea 2006: 230). 
 
This security-minded economic policy became institutionalized in the 
nebulous of intelligence apparatus of the state. In 1993, soon after the 
inauguration of the Vacaroiu government, a report of the Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI) alerted the Parliament to  
 
[t]he intentions of some foreign partners to control key positions in 
various economic sectors‖ and ―the economic offensive orchestrated by 









In addition to speaking to the political identity of the conservative sectors 
of the communist successor elite that took power in 1992, by wanting a statist 
variety of capitalism rather than a reformed socialism, the heterodox also looked 
less outré in the geopolitical landscape of the early 1990s. This was a period when 
ex-communist political forces in Eastern Europe were treated with hostility in 
Washington. As Thomas Carrothers report on Romania amply showed, American 
organizations held a dim view of the ex-communists and openly spent resources 
on backing the opposition (Carothers 1996). Reform socialism was also deemed 
unthinkable by IFIs and the European Commission (Berendt 2009). As Romania 
needed the funds and/or the markets controlled by these actors, heterodoxy 
gradually emerged as the only internationally presentable left alternative in early 
1990s Romania. As former Romanian president Ion Iliescu put it: 
 
In the summer of 1990 it was obvious that even with a program as right 
wing as Roman‘s we could not get the foreign funding needed to restart 
the economy. The situation remained virtually unchanged after the painful 
price liberalization measures. The West was thinking in cold war terms 
and because the left won the elections in they treated us as a kind of 
communist regime […]. Given these external obstacles there was no way 
that Yugoslav socialist market economics could have helped, although 
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many of us had preferred that model, at least in the immediate aftermath of 
the Revolution. In the end we thought that with a better government than 
Roman‘s we could convince the Westerners to support a reform program 
that was simultaneously inspired by the experience of developed market 
economies and was not the same with the calamity called shock therapy. 
 
The heterodox response to the economic crisis of socialism was the 
introduction of industrial policy as well as of indicative planning as permanent 
mechanisms of compromise ―between plan and market‖ deliverable with the 
technical assistance supplied by the many research institutes inherited from 
national-Stalinism. Rather than hope that price liberalization would generate 
competition, they argued that the high degree of monopolization of supply would 
deny prices their basic function as mechanisms for the rational allocation of 
resources and would turn ―markets‖ into mere excuses for rent-seeking. 
Consequently, they wanted gradual price liberalization, although they never 
considered the dual pricing strategy of the Chinese reformers.
649
 On industrial 
restructuring, the heterodox wanted to restart public investment by further price 
liberalizations and an end to the global subsidization of industry. This led them to 
demand the adoption of a three-pronged strategy: public investments in SOEs 
assessed to have chances to stay afloat, transparent public subsidies for firms with 
no such prospects but which were judged essential for the economy (about half of 
the industry!) and liquidation for the rest. 
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The heterodox position on the pace of transition was ambiguous, as it 
rejected both existing paradigms (shock therapy and gradualism) and proposed a 
pace commensurate with the specific conditions of the Romanian economy 
(Dobrota and Postolache 1990). Yet the analysis of their specific economic ideas 
strongly suggests that shock therapy was not on the agenda and that they preferred 
a very slow gradualism.
650
 In practice this meant a strong preference for the mixed 
economy, with a strong investor state targeting easy credit at industrial champions 
and state agribusiness while coordinating the expectations of individual firms and 
of entire economic sectors via French-style indicative planning (Dobrota and 
Postolache 1990; Zaman 1990).
 651
 Based on this normative position, they argued 
that the state was responsible for targeting industrial credit for investments in 
technology to prevent Romania from slipping back into a trap of labor-intensive 
specialization.  
Macroeconomic policy was eclectic as well. The objectives of monetary 
and fiscal policy were to balance monetary and price stability, on one hand, and 
full employment on the other. Through Alexandru Albu, an academic economist 
who was the head of the Economic Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, the 
heterodox opposed quick convertibility with the argument that one first needed a 
considerable increase in exports, so that the Leu would not collapse (Severin 
1995: 66). The Outline also called for progressive taxation of both personal and 
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 Thus, while rejecting the solution of the return to ―hypercentralized planning‖ and the state‘s 
monopoly over industry as a reactionary and utopian solution, the heterodox  nevertheless 
emphasized that the concrete aspects of the transition to the market economy should be ―adjusted 
to the needs, possibilities, traditions and interests of the Romanian people, with the integration of 
those economic institutions of advanced economies that are organically appropriate to our 
economic conditions‖ (Dobrota and Postolache 1990: 39). 
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corporate income, the nationalization of health, education and social welfare, 
increased spending on all these sectors and the institutionalization of a welfare 
system inspired by the Swedish corporatist model.  Most importantly, perhaps, the 
heterodox advanced cost-push rather than monetarist explanations of inflation: the 




The heterodox also resisted the idea of central bank independence and 
thought the BNR should be used as a development bank, if needed. State banks 
were to stay public and some of them turned into development banks. Within this 
framework, the heterodox rejected the undiluted comparative advantage 
dissertation and the strong liberal belief in the efficiency of the market: 
 
Left on their own, market devices generate the risk of excessively 
postponing the modernization of the national economy as well as the 
emergence of economic and social problems with unpredictable 
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 This interpretation was recently validated by Gabor (2008). Gabor argued that ―[t]he existence 
and large magnitude of the pass-through from exchange rates to prices is explained by Romanian 
production patterns, inherited from central planning, which create persistent, structural current 
account disequilibria and push exchange rate depreciations into increased costs of production and 
thus overall inflationary pressures. Of note in this context is that no depreciation, policy or market 
induced, has ever restored the current account surpluses registered during the planned period 
[…]After initially collapsing to less than half of the 1989 value due the disappearance of the 
socialist markets, exports earnings recovered extremely slowly, reaching the 1989 level only in 
2000. Secondly, the intensive industrialisation process characteristic to planned systems left the 
industrial sector highly dependent on imports of intermediary goods, which constitute the largest 
share of the total imports Thus, the specific import structure made all imports necessary, any 
reduction in volume strongly affecting industrial output. A devaluation-induced increase in the 
price of imports would have little success in shifting demand to lower priced, competitive products 
manufactured domestically, as the philosophy of central planning allowed only for supplementary 
and not competitive imports. This explains the pass-through effect and its larger impact on 
producer prices: with a production structure rigidly dependent on imports, any exchange rate 
devaluation reflects in the domestic price of intermediary inputs, quickly increasing costs of 




consequences. We therefore need to capitalize on the experience of 
advanced countries whose governments undertook active and flexible 
forms of intervention […] targeted at the technological updating and 
development of the national economy. (Dobrota and Postolache 1990: 43).  
 
Foreign direct investment was encouraged, but so was the use of 
international credits for industrial policy. Industrial policy was developmentalist: 
managed demand for domestic goods, and aggressive export subsidy regime 
based on manipulated currency and investment in the industrial base inherited 
from socialism. The success stories of postwar France, South Korea, Japan and 
China were used to bolster this argument. Attracting FDI with free economic 
zones and deregulation of repatriations of capital was understood as part of this 
strategy, based on the same examples (Cosea 1995: 143-145).  
Unlike liberals, the heterodox did not regard privatization as valuable in 
itself, as a form of credible commitment to the market economy. Neither did they 
see it as an act of economic democracy, as some saw it at the time.
653
 Instead, 
they regarded it as a complex developmental tool. Thus, the state property deemed 
to serve strategic objectives (national defense, food security, the mobility of 
people, merchandise and information, social peace) were considered 
unprivatizable. The minimalistic list of unprivatizables included all state firms in 
gas, oil, electricity, some mining, forestry, large farms, the basic transportation 
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 The heterodox rejected as flawed a popular proposal advanced by Constanin Cojocaru, an 
exiled Romanian economist, who suggested Milton Friedman‘s recipe for Eastern Europe: 
privatization of the entire economy through the gratuitous transfer of state assets to all citizens, as 
an act of economic democracy (Ionete 1993: 135). Cojocaru‘s proposal was widely debated in the 




and telecom infrastructure, defense manufacturing, social housing. Firms from all 
other sectors could be privatized, yet the heterodox insisted that large state firms 
could be sold only after giving workers the first option or, in subsidiary, after 
ensuring the availability of a foreign strategic investor.   
Yet the heterodox model was more nationalist and developmentalist than it 
was egalitarian. The idea was that full employment was the best social policy. 
Consequently, proponents of heterodoxy proposed cuts in current spending in 
order to have funds for public investment in ―strategic industries‖ and in firms 
experiencing temporary difficulties. To save employment, the privatization of 
small and medium state enterprises was to be pursued immediately, while large 
SOEs who served as large employers were to be maintained as public enterprises 
and benefit from targeted subsidies. Unprofitable firms were to be liquidated not 
through market mechanisms, but following state efforts to reorganize them in 
order to save those parts that could actually generate profit. Therefore, the 
heterodox saw the quick privatization suggested by foreign consultants as 
potentially catastrophic (Ionete 1993: 135). At a time when the Roman 
government decided to follow Janos Kornai and transfer half of the state‘s assets 
to the population, the heterodox reduced that figure to 30 percent and successfully 
pushed for barring public utilities from privatization (Dijmarescu 1994: 79).
654
 
 Overall, the heterodox paradigm was a powerful and coherent contender 
for the neoliberal reform paradigm. Yet this framework had a few intellectual 
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 The same interventionist penchant ruled agricultural policy. Trade policy was to balance 
liberalization and the interests of local producers. Since the problems of agriculture were 
diagnosed in the tariff liberalization unleashed by the Roman government, the government set out 
to build a system of price subsidies and cheap credit lines for local producers, with the central 




gaps that made it vulnerable to neoliberal attacks. First, it had nothing to say 
about the costs incurred by the state‘s withdrawal of its supervision of the 
companies it owned. Concerned to show that they were serious about their turn 
away from the past, the heterodox insisted that the management of state owned 
companies had decisional autonomy. This however prevented the government 
from tapping the profits of its own firms to fund much needed public investment 
or boost the shrinking health, education and welfare budgets. Second, the 
complacency of the heterodox about the banking sector (they thought that banking 
crises were not likely to plague a predominantly public banking industry) led 
them to ignore the importance of regulating the financial sector as whole. This 
allowed fraud and embezzlement that bankrupted two large private banks
655
 and 
the poor supervision of non-performing loans in state banks.  
 
Crafting Romanian Neoliberalism 
Overview of a quiet revolution 
It is now commonly said that the European economic transformations 
were ―the most dramatic episode of liberalization in economic history‖ (Murrell 
1996: 31). How did the ideas that made this change possible enter the Romanian 
academic-bureaucratic complex?  
Like in Spain, in Romania neoliberal ideas were adopted by a group of 
Romanian economists who used the revolving door between the central bank, 
academia and political parties. The group was not homogenous, however. Some 
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espoused hybridized arguments and concepts drawn from institutionalist 
economics or the domestic structuralist tradition with neoclassical orthodoxy. 
Economists like Misu Negritoiu and Aurel Iancu were closer to the ordoliberal 
ideal of the ―negotiated economy‖ and saw state intervention and neo-corporatist 
institutions as basic conditions of a competitive and stable economy.
656
 Others, by 
contrast, did very little conceptual editing and adopted monetarism, supply-side 
economics and rational expectations almost wholesale (e.g. Costea Munteanu, 
Lucian Croitoru, Cristian Popa). By the 2000s, many Romanian neoliberals 
radicalized their positions and started to integrate select elements of a more 
market fundamentalist streak.  
 Unlike in Spain, the political left grouped around Iliescu was at first 
hostile to the neoliberals and its economic policies were shaped by the ideas of the 
heterodox. The ousting of the Roman government in 1991 and of the Negritoiu 
group of experts in 1993 were suggestive episodes of the intellectual antipathy the 
―conservative‖ sectors of the ex-communists felt for pro-market forces. Yet 
around the turn of the century the heterodox quietly moved towards the Brussels 
Consensus. Around the same time, neoliberal economists from outside the party 
became prominent in the party executive and in the government, where they 
enjoyed the protection of party leader and premier Adrian Nastase. And after they 
embraced a Third Way ideological identity in 2000, the ex-communists quietly 
headed in the liberalizing direction its leaders had been fighting against during the 
early 1990s. The result was that they followed in the footsteps of their Spanish 
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counterparts after two decades.However, the Romanians did so without the 
commitment to income redistribution and industrial policy that their Spanish 
colleagues had made.  
 
The Altar network and the roots of Romanian neoliberalism 
Historically, Romanian neoliberals came from a network of outward-
looking economists influenced by the dissenting mathematical economists who 
had kindled the marginalist fire during the 60s and 70s. All these men had 
graduated in the top of their class and worked in sheltered ecologies in academia, 
institutes or the technocratic vehicles of the central government, where access to 
Western economic literature was not very limited. As much of the elite of 
marginalist mathematical economics had left the country to continue their work in 
the U.S. and elsewhere, their younger followers developed the skills of ―internal 
exile‖: reading Western economics classics in the American library and in the 
library reserves of the institutes, staying away from the open critique of economic 
policy and forming discussion groups on the latest developments in the Western 
economics profession.  
During the 1980s such activities enabled these budding economic liberals 
to develop a ―counter-elite‖ identity in the elitist seminar informally organized at 
the Cibernetics Institute by Moisa Altar, a brilliant and entrepreneurial 
mathematical economist known for his passion for high academic standards and 
proximity to the exiled mathematical economists. None of these men had made 




training the acquisition of the basic elements of this economic tradition came to 
be the very condition for joining this prestige group. After they were accepted, 
Altar made the reading of Western economic journals and books the de facto 
condition for acceptance in his discussion group. The capacity to debate complex 
economic arguments published in English by Western journals became a status 
marker. While they had to partake in some public form of choreographed 
acceptance of the regime‘s economic orthodoxy, often by publishing drivel, in 
private they defined themselves against those academic economists who kept their 
jobs by replacing economics with the regurgitation of propaganda speak. As Altar 
remembers, 
 
Only those who knew economics for real felt at ease in the group. And in 
order to know economics you had to be up to date, read American journals 
with a pencil in hand and get hold of Russian translations of the latest 
names in the US economics departments. These books cost around ten Lei. 
It was nothing. A couple of coffees…For most of my colleagues, this toil 
was not worth it. It just made no sense from the point of view of one‘s 





Yet some economists of the Adler group were confident enough that their 
dissimulation techniques would get their criticism past censorship. Between 1984 
and 1987 Vasile Pillat and Daniel Daianu published a string of articles in a 
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Romanian scientific review meant for English and French speakers that made 
subtle critiques of the traditional socialist development model. These articles were 
still far from any kind of neoclassical radicalism. They were but bland attempts to 
reconcile neoclassical, structuralist and neo-Marxist economics (Daianu 1984; 
Pillat and Daianu 1984; 1985; Daianu 1987).
658
 Basically the boldest attack on the 
mainstream was the veiled use of the neoclassical critique of socialism as unable 
to stay innovative in the long term.
659
  
The boldest move of the Altar group was made in 1987 by the Daniel 
Daianu, one the youngest and most immersed in Western literature. In an article 
published in English he advanced a critique of the economic status quo using the 
more radical marginalist positions of Janos Kornai, a Hungarian economist known 
in the West for his argument that socialism was salvageable only through market 
reforms.
660
 Kornai had been critiquing Soviet orthodoxy since 1953, but in his 
1980 book that Daianu found inspiration in, the Hungarian economist argued that 
chronic shortages were not the result of planners‘ mistakes but rather systemic 
problems inherent to socialist economies (Kornai 1980). The article suggested 
that by practicing effective dissimulation, the Altar group had gotten far and 
became prepared for radical openings in their thinking.  As Daianu put it, 
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 For example, in 1985 Vasile Pillat and Daniel Daianu published an article in English in which 
they did a veiled critique of the socialist economy using an odd mix of structuralist arguments 
about the core‘s control over technological innovations and the Western orthodox argument that 
the statist models embraced by developing countries had a low innovative capacity (Pillat and 
Daianu 1985). The build this argument the article made the controversial claim that neoclassical 
thinkers like Schumpeter and neo-Marxists like Mandel were fundamentally compatible in their 
analysis of innovation in depression cycles of the economy.  
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 The authors took a pretty direct stab at socialist development when they wrote that ―a society 
characterized by a low real innovational process, despite the eventual mobilization of great 
material and financial efforts, will stagnate and even move downward‖ (Pillat and Daianu 1985: 
47).   
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 Daianu‘s study was entitled "Echilibrul şi Performanţa Sistemelor Economice" and was 





My analysis relied on quantitative models but I used a couple of 
euphemisms and terminological decoys to camouflage the message […] I 
sought to argue that socialist economies faced ―structural supply 
restrictions,‖ that the deficit of raw resources is permanent and that 
reforms were needed. In Hungary Janos Kornai used the term ―shortage‖ 
[for this] and built an entire theory around it. I shied away from using 





After 1989 the Altar group was the source of a veritable who‘s who of 
postcommunist economics. Theodor Stolojan became finance minister and 
premier between 1990 and 1992. Daniel Daianu took up a position as chief 
economist of the central bank for most of the 1990s and that of minister of finance 
between 1998 and 1999. Ilie Serbanescu was minister of finance in 1998 and, 
with his astonishing capacity to tell simple and generally apocalyptic homilies 
about Romania‘s economies woes, he remained the most popular economic 
commentator in print media and television. After the revolution lmost all of them 
taught economics at ASE in between their research stints in the IMF or in Anglo-
American economics departments.
662
 Politically, the Adler group was close to the 
center-right opposition, as evidenced by their ministerial appointments when the 
Convention took power. Only two (Stolojan and Negritoiu) were in the political 
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field of the liberal wing of the ex-communists but they promptly defected once 
liberalization was clad in the heterodox clothes of the Vacaroiu government.
663
 
U.S. economic historians who had worked on Romania during the cold war (e.g. 
the Yale-based John Michael Montias) came on visits and took sides against the 
heterodox and the socialists 
664
 while endorsing the ideas of the Alter and the 
policy stance of the central bank.
665
 
Like their Spanish counterparts, Romanian neoliberals inhabited a 
bureaucratic-academic complex. Some split their day jobs between the central 
bank and academia (Daniel Daianu, Mugur Isarescu) while others did research 
during their day jobs as consultants for investment groups and IFIs (Lucian 
Croitoru). A few became public intellectual economists by entering the booming 
fields the economic commentariat in print media and/or television (Ilie 
Serbanescu). Few stuck to strictly academic jobs (Liviu Albu, Moisa Altar), yet 
from these positions they enjoyed considerable informal influence in the central 
bank through personal networks (all chief economists of the central bank except 
Daianu were mentored by Altar).  
Finally, to organize their professional ecology, the liberals established a 
professional association (SOREC) as a challenger to the gorbachevite AGER. In 
1991 they also established a small think-tank (IRLI), where the crème de la crème 
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of liberal economists would congregate regularly.
666
 In 1991 they obtained Open 
Society Foundation funding for launching a new economic review (Oeconomica) 
and a publishing house. In a few years both became the most respected 
professional outlets for publishing research or professional opinions on current 
economic events. During the second half of the 1990s the revolving door between 
the central bank and the neoliberal academics in ASE and the institutes took the 
form of a think-tank close to the central bank (CEROPE) that was to become the 




Replicating the Neoliberal Revolution  
It took the members of the Altar network less than one year to go from market 
socialism to neoliberalism. When the first issues of Oeconomica came out in 
1991, it was clear that only Vasile Pillat had not ―jumped the fence‖ and that 
Daniel Daianu was the leader of the group.  
Like in Spain, the Romanian neoliberalism was to a considerable extent a 
reproduction of its Western and Central European variants. There was as much of 
Janos Kornai‘s and Olivier Blanchard‘s neoinstitutionalist-neoclassical 
syndissertation as there was of Sargeant‘s uncompromising rational expectations. 
In a rush to distance themselves from all things interventionist, some went as far 
as taking the Laffer curve seriously. There was little dissent from the ten 
commandments of the Washington Consensus and historical narratives about the 
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self-defeating character of Keynesian, developmentalist and market socialist 
economics were as numerous as the actual applications of the neoliberal 
―technical‖ model to the Romanian context. 
Soon the Romanian neoliberals were engaged in a war against all reform 
options save for the neoliberal shock therapy. During the early 1990s their main 
targets was heterodoxy (primarily) and the neoclassical stop-and-go reforms of 
the Roman and Stolojan governments (in subsidiary).  
The main foil was the heterodox argument that the negotiation of a trade-
off between high inflation and full industrial employment achieved through public 
credit was necessary (and possible) in order to prevent further falls in aggregate 
demand. Faced with this claim, the neoliberals reacted with a barrage of books 
and articles where this argument was attacked with the mainstream neoliberal 
claim that a focus on full employment was bound to generate productivity losses 
even in developed capitalist states (Croitoru 1994; Isarescu 1991; Daianu 1991; 
1994).  
Like their Western peers, they declared that in the long term the self-
regulating market mechanisms bring unemployment down to its natural rate so 
demand management makes no sense. (Croitoru 1993; 1996; Daianu 1991; 1992; 
1993; 1994; Albu et al 1992; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; 1996; Lazea 1992; 
1993a; 1993b; Radulescu and Dragulin 1995). The right solution, they argued, 
was shock therapy and permanent fiscal austerity. In line with the monetarist view 
that high inflation rates were due to excessive liquidity in the system, they 




rate, two positions immediately embraced by the central bank (IMF 1991; 1994; 
Gabor 2008).  
Using the neoliberal historical narrative about the ―failure of 
Keynesianism‖ during the 1970s, in a prize-winning book Lucian Croitoru argued 
that the use of reflation in a recession was self-defeating even in the conditions of 
a capitalist economy.
 668
  He submitted that in the particular conditions of 
Romania (no mature capitalist economy, poor access to foreign credit) this option 
was even more risky, as it was bound to send the country into bankruptcy. In 
addition to an austere fiscal policy, the government had to make the reduction of 
inflation though controlling the money supply the focal points of its economic 
program. 
669
 This argument was predicated on adopting wholesale the rational 
expectations dissertation that since public announcements of devaluations made 
workers expect even worse devaluations, such announcements would only make 
wage demands incommensurate with macrostabilization.
 670
  
The ideas used by Western neoliberals as weapons against Keynesians 
during the 1970s in the context of the Western stagflation crisis were recycled by 
Romanian neoliberals as refurbished weapons against the heterodox despite the 
fact that they were dealing with a state-owned economy that faced very different 
challenges. Arguments about the inflationary effects of gradual price 
liberalization were made by recycling the classic monetarist and rational 
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 In accordance with transition economics, an appropriate spectrum of inflation ranged between 
20 and 30 percent (Croitoru 1993: 161). 
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 To make this argument Lucian Croitoru used World Bank research padded with rational 
expectations logic and stylized stories of failed heterodox policies in Latin America and Israel to 
reject the heterodox stabilization policies based on direct price, wage and exchange rate controls 




expectations argument of the 1970s that any form of government manipulation of 
the money supply had in-built inflationary risks. The most important of this was 
that rational workers would demand even higher wages/subsidies to compensate 
the expected loss of purchase power as a result of the price liberalizations 
announced by the government. Given this argument, the only option was sudden 
and comprehensive price liberalization (Croitoru 1993: 34; Isarecsu 1991; 1995; 
Negritoiu 1995: 48-49; 207).
671
 Similar arguments were made by Isarescu (1991; 
1995), Daianu (1991; 1992), Negritoiu (1995: 48-49; 207).  
The suggestion that some transitional form of planning could temper the 
inflationary incentives of state firms with monopolistic positions was rejected as 
well. While they did not go as far as Jeffrey Sachs in assuming that ―markets 
spring up as soon as central planning bureaucrats vacate the field‖ (Sachs 1994: 
xii), they nevertheless treated planning as a natural event that followed logically 
from the popular rebellion against national-Stalinism (Daianu 1991; 1992; 
Croitoru 1993; Albu 1992). And they were not alone in thinking this: in his report 
on the state of the economy from February 1991, prime-minister Roman himself 
declared that in his view central planning had become a ―chimera‖ during the last 
years of national-Stalinism and that the economy had been governed by ―a kind of 
laissez faire.‖
672
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But the neoliberals did not aim just for dismantling planning and 
macrostabilization.
673
 They were aware that they were also undertaking transition 
towards disembedded liberalism in which the measures adopted during 
stabilization would be made permanent and enhanced with structural reforms. The 
fundamental directions of the post-stabilization program included squeezing 
demand and stimulating supply, across-the-board marketization and free trade, the 
reduction of employment in the public sector, the liquidation of unprofitable 
SOEs and the privatization of the profitable ones.
674
  They also demanded 
deregulation, the stimulation of internal and external competition, privatization, 
concession contracts, supply-side economics tax reforms (lower marginal taxes, 
non-taxation of dividends), massive cuts in subsidies and the sale of public 
service companies active in energy and public transport (Albu 1994; Negritoiu 
1995: 204; 207-208). Citing conservative readings of postwar history, some went 
as far as arguing that capital accumulation, economic growth and redistribution 
could not be pursued simultaneously and that the historical record suggested that 
the first should take priority to begin with  (Dijmarescu 1994: 80).  
Rather than use rational expectations, others made the case for shock 
therapy by hybridizing neoclassical and institutionalist arguments, following the 
footpath of Olivier Blanchard‘s transition economics. A postdoctoral student of 
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Blanchard‘s, Daniel Daianu attacked both the market fundamentalists who 
thought market institutions would be self-generating as well as heterodoxy, which 
he thought  responsible for perpetuating the institutional disorganization of the 
economy. Drawing on Blanchard‘s neoinstitutionalist-neoliberal syndissertation 
(Blanchard 1991), Daianu argued that coordination failures among economic 
agents were inevitable in a system in which planning collapsed.
675
 These resulted 
in an environment marked not only by costly information but by sheer lack of 
knowledge of economic agents.  
Yet this neoliberal-institutionalist syndissertation was used to bolster 
rather than to weaken the case for shock therapy: when combined with the fact 
that the economy had a very large number of structurally-inefficient firms and an 
underdeveloped financial market, the institutional inertia of state firms and 
investors was bound to lead to a situation whereby the economy would be 
systemically griped by inter-enterprise debt. The solution that followed was that 
all reforms had to be launched quickly and simultaneously rather than gradually 
and sequentially. To attack this problem, he suggested that loss-making 
enterprises judged to have no future were to be cut off public subsidies. But given 
that some of these hired tens of thousands Daianu used a false (what does false 
mean here?) gradualist argument to make the case for radical reforms on 
privatization and FDI: 
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Loss-making enterprises should be gradually shut down so as to reduce 
unemployment and distribute its costs over time. In this way the 
government could find resources for social security and active labor 
market policies. The time horizon for terminating loss makers depends on 
the pace of privatization and adequate capital flows: the faster will be the 
privatization process and the higher will be capital flows […] the easier 
will be the termination of loss makers (Daianu 1993: 20). 
 
Radical neoliberal arguments on income redistribution were adopted in 
whole cloth as well. All neoliberals paid lip service to the need to have some kind 
of social compensation for those affected by unemployment. In a country that 
already had the lowest social welfare budgets in Europe and a population that 
already had suffered extreme deprivations during the 1980s this was hardly 
surprising. Yet Romanian neoliberal discourse did not have the robust 
commitment to progressive tax and higher social spending that leading Spanish 
neoliberals maintained. Even on the ―left‖ of the neoliberal spectrum welfare 
retrenchment, a shift from universalism and equality of outcome to means-tested 
benefits and equality of opportunity were considered an important aspect of 
welfare policy (Croitoru 1993: 169-170; Dijmarescu 1994: 83-85). Such 
arguments were based on the classic conservative dissertation-nowhere to be 
found in Spanish neoliberal discourse- that the combination between the trickle-




pensions, savings accounts, investments) were superior to public redistribitive 
schemes (Negritoiu 1995: 207; 210-211; Turlea 1999: 147).
 
(That neoliberal capitalism rather than simply liberal capitalism was the 
imagined end point of these economists became even more obvious when they 
approached labor market and tax issues. Rather than examine the relative effects 
on unemployment of a politically engineered collapse in public demand, 
Romanian neoliberals simply embraced the standard OECD diagnosis of 
unemployment in developed capitalist countries: rigid hire-and-fire rules and 
insider-outsider labor markets (Croitoru 1993; Turlea 1999). In what was the first 
adaptation of the rational expectations models of Sargent, Hall and Begg in 
Romania, Geomina Turlea detected disincentives for employment even in the 
minimum wage (the level of which ranged below 50 dollars a month in early 
1990s Romania) (Turlea 1999: 146; 149-151).  
The supply-side demand for a decreased progressivity of the tax system as 
a solution to flagging investment was embraced as well, paving the way for the 
general acceptance of the radical ―flat tax‖ solution by the entire community of 
neoliberal economists after 2003. This argument was advanced as early as 1993 
despite the non-existence of a robust local capitalist class whose presumed tax 
rebates could be used for investment.
 676
 Four years before Sorensen (1997) 
controversially demonstrated that the progressivity of taxation had effects on 
                                                 
676
 Croitoru suggested that the calming of inflation should be followed tax cuts for higher income 
brackets, a general reduction of the progressive nature of the tax system, the termination of taxes 
meant to stimulate certain kinds of behaviors deemed good for the economy, greater reliance on 
consumption taxes, the expansion of the tax base. The high progressivity of personal income tax 
was blamed as one of the causes of weak job creation (Croitoru 1993: 105-106; 161). That such 
arguments were being marshaled at a time when Romania‘s domestic investor class was hardly 
noticeable and when the average foreign company invested 50,000 a year in Romania was 




unemployment, Lucian Croitoru made precisely this point using the ―evidence‖ 
presented by the Reagan tax cuts (Croitoru 1993).  
 
Editing Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal transition economics was, however, not a simple top-down ideational 
flow whereby a neoliberal script was replicated by willing domestic advocates. 
Instead, in the translational dialogue that accompanied the transmission of such 
ideas, Romanian economists were active participants in making this translation 
possible. They often changed the ―original‖ neoliberal text by grafting on it their 
own innovations, mixed it with alternative economic frameworks 
(institutionalism, structuralism), and worked to ―black-box‖ the differences 
between neoliberal prescriptions for developed capitalist states and neoliberal 
transition economics. They also drew on domestic historical narratives and 
political frames to make neoliberal arguments resonate in a country that had not 
known economic liberalism. The result of this bricolage was a reading of 
neoliberalism that was in between the crude market fundamentalism espoused in 
the region by Estonian president Mart Laar, and the ―Third Way‖ neoliberalism 
pioneered by Spanish Socialists.  
First, there was little enthusiasm for crude versions of market 
fundamentalism. In interviews, Romanian neoliberals were quick to distance 
themselves from the ―talibans‖ (the libertarian economists analyzed in the next 
section) and many liked being considered eclectic economists.
677
 Some spent time 
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attacking select assumptions of neoclassical economics and couched their 
neoliberal policy prescriptions in an intellectual eclecticismthat drew on various 
traditions in economics (Iancu 1994; Daianu 1996). Others saw in democratic 
corporatist institutions like peak level collective bargaining and a tripartite 
collective bargaining institution important conditions for an efficient income 
policy (Croitoru 1993: 62-63; Negritoiu 1995: 196; Iancu 1994). The 
fundamentalist assumption that ―[people will] change their patterns of behavior 
and adjust their activities rationally and voluntarily if the market provides the 
right incentives‖ (Vaclav Klaus quoted in Blejer and Coricelli 1995: 100) was 
hardly a common occurrence. 
Also, while shock therapists thought that industrial policy ―flies in the face 
of everything we know about the behavior of states around the world‖ (Frydman, 
Rapaczynski and Turkewitz 1997: 85), few Romanian neoliberals thought that the 
state should suddenly embrace a neutral position vis-à-vis potential winners and 
losers. Granted, they subordinated enterprise reform to macrostabilization and 
therefore rejected industrial policy options used by the heterodox (subsidized 
industrial credit, tax exemptions and targeted tariffs) as leading to inflation, 
arrears and rent-seeking opportunities for insiders (Negritoiu 1995: 156-157; Popa 
1994; Munteanu 1994). 
 In the spirit of the neoclassical microfoundations critique, such policy 
interventions were also declared incompatible with the microeconomic bases of 






 It was therefore suggested that subsidies be made explicit 
and that they should be targeted as firms deemed to have a potential, yet it was 
insisted that the focus of industrial policy should be less about picking winners 
and more about picking losers to be shut down.  
Others, however, pleaded for the kind of ―smart‖ mix of interventionist 
and neutral industrial policy embraced by Spanish socialists: phasing-out 
chronically inefficient companies and investing state resources in strategic firms 
and industrial champions with potential for expansion in foreign markets (Daianu 
1992: 181-206; 1993: 19-20; Negritoiu 1995: 213-215).
679
 Yet unlike in the case 
of their Spanish counterparts, these economists relegated this industrial policy 
template to the periphery of their agenda until the issue was resuscitated by EU 
integration (Daianu et al 2003). 
Supply-side mimetism on taxation was often moderated by pleas for 
differentiated sale tax regimes for food, medicine, books, constructions and 
fertilizers (Croitoru 1993: 167). Also, not all accepted the radical neoliberal 
dissertation of there was a ―natural‖ rate of unemployment determined strictly by 
the laws of supply and demand. Instead, they demanded active labor market 
policies and the establishment of effective social bargaining institutions (Croitiru 
1991: 48-54). Finally, although they agreed with it in principle, in the late 1990s 
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 Some neoliberals went as far as considering that public ownership was by itself a disincentive 
for state owned firms to abide by the contracts they signed (Dijmarescu 1994: 79).   
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 On this terrain these neoliberals cooperated with heterodox like Emilian Dobrescu and neo-
Keynesians like Vasile Pillat. In 1993 Pillat and Negritoiu drafted a bill on a multiannual 
industrial policy template and then spurred efforts for a methodology of picking winners. This 
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leading neoliberals rejected the radical monetarist solution of the currency board 
adopted by the Baltics and Bulgaria (Croitoru and Daianu 1999). 
Nevertheless, Romanian neoliberals grafted their own innovations on 
neoliberal imports, usually with the effect of consolidating or radicalizing 
neoliberal policy prescriptions. For example, Daniel Daianu argued that the 
emergence of late payments between firms (arrears) was a form of money and to 
the extent that it affected state firms it had to be factored in the calculation of 
inflation and deficit figures. Similarly, Daianu‘s concept of ―structural strain‖ 
applied to the postcommunist economies suggested that only fast and systemic 
structural reform could unlock the institutional gridlock that kept the economy 
from functioning efficiently (Daianu 1995). Others ―recoded‖ the neo-Leynesian 
IS-LM model by assuming that the aggregate supply function is of rational 
expectations type (Lucas) and the monetary rule is of monetarist (Friedman) type 
(Altar 2008). 
Some of these innovations ended up strengthening the conceptual 
repertoire of the neoliberal message broadcast by international organizations 
through an interesting co-participation effect linking these institutions with the 
economists working outside the Western epistemic core. Thus the understanding 
of arrears as money made an international career after it had been popularized in 
the IMF Working Papers (Daianu 1994). Similarly, the OECD used the Romanian 
economist‘s ―structural strain‖ in its comparative studies on structural adjustments 




 Third, other Romanian economists transformed the very content of 
neoliberal transition economics. Thus, during the early 1990s the IMF and the 
World Bank softened their calls for austerity and the expansion of the tax base 
with demands that the tax system be made more progressive.
680
 Yet the idea of a 
progressive taxation system was attacked by Romanian neoliberals with the 
supply-side argument that a high degree of progressivity dramatically reduced 
incentives to invest and to save (Croitoru 1993).  
Another example concerns domestic justifications for macrostabilization. 
One of the central bank‘s most respected economists (Cristian Popa) dramatized 
the urgency of orthodox macrostabilization by adding a layer of rational 
expectations theory that did not figure in the standard neoclassical shock therapy 
argument.
681
 Citing no empirical evidence but drawing on rational expectations 
logic, he proposed a microeconomic theory of the rise of inter-firm debt, a factor 
that prevented successful macrostabilization through the buildup of arrears: 
 
[c]reditors themselves fail to sue their debtors […] due to their correct 
expectations that such an action increased the risk of bankruptcy for the 
creditor itself; more importantly, the benefits of suing one‘s debtor were 
smaller than the costs of losing an outlet for the creditor‘s own 
merchandise. Such behavior was diffused through imitation and ended up 
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 For example, in 1991 the IMF‘s technical assistance in Romania demanded (and obtained) the 
adoption of a steeply progressive income and corporate taxation system (Rodlauer 1995). 
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 Moreover, Popa used the postulates of rational expectations as grounds for exhorting the 
authorities to create perfect markets with perfect imformation. In making this argument Popa 
modified rational expectations by working with the assumption that such institutions were 
achievable realities through public policy and by suggesting that these institutions exist in the 





transforming structural inefficiency into the aggregate inefficiency of the 
entire national economy […] (Croitoru 1994: 131). 
 
The main policy implication of this innovation was that any alternative to 
neoclassical macrostabilization became ipso facto irrational from a 
microeconomic standpoint. Popa further argued that such suboptimal behavior 
was bound to continue as long as the economy remained state-owned because 
from within this theory‘s assumptions profit-making could only be conceived of 
as of peripheral concern to public firms. The reason was that in practice workers 
controlled the factories and their utility maximizing behavior could be no other 
than preserving employment and wages despite a fall in output, two highly 
suboptimal outcomes. In order to be efficient and rational in the sense of rational 
expectations theory, the microeconomic world of postcommunism had to perform 
the assumptions of that theory. Anything short of that was a form of deviance:  
 
[a]ny important progress towards market-conforming rationality will not 
occur until considerable segments of economic agents will behave in an 
economically optimal manner rather than in a rent-seeking one (Popa 
1994: 134). 
 
But the translation of neoliberalism did not take place only in the rarefied 
air of economic theory and ―technical‖ languages.  A host of local framing 




of Romanian neoliberal economics came to the fore, unfiltered by the ―soft‖ 
stylistic norms of the local economics profession.  
In this tradition, obscuring the controversial or marginal nature of an 
argument played a crucial role in radicalizing the neoliberal message. The 
research on controversial effects of the Reagan tax cuts on supply are not even 
mentioned in Lucian Albu‘s historical excursus into the genesis of the latest 
innovations in tax policy. For the same author the Laffer curve and the supply-
side argument that tax cuts for corporations pay for themselves were treated as 
scientific facts (Albu 1994: 37; 41-43)
682
 despite the fact that they were never 
taken seriously among professional Western economists (Blyth 2002).  
Also, controversial policy makers like Leszek Balcerowitz were cited as if 
they were dispassionate scientists (Negritoiu 1995)
683
  and, drawing on the 
popular bashing of the industrial workers by the intelligentsia (Miroiu 1999; 
Antohi 2001; Preoteasa 2002), some went as far as turning the ―worsening morals 
and discipline‖ of the industrial working class into an important cause of 
unemployment (Croitoru 1991; Dijmarescu 1993).  
Finally, radicalization was also enabled by the setting of false dichotomies 
between ―Western‖ and ―communist‖ arguments. Aurel Iancu made the case for 
central bank independence as if there were only two acceptable positions: the 
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 While supply-side economics was just one of the contestants in the field of Western orthodox 
economics during the 1990s, in Bucharest Albu declared it as ―the core of modern tax policy‖ 
(Albu 1994: 41). 
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Central Europe at the time of the fall of communism, steady and radical reforms were more 
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Western democratic position demanding complete independence and the national-
Stalinist one demanding complete subordination of the central bank to the 
executive, with the latter being ―endorsed by Ceausescu‘s former financiers and 
USSR-trained academics‖ (Iancu 1996: 44). Even a neoliberal as moderate and as 
given to eclecticism as Aurel Iancu talked about Europe‘s ―glorious thirties‖ 
through the lens of Milton Friedman‘s interpretation of it (Iancu 1994: 83; 90).
684
 
Unsurprisingly, then, economic liberalization and social fairness were deemed 
incompatible for Romania‘s stage of development
685
 and the progressive taxation 
applied to business activity was a form of ―neo-communist‖ redistribution, while 
social democracy was an economic regime in which social protection is achieved 
through the dividends made possible by citizens‘ ownership (Dijmarescu 1994: 
79).  
   
Neoliberalism après Neoliberalism 
For some neoliberals the failure of shock therapy and the crisis of capitalism after 
the East Asian financial crisis led to some soul-searching and moderation. Yet for 
most these events were just bits of evidence that neoliberal ideas had not been 
fully implemented. Neoliberal ideas had become convention and no amount of 
countervailing evidence could unseat them. 
Faced with the failure of shock therapy package of 1997, the neoliberals 
created a new causal narrative that tried to obfuscate the demand-side causes of 
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 To this end Iancu put as a period marked by the loss of freedom at the hands of bureaucrats and 
by the proliferation of the scourge of egalitarianism 
685





the crisis and the relative success of the previous heterodox government Croitoru 
1999; Isarescu et al 2003; Croitoru 2003a; 2003b; Altar 2003).
686
 As summarized 
by the chief economist of the central bank, the neoliberal response was that the 
shock therapy did not work because the liberalization of the remaining 
administered prices fueled the spike in inflation, the leu was overshot, the workers 
of the firms pushed into bankruptcy were given redundancy payments, the 
economy was too burdened by monopolies and monetary policy was relaxed too 
early for shock therapy to work. Rather than blame austerity for the public bailout 
of two large state banks in 1997,
687
 the neoliberals blamed it instead on the slow 
pace of privatization and restructuring (Daianu 1999: 16-18).
688
  
As austerity sent the economy into negative growth rates, bankruptcies 
and unemployment at record lows, the neoliberals demanded more of it. The 
familiar rhetorical strategy of Western neoliberals (Aslund, Boone and Johnson 
1996; de Melo, Denizer and Gelb 1996, Fisher, Sahay and Vegh 1996; Sachs 
1997) to blame the failure of shock therapy on the insufficient intensity of the 
shock rather than on its negative effects on demand were prominent (Croitoru and 
Tarhoaca 1999; Albu and Pelinescu 2000; Radulescu 2000; Croitoru and Schaffer 
2000). The same narrative of austerity demanded the further ―soaking‖ of the 
smattering of institutions of redistribution. Even as Romania had the lowest levels 
of spending on healthcare, education and welfare in the region, leading 
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 One exception is Daianu‘s acknowledgement that and the fact the multiple exchange rate 
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neoliberals demanded more spending cuts as ―budget transfers sustain unviable 
social insurance systems and ineffective social insurance schemes‖ (Croitoru and 
Tarhoaca 1999: 13). 
After the failure of shock therapy, tax cuts were advanced as the solution 
to a whole slew of issues, from the weak capacity of the state to collect taxes to 
the weak flows of FDI. Indeed, tax reforms replaced fiscal stimulus as the main 
answer to sluggish demand. The force of supply-side tax ideas was particularly 
striking as the ―transformational recession‖ engineered by the 1997 shock therapy 
forced both public and private firms into tax delinquency.
689
 According to a study 
commissioned to CEROPE, a think-tank close to the central bank, the measure of 
the firms‘ tendency to transfer the costs they incurred as a result of shock therapy 
into budgetary austerity was captured by the main finding of the study: ―[a]lmost 
all firms are increasing their tax debts to the government by more than their tax 
payments‖ (Croitoru and Schaffer 2000: 19).  
To address this situation, the neoliberals demanded not only improvement 
in the tax collection capacity of the state, but also less progressivity in the system 
(Croitoru and Schaffer 2000; Lazea 2001).
690
 A supply-side tax revolution meant 
to make taxation less regressive was clamored as a solution to unemployment and 
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informal labor as well. The neoliberal economists pleaded for reduced marginal 
income tax rates and social security contributions and the corresponding increase 
in the minimum income tax rates and in the VAT (Albu et al 2001).
691
  
By 2003 this position was radicalized
692
 and none of the neoliberals came 
out strongly against the idea of adopting the radical idea of a low ―flat tax‖ on 
income and capital.
693
 Even the self-doubting Daianu publicly endorsed the logic 
underlying it by showing that, based on the Russian success at implementing it, a 
flat tax could increase public revenues by bringing to light previously undeclared 
earnings.
694
 Moreover, some joined the effort of ―flat taxers‖ to attack the 
country‘s World Bank-designed tax system which despite several waves of 
reforms that dramatically reduced its progressivity was still deemed ―socialist.‖ 
Leading neoliberal economist and commentator Ilie Serbanescu justified his 
opposition to a government initiative to crack down on informal labor by arguing 
that unless labor taxes and welfare contributions would be cut by half,  
 
[t]hose who now hire informal workers would try to avoid paying taxes for 
activities because they would simply go bankrupt given the current levels 
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of labor taxation […] Only a small percentage of firms can afford doing 
business by paying these prohibitive taxes and social contributions and 
these are the businesses that cater to the needs of the well-off and of the 
wealthy […] So, should the government launch a massive campaign 
against  informal labor, a massive chunk of economic activity would grind 
to a halt, leaving behind an economic and social disaster. And the state 
would lose more in revenue than it does now as a result of lost VAT and 
corporate income tax. And there would be great social tensions as well. 
All those who would be deprived of informal jobs would protest in the 




Along with the principle of progressive taxation, industrial policy and neo-
corporatism also disappeared from the agenda of mainstream neoliberalism. New 
issues appeared, most of them culled from the EU Lisbon agenda: inflation 
targeting, the partial privatization of the pension system, flexible hire-and-fire 
rules, the deregulation of temporary employment (Daianu et al 2004). External 
events like the crisis in Argentina in 2002 served only to reinforce calls for more 
fiscal austerity.
696
 The World Bank and EBRD position that failures were not the 
result of bad policies but of pervasive institutional ―cronyism‖ (EBRD 1999; 
World Bank 1999) entered the debate in full force, while ideas of the central bank 
economists became lingua franca even in the PSD, where US-trained Finance 
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minister and party secretary Mihai Tanasescu shaped economic policy (Abraham 
2004).  
A new graduate program (DOFIN) established by the same Moisa Altar 
churned out graduates whose dissertations evinced a systematic knowledge of the 
latest in Western neoliberal economics.
697
 From Friedman‘s strategies for 
controlling inflation, to Robert Lucas‘ positions on fiscal policy or the human 
capital factor, Merton Miller‘s and Ross Levine‘s  arguments about the role of 
deregulated finance for growth, the repertoire of Western orthodoxy finally 
became part of postgraduate training of Romania‘s elite of economists. Similarly, 
orthodox ideas about the extent of central bank independence, social security 
financing, the most ―pro-growth‖ levels of taxation or the low likelyhood of 
economic growth even at very low levels of inflation became familiar and are 
―indigenized‖ with local data.  
New concepts (shareholder value) and methodologies (value-at-risk) were 
introduced. Such concepts and models were then applied and respectively 
calibrated in the graduates‘ dissertations on the specific situation of the Romanian 
economy. As to development economics themes, the only references one can find 
in such theses are from scholars who put schooling and life expectancy on a par 
with lower government consumption and lower inflation as emdowment factors 
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for sustainable development (e.g. Doppelhofer, Sala-i-Martin).  Finally, complex 
models and longitudinal data series for EU countries is marshaled to advocate the 
tenets of supply-side taxation policy: Europe‘s high tax rates have a negative 
effect on economic growth, the relationship between government expenditures 
and economic growth is negative, there is a consistent negative relation between 
budget deficits and growth, and government consumption has a much greater 
negative effect on output growth than total government expenditure.  
By 2005 Romania had a flat tax regime, inflation targeting, finacialization 
and a highly internationalized manufacturing base. Even as the crisis struck in 
2008, the central bank governor hubristically declared that Romania‘s careful 
monetary management and credibility conferred by its inflation targeting regime 
strengthened the country against the crisis (Isarescu 2008). Months later the 
country saw Eastern Europe‘s biggest international bailout and its most severe 
economic crisis since 1992. 
 
The Withering of the Heterodox Threat and the Rise of Libertarianism 
Heterodoxy proved to be a qualified economic success compared to the crater left 
behind by the shock therapists of the Convention yet its record was almost never 
used by the PSD and Iliescu in their electoral campaign in 2000. When Iliescu and 
the PSD returned to office in 2000, his top economic counselors (Gheorghe 
Zaman and Florin Georgescu) had changed dramatically from their heterodox 
years. Their publications now reflected ideas that were in lockstep with the 




1999; 2004). In his contributions to a popular economics textbook (Vacarel et al 
1999), Georgescu acquiesced to select conservative arguments about the 
perversity of anti-poverty programs and the decrepitude of the Swedish model.
698
 
 Zaman‘s views in the early 2000s were not particularly left-leaning either, 
especially on such key policy areas as pensions. His research on the woes of the 
Romanian pension system endorsed the World Bank‘s semi-privatization scheme 
developed for Romania in 1995 (World Bank 1995) and put pension privatization 
in the program of the Nastase cabinet (Vasile and Zaman 2001).
699
 Zaman‘s 
research on pensions shows a significant integration of the neoliberal pension 
reform agenda in other respects as well: stimulating participation in private 
schemes via higher fiscal deductibility of private pension payments, the 
multiplication of private-public schemes, reliance on municipalities and charities 
for increasing the income of the oldest pensioners living below the poverty level. 
At the same time, Zaman also advanced structural remedies such as a more active 
pro-birth policy, better tax enforcement and improved preventive care (Vasile and 
Zaman 2001; 2005). 
Yet theirs was generally a more redistributive or ―embedded‖ kind of 
neoliberalism. For example, Georgescu‘s academic work on taxation during the 
late 1990s was based largely in 1960s Keynesian contributions such as 
Musgrave‘s, rather than on the supply-side fashions worn by some of the 
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economists in the Finance ministry (Vacarel et al., 1999).
700
 Of the available 
varieties of income tax, he drew on a 1970 French taxation textbook to choose the 
most progressive one and does not even mention the flat tax.
 701
  In the same 
contribution he exposed the supply-side argument for tax cuts and particularly the 
Laffer curve to a systemic critique peppered with anecdotes about the failure of 
the Reagan administration to maintain an adequate level of the tax receipts 
(Vacarel et al 1999: 400-405).  
Similarly, Gheorghe Zaman lambasted neoliberal distrust in 
interventionism and pleaded for industrial policy and state-owned industrial 
champions well into the mid 2000s. He critiqued the executive‘s strategy to 
privatize all profitable state firms using the argument that its tax collection 
capacity was too low to afford selling profitable state firms to West European 
state firms. Well before the 2009 crisis hit Romania‘s economy, Zaman was 
among the few who critiqued the euphoria of the BNR and of the executive about 
the boom of remittances and FDI as substitutes for domestic investment (Zaman 
2005). 
Also, like Georgescu, Zaman found the flat tax an unfair upward 
redistribution of incomes and a few years later he used IO methodology and 
particularly Leontieff‘s work on tax multipliers to advocate lower taxes for 
economic sectors that serve other sectors of the national economy (energy, 
education, public services) with the argument that the former have a higher tax 
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propagation effect based around the principle of state‘s right to influence the 
decisions of individuals and firms to foster growth (Zaman et al 2010).   
As heterodoxy reached its terminal crisis in a form of embedded 
neoliberalism, Romanian libertarian economics began to challenge the neoliberal 
mainstream from the right. The local translation of the Austrian School of 
economics had begun in the early 1990s among a few marginal philosophers and 
maverick young economists. Its first advocate was Mihai Radu Solcan, an 
assistant professor at a Bucharest engineering university (Politehnica) who 
discovered libertarian philosophy and economics during the 1980s.
702
 After 1990, 
he used his position as a philosophy professor to popularize the classics of 
libertarianism. As the editor of the country‘s most respected private publishing 
house (Humanitas) he also facilitated the publication of the Romanian language 
editions of the work of the luminaries of the libertarian movement.
703
 Similarly, as 
dean of the philosophy department of University of Bucharest, Adrian Miroiu 
mentored a group of young libertarian students who in the late 1990s and early 
2000s staffed the research teams of pro-market think-tanks like the Romanian 
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 Solcanu ran into libertarian readings in a Bucharest bookstore and soon used Popper‘s Poverty 
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 Solcanu‘s academic publications during the early 1990s applied to Romanian socio-economic 
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Thanks to these two intellectuals, libertarian political philosophy laid the 
ground for the advocacy of libertarian economics. As early as 1992, a small group 
of young economists established a small anarcho-capitalist reading group, with 
the charismatic young economist Cristian Comanescu acting as a dedicated 
mentor. In the same year Comanescu established the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
a network of libertarian economists named after its US namesake based in 
Auburn, Alabama. Unlike the well-heeled US think tanks espousing such ideas, 
this institute focused on scholarship and the popularization of libertarian ideas, 
rather than on dealing with contemporary policy issues (Evans 2009).  
 Discreet and scholarly, by the late 1990s the libertarians nevertheless 
began to shape economic policy debates in more aggressive ways. Comanescu‘s 
―Mises seminar‖ became an incubator for the economic commentariat by 
attracting a steady flow of young journalists from leading national dailies. 
According to an insider, these people ―basically got all they know about 
economics from Cristi Comanescu‘s seminar.‖
705
 Most importantly, libertarian 
disciples began an aggressive apostolate in economics and social science 
departments.  
Around the time when the Nastase government was about to take office, 
the economics departments in Bucharest and Cluj hired a dozen of well-read 
libertarian professors teaching core courses like economic theory or comparative 
economic systems.
706
 The same happened in political science, after Adrian Miroiu 
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As some libertarians joined the influential pro-market Romanian 
Academic Society (Sorin Ionita, Cristian Ghinea), others (Horia Terpe) 
established a policy-oriented think-tank (CADI), an organization put under the 
patronage of the Liberal Party‘s crème de la crème (Mona Musca, Varujan 
Vosganian, Valeriu Stoica, Dinu Patriciu).
 708
  Others still created the most vibrant 
online academic discussion groups in the country (Asociatia Liberalism.ro).
709
 
The rise of the libertarians during the 2000s inspired the radical tax policies of the 
center-right government that came to power in 2005. While it is unclear how the 
libertarian challenge directly contributed to the radicalization of mainstream 
neoliberals, it is suggestive that during the economic crisis that began in 2008 the 
IMF‘s cautiously redefined neoliberal orthodoxy demanding austerity softened by 
taxes hikes on the rich clashed with a Romanian neoliberal heterodoxy that 
demanded austerity through pay cuts, lay-offs and the gutting of Romania‘s 
fledgling social services. The IMF was thus being outbid from the right. In one of 
history‘s comical twists, the IMF chief stood accused of playing ―socialist‖ 
politics
710
 in one of the few postcommunist countries where neoliberalism had 
been adopted only after a long fight.  
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The main argument of this chapter is that neoliberalism was not a seamless 
scientific artifact developed in a foreign ―lab‖ and unreflexively adopted in 
Romania. In other words its adoption was not the result of simple imitation and 
imposition processes stressing its reproduction in a new context. Rather, like in 
Spain, this protean intellectual framework was as much a replica of the Western 
―original‖ as it was a hybrid infused with local flavors. 
The chapter opens with the following challenge: if Romanian economics 
was historically so hostile to the neoclassical tradition from which neoliberalism 
grew, how could the neoliberal seeds germinate in such infertile soil? I address 
this question by examining the transnational dialogue between Romanian 
economists and their Western counterparts. Then, I turn to how the legacy of this 
dialogue to the post-communist reality was a robust network of economists who 
quickly took much of the neoliberal model as ―fact‖ while reflexively and 
knowledgeably scrutinizing some of its implications and weaving together a 
network of discursive relations between neoliberalism and other scientific 
artifacts (institutionalism, structuralism, corporatism). The bulk of the chapter 
focuses on how this conceptual network was constructed and its internal workings 
―black-boxed‖ in the process of translation.  
The result was a variant of neoliberalism that was less statist and less 
redistributive than Spain‘s. Its advocates radicalized some of the ―classic‖ 
neoliberal positions on taxation, income redistribution and industrial policy while 




tradition that had once been used to critique core-periphery trade relations and the 
bottlenecks of the interventionist development model was now used to bolster 
calls for a local version of neoliberal shock therapy that left very little space for 
protecting the economically disenfranchised. But unlike in Spain, where 
economists remained skepticism towards the Laffer curve and other artifacts 
upheld by marginal US supply-side economics, in Romania such ideas were 
incorporated into mainstream Romanian economics as uncontested scientific 
instruments and inspired the adoption of a regressive tax regime. Similarly, while 
in Spain the advocates of neoliberal macroeconomic or labor policy saw state 
ownership of industrial champions as a means to increase the external 
competitiveness of the economy, their Romanian counterparts saw such 
interventions as doing the opposite. 
 The chapter also shows that it could have been otherwise. Neoliberalism 
did not diffuse unproblematically as an uncontested ―world culture.‖ Instead, 
during the first half of the 1990s its ideas were heavily contested by domestic 
advocates of reform socialism and heterodoxy. It was only as these non-neoliberal 
traditions gradually withered out during the late 1990s that and neoliberal 
dominance in academia and the central bank could dramatically shape the 
economic agenda of the ex-communist party. As the next chapter shows, this was 
not a ―natural‖ process of paradigm obsolescence structurally demanded by the 
end of real-existing socialism. Rather, it was a heavily political process whereby 
external agents empowered the translators of neoliberalism and marginalized 












Chapter X - The Translators of Romanian Neoliberalism 
Overview 
Through what conduits were Western economic ideas translated in Romania? The 
chapter explores the ways in which transnational and domestic actors participated 
in the translation work outlined in the previous chapter. The main 
hypodissertation tested here is that the supply of domestic translators for 
neoliberalism is shaped by elite transnationalization processes. To this end, I 
examine which kinds of foreign training in economics had a real impact and how 
IOs, transnationalized think-tanks and transnational party networks shaped 
Romanian economic debates towards neoliberal reforms.  
The chapter‘s sections are organized around each one of these conduits. 
First, I examine the ebbs and flows of the transnationalization of Romanian 
economics before and after 1989. My analysis will dwell on the making and 
subsequent unbundling of transnational ties between Romanian mathematical 
economists and their Western peers during national-Stalinism and locate in these 
ties the first conduits for the diffusion of Western economic ideas in what was 
then one of the Eastern Bloc‘s most heavily policed economic professions. 
Second, I turn to the dynamics of transnationalization after 1989 and focus on the 
extent and shape of the opportunities for a more systematic re-opening of 
Romanian economics to Western educational opportunities and academic 
markets. The last part of the paper looks at transnational party networks, political 
development NGOs with economic think-tank functions and ―classic‖ think-tanks 





Ebbs and Flows: The Transnationalization of Romanian Economics 
From semi-periphery to the periphery of the periphery 
Before the advent of national-Stalinism, Romanian economics had been as highly 
transnationalized as Spanish economics. The discipline was taught in a separate 
department whose structure and curriculum closely followed that of the French 
grandes ecoles.
711
 Beginning with the late 19
th
 century, a solid publication record 
in respectable foreign journals and presses plus a Western PhD became basic 
conditions for acquiring and maintaining university employment.
712
 Economics 
departments were well-stocked with the latest French and German books and 
journals and the flagship Romanian economics review (Revue roumaine des 
etudes sociales) was published directly in French and enjoyed a respectable 
international ranking (Kiritescu 1995). Training was rigorous, many members of 
this exceptionally polyglot faculty made international careers and some (Mihail 
Manoilescu, Georgescu-Roegen) reached world notoriety. Like in Spain, much of 
this performance was the result of a consistent state strategy to invest in the 
Western training of a world-class academic elite that could be enlisted in its 
economic development plans.
713
 As a result, in less than thirty years, Romanian 
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 Suggestively, the very name of the department was a direct translation from French (Academia 
de Inalte Studii Comerciale si Industriale). 
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 See Love (1996). For example, all the theorists of Romanian cooperatist economists (Virgil 
Madgearu, Ion Raducanu, Gr. Mladenatz) who taught economics had German Phds (Murgescu 
1990).  
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 Like in Spain, beginning with the late 19
th
 century, the ministry of education fully funded 
economics graduates to complete their doctoral studies at leading French and German universities. 
Upon their return, these graduates were guaranteed employment and upper-middle class wages. 
Leading economics professors were routinely invited to hold ministerial positions and advising 




economics went from amateurism and international irrelevance to a high degree 
of professionalization and the beginning of an international profile.  
The first fifteen years of national-Stalinism abruptly ended this ―golden 
age‖ of Romanian economics. Most forms of direct contact with Western 
economics were terminated. Outside of mathematical economics, the quality of 
training decreased and, consequently, the profession ceased to have any kind of 
international impact outside of a few isolated publications in mathematical 
economics (Balas 2000: 329).
714
 Access to Western publications was limited, yet 
not dramatically so if one was doing intensive research for a living. The Institute 
of Economic Research (IER) of the Academy, Cybernetics, the American Library, 
the RCP Academy but also non-academic institutions such as the Chamber of 
Commerce
715
 had basic collections of Western literature (Balas 2000: 329; 
Severin 2002; Daianu 2005).
716
 
As a result of these political interventions, in just a few years, Romanian 
economics went from its prewar epistemic semi-periphery status to the periphery 
of the periphery. Yet beginning with the early 1960s the détente, the partial 
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 In 1957 Egon Balas published an article in the French journal Etudes Economiques (Balas 
2000: 329).  
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 During the 1960s and 1970s the Foreign Trade Institute of the Foreign Chamber of Commerce, 
an institution that drafted reports on the dynamics of international markets needed by the regime. 
This entailed access to foreign economics reviews but since publication using international sources 
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During the 1960s this institution hired prominent economist Tiberiu Schatteles who recently 
testified that researchers at this institutes had the latest editions of American Economic Review and 
Econometrica. (Aligica and Terpe 2007: 11-13).  
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 Author interview with Moisa Adler. Also according to Blas‘ memoir, in the library of IER one 
could read the classic of linear programming (Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow 1958) one year 
after it was published in the US (Balas 2000: 373). Since the late 1950s until the 1980s the 
relevant American publications in linear programming were available (Balas 2000: 377) and 





―thaw‖ of Stalinism and the entrepreneurialism of a generation of young 
economists dampened the effects of isolation.  
 
Détente, nationalism and the re-transnationalization of Romanian economics 
While the Romanian ―thaw‖ of the 1960s was largely a form of ―simulated 
change‖ that ended up foiling reform scenarios on the Polish, Hungarian or 
Czechoslovak mold (Schafir 1985; Tismaneanu 1989; 2003), this political process 
nevertheless terminated the more extreme forms of parochialization of the 
economics profession enforced during the 1950s.
717
 This shift was possible due to 
the simultaneous occurrence of détente, the anti-Soviet turn in Romanian foreign 
policy and the intellectual entrepreneurialism of local economists.  
The East-West ouvertures initiated by the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations opened up spaces for the renewal of transnational ties between 
Romanian and Western economists.
718
 In 1962 the embrace of West German ideas 
about détente by the Kennedy administration led to the initiation of academic 
exchanges between the Warsaw pact and the ―West‖ that would have been 
unthinkable during the 1950s (Hofmann 2006; Richmond 2004). The effects of 
the détente were magnified in the Romanian case by the regime‘s pursuance 
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 This shift followed the country‘s unilateral breach of solidarity with the Warsaw Pact during 
the Cuban missile crisis (Deletant 2007: 499). According to Deletant, ―[t]he Romanian foreign 
minister Corneliu Manescu told Dean Rusk during a meeting on 4 October 1963 that Romania had 
not been consulted over the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, and was not 
therefore a party to the dispute. The Romanian government wanted the United States to understand 
that Romania would remain neutral in any conflict generated by such actions as the Soviet 
deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assurances that in the event of hostilities 
arising from such a situation, the United States would not strike Romania on the mistaken 




during the early 1960s of an increasingly nationalist and anti-Soviet course in 
foreign policy that made the regime a darling of the West.
719
   
This foreign policy course culminated with such episodes as the regime‘s 
protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968),
720
 the first recognition of 
West Germany in the Eastern bloc (1967), siding with the Chinese in the Sino-
Soviet split, or the refusal to break diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six 
Day War
721
 (Braun 1978; Alexiev 1981; Ionescu et al 2004; Ioanid 2005; Mastny 
and Byrne 2005; Deletant 2007). Most importantly, by the late 1960s Romanian-
American relations were unusually close by Eastern Bloc standards: several 
presidential visits of Nixon and Ford to Bucharest, Romanian-American joint 
ventures and special trade relations, American support for Romania‘s entry into 




Détente and the special US-Romanian relationship engendered by the 
regime‘s anti-Soviet turn made possible the renewal of academic exchanges 
between Romanian economics and Western economists after almost three decades 
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 In 1964 the Romanian regime asserted its political autonomy against Moscow through a series 
of dramatic gestures: the expelling KGB operatives, closing the Russian Institute in Bucharest, 
eliminating Russian as a compulsory language from the education system (Deletant 2007: 499). 
Also, Romania sided with China in the Sino-Soviet split. See ―Ceausescu Indicated Romania 
Would Not Give Soviet Union Military Support Against Red China‖, New York Times, April 20, 
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 Romania‘s proximity to Israel also entailed the regime‘s extortion of ―ransom‖ for the 
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New York Times, August 4, 1969; ―Ceausescu Visits Nixon at the White House for Talks on 
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of isolation. The Americans made the first move by establishing a public-private 
partnership between the US government and private foundations that would fund 
and offer institutional support to Romanian economists willing and allowed by the 
regime to study or do research in Western universities.  
 
Détente, inter-bloc networks and the rediscovery of Western economics 
As early as 1962, the Ford Foundation began to fund American study trips for 
Romanian economists. As a result, by 1979 several English-speaking Romanian 
economists were enrolled in the US National Academy of Sciences exchange 
programs while mathematical economists began to attend Kondratieff‘s Russia 
Center at Harvard.
723
 In 1971, a year after Ceausescu‘s presidential visit to the 
U.S., this cooperation was so extensive that the Ford Foundation and IREX were 
funding an entire academic exchange program in management studies in 
Bucharest (Byrnes 1976; Bockman and Eyal 2002: 325).  
Such opportunities gave a young generation of Romanian economists who 
were more likely to speak English than Russian the funds to conduct research in 
top-ranked American universities for up to ten months and develop relations with 
their Western peers.
724
 Here, they acquired data, skills in input-output modeling 
and access to the basic books and journal subscriptions of Western economics. 
Most importantly, they learned the basic rules for getting more stints in US-
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 Nevertheless, a ―political dossier‖ could block such international scholarly opportunities even 
if one had publications in Western journals, a rare performance in those years (Balas 2000: 415; 
436). After a prison term, harassment and a ban on international conference travel Balas 
eventually secured a trip to Israel and  definitively left the country in 1966 to take up teaching 




sponsored institutions and thus an entry point to learn directly from the source 
what the state of the art in Western economics was. Finally, during the late 1960s, 
when the Romanian communist regime was at the peak of its popularity among 
US and West European policymakers, Western economists interested in the 
strengths and limits of socialist economics lectured in Bucharest.
725
  
The economists who benefited the most from these exchanges during the 
late 60s and early 70s were a group of linear programmers who had access to the 
revolving door between the planning bureaucracy at the State Planning 
Committee and the elite research institutes newly established by the regime within 
the confines of the Romanian Academy. Between 1970 and 1971 Aurel Iancu, 
then a senior researcher at the IER and one of the earliest advocates of 
mathematical economics, used an IREX fellowship to do research at Harvard, 
MIT and Berkeley and participate in the seminars of such luminaries as Leontief, 
Samuelson, Solow and Debreu.
726
 While in the US he also visited and struck a 
long-term relationship with Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, the most famous 
Romanian economist in exile, who had become a radical critic of the neoclassical 
syndissertation after decades of having been part of its elite.
727
 During the 1970s 
he also had the opportunity to frequently present his work at professional 
conferences in Italy and France. Iancu‘s prolific work published after his return 
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 The encounter seems to have left a long-term imprint on Iancu‘s formation. As late as 2007, 
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maverick economics, an intellectual universe in which mathematics, physics and epistemiology 
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scientific pretensions of neoclassical economics. Aurel Iancu, ― Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 




from the US showed a significant degree of integration of relatively up-to-date 
American economics literature. 
Other scholars (Emilian Dobrescu, Gheorghe Zaman) interacted with 
Western economics in Britain, France, Austria and Italy. In 1969 Gheorghe 
Zaman, then a young researcher at the Economic Research Institute, spent a few 
months at Cambridge. During his stay, he trained in the mathematical modeling of 
consumption and took classes with leading Keynesians of the day (Richard Stone, 
Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson). A year later he was a guest scholar of the 
American Studies Seminar in Salzburg (Austria), one of the US-sponsored venues 
of the détente.
728
  Back in Romania, Zaman used his newly acquired skills to 
contribute to the (input-output based) mathematical modeling of connections 
between the economic sectors of the Romanian economy.
 
In 1970 Zaman was 
appointed by IER as scientific secretary and co-organizer of Franco-Romanian 
colloquia on economic efficiency, then organized in Paris where he presented his 
work.
729
 Also, as a researcher for the CMEA headquarters in Moscow between 
1973 and 1979, he had access to developments in Western literature through the 
well-stocked libraries of the Soviet Academy.  
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 At this seminar the leading representatives of America‘s postwar ―embedded liberalism‖ 
(Daniel Bell, Margaret Mead, Talcott Parsons) presented their ideas to East European scholars. 
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 See Zaman‘s (1970), L‟utilisation du modèle input-output dans le calcul de l‟efficience du 
commerce extérieur, Colloque Franco-Roumain sur le thème: Problèmes de l‘efficience 
économique, France, Institut de Recherches Economiques, Institut de Science Economique 
Appliquée. Zaman cooperated on IO with another beneficiary of Western study travels: Emilian 
Dobrescu. For the debates on Romanian input-output models at the time see Probleme Economice, 
no. 2-6 and 10, 1972;  Contribuţii la dezbaterea  problemelor teoretice ale economiei socialiste, 
Editura Politică, 1974, pp.139-201. Welcoming Dobrescu‘s work, Theodor Schatteles noted that 
―It is for the first time that someone attempts  a numerical simulation of the growth process of our 
economy, and in an exemplary  manner. The various known models in the literature to which we 
resort so often do not always possess the ability of materializing themselves numerically with the 
help of the existing statistics. The model(s) in the discussed paper is (are) a beautiful technical 




Another conduit for the diffusion of Western economic ideas was CESES, 
a platform for academic exchanges and were Romanian economists were often 
invited to join.
730
 Rather than defend the Soviet economics line, the Romanian 
economists present here were reported to have tried to convince the audience that 
a ―third way‖ between neoclassical and Marxist economics was possible 
(Bockman 2007).  
Knowledge of Western economics penetrated through Eastern bloc 
conduits as well. Romanian-Hungarian linkages formed by Hungarian speaking 
economists from Transylvania enabled a limited diffusion of Oskar Lange‘s and 
Yugoslav economists‘ market socialist ideas during the late 1950s. This was the 
case of Egon Balas, who learnt about such unorthodox debates through his visits 
in Budapest. In 1957, a year after the Budapest Uprising, he went as far as 
publishing an article for a popular Transylvanian magazine (Korunk) where he 
advanced  the revisionist idea of the importance of having market prices as a 
means to strengthen socialism (Balas 2000: 347). Balas also seems to have got 
many of his revisionist ideas from Hungarian economists who, upon the 
instigation of Austrian School marginalism who survived the communist takeover 




It was also during the 1960s that transnationalization efforts began on the 
Romanian end, when local economists quickly began to break the scholarly 
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isolation of Romanian economics. Egon Balas began publishing in leading 
Western journals (Balas 1962, 1965; 1966) and opened up spaces of cooperation 
with Western scholars.
732
 In 1964 Balas publishes one of the most widely-cited 
articles in Operations Research, the American flagship journal of thatsubfield and 
made possible Balas‘ correspondence and joint research with the ―father‖ of linear 
planning, US economist George Dantzig after Balas‘ departure from Romania in 
1966. Balas‘s success demonstrated not only that even under national-Stalinism 
one could stay internationally competitive but that the lack of access to Western 
literature had been not been as acute as some have suggested (see for example 
Aligica and Evans 2009).   
All this changed during the 1980s. The regime tightened both authoritarian 
practices and, after the 1982 debt crisis it turned inward. The transnational flows 
that had emerged during the previous decades formed a small network of critical 
economists but after the debt crisis they were curtailed. As a result, as the 
previous chapter showed, engagement with Western economics became a matter 
of semi-clandestine academic entrepreneurialism.  
Moreover, the severing of direct transnational ties between Romanian and 
foreign economists came right at a time when Hungarian, Czech and Polish 
economists were growing gradually skeptical that market socialism could solve 
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 Balas‘ 1962 English language study on parametric linear programs published in a Belgian 
operations research review put his team of researchers on the radar of American economists: ―[w]e 
started getting reactions, both through the mail and in the pages of the Belgian journal, from 
American researchers‖(Balas 2000). In the same year Balas and Petre Ivanescu, another 
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most frequently cited article of Operations Research between 1954 and 1982 (Balas 2000: 395). It 
is also important to point out that Iosif Batty, a research economist in the State Planning 
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the economic crisis of the Eastern Bloc. This meant that the chances of the 
Romanian economics profession experiencing domestic growth of a robust non-
Soviet economics strand were limited. As I evidenced in chapter nine, Romanian 
economists were able to read Kornai and other disenchanted Central European 
economists but those who did so were few and, once national-Stalinism collapsed, 
they faced the powerful camp of central planners and official economists turned 
heterodox. The result was an economic profession that suffered from the stigma 
of parochialism: 
 
In 90-91 many of us could hardly hold our own in an international 
seminar. And this was despite the fact that the Western economists who 
engaged their Romanian peers were hardly stars of Western economics. It 
was that dire! We used ―diplomatic‖ language to cover ignorance of the 
substance of the debate and, in their odes to market reforms and trashing 
of Marxism some ended up entertaining the audience by slipping in 
Marxist or structuralist language that felt antediluvian to their Western 
colleagues […] I mean some of these people never read the Samuelson 
textbook. Our Hungarian and Polish colleagues were light years ahead of 




So far, the chapter showed that during the late sixties and early seventies 
Romanian economics was far from being completely cut off from the lived reality 
of Western economics. The détente and the special US-Romanian relationship 
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developed during those years fostered a surprising level of transnational 
socialization that ended up created alternative professional spaces in academia 
and even in the higher echelons of the state technocracy. The acquisition of non-
Soviet economic ideas through horizontal Eastern Bloc linkages was interesting as 
well.  
But these sections also showed the capacity of very authoritarian regimes 
to terminate such possibilities for transnatiobnal dialogue, with very observable 
long-term consequences for policy. The advent of democracy after 1989 changed 
reopened the windows but not in the ways one would have expected from reading 
the literature on the translation of neoliberal ideas on the Chicago Boys of legend.  
 
Neoliberalism Without Chicago Boys 
Unlike in parts of Western Europe (including Spain), Latin America, Africa or 
Asia, Anglo-American doctorates did not serve as conduits for neoliberal ideas. 
The evidence from the case of Romania shows that it does not take a US PhD in 
economics at Chicago to do the job. Visiting fellowships at Western universities, 
masters‘ degrees, participation in research and teaching projects with Western 
scholars seem to have created enough transnational dialogue for neoliberal ideas 
to be embraced by a critical mass of Romanian economists. 
The re-transnationalization of the profession began early in 1990. The 
Ceausescu-era academic elite, including the most ideologically subservient 
professors, preserved its positions, but a French translation of the Samuelson 




immediately after 1990 (Aligica 2002).
734
 Moreover, Western aid programs like 
Phare and Tempus and private initiatives like the Soros Foundation funded 
specializations taught entirely in English, translations of Western classics and 
seminars conducted by Western visiting professors.
735
  
Travel restrictions no longer prevented faculty and students from seeking 
research and educational opportunities abroad. External funding compensated for 
weak government sponsorship for such opportunities.
736
 This was especially the 
case the EU‘s TEMPUS educational program began to make its first 
disbursements for short term study trips.
737
 After 1997, increased EU funding 
through specialized transnational education programs (LEONARDO, ERASMUS 
and SOCRATES) and the emergence of a genuine emigration subculture in 
universities further increased the academic mobility of the best graduates.
738
 As 
dozens of US economists visited or were stationed in Bucharest during the early 
1990s as consultants or visiting professors, many young Romanian economists 
also discovered directly from the source the relatively low financial costs of 
getting into a fully-funded US PhD.
739
 By contrast, Romanian émigré economists 
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Roundtable,‖ www.adastra.ro/library/papers/Aferro_Brain_Drain.pdf 
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were not particularly keen on getting involved, a situation that did not begin to 
change until the late 2000s.
740
   
A few ASE graduates traveled abroad for their PhD training but unlike in 
the case of their Spanish peers, Romanian economists with Western doctoral 
degrees had no significant impact on economic policy or on academia. This is 
because they either found employment abroad, thus contributing to brain drain or, 
if they did return, they were not tempted by government or academic jobs that 
failed to offer wages commensurate with even the most modest expectations of a 
US graduate student.
741
 Basically it was only the central bank that could pay the 
salaries expected by returning graduates, a factor that facilitated its growing 
epistemic authority. Even so, those who returned and worked for the central bank 
held at most a master degree.
742
  
Things did not change dramatically in the late 90s and early 2000s either. 
A decade after 1989, economics departments had only intermittent access to the 
leading Western economics journals in print or electronic form and it was only in 
2007 that public universities got access to online journals (Cojanu and Nicolae, 
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Liberal economists like Theodor Schatelles or Nicholas Spulber remained aloof.  Yet during the 
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 And even as wages increased during the early 2000s, economics 
departments remained plagued by poor international reputation and ethical 
problems that made the perspective of academic employment in Romania highly 
unattractive for the academically-minded. Additionally, the ―White Book‖ of 
higher education in Romania published by Ad Astra, a researchers‘ NGO, found 
that economics departments remained laggards in promoting research, were 
ranked very low relative to other departments and that the faculty at ASE had a 




From Chicago to Bucharest on the Cheap 
As it became clear that Western graduate training was more likely to lead to brain 
drain than be a resource for restaffing economics departments and government 
economic policy positions, in 1994 Moisa Altar entered the scene yet again with a 
new elite formation project: The Doctorate School of Finance and Banking 
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―White Book‖ of higher education in Romania published by Ad Astra, a researchers‘ NGO found 
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 The research was carried out in 2008 and 2009 by a coalition for the reform of academia and 
was composed of several student and researcher‘s NGOs, the educators‘ union and so on. The 
report revealed that PhD advisors had on average two ISI publications, job searches were weakly 
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(DOFIN). The project departed from his frustration with the state of Romanian 
economics after the revolution. As one of his former advisees remembers, 
 
All I want to say is that in ―Western‖ universities, be they ―mediocre‖ or 
not, some elements of an economist‘s basic training that were and are 
maybe still contentious in Romania, are taken for granted. What I am 
talking about are two interrelated things: the use of mathematical models 
in economic theory and of econometrics in all sub-disciplines, from 
finance to economic geography. The few who had the courage to uphold 
this way of seeing economics – and here I would highlight the role of 





Established in the former Cybernetics, where Adler maintained his position, 
DOFIN was established following a competition for accreditation by the 
European Council and became one of the four E.U. Centers of Excellence.  
Beginning with 1998, DOFIN received financing from the World Bank for paying 
expenses associated with doctoral conferences and lectures delivered by Western 
academic economists as well as for fellowships at partner universities for 
DOFIN‘s PhD. and MSc students.  
Endowed with this international licensing and generous funding, DOFIN 
adopted a constitutional rule that dissertation committees had to be chaired by 
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economists from leading West European and American economics departments. 
Basically, The 6 to 8 member examination committees for DOFIN theses only 
had Alter himself and one more ASE faculty member. The rest were international 
scholars. 
746
 Moreover, the program began to offer course modules taught by 
faculty from Sorbonne (Paris), EUI (Italy), Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona 
(Spain), Erasmus University (Holland), Reading (UK), Chicago and Rutgers 
(US). The modules covered the whole spectrum of advanced finance degrees, 
from theory, international financial economics and monetary policy institutions to 
derivatives, value-at-risk models and capital asset pricing.  
While staying on the radar of media attention, DOFIN emerged as the 
most internationally-prestigious Romanian graduate school in economics and 
continued to attract Western faculty on dissertation committees as well as in the 
classroom. Its standing partnership with seven leading West European graduate 
schools specializing in finance ensured the continued provision of internationally 
competitive education.
 
The level of the students was unusually high, even by 
international standards. Carol Alexander, a professor of risk management at one 
of DOFIN‘s partner universities (University of Reading) declared that  
 
The DOFIN MSc students rank amongst the best in the world. In 
my opinion the general level of DOFIN students is actually better 
than most of the large and famous American and European business 
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schools. Two of my most talented PhD students came from DOFIN 




DOFIN‘s recognition among international finance practitioners came in 
2004 when DOFIN was listed by the Professional Risk Managers‘ International 
Association (PRIMIA) as of one Europe‘s elite graduate programs in risk 
management.
748
 Moreover, Altar tapped into his expatriated student networks. As 
a professor of finance, he had trained a group of young economists who made 
spectacular careers in Western universities and finance firms.
749
 Their 
international prestige and continuing support for DOFIN further magnified Alter‘s 
domestic reputation as a mandarin academic and some former students even came 
to teach there for short periods.
750
 For the second time in fifty tears, Altar‘s 
intellectual and organizational entrepreneurship was de facto bringing Western 
graduate education home to Romania. 
Most importantly, through DOFIN he created an elite corpus of 
economists with internationally-fungible skills who during the 2000s assumed 
leading positions in the central bank and an increasingly internationalized 
financial sector. While most DOFIN graduates chose careers in private finance, 
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almost 20 percent went to work for the central bank and 15 percent in 
academia.
751
 Also, during the 2000s DOFIN graduates had access to the ASE-
banking sector revolving door, as professors/consultants specialized in the 
financial market.
752
 Alter was also the mentor of central bank chief economist 
Cristian Popa (a DOFIN graduate) and, most importantly he has been known as 
the main informal advisor of the central bank governor Mugur Isarescu.  
Another conduit for spreading neoliberal orthodoxy was the surrogate 
postgraduate education offered by the IFIs. Central Bank chief economist Daniel 
Daianu spent time as a researcher at the IMF in 1993. Both Lucian Croitoru, one 
of the central bank‘s star economists, and Mihai Tanasescu, the PSD‘s Finance 
minister between 2000 and 2004, studied at the an Joint Vienna Institute, an IMF 
training center in macroeconomic policy for East European officials and 
academics. Both prime-minister Theodor Stolojan (1991-1992) and the same 
Mihai Tanasescu had long stints at the World Bank.  
Visiting fellowships and professorships also contributed to the 
strengthening of the neoliberal network in Romania as well. While the heterodox 
lingered in local universities, Daniel Daianu and his successor at the central 
bank‘s chief economist office had one year Fulbright fellowships at Harvard in 
1990-1991 and 1994-1995 respectively. Also, both had been visiting scholars at 
the University of Michigan and occasionally gave lectures on transition 
economics at LSE and US Ivies. Between 1990 and 2004 their research 
                                                 
751
 2010 DOFIN survey, http://www.dofin.ase.ro/ 
752
 This was the case of Mihai Ion (professor of finance at ASE and CEO of Reiffessen Asset 





collaborator Lucian Albu averaged four training/research experiences a year in 
Western Europe and was a fellow researcher at the Sorbonne‘s mathematical 
economics department and a PHARE program visiting professor at University of 
Leicester.  
In sum, the Romanian case shows that the spread of neoliberalism though 
academic experiences could be done not just through doctorates, as in Latin 
America and elsewhere, but on the cheap, with local replicas of Western 
postgraduate programs, short-term fellowships, grants and visiting positions.  
 
NGOs: From Civil Society to Economic Advocacy 
The initial marginality of neoliberalism in the civil society 
There is no doubt that NGOs have been a crucial site for the political 
democratization of Romania after 1989. From election monitoring to human 
rights advocacy, the NGOs stood up against the authoritarian tendencies of some 
political actors. Yet after the second half of the 1990s the elite organizations of 
the NGO sector began to enter the field of economic policy advocacy as well and, 
by the early 2000s, they branched out into economic think-tank functions. In 
contrast to what happened in Spain, by the end of the decade Romanian NGOs 
joined forces with neoliberal economists and entered public advocacy for radical 
tax, labor and pension reforms.  
Yet the beginnings of the transition did not point to an obvious neoliberal 
identity of the liberal civil society. Immediately after the fall of the Ceausescu 




proposed by FSN formed the Group for Social Dialogue (Grupul pentru Dialog 
Social or GDS), an elite ―forum for critical reflection‖ meant to function as an 
epistemic center for a broad spectrum of professions.
753
 Since the list of founding 
members was a who‘s who of the country‘s cultural elite and since the 
organization soon received generous Western founding, GDS soon emerged as the 
leading voice of the anti-FSN liberal civil society.
754
  
Economic reforms were not a real priority for GDS and other pro-
democracy NGOs. In the 1990,  FSN‘s timid economic reforms became 
occasional targets,
755
 and civic leaders made rhetorical pleas for 
―Westernization,‖ ―return to Europe‖  and the ―market economy‖, but it was not 
yet entirely clear that the proposed alternative was laissez faire radicalism. 
Instead, the alternatives imagined by these civic leaders pointed toward a ―third 
way‖ between West European varieties of capitalism and reform socialism. In 
1990 and 1991 the programmatic documents of Romanian liberals did not suggest 
allegiance to neoliberalism either and the term ―capitalism‖ was still shunned.
 756
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 Societatea Timisoara, the Independent Group for Democracy, the December 21
st
 Association 
and the Students‘ League playing similar roles (Tismaneanu 1991). By the spring, GDS was at the 
core of Central Europe‘s longest street demonstration for liberal-democracy: the University Square 
movement. 
755
 Stalian Tanase, ―Nu perestroika!‖ Revista 22, February 2, 1990; ―Ceasuri linistite‖, Revista 22, 
February 16, 1990.  
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 Vladimir Tismaneanu regarded the proclamation as ―the cornerstone of the reawakening of 
Romanian civil society‖. http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com/2010/03/10/proclamatia-de-la-
timisoara-si-ruptura-cu-trecutul-comunist/moment crucial al desteptarii societatii civile romanesti. 
Also, GDS analyst Ruxandra Cesereanu described the proclamation as ―the most important 
political and civic text from 1990‖ Proclamatia de la Timisoara si legea lustratiei, Revista 22, May 




Thus, the signatories of the Timisoara Proclamation, perhaps the most 
important normative statement of opposition parties and anti-FSN civil society 
organizations, demanded investments in public goods neglected by Ceausescu 
(health and sanitation) instead of systemic privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation. 
757
 They encouraged foreign investments in a developmentalist 
rather than neoliberal mode.
758
 While they endorsed the ―return to Europe‖ and 
―private initiative,‖ the signatories nevertheless cautioned that ―[we] do not wish 
to copy Western capitalist societies, which have their own deficiencies and 
injustices‖ and demanded the sale of SOEs primarily to their workers, with the 
state maintaining the controlling package so that ―all workers would thus have 
equal chances to prosper.‖
759
  
In sum, the intellectual dynamic of the liberal Romanian civil society at 
the critical juncture of transition was not the market fundamentalism that scholars 
encountered elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Eyal and Szelenyi 1997; 1998; Eyal 
2000; 2003; Shields 2003; Ost 2005). Until the mid 1990s, outside the marginal 
libertarian circles discussed in the previous chapter, it was mainly the neoliberal 
economists based around the central bank that built the coherent, yet relatively 
open neoliberal agenda. 
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This situation started to change in the mid 1990s, when a few clusters of 
liberal intellectuals began to propose an articulate neoliberal economic policy 
platform and systematically popularize the ideas that underpinned it. It was not 
until then that liberal civil society began to embrace the idea that shock therapy 
was the only legitimate kind of economic reform and that gradualism was a mark 
of ―neo-communism.‖ And it was not until then that the deepening of 
democratization and the ―return to Europe‖ were equated with the initiation of a 
bold transition to disembedded neoliberal capitalism.  
 
Merging democratization and neoliberalism 
Several factors facilitated the neoliberal turn in the NGO sector. First, the effects 
of heterodox reforms enraged many intellectuals. State enterprise executives got 
rich by siphoning off the assets of the firms they managed via their own private 
firms. And since this executive class was assumed to be the economic base of a 
detested ―neo-communist‖ regime, the idea proposed by some civil society 
leaders that shock therapy was the most effective way to break its strength 
appeared to make sense (Cornea 1995; Mungiu 1995; Tanase 1996).
760
 Second, 
some of the emblematic names of the leading liberal intellectuals used the 
opportunity awarded by visiting fellowships in U.S. French and German 
universities to clarify their identity on transition economics.
 761
  The result was in 
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most cases the embrace of a syndissertation of cultural conservatism and 
economic liberalism that was hostile not only to embedded liberalism, but also of 
the embedded neoliberalism that was being practiced in continental Europe during 
the 1990s (Miroiu 1999; Barbu 1999; Preoteasa 2002). The Western experience 




Yet most intellectuals stuck to political theory and, while they publicly 
endorsed neoliberal policies proposed by others, they showed little appetite for 
getting specific about the policy implications of their ideas in the Romanian 
context. This gap was plugged beginning with the late 1990s by a new type of 
actor then entering the stage of Romanian postcommunism: the economic 
intellectual. Their profile was a unique hybrid, as most led ―seven lives‖ as 
academics, editorialists, activists, consultants for international organizations, 
political advisors to center-right parties and even civil servants during the 
Convention‘s spell in government. Most were social scientists and had studied in 
Western graduate programs,
763
 where they acquired more systematic knowledge 
                                                                                                                                     
Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris) and between December 1994 and June 1995 he has a 
fellowship in Germany with the Goethe Institut.  
762
 As a discourse analysis of the work of leading GDS intellectual Horia Roman Patapievici put it, 
―from a conservative perspective, the left is rejected on account of its egalitarianism, 
progressivism and radicalism, as the embodiment of a pathological obsession with revolutionary 
change‖ (Preoteasa 2002: 274). She found evidence of a struggle ―against feminism, ‗political 
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attempt to recreate the new world anew (left-wing 
radicalism) but to try to relive its most fertile traditions (right-wing conservatism)(Patapievici, 
1994: 303)‖ (Preoteasa 2002: 275).  
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about what was viewed in the West as the ―best practice‖ of economic and 
political liberalization. Seeing themselves as the carriers of a renewed Romanian 
liberal project meant to bring the country back in Europe, they bitterly resented 
the perceived stagnation of Romania in the nationalist-heterodox project of the 
ex-communists that risked taking the country closer to Belarus or Serbia than to 
Western Europe. As one of its most dynamic representatives put it, they felt that 
they had a civilizing mission 
 
[t]he first impulse of intellectuals was to educate the electorate. We were 
all gripped by the idea that regular people had been perverted by communism but 
that somehow intellectuals had escaped unscathed. Therefore it was the 
intellectuals‘ duty to turn homo sovieticus into a regular democratic citizen 
(Mungiu 2006: 2). 
 
Endowed with such values, skills and professional dossiers, upon their 
return to Romania they began to teach in newly established political science and 
public policy programs while setting up and running NGOs. They became very 
sucessful at securing funding from Western public and private donors.
764
 Against 
the backdrop of the Yugoslavian civil war, the NGOs set up by these activist 
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academics received Western European and particularly American funding for 
such liberal political causes as ethnic minority rights, human rights, judicial 
reform and civic education. Western disaster scenarios fueled the rise of these 
increasingly professionalized organizations, as this was a time when many in the 
Western security establishment feared a Yugoslav scenario in Romania.
765
 In this 
way, these organizations became obligatory passage points between Western 
interests and the domestic political scene.  
But once the Yugoslav wars died down in 1995 and once the 1996 
elections were won by a liberal coalition that also contained the party of the 
Hungarian minority, Romania became a less problematic case.
766
 This also meant 
that Western funding was going elsewhere: public policy advocacy. Dispatched to 
Romania by the Carnegie Endowment in 1996 to assess US democracy assistance, 
the democratization scholar Thomas Carothers noted that American assistance 
 
[h]as been concentrated on what I will all civic society organizations-small 
nonprofit NGOs seeking to affect governmental policy. Up to 1995, US 
civil society assistance concentrated on the more political types of such 
NGOs […]. With the recent establishment of the Democracy Newtork 
program, socio-economic NGOs now also fall within the US civil society 
assistance effort, provided they are policy-oriented NGOs […] Three local 
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NGOs no longer have only politics-related themes such as human rights 
and civic education as their main area of work; they now sometimes focus 
on more economic-related concerns […] In short, assistance programs 
involving NGOs increasingly relate explicitly to both democracy 
promotion and economic reform‖ (Carothers 1996: 65; 107) (my 
emphasis). 
 
By the late 1990s, these trends led to the emergence of a new translator of 
neoliberal ideas: the academic think-tank, a public policy organization staffed by 
academics. Certified and funded by Western actors, these organizations played a 
crucial role in popularizing and adapting policy-ready neoliberal ideas in the 
Romanian context.  
 
The rise of the think-tank 
The first democratization NGOs that used such external opportunities for 
branching out into economic policy advocacy was the Romanian Academic 
Society (Societatea Academica Romana or SAR). Established in 1995 as a small 
operation, SAR was one of the PHARE and Soros Foundation-financed political 




SAR‘s founder was Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, a young psychiatrist with a 
dissident past, a Fulbright scholar in political science at Harvard between 1994 
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 and with a reputation for an extraordinarily effective combination 
between NGO activism and analytic skill. Mungiu returned from Harvard with the 
strong conviction that the opposition‘s model of public activism reliant on the 
figure of the public intellectual, a model that Romanian intellectual subcultures 
imported from France for over a century, was leading nowhere.
769
 A genuine 
secularist, she also bitterly resented the fact that the culture of the opposition was 
weighed down by dependence on the writings of charismatic intellectual 
monastics educated in the interwar years whose concrete socio-economic 
prescriptions were generally sparse and, at any rate, ambiguous towards economic 
liberalism and liberalism more generally (Mungiu 1998).
770
 At the same time, 
Mungiu was open about her right-liberal political philosophy and was generally, 




SAR‘s initial activities consisted of democratic education, grant-writing 
training for NGOs and political training for MPs. Following its success at 
influencing the government program of the Democratic Convention and judicial 
reforms
772
 SAR decided to mix a liberal-democratic political agenda (the 
improvement of the quality of central and municipal government, better citizen 
access to government etc) with an economic agenda. The shift had been inspired 
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 SAR‘s competence on judicial reform was acknowledged by the state when the Ministry of 





by Mungiu‘s deep involvement in transnational dialogues with other East 
European activists
773
 and was motivated by her realization that politicians were 
incapable to understand what was needed in the first place for a capitalist and 
―European‖ transformation: 
 
After the enthusiastic start in 1997, it had become clear for local and 
foreign experts that Romanian governments lacked both the staff and the 
experience to deal with the complex problems of the Romanian economy. 
Furthermore, it lacked a general philosophy of transformation of the 
command economy, centralized state and their long enduring institutions 
into a real market and competitive society able to apply successfully for 
the European Union. For this huge task the Romanian political class […] 





 In 1998 SAR creates its own mini economic think-tank (Center for Public 
Policies or CPP) which shortly begins to churn out radical policy proposals. The 
research director was a former journalist and the recent graduate of an MA in 
comparative politics at Central European University (Sorin Ionita) whose only 
research experience was in anthropology,
775
 but whose academic publications 
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surprised with their uncompromising positions on the ―illusions of gradualism‖ or 
the self-defeating nature of welfare institutions and steeply progressive 
taxation.
776
 SAR‘s expert on social policies was another political scientist with an 
M.A. from Central European University (Bogdan Chiritoiu), but who had 
professional experience in the public affairs department of a US pharma giant 
(Merck). All three of them became lecturers in political science at the elite 
National School of Political and Administrative Sciences and began to serve as 
policy experts for UNDP, the World Bank and Freedom House. In addition to 
these social scientists, SAR also boasted three Western-trained economists known 




In 1998 SAR begins to carry out its own empirical research and publish 
the results in formats that had been previously unknown in Romania: the working 
paper, the crisis report and the early warning report. Their research generates 
unknown facts about social reality that served the neoliberal agenda: Romanians 
did not appear aware of the prohibitive tax costs they paid for the welfare state, 
the gratuitous access to university education created perverse incentives and the 
introduction of fees was necessary, the government showed a clear propensity to 
expand and fail unless it was checked by New Public Management practices.
778
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By the early 2000s the SAR research team gets to the point of editing 
book-length arguments on such ―second wave‖ neoliberal reforms as the partial 
privatization of pensions or the marketization of the public healthcare 
sector.
779
Unlike the neoliberal economists, the think-tankers at SAR had years of 
experience in the media and used it efficiently to put into popular policy discourse 
select elements of the neoliberal ideational toolbox: the perversity of the welfare 
system, the ―fiscal illusions‖ of progressive taxation, the Laffer curve, the 
superiority of private firms relative to state management in the area of health care, 
the false equality of opportunity provided by public access to university 
education.   
Another academic think-tank was the Romanian Center for Economic 
Policies (CEROPE), an organization with which SAR shared two experts (Daniel 
Daianu and Lucian Albu). Established in 1998, CEROPE was a think-tank of 
professional economists whose epistemic and institutional prowess came from 
serving as an interface between the central bank and several epistemic centers like 
ASE and the Economic Prognosis Institute. The central bank team was 
represented at the highest level (Mugur Isarescu, Lucian Croitoru, Daniel 
Daianu), as was ASE (Cornel Tarhoaca) and the Economic Prognosis Institute of 
the Academy (Lucian Albu). During governor Isarescu‘s premiership (1999-2000) 
many CEROPE members served in the government in different capacities.  
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Rather than engage in media-savvy advocacy, this think-tank focused 
instead on the production of descriptive and analytical research materials in 
English that presented domestic and Western policymakers with highly-technical 
expertise framed in an accessible language. The CEROPE reports also offered 
IFIs domestic confirmations of their diagnoses of the Romanian economy. Its 
working papers, academic articles and books in English consolidated its 
international status and facilitated its inclusion in the World Bank‘s Global 
Development Network and its earning of ―policy reviewer‖ status from OECD.  
In addition to such academic think-tanks, by the 2000s the more standard 
US-style business think-tank genre appeared as well. These new players had no 
explicit commitment to the agenda of political parties. Staffed by non-profit 
professionals, lawyers and economic consultants with international careers, such 
organizations as Romania Think-Tank, Academia de Advocacy, and CHF 
International Romania had no qualms to engage with the cabinet and even with 
the PSD leadership itself. Closely connected with the increasingly visible 
transnational capital and the development aid structures of large donors, these 
organizations translated the agenda, the advocacy language and the advocacy 
repertoire of US pro-business think-tanks. At the same time, they ―edited‖ the US 
think-tank model by putting strong emphasis on the further development of 








The case of Academia de Advocacy (AA) is illustrative in this regard as a 
case where the supply of translators was changed as a direct result of external 
intervention. Established in 2002 by a provincial Romanian businessman from 
one the country‘s first export processing zones and bankrolled by five domestic 
employer organizations,
781
 Academia de Advocacy (AA) was the first professional 
pro-business think-tank. Taking the American conservative think-tank as a model, 
its founders partnered with the Bucharest chapters of USAID and of one of the 
institutes of the US-based national Endowment for Democracy (The Center for 
International Private Enterprise or CIPE) to benefit from the Americans‘ 
organizational and advocacy expertise.
782
  
With the aid of a CIPE-provided American advocacy consultant, AA 
began training a new profession (advocacy consultants)  and, most importantly, it 
began a systematic effort to catalogue the ―best practices‖ on taxation and the 
labor market advocated at home by US business organizations. Brought together 
in booklets and guidelines, these ―best practices‖ were then systematically 
disseminated to government ministries and media outlets. To ensure that the 
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government would not ignore them, AA organized public hearings and carried out 
a systematic monitoring of parliamentary debates on its issues of interest. All 
along, AA received CIPE ―coaching.‖The passing of the strict 2003 labor code 
and the debates on the flat tax during the same year made AA competent and 
media-savvy player whose experts brought together employers and pro-business 
tax and labor experts in a dozen workshops that AA managed to publicize 
received extensive media coverage. During its seminars, AA it disseminated 
among journalists, academics and business leader supply-side arguments against 
labor unions and pro-worker hire-and-fire regulations. Until AA became involved, 
employment protection legislation had been largely a non-issue and the employer 
organizations that advocated for deregulation had had no cross-national data and 
economic conceptual repertoire with which to press for reforms.  
So far, this chapter looked at the reconstruction of the Romanian 
economics profession through transnational exchanges and found that the 
different forms of systematic engagement with Western economics after 1989 
benefited a small group of economists using the revolving door connecting 
academia, the central bank and the ministry of Finance. The chapter also showed 
that hybrid organizations that were half think-tanks, half pro-demoracy NGOs 
advocated for radical neoliberal ideas while serving as civic engines for the 
deepening of liberal democracy in the country. These sections tell us a lot about 
the making of Romanian neoliberalism in economics and the ―third sector‖ sphere 
but they do not tell us why the ex-communists became Third Way neoliberals in 





Enlarging the Third Way: Transnational Party Networks  
 
―Social-democrats have not been the real antagonists of 
neoliberalism, but its protagonists. Gerhard Schroeder was far 
more radical in deregulatory reforms than Helmut Kohl. The Third 
Way distracted social-democrats from their successful postwar 
story. The Third Way was not a syndissertation between the 
welfare state and American liberalism, it was mostly American 





The Doghouse Years (1990-2000) 
It was perhaps symbolic that the first foreign statements of support for the FSN 
authorities came from Eurocommunist and Third World communist parties.
784
 As 
suggested in chapter seven, during the first half of 1990 the economic identity of 
the FSN stood under the auspices of heterodoxy and this identity was recognized 
as such on the international scene. Yet beginning with the summer of 1990, FSN 
leaders began to signal their preference for indigenizing elements of the economic 
agenda of West European social-democracy (Nastase 2000; 2007; Teodorescu 
2004). 
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In theory, the attempt of a political party controlled by communist elites to 
become part of European social-democratic networks was not necessarily doomed 
to fail. French, Italian and Spanish Socialists in particular seemed poised to invest 
in the mainstreaming of the FSN, just like the SPD had done for the Spanish 
Socialists more than a decade earlier. In 1990 one of the FSN leaders who was 
then a minister of foreign affairs claimed that the Italian socialists promised to 
serve as brokers for FSN‘s rehabilitation after the disaster represented by its 
association with the coal miners‘ atrocities in June 1990 (Teodorescu 2004).  
Prime-minister Petre Roman made even greater advances. Educated in 
France and raised in a family of former leftist fighters in the Spanish civil war, 
Petre Roman became a friend of Felipe Gonzales and Francois Mitterand and 
declared Socialist Spain and Gonzales as inspiring vectors for his political 
decisions. 
785
 Also, against the protests of the Gaullist parliamentary majority, in 
1991 Mitterrand was the first Western head of state to visit Romania in what was 
perceived as the French left‘s blessing of the Roman government.  And once 
Roman‘s reformists took control of the party, the FSN was immediately accepted 
in the Socialist International, leaving the conservatives to form a different party 
(PDSR) led by Ion Iliescu. 
Western skepticism that the ―conservative‖ PDSR could join the social-
democratic ―club‖ lasted throughout the 1990s. At first, this was due to this 
party‘s own ideological confusion: it was not until mid 1993 that its leaders 
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formally applied for membership in the Socialist International.
786
 The application 
was rejected because the party was perceived as too wedded to a statist economic 
agenda and was too contaminated by conservative cultural discourses and 
authoritarian practices.
787
 And PDSR‘s political behavior reinforced such 
impressions through a political alliance with ultranationalist parties between 1993 
and 1995.
788
 Also, Ion Iliescu was perceived as being on a par with East European 
―red-brown‖ leaders like Slobodan Milosvic of Serbia and Vladimir Meciar of 
Slovakia. As late as 1996, Ion Iliescu campaigned in ultranationalist mode by 
hustling the specter of a Yugoslav-style ethnic conflict in Transylvania, a rhetoric 
embraced by Adrian Nastase himself after the CDR victory in the 1996 
elections.
789
 Even more worries emerged when a reformist faction attempted to 
give the party‘s political program a more economically liberal flavor at the 1997 
party convention, the faction was forced out of the party entirely. 
 
Joining the Third Way (2000-) 
Things began to change dramatically in 1999. The Kosovo war convinced West 
European elites that the Yugoslav nightmare could travel to Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
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Against a public opinion that generally identified with the Serbs, the Romanian 
government supported the NATO operation while showcasing the fact that in 
Romania the biggest and the most politicized ethnic minority was in government. 
It was against this background that in the fall of 1999 the EU made the political 
decision to put Romania on the map of EU integration, with British premier Tony 
Blair serving as a strong advocate (Phinnemore 2008; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore 2008). 
Once it became clear that the PDSR would form the new government and 
Romania was seriously considered for membership in the European Union, 
Western social-democrats began to open up to the ex-communists now rebaptized 
as the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Like in the case of PSOE almost three 
decades earlier, the PDSR international recognition and embrace of economic 
liberalization came as a result of the intervention of German social-democrats, 
with the Ebert Foundation serving as the organizational platform for this process.  
Ebert had had a Bucharest office since 1994, yet its relations with the 
PDSR had been cold.
790
 In 1999 Ebert approached the PDSR and offered its 
assistance for the rewriting of its party program with a view to the 2000 elections, 
with SPD experts Elke Zaviel and Susanne Kastner playing the main roles. 
According to a former adviser to Adrian Nastase, the new party president: 
 
Basically the Germans helped rewrite the PSD‘s political program by 
deleting language that sounded too suggestive of intervention in the economy. 
And they inserted some of the latest Third Way ideas about equality of chances, a 
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more pragmatic take on the market and so on... They taught seminars on what was 
legitimate economic policy in Western Europe, told party bosses that the 
independence of the central bank and its monetary policy should not be 
negotiable. It was really systematic advice. The Germans clearly meant business 
and Nastase and his collaborators acted as if the Germans were preaching to the 
converted. They openly critiqued the policies of the Vacaroiu government and 
orchestrated an entire political ballet meant to distance themselves from Iliescu 




Following its programmatic turn, which included changing its name into 
the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), 
792
 the party received even more explicit 
assistance from the SPD and from other European center-left parties. The 
excellent relationship with the Germans culminated in Nastase‘s personal 
friendship with Gerhard Schroeder and the SPD leader Christoph Zopel.
793
 An 
advocate of the Third Way and an unqualified supporter of Anthony Giddens‘ 
view of modern social-democracy, Zopfel made much of his ideological 
proximity with Nastase and his role in facilitating PSD‘s entry in the Socialist 
International (Zopfel 2007).  
To inspire confidence that the economic policy of the PSD was no longer 
to be the province of heterodox economics, the new party executive invited 
Adrian Severin, the most economically liberal minister in the 1990-1991 Roman 
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government and the scourge of the heterodox to join the program rewriting effort. 
After a successful career at the Council of Europe and OSCE, Severin had close 
connections with prominent European social-democrats. In 2000 he was given the 
top job at the PSD‘s new institute (Ovidiu Sincai), which he soon turned into a 
―party school‖ and platform for the assistance given to the PSD by West 
European social-democratic party leaders and experts. 
As a result of these transformations, in 2003 PSD joined the Socialist 
International at its convention in Sao Paolo (Brazil), with the only ‗con‘ vote 
coming from Roman‘s PD. To prove the added value of its membership, PSD 
demonstrated it had the right connections to improve the communication between 
the Socialist International and the Chinese Communist Party.
794
  
During the early 1990s Nastase also became a regular at the Progressive 
Governance conferences of social-democratic party leaders. Established at the 
initiative of Bill Clinton in 1999, these transnational party conferences were 
basically a platform for Third-Way party leaders like Tony Blair, Peter 
Mendelson, Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Gerhart Schroeder who struggled to 
bring European social-democracy closer to the ideologically more centrist 
―progressive Left‖ standards of US Democrats.
795
 The era of the class politics of 
―old‖ social democracy was definitively buried in the diagnosis proposed by the 
intellectual entrepreneurs of this transnational party network.  
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As chapter eight showed, the Nastase government was particularly 
effective at carrying out the market reforms demanded by EU integration-
Romania‘s membership negotiations ended during his term-and went showed and 
the premier showed an equally remarkable record at emulating Third Way 
rhetoric. Yet, like the government‘s policies, Nastase‘s ideas about the economy 
also showed a propensity to be more neoliberal than that of the Third Wayers 
themselves. Thus, he viewed tax policy as predominantly an instrument for 
building a middle class. He argued that since the task of the government was to 
foster a Romanian middle-class, progressive income tax could not have been 
maintained because it hurt this class disproportionately (Nastase 2007: 339-340). 
Although after the flat tax was adopted by the center right in 2004 Nastase 
became a critic of this institution, his support for the reinstatement of the 
progressive tax system was suggestively conditioned on the adoption of near-zero 
taxes on accrued interest of tax deduction for spending on private health insurance 
and private pension funds (Nastase 2007: 361-363).  
The editing of the Third Way discourse is even clearer in the case of FDI 
policy. Attracting multinationals became the reversed mirror image of the 
heterodox obsession with saving the industrial giants of the national-Stalinist era: 
 
I am convinced that the developed capitalist economy we wish to develop 
is based on the big capital accumulated in large corporations. Small firms 
are useful, necessary and indispensable but the real carriers of 




innovations, increased productivity, investment organizational solutions 
and the development of domestic and international markets. And of these 
corporations we need particularly the multinational ones. We need the big 
foreign capital. In fact, the current globalization is almost tantamount with 
the expansion of the capital of the developed world in the less developed 
one to which Romania belongs. And the right strategy to bring a country 
in the position of benefiting from the advantages and innovations of 
globalization is to bring multinational capital to her side and to offer this 
capital space for development inside the national economy (Nastase 
2007:370) 
 
But while privatization is regarded strictly as an efficiency question in 
Third Way thinking (Schroder 2003; Blair 2003; Giddens 1999; 2000), the sale of 
profitable state firms to foreign multinationals was framed by Nastase as a form 
of cultural Europeanization. In his view multinationals deserved to be appreciated 
less for their capital investments and more for the cultural changes they were 
expected to generate (Nastase 2007: 130-131).  
To make this argument he subscribed to two ―self-orientalizing‖ narratives 
popular in Romania. The first was an internalized version of Balkanism 
(Todorova 1997; Bojikova 2006; Hammons 2006), an essentializing discourse 
transferred in the field of business ideas according to which domestic private 
capital was bound to be inefficient and feed off the state because of several 




cultural legacy: corruption, disorganization, authoritarianism and laziness.  The 
second can be traced down to cold war era depictions of work ethic in the 
communist camp as an obstacle to economic modernization (Govorukhin 1989; 
Shiller et al 1992; Buchowski 2006; Swader 2010). According to this discourse, 
Romania‘s economic woes were due in part to a poor workforce. Building off this 
assumption, Nastase argued that this ethic could be remedied forcibly via 
migration or massive foreign investments in manufacturing that would bring the 
Protestant work ethic of Western Europe and North America (Nastase 2007: 130-
131).  
In sum, both PSOE and PSD swung to neoliberalism following the 
mobilization of transnational party networks based around German social-
democrats. Although such exogenous interventions did not determine the 
radicalization of the Third Way agenda during Nastase‘s term, it is important to 
note that West European social-democrats never expressed shock at Nastase‘s 
advocacy of the flat tax in 2003. Nor did they signal displeasure at the fact that 
the social spending levels of Europe‘s most miserly welfare state stagnated in the 
middle of a boom or at the weakening of social solidarity through the 
government‘s tolerance of the early retirement on dubious medical grounds of a 
large portion of the labor force. Taken to places like Romania the Third Way 
morphed into a quite disembedded form of neoliberalism and this seemed 






In Romania economics emerged from authoritarianism with a weakly 
transnationalized economics profession as a consequence of almost a decade of 
forced isolation from Western economics. As a result, the rise of a generation of 
Western-trained economists took several years. Unlike in Spain 
transnationalization came not through Western doctoral education but through 
training with international financial organizations, transnational research 
programs, and, most innovatively, access to Western-licensed yet domestically-
organized graduate programs. As heterodox economists were enrolled in these 
forms of transnational socialization they gradually lost their epistemic solidarity 
and dropped their veto to the core of the neoliberal program.  
The chapter also finds that when the supply of neoliberal economists 
proved too low, Western funding enabled amateur economists (political scientists, 
sociologists, philosophers) to enter the jurisdictional space of the economics 
profession via ―dual use‖ think-tanks: half pro-democracy NGO and half 
economic think-tanks. By contrast with Spain, where think-tanks bent on 
radicalizing neoliberalism were left out, the entry of these think-tanks on the 
scene added to the radicalization of the Romanian neoliberal project.  
Transnational party networks played an important role as well. The 
evidence shows that both Spanish Socialists and Romanian social-democrats 
underwent programmatic changes on economic policy after the intervention of 
their peers from Germany, a country where monetarism had been a point of 










Chapter XI - Conclusions 
Overview 
This study sought to examine the secular shift towards neoliberalism in Spain and 
Romania.  The main argument is that the shift cannot be understood just by 
looking at structural factors. Instead, the study argues that the economic theories 
and historical narratives embraced by critical actors in the government better 
explain both why non-neoliberal paths were rejected and why some varieties of 
neoliberalism and not others became institutionalized in policy practice.  
The study shows how the activities of reflexive and active advocates of 
neoliberalism gave its theories and historical narratives a local face that differed 
from the ―original‖ versions advocated by Western economists or international 
financial organizations. 
This dissertation departed from the claim made by sociologists of 
translation that ideas do not stay the same as they travel from one social setting to 
another but are ―translated‖ in the process by idea entrepreneurs called 
―translators‖. The ambition of the dissertation is to clarify what shapes the result 
of translation, the pace with which it occurs and the means through which it can 
shape policy.  It is first submitted that the content of adopted neoliberal ideas is 
shaped by the context-specific choices made by translators.  In turn, the pace of 
translation is shaped by the density of transnational ties between domestic 
participants in the economic policy process and external advocates of 
neoliberalism. Finally, the translated neoliberal ideas are likely to serve as 




coherent policy team inside a cabinet that can effectively control economic policy 
decisions. 
More specifically, the study submits that two mechanisms are at work in 
the travel of neoliberal ideas across nations, with each mechanism having three 
causal devices.  The first mechanism was called ―translation‖ and was defined as 
the process through which new economic ideas developed by foreign epistemic 
communities and practitioners are transformed for domestic use by idea 
entrepreneurs called translators. I further argued that the mechanism of translation 
can be unpacked into three devices: framing, grafting and editing. The second 
mechanism was called ―transnationalization‖ and was defined as the process 
through which the domestic supply of translators is affected by the integration of 
domestic economic policy elites in transnational networks through such sub-
mechanisms as Western training or through membership in transnational political 
party networks. 
In the first part of the chapter I present the evidence for these mechanisms 
and for their causal devices, while in the second half I will turn to suggestions for 
empirical, theoretical and methodological improvements to the study of the 
transnational spread of neoliberal ideas.   
 
Hypotheses and Findings 
 






Grafting was defined as a translation device that associates new economic ideas 
with preexisting ideas that are relevant for the same issue area of economic policy 
and make similar prohibitions or injunctions, even as local ideas are reconstructed 
in accordance with neoliberal ideas. This device enables translators to recycle pre-
existing economic ideas that are consistent with neoliberalism. The expected 
result was the presentation of neoliberal ideas as if they were part of the domestic 
ideational stock, thus making neoliberalism seem less problematic in the domestic 
context. But grafting can also change neoliberal ideas by giving birth to hybrids 
between the local ideational ―rootstock‖ and the neoliberal ―stem.‖  
The evidence supports this argument. In the case of Spain, the robust grip 
of German ordoliberal ideas on Spanish economics before neoliberalism enabled 
domestic neoliberal entrepreneurs to dismiss expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies with old and ingrained ordoliberal arguments against Keynesianism.  The 
grafting of neoliberalism on ordoliberalism bred hybrids as well. Ordoliberal 
ideas about the imperative of building a social market economy as a means to 
generate social peace and support for capitalism, constituted an important veto 
point to the wholesale diffusion of supply-side welfare retrenchment narratives.  
Similarly, ingrained Romanian structuralist arguments about systemic 
bottlenecks and monopolistic production were used to argue against gradualism.  
More specifically, structuralism turned on its head was used to make the 
neoliberal argument that a gradualist transition strategy could only reproduce 




reforms were needed instead to resuscitate the dormant mechanisms of market 
efficiency.  In this way, both countries witnessed advocacy for neoliberal 
economic ideas that had made use of hybridization with older economic theories.  
 
H2: Neoliberal ideas change through editing  
 
Editing brings to the fore the ability of network participants to devise dynamic 
interpretations of neoliberal ideas that overcome the problems raised by 
neoliberalism‘s poor domestic resonance with pre-existing economic ideas. It was 
hypothesized that through editing neoliberal economic ideas are transformed by 
translators in accordance with what they perceive to be domestically dominant 
ideational conventions. As a translation device, editing was defined as the 
reformulations of the neoliberal text in terms of its focus, content and meaning. 
But editing can also entail that contested ideas from the outer boundaries of the 
neoliberal paradigm can be made to seem uncontested and central to 
neoliberalism. Editing may produce mistranslations, hybrids and affect pre-
existing economic ideas as well. The results of this veritable intellectual bricolage 
were expected to be highly contextual.  
The evidence strongly supports these claims. When neoliberal ideas about 
the role of the state in fostering export-driven growth entered Spain, they were 
grafted on deep-rooted developmentalist ideas about state ownership in industrial 
champions as a means to boost the country‘s export competitiveness. This editing 




inflation threw subsidies at high achievers, bankrolled incentives for industrial 
diversification and put brakes on private mergers and acquisitions that threatened 
its stakes in industrial champions. Key neoliberal advocates tried to demonstrate 
the possibility of a syndissertation between the ideas of the neoclassical-
Keynesian syndissertation, monetarism and rational expectations, a position that 
enabled the survival of progressive taxation and the resistance to supply-side tax 
policy in Spanish neoliberalism.  
Local translators did similar things in Romania, but the result was a 
variant of neoliberalism that was less statist and less redistributive than Spain‘s. 
Unlike in Spain, where economists remained skeptical towards the Laffer curve 
and other artifacts upheld by marginal US supply-side economics, in Romania 
such ideas were incorporated into mainstream economics as uncontested scientific 
instruments and inspired the adoption of a very regressive tax regime. Ironically, 
this led to a situation in which the IMF emerged as a defender of progressive 
taxation and critic of radical supply-side models. Similarly, while in Spain the 
advocates of neoliberal macroeconomic or labor policy saw state ownership of 
industrial champions as a means to increase the external competitiveness of the 
economy, their Romanian counterparts saw such interventions as likely to do 
harm. Finally, some local neoliberals dramatized the urgency of orthodox 
macrostabilization by adding a layer of rational expectations theory that did not 
figure in the standard shock therapy arguments for the East European transition. 




to shock therapy macrostabilization and a fire sale of the economy were ipso facto 
irrational. 
But translation does not take place only in the rarefied air of economic 
theory and ―technical‖ languages. As Deidre McCloskey reminded us, economics 
is just another form of rhetoric, a matter I turn to next. 
 
H3: Neoliberal ideas change through their framing within domestic historical 
narratives 
 
In the theory chapter framing was posited as one of the devices of translation and 
was defined as the process through which translators make ideational innovations 
like neoliberalism seem local by using language and presentation styles that 
―bridge‖ domestic historical narratives with neoliberal ones. This translation 
device allows for a variety of outcomes that can range from the radicalization of 
ideas to its very opposite.   
Examination of the evidence revealed that in both countries neoliberalism 
was sold as a form of ―modernization‖ and ―Europeanization‖, both of which 
were completely uncontested after the fall of the nationalist authoritarian regimes 
in these countries. In Spain, neoliberalism was presented by leading economists 
and politicians as the natural sequel to the modernization of the national economy, 
a process that was associated with two macrostabilization reforms adopted in 
1959 and 1977, respectively. In Romania, the adoption of neoliberalism was 




traumatic national-Stalinist experience and as a guidepost for popular narratives 
about the ―return to Europe.‖  
But the framing of neoliberalism was more creative in Romania, where 
political debate was more polarized and the local style of writing economic 
arguments demanded less neutrality, allowing for more radicalization. Thus, some 
translators bridged neoliberal skepticism about state ownership and intervention 
in the economy with postcommunist elite discourses that presumed communist 
cultural pathologies of Romanian workers.  Such pathologies, the argument went, 
could only be remedied by harsh market discipline and foreign ownership of the 
industry. Such frames would have been less likely among Spanish elites, given the 
classist ideology of the ancien regime.  
A comparison between the two cases thus provides a good example of the 
range of possibilities allowed by framing; with one framing strategy yielding a 
relatively moderate outcome and the other a more radical one. 
 
H4: A high degree of transnationalization of the domestic policy actors increases 
the pace of translation 
 
Transnationalization was defined as the device through which domestic actors 
who shape policy (economists, political party leaders) become part of 
international networks of advocates for neoliberal ideas, thus expanding such 
networks to new jurisdictions.  External advocates facilitate this device by 




resources and by reconstructing the boundaries of domestic epistemic authority. 
This selective endowment of potential translators may increase the pace of 
translation by creating incentives for the emergence of a critical mass of 
advocates for neoliberalism and weakening the solidarity of neoliberalism‘s 
opponents. Particularly important in this regard is the international certification 
granted by Western training and the formation of transnational ties among 
political parties. Similarly, in cases where the economics profession is divided 
and has a small supply of neoliberal advocates, external actors may enable 
amateur economists to claim epistemic authority and fill this gap. In both cases 
the result is an acceleration of the pace of translation.  
The data supports the case for the transnationalization device across the 
examined cases. In both countries Western education functioned as an 
international licensing device for domestic economic policy elites, which also 
boosted their authority at home. The leading advocates of neoliberalism in Spain 
and Romania had some kind of Western graduate education before or after the 
end of the authoritarian regime. However while the Western-trained economists 
were already in place when the Spanish economic transition began, in Romania it 
took several years to build this elite. 
 In Spain the transition from Keynesianism to neoliberalism found the 
leading economists already with doctorates from prominent British and American 
universities, where most studied with luminaries of the neoclassical opposition to 
the more interventionist forms of Keynesianism during the postwar decades. This 




in Spain even before neoliberalism‘s triumph became obvious in the West. 
Paradoxically, this critical mass of Western training also facilitated a moderate 
Spanish translation of neoliberalism, as the more radical amateur actors, such as 
think tanks, were not a prominent part of the process.  Basically, the existence of a 
robust network of neoliberals obviated the need for an external reconstruction of 
epistemic boundaries by forcing economic think-tanks in. 
By contrast, in Romania economics emerged from authoritarianism with a 
weakly transnationalized economics profession as a consequence of almost a 
decade of forced isolation from Western economics. As a result, the rise of a 
generation of Western-trained economists took several years. Unlike in Spain 
transnationalization came not through Western doctoral education but through 
training with international financial organizations, transnational research 
programs, and, most innovatively, access to Western-licensed yet domestically-
organized graduate programs. As heterodox economists were enrolled in these 
forms of transnational socialization they gradually lost their epistemic solidarity 
and dropped their veto to the core of the neoliberal program. Until then, when the 
supply of neoliberal economists proved too low, Western funding enabled 
amateur economists (political scientists, sociologists, philosophers) to enter the 
jurisdictional space of the economics profession via ―dual use‖ think-tanks: half 
pro-democracy NGO and half economic think-tanks. By contrast with Spain, 
where think-tanks bent on radicalizing neoliberalism were left out, the entry of 
these think-tanks on the scene added to the radicalization of the Romanian 




Transnational party networks played an important role as well. The 
evidence shows that both Spanish Socialists and Romanian social-democrats 
underwent programmatic changes on economic policy after the intervention of 
their peers from Germany, a country where monetarism had been a point of 
partisan consensus since the early 1970s.  
 
H5: The likelihood that neoliberal ideas serve as templates for economic policies  
increases when the former are shared by an intellectually-coherent policy team in 
a cabinet that can effectively control economic policy decisions. 
 
It was submitted that the translation of neoliberalism will have consequences for 
policy when like-minded actors control the economic policy decision making in 
the cabinet and the cabinet itself is institutionally autonomous from the pressures 
of competing actors who may oppose or damage the translation process. Without 
coherence, the likely result will be struggle and delayed translation of 
neoliberalism in the policy arena. It was also expected that coherence would be 
unlikely to protect translation processes from challengers if the policy process is 
not centralized in the cabinet and if the head of the cabinet does have institutional 
tools to shield the policy team from the potential challenges made by ruling 
party/coalition. 
The evidence gives empirical weight to this hypodissertation. In 1982, 
when Spain turned to neoliberalism, the Socialist cabinet had full control over the 




neoliberal professional network based around the central bank. Moreover, 
members of the policy team were insulated from pressure from anti-neoliberal 
dissenters both within and outside the party. Until a similar alignment occurred in 
Romania in the late 1990s, neoliberal ideas made few inroads. The first ex-
communist cabinet inaugurated in 1990 had a coherent policy team committed to 
neoliberalism, but did not control the policy process. This led to a stop-and-go 
policy process culminating in the collapse of the cabinet. The next government 
(1992-1996), however, fit the bill. It had control over policy because it was 
strongly supported both by the president and the ruling party and a coherent 
policy team of heterodox economists which dominated the party.  This policy 
team pushed through heterodox reforms even in the face of international and 
domestic opposition. 
Conversely, a center-of-right cabinet, which took power in 1997, lacked 
both an intellectually coherent policy team and was inconsistently supported by 
the ruling coalition and the president. 
  Accordingly, it failed to push through reforms. All the posited variables 
were, however, in place from 2000 to 2004, when the ex-communists returned to 
power with a neoliberal agenda. This cabinet consistently got neoliberal reforms 
passed. These examples seem to buttress the argument that all these variables 
need to be in place for the observed outcome to occur. However, while important, 
these dynamics do not explain why the cabinet policy teams espouse some ideas 





Suggestions for Future Research 
Future empirical questions 
This study raises and provides the opportunity to answer at least two more big 
questions. First, if systemic breakdowns of the world economy generate radical 
uncertainty, do economic ideas matter differently under authoritarianism and 
democracy? To address this question, one could compare the reactions of 
authoritarian regimes in Spain and Romania to the oil crises of the 1970s and the 
policy responses of democratic Spanish and Romanian governments to the world 
financial crisis of 2009-2010.  
Another project could aim to problematize the epistemic communities 
hypodissertation that Anglo-American graduate training in economics is a robust 
mechanism of global diffusion of neoliberal ideas because such certification 
ensures appointments in top economic policy posts for returning students. This 
hypodissertation rests on the untested assumption that graduate education in a 
discipline as intellectually homogenous as economics is a socialization experience 
that guarantees long-term commitment to the neoclassical paradigm on which 
contemporary US economics rests. Moreover, I suggest that this assumption 
overstates the intellectual homogeneity of US economics departments. This 
assumption invites specification of the conditions under which the neoclassical 
tenets are reproduced over time and become institutionalized via government 
action. To probe these points, this research project could trace the educational and 
professional track of US or UK-trained economists occupying top economic 





Potential Theoretical Ramifications  
Future research could import the core of the agenda of the sociology of science 
tradition inaugurated by Bruno Latour. Well before the ―thick‖ definition of 
diffusion emerged, a group of sociologists of science based around Bruno Latour 
and known as proponents of actor-network theory (ANT) proposed discarding the 
concept of diffusion altogether and replacing it with the concept of translation 
(Woolgar and Latour 1986; Law 1986; Latour 1987; Callon 1986; 1998; 2002; 
2003; 2007; Law 1999; Callon and Cohendet 1999; Muniesa and Callon 2007; 
2009). 
 The idea of bringing French sociology of science can draw on the 
experience of US empirical sociologists who have used Latour for over a decade 
and provided their field with a fresh look at the transnational diffusion of 
neoliberal economic ideas (Bockman and Eyal 2002). ANT has also been 
mainstreamed by Scandinavian organizational sociologists doing empirical 
research on translation practices in state and municipal institutions (Czarniawska 
and Sevon 2005; Botzem and Quack 2006).  
As Bruno Latour‘s Science in Action showed, as bearers of 
technoscientific knowledge economists are powerful rhetorical actors who work 
to enlist others in their networks in order to serve as resources in their 
professional struggles with other economists. The basic aim of this competitive 
enlistment is to blackbox certain ideas,
796
 objects and facts so that these ideas can 
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 The basic idea behind this competitive enlistment is not only to attack and defeat opposing 




become unproblematic and therefore no longer provide opportunities for struggle. 
Metaphorically speaking, competitive enlistment makes it difficult to muster 
enough forces to open up the box of science-once-made and expose its 
problematic assumptions and facts. This allows the entrepreneurs of new ideas to 
make more black boxes, accumulate more capital, downplay the critique of others 
and thereby increase the appearance of strength and coherence of their projects as 
is required for network expansion. As Latour puts it, in this strategic process of 
expansion ―the rules are simple enough: weaken your enemies, paralyze those you 
cannot weaken, help your allies if attacked, ensure safe communication with those 
who supply you with indisputable instruments, oblige your enemies to fight one 
another‖ (Latour, 1987: 37). But what are the valuable results of applying the 
ANT perspective to constructivist IPE?  
First, as two early proponents of ANT in political economy have argued, 
this means a different objective for explanation, which should ideally ―focus on 
the actual work of constructing a network and of establishing ties between 
statements, instrumentation, effects demonstrated in the lab, financial resources,  
the opinion and support of colleagues, and other such components. If a certain 
institutional  form  is  reproduced and  disseminated,  this  is  in direct proportion 
to  the  amount of  resources mobilized through network ties, to the strength of the 
ties forged, and to the capacity of  interested  actors  to  close  them  in  a  ―black 
box‖; that  is,  to  hide the work needed  to connect together the different elements 
of the actor-network‖ (Eyal and Bockman 2001: 314). In their empirical study of 
                                                                                                                                     
that are inconvenient become blackboxed and become invisible in the terrain of struggle by 





the spread of neoliberal ideas to Eastern Europe Eyal and Bockman show that the 
research of linear programming economists working inside the Eastern European 
laboratory of state socialism was mobilized by neoliberal economists in the West 
to attack the ideas of their Keynesian colleagues through a translation that black-
boxed the differences between capitalist and state socialist economies. 
 In the translational dialogue that accompanies such developments, the 
East European economists were not passive ―receivers‖ of otherwise heavily 
contested ―Western‖ wisdom. Instead, they were active participants in making this 
translation possible.  Simultaneously they used their external linkages to fight 
jurisdictional battles against economic policy bureaucrats in their home countries 
by opening the black boxes with artifacts about the economy constructed by these 
opponents and by generating new artifacts that presented the socialist economies 
as beyond repair and in need of neoliberal intervention. 
Second, ANT would suggest that there is no boundary between external 
diffusers and domestic translators and that all actors involved in spreading new 
economic ideas are in fact undertaking translation activities understood lato sensu 
as co-participation in innovation and adaptation of the content of the innovation to 
context-sensitive use. This claim simplifies research design by focusing our 
attention on networks linking external and domestic translators rather than on the 
traditional troika of diffusers, brokers and translators. In addition to enlisting 
more human allies, network builders get the right to define reality by crafting new 
linkages among non-human entities (equations, databases, articles, experiments) 




weakening their epistemic solidarity or recruiting them directly through skilled 
framing or other means. What follows from this is that the elementary task of the 
social scientists analyzing this process of network expansion would be to measure 
the strength, the patterns and the outcomes of the actor-network as it ―does battle‖ 
over time. 
Third, domestic translators should not be expected to limit their role to 
facilitating the domestic congruence of new economic ideas. Instead, what gets 
translated is not just new foreign economic ideas, but the very interests of the 
domestic policymakers.
797
 Thus, through various strategic devices, translators 
redefine the interests of the main actors involved in the economic policy process 
so that these interests could not be pursued in the absence of the advice given by 
translators (interessement). For example, a local economist acting as translator for 
neoliberal ideas would advise a social-democratic party executive that the party‘s 
long term electoral interest lies in knowing the answer to the question, ―how does 
current account liberalization benefit the working class more than capital 
controls?‖ 
 Fourth, in what can be regarded as a ―thinning‖ of constructivist 
epistemiology, an ANT-inspired student of the translational spread of economic 
ideas would further argue that the strategic devices used by translators to lure 
decision-makers may include not just ―culturalist‖ ones like teaching and 
socialization, but also more ―rationalist‖ devices. Examples of the latter may 
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include cognitive manipulation, status incentives, subsidized access to 
organizational resources or methodological metrics that imply affordable 
professional commitments, threats of burial under a mountain of previously 
unavailable databases or output produced by Nobel prize winners and prestigious 
organizations, etc.  
To use an example from Abdelal (2007), translators could resort to 
manipulation through the presentation to left politicians of sophisticated (and 
presumably hoarded) econometric models and dramatic policy stories that 
―indisputably‖ show the prohibitive social costs of capital controls and the 
―spectacular‖ effects of capital account liberalization on the fortunes of the 
working class. The acceptance of the translators‘ ideas would facilitate the 
expansion of their alliances (enrolment)
798
 by compelling the left party elite to 
recognize that its entry into policy coalitions with organized financial capital and 
the corresponding weakening of its ties with organized labor would benefit the 
electoral fortunes of the party because unions‘ interests, as narrated by the 
neoliberal paradigm, actually harm the interests of the traditional constituency of 
left parties. Another stratagem could be positing analytical equivalence between 
two problems, thus requiring those who want to solve one to acquiesce to the 
proposed solution for the other. 
Finally, an ANT perspective would mean an equal emphasis on 
reproduction as on change. This is because translation does not always end with 
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the actors remaining in a constraining network.  Dissidence can come from the 
defection of members of the translation networks but also from its non-human 
elements (concepts, data, models). Like Callon‘s scallops failing to anchor to 
supply evidence to the researchers‘ hypodissertation, the artifacts black-boxed by 
technoscientific elites might be exposed by dramatic events like systemic 
economic crises.  
The ANT approach was limited by its framers to scientists and engineers, 
but its mantle is arguably generous enough to include other technoscientific elites 
that are relevant for the study of transnational translation. Also, its ―grafting‖ onto 
the IPE agenda can benefit from the suggestion made by some constructivists that 
the job of coordinating and communicating economic ideas can, under certain 
conditions, be influenced by the permeability of knowledge production networks 
to the everyday politics of non-elite publics (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009). 
 
Further methodological questions 
Constructivists interested in the diffusion of economic ideas have much to learn 
from other social scientists and even from economists about how to increase the 
resolution of their interpretations and, at the same time, to make those 
interpretations more rigorous. I submit that one can map out the transnational 
spread of economic ideas more rigorously if case studies and process tracing are 
complemented with bibliometric and content analysis, while the undertaking of 
discourse analysis on pivotal economic texts should lend the study of this 




One of the observable implications of the transnational diffusion of new 
economic ideas is that titles and authors associated with new ideas developed 
abroad become part of the domestic scholarly and policy fields. Bibliometric 
analysis is an ideal instrument for measuring this aspect of transnational diffusion.  
It has specific guidelines for producing statistics which describe the variable 
density of adoption of foreign ideational innovations. This methodological 
instrument can be applied to the syllabi of required economics courses or to the 
output of academic economists produced over time.  Since not all domestic 
importers of new ideas matter, I argue that it is reasonable to use this tool on the 
output of those who matter de facto in the domestic economic policy process. To 
this end, one can develop indicators of influence such as ―technopol‖ status or 
appointment to top advisory positions in the economic policy sphere. 
Depending on the context, local scholarly and policy output can be 
overwhelmingly large. This problem can be addressed by using specialized 
bibliometrics software packages.  These programs, such as HistCite, are able to 
convert bibliographies into a historioraph, a time-based network of bibliographic 
materials and their citation relationships.  The symbols are arranged according to 
the publication dates for the papers and connected by lines that represent the 
citation relationships (see appendix). The program can also establish how much 
literature has been published on the economic issues of interest by what authors, 
and which local economics articles were the most influential at a given point in 
time. The resulting historiograph forms a snapshot of a specific period or an in-




historiograph is created for a bibliography, it is also easier to understand the 
subject‘s key publication events, chronology and relative influence more 
objectively. 
To analyze the message characteristics of domestic economic ideas 
systematically, some sociologists conducting empirical research on economists 
have ―mainstreamed‖ the use of content analysis in studying the diffusion of 
economic ideas. To assess the degree to which US-style neoliberal economic 
ideas influenced the Mexican academy, Sarah Babb (2001) conducted a content 
analysis of 287 undergraduate economics theses. Monica Prasad then replicated 
this methodological approach in her research on economic reforms in Western 
Europe and the U.S. (Prasad 2006: 196; 197; 261; 263).  
These studies are useful points of departure that can be further developed 
in several important ways.  First, qualitative content analysis can be combined 
with an ethnographic approach, a methodological consideration acknowledged by 
media studies (Altheide 2005; Jernigan and Dorfman 1998). Second, 
constructivists may be interested in the fact that communication scholars 
(Krippendorf 2004; Neumann 2002) and scholars from business studies 
(Barringer et al. 2005) have developed sophisticated tools for combining 
qualitative content analysis with quantitative versions of the same methodology. 
Most importantly, however, coding economics theses from core undergraduate 
courses may be suggestive of what ideas are considered orthodox in academic 




Yet, such theses tell us very little about the ideas of prominent economists 
and, crucially, about economists who actually influence the policy process. I 
therefore suggest that this methodology should be applied first and foremost to the 
books and articles by elites, technopols, top government advisors and academic 
economists.  Their joint appointments enable them to spread their ideas through 
the revolving door between knowledge institutions and the state. Also, given the 
increasing sophistication of think-tanks and research arms of central policy 
institutions (central banks, ministries of finance), the coding of their research 
output should become the object of content analysis as well. Finally, 
constructivists can learn from research done by economists who study the 
transnationalization of their own profession (Lora and Nopo 2009) by coding 
economics textbooks.  
Content analysis provides opportunities for a systematic analysis of the 
spread of economic ideas in a way that is complementary to the traditional 
intellectual history approach. Yet, the interpretive edge of this text analysis tool 
remains relatively blunt when it comes to providing a clear picture of how new 
economic ideas are grafted onto similar domestic ideas.  For this task, the kind of 
discourse analysis used by innovative strands of economics and intellectual 
history may be more appropriate.  
During the last few decades, neoclassical economics has had a noticeable 
impact on the rationalist political science mainstream (Green and Shapiro 1994). 
Keynes‘ insights on uncertainty, market stability and the importance of 




constructivist IPE scholars (2002: 42-43; 260; Widmeier 2003). The field has a 
long (and increasingly unpopular) tradition in intellectual history (Blaug 2002). 
What is more, during the past two decades, this discipline seconded economic 
history in developing its own ―discursive turn.‖ The opening salvo was Donald 
McCloskey‘s Rhetoric of Economics (1983), a text that challenged modernist 
methods in economic theory by calling attention to how economists construct 
their arguments. While in the U.S., the application of discourse analysis to 
economic texts is relegated to the discipline of applied linguistics (Bazerman), in 
Europe it has been taken up by economists as well (Brown 1994, Backhouse, 
Gerard; Maki, Henderson et al 1993). Although marginal in economics, the 
lessons of this movement provide IPE constructivists with a major opportunity for 
honing their methodological tools when working with economics texts.  
Following Latour‘s understanding of scientists as rhetorical actors (Latour 
1986) I argue that longitudinal discourse analysis applied to crucial texts, 
produced by key diffusers and translators over time, can give the ideational 
research program a subtler understanding of the discursive practices through 
which economic ideas are ―indigenized.‖ Relative to mere idea description, 
discourse analysis provides a finer understanding of why and how some economic 
ideas are replicated, while others are altered or simply rejected. It can also explore 
cultural politics, revealing what discursive strategies are employed by idea 
translators to soften the incongruity between neoliberal and domestic ideas. The 
discursive turn in economic theory starts from the Hirschmanian assumption that 




analyze the economic text differently from the political text, especially when it is 
addressed to audiences situated outside the economics profession.  
Since discourse analysis is an intensive methodology, its proponents 
suggest working with a few carefully selected high-impact economic texts. For 
example, Hirsch and Marchi (1990) perform discourse analysis on Friedman‘s 
classic article ―The methodology of positive economics‖ (1953). Similarly, 
Patinkin (1990) use literary theory to establish how Keynes understood his own 
General Theory, while Rosetti (1990) deconstructs the work of Robert Lucas. One 
can also find fine methodological guidelines in Vivienne Brown‘s appropriation 
of Mikhail Bakhtin‘s literary theory, treating economic discourse as a form of 
dialogue or intertextuality (borrowing and transformation of a prior text).  This 
would be extremely useful for a close study of translation (Brown 1991; 1994; 
1994; 2006; 2007).
799
   
Finally, to obtain descriptive statistics of the degree to which new 
economic ideas ―trickle down‖ to the profession at a given point in time, one 
useful tool is to mix surveys of economics students, interviews and curriculum 
analysis. Pioneered by economist David Colander, this approach generates useful 
quantitative and qualitative data on the economic profession in the US (Klamer 
and Colander 1991; 2005) and Western Europe (Colander 2009). 
800
 A 2009 
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authors are allowed to participate in modern conversations, thus making possible the ―telescoping‖ 
of the historical distance between classics and contemporary economists‖ (Brown 1993).   
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 Inaugurated by Klamer and Colander (1991), the mix of surveys and interviews method 
became so mainstream that AEA established a commission that reached similar conclusions 
(Krueger et al 1991). Colander‘s survey questions at a minimum include the following topics: 
current versus earlier perspectives on the scientific nature of neoclassical economics, the 
importance of neoclassical assumptions (rational behavior versus economic behavior according to 




Interamerican Development Bank study replicated the Colander method by 
surveying around 600 graduates in Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Bolivia. 
801
  
The Colander method is useful for diffusion studies but it should be 
improved. The most important reason for this is that Colander‘s coverage of 
economic ideas is ―thin.‖ The survey and the interviews do not go beyond 
mapping how the assumptions of neoclassical economics are replicated. This 
leaves much room for clarifying views of specific economic ideas within the 
neoclassical spectrum, a task of crucial importance if we are to distinguish 
between, say, ―varieties of neoliberalism.‖  
As for economic history, there is much more to it than the narrative 
method: discourse analysis templates applicable to ―constitutional‖  economic 
texts There is also much to be learned from largely forgotten work done in this 
subfield on such key elements of the spread of economic ideas as the formation of 
linkages between economic theorists and non-professional opinion (Goodwin 
1972; Solow 1993), or the popularization of economic paradigms through 
textbooks (Goldstrom 1968), popular media (Hutchinson 1968; 1977; Silk et al 
1972; Warsh 1993) and university presses (Day 1993).  
 
                                                                                                                                     
the stated interests of students by area (micro, econometrics, macro, finance, theory, economic 
history, comparative economic systems). 
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 Colander replicated his study fifteen years later (2005) and extended it to European economics 
departments using the same survey questions as for the US (2010). ENTER (European Network 
for Training in Economic Research) and EDP (European Doctoral program) can administer online 
surveys to current students. For the replication of his work on Latin American economics see 





Appendix:  List of interviewees 
 
1. Ion Iliescu 
2. Adrian Severin 
3. Florin Abraham 
4. Constantin Gheorghe 
5. Daniel Daianu 
6. Liviu Voinea 
7. Valentin Cojanu 
8. Sorin Ionita 
9. Cristian Ghinea 
10. Moisa Altar 
11. Horia Braun 
12. Valentin Lazea 
13. Florin Georgescu 
14. Horia Terpe 
15. Valeriu Stoica 
16. Petre Dandea 
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